achievement of diaspora here, then, is also the achievement of globalization, in which Indianness is neither a dominant nor a subsidiary formation. Diaspora captures the many and contradictory relationships that are a sign of the future, though they continue to draw on the past. The difficulties and pleasures and, yes, necessities of that form of belonging underlie the concerns of this book.

India Abroad. By Sandhya Shukla
Princeton Univ. Press, 2003.

ONE

HISTORIES AND NATIONS

> This is indeed India! The land of dreams
> and romance, . . . of tigers and
> elephants. . . . The country of a hundred
> nations and a hundred tongues, cradle of
> human race, birthplace of human speech,
> mother of history, grandmother of legends,
> great grandmother of tradition.
> —Mark Twain

THESE WORDS appeared on a *New York Times* advertising supplement for the 1991 Cultural Festival of India.[1] Without leaving their homes, *New York Times* readers toured India as they flipped through a promotional brochure filled with pictures of waterfalls, tigers, and the Himalayas. The legitimacy of this travel in the North American cultural marketplace emerged both from the evocation of the prototypical American writer Mark Twain and the assemblage of exotic sights presumed to compose India. Final authentication of this consumption came not from booking a flight to Bombay, but from embarking on a voyage to Edison, New Jersey, to witness a spectacularized representation of Indian culture. Where is India? one might ask. Though the opening quote from Twain for the Cultural Festival promotion exudes a sense of confidence about location—that "this" is India—the reading (and festival) experience may render the referent somewhat indistinct.

From July 12 to August 11, 1991, Bochasanwasi Shree Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha, or BAPS, a Hindu sect with U.S. headquarters in Queens, New York, sponsored a Cultural Festival of India. The $35 million, thirty-day extravaganza featured dance and musical performances, educational workshops, shopping displays, and a food bazaar, among other things. Edison, New Jersey, once an industrial working-class town with large white ethnic populations (Italian and Irish), has more recently developed a significant contingent of middle-class migrant Indians. In fact Indians, over the years, had grown to be the largest Asian American group in the state of New Jersey.[2] In a context of such a rapidly changing racial landscape, the town of Edison served as an important symbolic backdrop for the project of imparting nation to Indians "imagining community" in the diaspora and in the United States.

Six years earlier, from July 15 to August 18, 1985, BAPS arranged a Cultural Festival of India in London, advertised on buses around the city

with the lines, "The local tandoori can't give you the true taste of India" and "A Passage to India, Climb aboard a No. 29."[3] For this event, the Swaminarayan collectivity chose the grounds of Alexandra Palace, a certain symbol of the decline of the British empire, to create a vision of India, not now as a jewel in the colonial crown, but instead as a force in the lives of migrants and their children. These British Indians for whom the address was made, like their counterparts in the United States, were navigating the complexities of citizenship that entailed undergoing particular processes of racialization and struggling to develop responsive discourses for group identity.

These Cultural Festivals of India, like so many cultural productions of migrants, constructed nations in places far away from the nation-state of India—places with rather imprecise, though deliberated, geographical coordinates and in moments at once transhistorical and indexed to concerns of the contemporary. The uses of that deeply paradoxical formation is part of what this chapter seeks to unravel. An image of India in the festivals took shape through an "invention of tradition," to use the wonderful phrasing of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger,[4] a history of nation that could be mobilized for the diaspora's negotiations of past and present. Despite the fact that the stated goal of this particular event was to bring participants, imaginatively, to India, migrants were the audience. Though those United States and British citizens may have lived in complex worlds of ethnic and racial subjectification, the festivals insisted that a particular rendition of India occupy central stage in the formation of identity. Revealing the magnitude of the work that went into producing the conjunctures of India and the diaspora is the fact that BAPS transported by sea huge, "authentic" pieces of forty-foot high display structures from India for both events, and then assembled them at the festival sites. This physical transplantation prepared the ground for discursive importations, as cacophonous stories were massaged into shape to create a history of India that could be read and thus made real for migrants in Alexandra Palace and a county college campus in Edison.

The festivals rightly presumed that a portable history of India was essential to Indianness in diaspora. But in their production of India as a closed entity, they missed a central experience of diaspora, that migration has thoroughly complicated ideas about history and nation. If in diaspora Indianness has become disaggregated, in a sense disintegrated, and has needed force to rebuild, that energy has come from the heterogeneity that constituted diaspora: multiple histories and multiple nations. Diaspora does not simply reproduce India but in fact translates India through alternative languages of time and place and through movement itself. The India in diaspora that has emerged has been inextricably linked to Indianness abroad.

The connection between nation and identity, over time, is the underlying logic for alternative stories to the one the Cultural Festivals tell.

History, I suggest in this chapter, is a site in which to rethink what it means to be Indian in the diaspora. Of course there is no singular history, but a set of stories about the past that operate autonomously or in concert with one another. As Paul Veyne has put it: "History with a capital H . . . does not exist. There only exists 'histories of. . . .' "[5] Stories, or in Veyne's words, "plots"[6] about Indianness have varied trajectories; some emanate from a mythical "homeland," while others emerge through formations dispersed across state boundaries; in all cases, however, the nation cannot remain rooted to a place. A collection of repercussions and projections in and through a notion of India forms a representational archive that diasporic subjects draw on in their productions of culture. This analeptic and proleptic force of history, too, is what can make diaspora comprehensible within narrative. While at first glance the travails of Punjabi factory workers in 1950s London and the financial successes of southern Indian software engineers in California's Silicon Valley in the 1990s may appear incongruous, both experiences represent facets of a cultural world that peoples from India publicly and privately inhabit. And the different periods for these events that become formative for a present-oriented sensibility highlight the complicated nature of time for diaspora. As an alibi for individuals to identify with one another and create communities, a historical Indianness is constantly being adapted and reworked. What results is a densely constituted subjectivity that might be read in a variety of locations provided by stories of the past and present.

From a transnational history that spans the continents of North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, there emerges a particular kind of heterogeneity based not only on the local interests of a group of people, but also in the notion of India that is being created. Unraveling the process of becoming Indian in the diaspora is to imagine what India, as nation, as state, or as culture, has signified to migrants, and how that India has been articulated with other national formations, like "America." If critically interpreting the importation of categories of origin effectively pulls apart India, looking at the cultures of those who affiliate with a homeland puts India back together again, in altogether different form. Though Indian emigrants come to live in England and the United States, their worlds bear more than traces of nationalities that are formed outside these host countries. Casting one plot of Indian diasporic subjectivity, however heuristically, as "becoming Indian" rather than "becoming American" or "becoming British," through the histories of migrants' movements, allows us to conceive of peoplehood, place, and origin more imaginatively than teleological notions of immigration have previously allowed. This is to

say that first-world states do not constitute a conceptual endpoint for the imagination of migrants themselves.

While the United States and Britain cannot fully contain the cultures of migration, they never lose their importance as lands of settlement and as national formations. Indeed, they provide locations for diaspora—locations that are crucial to map in order to comprehend the generated experience of Indianness. Just as a history of migration is a history of nations, the histories of India that migrants reimagine are also histories of multiple nations. A central quality of diasporic Indianness, then, is its discursive arrangement in transnational space, ordered not by a line from one point to another, but by a circularity of movements.

Distinct ideas of Indian migration emerge through rhetorics of time, too. The periodization of shared experiences reveals the nature of political and cultural ideologies, precisely because the choices in how to begin or end a story resound in the manner in which we view these communities, and in how they understand themselves as communities. In this respect, dates will be important for this chapter, both for what they invoke as familiar ways of thinking about India and migration, and for the experiences that they might decenter in established teleologies of diaspora. Formative instances for Indian movements around the world include 1947, the date of Indian independence from colonial rule, and 1965, the year that immigration regulations for Indians were relaxed in the United States. Wading through local and trans-local meanings for particular moments deepens our understanding of group consolidation and citizenship.

In any story, there are a range of textual presences and absences that periodically interrupt the flow. So too in a production of histories, about India, and Indianness, we must encounter seams that cut through not only different renderings of the subject, but often competing claims about its meaning. That is an experience that this chapter seeks to recreate in its juxtaposition of stories of nation and culture—those of the Cultural Festivals of India and those of migration. Though the festivals consign the nation to narrative closure, migration opens that up by indicating that nation is excessive in diaspora. But this is not to suggest that either textual strategy constitutes a true history. The Cultural Festivals of India, both in London and Edison, are able to animate readings of diasporic subjectivity precisely because the hyperbolic constructions of "India" occur multiply, too, through dialogues with each of the following: the British empire and the physical and political movements it generated, ghost immigrant populations in deindustrialized New Jersey, resident Indians in a variety of places, and ideologies of multiculturalism during globalization. Situated within the synchronous developments of late capitalism and the new nationalisms of migrant diasporas, and the framework of colonialism/postcolonialism, the Cultural Festivals dissolved boundaries between the local

Figure 2. Peacock Archway (courtesy BAPS).

and the global, as well as between the past and the present, and were able to represent some experience of the world that was very real to its participants.[7] They thus serve as a useful touchstone for thinking through histories of migration, and, finally, diasporic Indianness.

Peoples of India in the World

To many, India remains little more than an abstraction. Making India real was the intricate feat that the creators of the Cultural Festivals accomplished through the display of material products like food, musical recordings, dancers, and calculators.[8] But the brilliance of the gesture lay in the festivals' concurrent ability to retain the broader imaginative possibilities of India as an integrated whole, in a world where nations and cultures are deeply fragmented. The extravagance of the festival signified the magnitude of such ideological work.

The entry of the festival was framed by two archways, the Mayur Dwar (Peacock Archway) and the Gaj Dwar (Elephant Archway) (see figs. 2 and 3). The huge (30–40 feet high) ornate pieces built in India and transported to the West served a number of purposes; the peacock and the elephant are among the most colorful and exotic animals found in India and have historically appeared in prosaic western images of India. That these animals are really quite common in India seems not to be the point, for they became rare or wondrous in their new setting.

On meticulously organized grounds, a set of exhibits and performances immediately followed the welcome brigade. The participants were invited to peruse a series of handicraft booths (tie-dye, paper pulp objects, stone carvings, brass work) in the part of the fair entitled "India Village," decorated with a banner that read, "Experience rural India." Actual craftspeople, direct from India, were producing the pieces in each of the booths;

Figure 3. Elephant Archway (courtesy BAPS).

the public was invited to watch the process as well as periodically partici-
pate in the activities. Quite unlike the real Indian village, nothing was
for sale in these booths, nor were visitors ever directly addressed. This
particular experience of India was about presenting what is old, what is
quaint, and finally what is authentic. What is made by hand is a compel-
ling trope for antiquity, and also for nationalist struggles in the third
world. In fact, the handloom was the prevailing Gandhian metaphor for
all that was untouched by or resistant to (modern) colonialism and impe-
rialism. And it stood in stark contrast to the stalls for Indian American
businesses, many of which specialized in electronics products.[9]

Though the festivals did not directly reference British colonialism or, in
fact, national independence, they certainly performed a response to that set
of historical experiences. In these festivals the creation of a collective set of
(invented) traditions was the means to root an authentic idea of Indianness,
just as it was for an earlier period of nationalism. An intertwining of culture
and nation here, just as in India, could not be anything but overwrought,
precisely because it was so difficult to achieve for such complex and chaotic
entities; the exorbitant physical presentation was one symptom of such
anxiety. Because the Indianness they sought to create required a fixed refer-
ence point, the festivals gave India an invented stability.

Among peoples of the Indian diaspora, fixity has acquired a special
status as desired object because of the intensely *unsettling* experiences of

migration; yet migrations themselves can be utilized to interrogate the
limits of stable nations. The movements of Indians around the world
began well before colonialism and through colonialism acquired the
shape that is familiar to us today.[10] Among other things, colonialism deter-
mined a sense of connections between India (and its peoples) and England
(and its cultures). The colonial state governed from within as well as from
without, or abroad, and achieved its work through intimate relationships
with local Indian elites and local peoples. England was very real indeed
to a wide variety of Indians who had come in contact with the English
language, with stories and representations of England, and with English
men and women.[11] Migration out of India was not always a particularly
culturally disruptive act; the relationship between the colony and the em-
pire had long established the grounds for a kind of movement that forms
what we might call an early history, to anchor on one side the developing
narrative on diasporic Indian communities extending into the present.
This set of experiences constitutes a story that the festivals did not tell,
and one that later "histories of Indian immigration" also will not tell.

Fundamental to any form of colonialism is the movement of people,
capital, and governing bodies, and occupying center stage within the Brit-
ish variety is the Indian worker-immigrant. As a solution to impending
labor shortages in sugar production and other agricultural activities pro-
duced by the abolition of African slavery in 1834,[12] indentured labor be-
came a niche for peoples from India who faced high population density
and few employment opportunities at home. Between 1830 and 1920, a
large proportion of Indians living abroad served as indentured labor in
Mauritius, Malaya, Burma, Ceylon, Réunion, Jamaica, Trinidad, Marti-
nique, British Guiana, Natal, and elsewhere.[13] The decline and eventual
abolition of this system occurred through a growing awareness of the
exploitation inherent in arrangements that were only marginally freely
chosen,[14] in the plantation colonies themselves, in Britain, and in India.
In the rise of the concept of Indian emigration, as a response to these
thorny issues, it is possible to see the confluence of the forces of British
liberalism and the desire of moving subjects to define their life trajectories.
Reflected as well in the produced shift from the category of workers-in-
transit to immigrants in the sugar colonies is the acknowledged failure of
the British government to protect its citizens abroad in the face of the
inexorable need for cheap labor by profit-driven planters. Indian commu-
nities all over the British colonies, from Trinidad to Fiji, evidenced the
twinned, if not contradictory, impulses of autonomous development and
sustained relationships to the British imperial administration.[15]

In the seat of the empire, in England itself, such issues were, perhaps,
more complexly drawn. Some of the first Indians to become noticeable as
a population to the English in the late 1700s were those of a veritable

underclass of laborers.[16] Indian sailors, or lascars, who had worked on British ships transporting goods, were a matter of great debate among the British public.[17] After being paid minuscule wages and undergoing severe maltreatment on the ships, many of these men, from mostly poor families in India, escaped the hold of the foremen by foregoing their return passage home (and further abuse during the journey) and settling in London; many ended up residing in London simply due to the inability or unwillingness of companies to honor the second part of the agreement.[18] Left in a new city with few financial resources or skills translatable to the local economy, lascars grouped together in the poorest areas of London in boarding houses supplied either by various social reform groups or by the East India Company, which assumed responsibility for the disastrous handling of the situation by ships that were in some form or another in their employ.

Indian women and some men who had made the passage from India to serve English families as nannies, valets, and household servants became part of the British cityscape by the mid-1800s. The distinction between domestic "household" labor and the "hard" labor of slavery was to be partially negotiated on the axis of gender, as Indian women had a particular role in the production of imperial communities; their subsequent presence in England would be framed, from this moment on, by understandings of feminized domesticity. Recently discharged from their duties, some of the nannies, or ayahs, were organized into homes and later dispatched to other jobs in Britain for passage to India and to other places in the empire.[19]

Lascars, however, lived a more publicly immiserated existence and became the subjects of studies and reports that linked ethnic origin or race (being "Asiatic" or "Oriental") with social and cultural vices.[20] The history of British social reform in the nineteenth century took shape partly around the issue of how to address the situation of poor Indians in London. In a classic 1873 study entitled *The Asiatic in England*, Joseph Salter, a missionary, described his social work among lascar communities, and in particular his efforts to bring them to a Christian home. "Asians," he noted, "have an aversion to the Union[,] for eating and drinking are part of their religion, and they would rather huddle twenty or thirty together in a small house, where they can cook and eat and drink and smoke, a la mode Orientale, amid the fumes of opium and joggree."[21] These images of sailors and other poor Indian men in London also buttressed the colonial project, though in rather different ways from stories about exceptional Indians. An anecdote about visiting the residence halls of lascars illustrates the correspondence: "On one occasion, I was requested to accompany two friends . . . one, an officer in the Bengal Army, the other, a gentleman about to proceed to India in the Civil Service. Both acknowledged

that much they had seen was harrowing to their feelings and exceeded all belief; the younger of the two . . . felt most deeply the sickening and degrading scenes he had witnessed."[22] Effectively, the British presence in India was justified by defining the deficiencies of the Other. If these poor Indians in England needed someone to take care of them, surely those in the subcontinent required instruction and governance from abroad.

Indians were also drawn to North America. There, newly developing fishing industries, railroads, and agriculture demanded substantial cheap labor just as the largely agricultural regions of Punjab were experiencing drought and famine that forced many to leave in search of work in the late 1800s. Large numbers of Sikh soldiers who had served in the British army also began to look for alternatives to colonial service or subsistence farming. At the same time, migrating to North America began to acquire the aura of opportunity throughout India, as a counterpart to supporting the colonial administration; this was also true throughout Asia more generally, as the continuous move of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean workers abroad to expanding agricultural plantations in the U.S. west evidences.

Simultaneous with the onset of Indian immigration to the United States was an engagement with India and things Indian, though here not through the formal apparatuses of colonialism, but instead through a kind of cultural exchange. Beginning in early colonial times, and through the early 1900s, small numbers of Indians passed through North America for academic, business, and religious purposes. The significance of India (and hence Indians) as a site of spirituality for Americans began in the middle to late 1800s and continues unabated to this day. Various scholars have uncovered the intellectual commerce between religious trends in India and elite U.S. philosophical circles in writings by people like Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson; theosophical movements established doctrinal links between Buddhism and Brahmanism, and the category of "Boston Brahmin" emerged from this sociocultural formation.[23] Giving further weight to the continuous circuits of "Indian" and "American" intellectual developments was the fact that Mohandas Gandhi was said to have been influenced by Thoreau, and Gandhi's writings and ideas are widely known to have inspired Martin Luther King, Jr.[24] An important marker of this early period was the visit of Swami Vivekananda to the 1893 Chicago World's Fair, to give a talk at the World's Parliament of Religions. Indians were not the only ones on the move; India, too, was traveling.

In the early 1900s, a number of Indians went to the state of Washington to do a variety of manual labor; they formed a small community in the town of Bellingham. Like the Chinese and Japanese before them, Indians—viciously referred to as "rag-heads"—were typed as racial Others taking jobs from white workers. Employers had indeed used recent immi-

grants as cheaper labor at a time when unions were fighting to ensure fair wages and work conditions, and those same unions excluded nonwhites.[25] A complex set of factors formed the context in which Indians became the target of intense and, to some extent, organized anger.

One of the most dramatic instances of concerted action against Indian workers was in 1907, when hundreds of white workers in Bellingham stormed makeshift Indian residences, stoned Indian workers, and successfully orchestrated the non-involvement of local police. Despite the weak attempts at reconciliation by town officials after the attacks, local action against Indian labor had persuaded residents and employers that it was extremely volatile to have Indians, and foreigners more generally, present. The lasting meaning of these events for Indians lay in the highly racialized subjectivities that were foisted upon laboring immigrants, very much in contrast to the ideologies of ascendancy and agency that United States national mythologies had assumed for them back home. The contradictions of these stories remain unresolved to this day.

In California, issues of race and labor had both a specific and seminal importance for Indians and other immigrants. Mostly Punjabi Sikh Indians moved to California from India itself and also down from northern sites where they had encountered intense discrimination, to work in a variety of occupations. California-bound Indians found a burgeoning agricultural economy that was in great need of cheap labor; the skills of Indian peasants corresponded well to the occupational demands of the area's farming expansion. Fulfilling the same symbolic functions as other Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Filipino workers, Indians too were part of the "Asian problem," and Punjabi Sikhs, Indian Muslims, and others were all considered to constitute a "Hindu Invasion."[26] The Indian presence in California also became part of a continuous story of Asian workers taking "native" white workers' jobs. Organizations like the Asiatic Exclusion League, which had been formed by anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese activists, now broadened their xenophobic address to encompass Indians entering California and other places in the West.

Work, in indentured or free labor systems, in North America and the Caribbean, Africa and England, became central to how Indians abroad were seen during this early period. In a number of sites, particularly in the Caribbean and Africa, local populations directly identified Indian immigrant presence with hard labor. Through time and in more varied areas and populations, in a place like London, remembered associations have produced images of Indian workers as images of India, resulting in both distancing mechanisms, where middle- and upper-class Indians have dismissed connections to lascars or others, and solidarity, where politically active Indian-origin politicians publicly took up the cause of indenture.[27] In the United States, as we shall see, Indian workers in California and the

Pacific Northwest during the early 1900s have a confusing and suppressed relationship to the story of later migrations.

Indian migrant laborers of the middle 1800s to early 1900s should also be placed in plots of racial formation. The continuing presence of Indians within a mix of peoples—black, white, as well as East Asian—was an important effect of British colonial labor arrangements. In that racialized world of the sugar colonies in particular, Indians interacted, struggled, and had deep conflicts with former African slaves; that intercourse structured Indianness as it has taken shape both inside and outside the countries that provided the first stop in the migration process. Within the United States, Indian laborers appear within two constructed histories. First, and most locally, an important reference point for Indian laborers in the United States between 1905 and the 1920s is the broader history of Asian workers in Hawaii, California, and the Pacific Northwest that began as early as the mid-1800s, just as African slavery in the United States was headed toward abolition.[28] The racial discourse of that period generated "Asian" as a highly absorbent category for peoples from an Asia that included China, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. This grouping of "Asian" bears a strong (and parallel) resemblance to that of "black" in the United States at this time, as a way to describe colorist difference for peoples who had a specific position within the United States economy. The specificity of an Asian subjectification was based on an idea of "Asians" being distinct from "blacks," having never been subjected to plantation slavery, and, indeed, as having come to the United States as free laborers in response to labor shortages. Though Indians worked in places far away from the Hawaiian sugar plantations, where many other Asian groups had initially gone, they and Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese migrants worked in similar occupations in the West, albeit in much smaller numbers.

The activities of Indians in the United States at this time might also be read within another historical framework, of British colonial subjects from India traveling to participate in agricultural and other enterprises through the world as indentured and then free labor. In that body of historical experiences, Indians, of course, played a more central role than they did in the Asian American migration story, in terms of numbers and influence; in places like Trinidad and South Africa, the racial Others were equally Indians and Africans, and those from China and other places in Asia formed smaller groups in the broader landscapes. Through this particular trajectory, Indians' racial subjectivities were formed through British colonialism. An international experience of race and labor may be counterposed to questions of "Asian exclusion" in the United States. Indians in the United States at this early point in their history lived within multiple possibilities for self- and social definition. On the one hand, they

formed part of a local racial world, occupying a third, or perhaps even a fourth, racialized space, after former African slaves, native Americans, East Asians who had been in the area for a longer time and in much greater numbers, and Mexicans. On the other hand, they constituted the primary racial Other in a colonial system deeply fixated on India.[29]

How to classify Indians was a matter of much contradictory racial theorizing.[30] The broader racial categorization of humanity, as Aryan, Negro, or Oriental, omitted Indians. Within the parameters of the reigning scientific languages of race, then, "Indians" as a people comprised a variety of affiliations, among which "Aryan" was perhaps the most ambiguous. Those from northern India at various points in history have claimed that term, and the British themselves utilized racial distinctions based on the Aryan/non-Aryan dichotomy. Not surprisingly, the brown, non–East Asian, non–Native American, non-African, and purportedly Aryan immigrants posed a conceptual and political problem to racial ideologues in the United States. Indians entering the United States immediately after 1905 were not directly or indirectly addressed by the early exclusion laws, yet given their racial ambiguities vis-à-vis "whiteness," their eligibility for citizenship was a matter of some debate. On the one hand, the "barred zone" of the 1917 act was in part intended to forestall the complications presented by an avowedly "Aryan" group of working-class and brown immigrants, by prohibiting those from India from immigrating. On the other hand, Indians who had been in the United States for many years had already applied for and in many cases received permission to naturalize, and had in effect become U.S. citizens. The contradictions inherent in the period climaxed in 1923 around the now legendary case of the Indian immigrant Bhagat Singh Thind.

Having previously ruled in 1922 that Taddeo Ozawa, a Japanese man in the United States for a long time, was ineligible for citizenship because he was not white,[31] the Supreme Court was poised to determine the parameters of whiteness. By this time, Bhagat Singh Thind had lived in the United States for nine years, had fought in the army during World War I, and had applied for and received citizenship from the state of Oregon, but was in danger of being "denaturalized" by the Bureau of Immigration following recent court decisions involving Asians. In a landmark 1928 case, the Supreme Court decided against Thind, saying that though Indians were considered by academic authorities (anthropologists and sociologists) to be "Aryan," and thus thought to be synonymous with "Caucasian," they were not "white" according to popular meaning, in the understandings of the "common man."[32] The Supreme Court made race a social category, apart from social scientific renderings of the concept, and ascribed to Indians a racial representation, borne not out of origin or, necessarily, self-identification, but out of their embeddedness in local

social and class formations. The judicial gesture was as much to cultural groups and labor organizations that were working to exclude Asian labor from a number of occupations and geographical areas as it was to formal tenets of the law; an ambiguous appeal to a kind of "common sense" conveyed the external pressures on the court. Broad patterns of social activism, diverse communities of immigrants, and local and national ideologies of nationalism, then, all conditioned the "race" of Indians in the United States.

Complications of nationality and citizenship during this period are further dramatized by a rather different and more unusual kind of immigration case in 1928. Cyril R. T. Moir was the son of an official of the viceregal establishment in India who wrote to the Economic and Overseas Department of the British government asking if he should apply for inclusion in the Indian or British quota for entry into the United States. J. C. Walton, the secretary of the department, noted that were Moir to apply as an Indian, he would be admitted as part of a quota of one hundred. The logic was that because recent laws denied entry to those peoples who were ineligible for citizenship, such as Indians, there was space in the original quota. But as an "Englishman," in racial terms, Moir would be eligible for citizenship. A handwritten reply on the Economic and Overseas Department folder describing this petition reads: "Quite interesting. I was myself born in India. It seems that if I were to go to the U.S.A. then I should have to enter as an Indian."[33]

If national forces of and in the United States and Britain actively shaped Indian migrant subjectivity, so too did India, as a nation, though not yet a state, factor into these constructions. While colonialism on the most obvious level connected Indians abroad to Britain, as British subjects, it also linked them in an enduring way to India because an ambiguous nationality was a barrier to the assumption of other national affiliations, like being American or British. These peoples continued to be interpellated as Indian—colonized Indian, perhaps—but Indian nonetheless. Basic to the rhetoric for empire were places (homelands) that made sense to their inhabitants.

Developing here as well is a sense of a diaspora: a community of Indians outside of India. A 1916 article in the Modern Review, published in India, reveals the early investments and concerns of such a formation. Entitled "Hindu Immigration, with special reference to the U.S. of America," this piece painstakingly details the movements of Indians to England, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Caribbean, and North America, focusing on laborers and their subsequent treatment and integration into host societies. While on the surface the author of the article, Indu Parkas Bannerji, seems most respectful toward Britain and the Empire, he nonetheless subtly critiques the effects of colonialism, noting at one point:

"Some migrate to foreign lands to enjoy, permanently or for a time, political equality with free men."[34] This and other comments implicitly contrast the state of Indians abroad, as possible citizens of other nations, particularly in the United States, to their colonized status in Britain. With this migration narrative, which extends not only through the British colonies but also to North America (and, possibly, South America),[35] Bannerji establishes the reach of India itself. And in fact, the thrust of the article is devoted to a kind of admonishment to Britain to not impede such movements, which Bannerji terms "such just and natural expansion of the Indian nation within the Empire."[36] In the style of later pronouncements of anticolonial nationalists, he remarks that were England to do so, "the consequences will be more than we can see now" and "an Empire with water-tight compartments is hardly conceivable."[37] We can read in this text the presumption that India does not only exist in the subcontinent, but lives in its peoples abroad, and, therefore, in the world, however complicated and even contradictory a possibility that might seem prior to independence.[38]

Also dwelling in the midst of such contradictions and possibilities were students and other middle- to upper-class Indians in England and the United States. Beginning in the late 1800s, a number of aspiring Indian professionals arrived in London, at about the same time as the lascars and ayahs. An important discriminatory mechanism for the Indian civil service was its sole administration in London, preventing in most cases and impeding in some the integration of local peoples into the governing system. Many of those people who hailed from elite and wealthy families who had made the trip to England with the goal of becoming certified to serve in the British colonial administration stayed and established residency in London and other large cities. The Indian elite also saw the cultural value of a British education and sent their children to be educated abroad; a relationship with England was a way of signifying class status back home.[39] Indian businessmen and doctors also migrated to England, both those who had been affiliated with British companies in India and others who had skills and educational and other resources to start their professions abroad.[40]

Though the Indian population in England was extremely variegated by class, it did find common interests for affiliation.[41] The development of a kind of Indian community, with political and cultural "representatives," even elected lawmakers such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Mancherjee Bhownagree,[42] subsequently took shape without a studied or even artificial reconciling of the various elements of the Indian population that remained for the most part distinct. In these formations, middle-class Indians of course held sway. The claims of financial success and cultural equality, the mastering of a "British" lifestyle, and eventually the nationalist desire

for a state all structured the rise of Indian figures in England who would influence political and social discourses preceding independence in 1947. In the United States, middle-class Indians began to hold positions of significant influence in what might be called Indian interests. Indians had gone to study in the United States, too, particularly to places on the West Coast, in California and the state of Washington. And there were also small numbers of Indian businessmen and their families in the New York area, one of whom, Sirdar Jagjit Singh, was eventually profiled in the *New Yorker*.[43]

If the classed Indian migrants of California, London, and New York had autonomous existences in different social worlds, they had some connections across space through the aspiration of a free India. Many differentiated responses to British colonialism found common ground in nationalist discourse, though, as many have argued, different ideas about the constitution of the nation have been suppressed in that production.[44] Perhaps the most explicitly revolutionary anticolonial responses were among Indian students and workers on the West Coast of the United States who formed the Ghadar Party. In 1913, student leader Har Dayal, other students, and Indian farmers established a group called the Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast in Portland, Oregon; they began a newspaper called *Ghadar* and set up a group house, Yugantar Ashram, in San Francisco.[45] While the paper was produced in the western United States, it was distributed through Indian immigrant groups allied with the cause of independence in North America, the Philippines, the Caribbean (Trinidad, Honduras), Hong Kong and China, Singapore, and elsewhere.[46] And connections with all sorts of activists in other countries were forged through an anti-imperialist consciousness.[47]

Movements for independence from India, too, radiated outward, into the diaspora. In 1885, the Indian National Congress was formed to address the emerging issues; a number of journals, including *India*, were disseminated at home and abroad for this end.[48] Many leaders of the Indian National Congress went to study in England and, subsequently, established links there with British and Indian sympathizers throughout Europe during their tenure at places like Cambridge and the University of London.[49] Eventually, with the advent of the twentieth century, more "moderate" leaders who were centered around the Indian National Congress gave way to a student movement in Britain and elsewhere directed at the goal of Indian independence in no uncertain terms. In London, groups based their work in the hostel India House; in 1905 the Indian Home Rule Society was formed. These British revolutionaries were part of a larger diasporic movement of ideas, resources, and activists; the group in London might be seen alongside Ghadarites. Such activists for

Indian independence also coordinated political work throughout Europe, via London, Paris, and cities in India.

The British and U.S. governments responded to the threat of these pro-independence activities all over the world. When Ghadarites sought aid and counsel from the German government during World War I, the United States prosecuted them.[50] The U.S. government responded to this political activity less out of pure concern for the issue at hand than because of its continued alliance with Britain. And the fact that heightened activities of the Ghadar Party coincided with the advent of a war in which the sides were clearly delineated greatly intensified the harsh light to which Indian nationalists would be exposed in the United States. The British were also keenly aware of the broad dispersion of Indians around the world and of the personal and political connections that ran through those communities. The British maintained an elaborate system of surveillance through the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s; they kept detailed information on Indians traveling not only in the United States, but throughout the Americas. Their lists of "extremists" there in the late 1930s, during a period of stepped up activities around Indian independence at home and abroad, also provides a sense of the span of the political Indian diaspora through the Americas, including Indians in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Panama, Brazil, and Argentina.[51] In England, after the 1909 assassination of an India Office administrator, Sir William Curzon Wyllie, the British government stepped up its tactics of repression, charging many student leaders with sedition, deporting and imprisoning them, preventing various activists from being admitted to the bar, and closing down a number of important social institutions for Indian students.

Not all movements for independence were explicitly revolutionary; many were formed with multiple purposes in mind. In New York, far from California's worker and student populations, there was a constituency of Indian migrants and others who also were deeply invested in the question of British colonialism. There, in the early 1900s, a number of small groups arose, including the Pan-Aryan Association, the Indo-American National Association, the Society for the Advancement of India, and the Indo-American Club; the India Home Rule League of America, created later, in 1917, would be the longest lasting and most influential. In the early years, some Indians participated in anticolonial activities, but for the most part, Americans comprised the groups. Many scholars have observed that Indians and Irish Americans found common cause in their political organizing against British control of foreign lands; and the considerable resources in the Irish American community, of political groups, journals, and newspapers, were utilized by Indians and those sympathetic to a free India.[52]

To understand what drove some Americans to become invested in overturning British colonialism in India is, again, to be attuned to a broader international political context. Alan Raucher has suggested that the question of imperialism, regarding the Philippines, and, by extension, India, became a topic of significant debate among a range of U.S. intellectuals and public figures, including Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, and Agnes Smedley. The ideological roots of the critiques of "empire" were heterogeneous. Carnegie opposed imperialism through a kind of pragmatism, in which he remained skeptical of commonalities between ideas of Western and other societies, and committed to the security and stability of the British and U.S. governments, which could be threatened by revolutions for independence. On the other hand, those on the left argued against imperialism from a more humanitarian standpoint, based on observations of the state of Indians under colonialism, and also through the desire for alternatives to U.S. nationalism, in full and dominating force during the world wars.[53] What might appear as primarily a debate on the fate of India should also be seen as a deliberation of what the nation of the United States was, and could become. The East-West polarity that was an important and useful component of anticolonialism, and one evidenced in the alliance of Britain and the United States against Indian revolutionaries, nevertheless reifies and makes monolithic "America" in ways that ultimately do disservice to the historical contingency and instability of that ideology. Seeing the United States as a more contested entity during this period and others allows for more nuanced understandings of a range of political developments.

In the activities of the officials of various Indian organizations and others in the United States, there seemed to be no contradictions in advocating for independence from Britain and the right to citizenship in the United States. Indeed the moves for U.S. and Indian nationality seemed to shadow one another, particularly in the late 1930s to 1940s.[54] Sirdar Jagjit Singh, the renowned president of the India League of America, wrote letters to popular news publications about the denial of naturalization rights to those of Indian origin and simultaneously campaigned for a Gandhian transition to home rule and for support to those Indians adversely affected by British colonialism.[55]

Indian independence refracted internationalist issues for a range of peoples. One interesting example is that of the writer Kumar Goshal. Having immigrated to the United States from India in 1920, Goshal exerted himself very specifically for the overthrow of British colonialism, but also worked for many other causes; as a leftist, he enunciated a politics that was broadly global.[56] Goshal wrote articles for the *National Guardian*, the *Nation*, and other periodicals on matters largely concerned with Asia and Africa and opposed to various forms of imperialism. From 1942 until

1947, just after Indian independence, Goshal had a regular column in an African American newspaper, the *Pittsburgh Courier*. A closer look at his writings there reveals Goshal's expansive sensibilities, in critiques of foreign influence in the Philippines, Burma, and Indonesia, as well as in discussions about lynching and racial representation.[57] In a 1942 article, Goshal issued a series of challenges to "progressive" movie directors such as Frank Capra and Lewis Milestone:

> Let these directors show us that the Chinese are not all Fu Manchus, nor are they Charlie Chans. . . . Let them present the Negro people as they truly are, stripped of the tradition of plantation mammies, smiling mint julep servers, corn pones and magnolia blossoms. Let us see the Negro people carrying on a heroic struggle against terrific odds. . . . Let us see the people of India, not as Gunga Dins and elephant boys, bejeweled maharajahs and snake charmers, naked fakirs and nautch girls—but as a people who, given the opportunity, would repeat the glorious story of the Chinese. . . . Let us see the real Indian people who have made incredible sacrifices in their fight for national freedom.[58]

Goshal's solidarities with what would shortly be called "third world" peoples are mirrored in the decision of a black newspaper to include this column, as well as one by other international citizens, such as a Chinese columnist. Developing at this time, clearly, is a complex network of affiliations based on divisions between north and south, east and west, and more and less industrially developed nations, and their peoples. In a description of the lack of segregation between Indian and white British pilots preparing for an offensive against the Japanese, black intellectual George Padmore refers to the Indians as "colored."[59] What is important to understand about this period is both the internationalism of Indians and also the cosmopolitanism of African American political communities.[60]

By the 1940s, the sociopolitical landscape in England was changing, too. Punjabi Sikhs came to London and northern England, and subsisted by working in factories and by selling textiles in the neighborhoods in which they lived. These immigrants formed the Indian Workers' Association in 1938 to represent their interests as workers in Britain, to provide institutional space for a developing "community," and also, to advocate anticolonial causes in England and in India.[61] Student organizations at the universities in London, as well as at Oxford and Cambridge, multiplied, with both political and more broadly cultural aims. A great majority of Indian groups in the period preceding independence addressed the problems and aspirations of immigrants in England while remaining committed to the broader goal of independence from British colonial rule; they were therefore carefully watched by the India Office and other arms of

the state. Given the increased presence of Indians in Britain, the British state was also fixated on the possibilities of large-scale migrations from India to the West, without the natural inhibition and control that the imperial relationship had once provided. During these years, the British government kept detailed files on the movement for naturalized citizenship in the United States.[62] And Britain continued to monitor closely the number of Indians who actually went to the United States.[63]

The radiating effects of Indian nationalism took shape through other national formations of politics and culture: American and British, to name just two examples. And, furthermore, this occurred within various social landscapes, inflected in important ways by class and race. The efforts of Indians for naturalization, and therefore full citizenship in the United States, ultimately bore fruit in the 1946 Luce-Celler bill, just one year before Indian independence. Here the relationship between two forms of nationality, American and Indian, seems to be best expressed not through mere coincidence of chronology, but by a complementarity between the developing epistemologies of national identity. This was a way of thinking and living nationality that, even in its tamest forms, demanded some sort of critique of international-geopolitical power arrangements, and effectively took issue with the nations of the United States and Britain. Cultural diversity or worlds of many cultures in the 1940s emerged in both places as national ideals. This is why even Sirdar Jagjit Singh, a less radical, more middle-class proponent of Indian nationalism, could be just as concerned as Kumar Goshal or Ghadar Party members with questions of racial-national representation, and assert solidarities across emerging non-Western states.[64] Pro-independence Indian students in England developed their own alliances, with working-class and leftist causes, to influence visions of British nationality, which would be under increased scrutiny after the Second World War.

By the time of Indian independence, small populations of Indian migrants remained in the United States, in California and New York especially, but altogether not more than 4,000.[65] Many who had in the 1920s and 1930s been deprived of citizenship rights were also subject to the greater implementation of alien land laws; denaturalized and immigrant Indians who owned land in California were thus stripped of an important investment not only in the region itself, but also in a broader vision of life in the United States.[66] Disgruntled with discrimination and exclusion from basic individual liberties, Indians had begun to leave and the immigrant population dwindled.[67] Indian communities in England, while larger than those in the United States, were limited, too, in their reach and diversity; prior to independence there were largely those who had worked in some capacity in the apparatus of empire, such as lascars or ayahs, more upper-

wealth, with the assumption that the major direction of the flows would be, as in the past, from England outward.[70] The state's touting of free movement and inclusion, twinned with its self-image of benevolence, continued to have a significant impact in a number of quarters both inside and outside England, for proponents of a postwar liberalism and for those about to migrate.

Somewhat differently, the United States inaugurated the "American Century" with the rise of intellectuals and policymakers like Henry Luce and others in the 1940s, who espoused an aggressive nationalism to combat disruptive political trends around the world, including socialism, anti-imperialism, and anticolonialism.[71] The close of World War II intensified domestic aspirations for guaranteed U.S. political domination of the world, and thus affected relationships between the United States and the emerging "third world." Though both the United States and British cases are important on their own terms, what also stands out at this critical historical juncture is the contrast between those nationalisms, and the perception of that difference through the 1940s and 1950s by other developing nation-states such as India, and especially by future migrants. The British state publicly committed itself to accepting the movement of peoples from former and present colonies and the U.S. government, despite granting the rights of naturalization to Indian immigrants in 1946, installed a quota of only one hundred immigrants from India per year. This quota effectively worked against the possibility of the building of active new migrant communities and also deferred the development of lived connections with the emerging independent India that would be so important in a later era. In the entire period between 1946 and 1964, only 6,319 Indians immigrated to the United States.[72]

Britain and the United States also offered different postwar possibilities for the script of the nation—for the migrant subject and for the emerging Indian state. England was saddled with the legacy of colonialism, while America could recast its imperial involvements and its history of exclusion into triumphant stories of combating Nazism and other forms of intolerance and, by the early 1950s, ensuring citizenship rights for all. Small wonder, then, that when Indian immigrant and U.S. congressman Dalip Singh Saund described his passage to the United States by boat through Britain, he remarked: "I was not interested in empire builders. Abraham Lincoln's statue, however, evoked in me quite a different response."[73] As a congressman in the late 1950s to early 1960s, Saund was extremely concerned, as was the U.S. government, with what road independent India would take, whether toward socialism or toward "American democracy."[74] What kind of nation India was had a relationship to what kind of migrant subject, in another nation, an Indian could be.

India's independence was an initial sign of broader decolonization efforts and ideas about autonomy all over Asia and Africa. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first president, had been meeting with Asian, African, and North and South American nationalist leaders since 1927, and by the time of his own country's independence he was already part of a broad network of political formations that were militating for independence and against the forces of imperialism. Nehru, with Gamal Abdel Nasser, Josip Broz Tito, and Achmad Soekarno, was central to the 1955 Bandung meeting in Indonesia that served as a statement of collective pan-Asian, African, and Arab solidarities in the face of postwar U.S.-European political domination, and was an important precursor to the Non-Aligned Movement formally instituted in 1961.[75] The principles of nonalignment remained deliberately broad and open-ended, and the many nations that participated in the summits and conferences from 1961 on were by no means consistent in their adherence to constitutive issues like economic independence and political autonomy; how to support liberation movements and how to negotiate relationships with "superpowers" were sorted out in various ways by member countries. Yet questions of territorial integrity and social justice continued to shape the development of the nationalisms of third-world states, most especially India because of its prominent role in the nonaligned movement, and, necessarily, ideologically influenced national-Indian subjects all over the world.

Postcolony in the World

A central exhibition in the Cultural Festival of India in Edison was entitled "Beautiful Borderless World" (see fig. 4). Upon entrance, the attention of participants was directed to an overhead sign with the message:

> Our World was born with borders.
> Today it is caged and confined,
> torn and tortured by a thousand divisions.
> Let us not further disunite and disfigure it.
> As children of mother earth,
> We ought to heal her wounds, promise to be
> nice to her, to each other and help
> rebuild a BEAUTIFUL BORDERLESS WORLD

The festival elaborated the borders of the particular nation, of India, and the Indianness that is a result, in the framework of a world without borders. But that paradoxical construction could only be sustained by giving India (and the world) a stability—temporal and spatial—that was thoroughly undone by transnational migration, among other things. To those

Figure 4. Beautiful Borderless World (courtesy BAPS).

who moved, the borders were very real indeed, and thickly layered by complex histories. While the festival glibly and spiritually asserted collective ownership of the earth, being a citizen of the real world was fraught with tensions. Subjective living in a new world was the setting for alternative diasporic constructions of India and other nations. And that world was built of systems based in the continual erection of borders.

As the world realigned, Indians were becoming reinscribed as "workers" in postwar England. The economies of many western countries, including those of the United States and Britain, enjoyed significant expansion and prosperity after the war. Britain required new sources of labor for burgeoning industrial enterprises in areas of London and northern England, and this development coincided with both the 1948 Nationality Act and Indian independence, though not without some consternation. Pushed by social and cultural conflicts unleashed by the withdrawal of British forces and pulled by the prospect of steady employment in British industry, Indians began to go abroad as labor in the early 1950s, much as they had traveled to various parts of the British empire, including England itself, but with different expectations. As new nationals, Indian migrants

now had access to narratives of immigration, particularly those that stressed individual betterment, group legitimacy, and settlement abroad.

Beginning in the 1950s, Indians abroad would become consolidated as "immigrant populations" in an unprecedented fashion. Turning first to the society they knew best, Indians migrated en masse to England, and only later to the United States. Indians' experiences as British colonial subjects were easily, if resentfully, transmogrified into identities of racial otherness. And numbers begin to tell a story of both magnitude and classification. Most scholars agree that the peak period for Indian migration to England was between 1955 and 1965. Beginning with numbers near six thousand for the years 1955 through 1960, the number of migrants jumped to 23,750 in 1961 and continued in that fashion through the 1960s. Until the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, most of the migrants were assumed to be new immigrants; after the middle of 1962 (when the act was implemented), a good number of the migrants were relatives of those already here and/or meeting qualifications of entry by way of professional status.[76] The numbers of Indian migrants before 1962 were much smaller than those for West Indians and, after that, consistently exceeded the West Indian figures.[77]

Most of these Indians, especially prior to the middle 1960s, exhibited a distinct downward mobility. A variety of factories engaged in heavy industrial production recruited or served as magnets for Indians in both developing cities in northern England as well as in what was beginning to be known as greater London. Performing a wide variety of types of unskilled and then skilled labor, these workers established themselves as visible and significant parts of the British working class. India's place in the world had changed, from a British colony to a "third world" country, and so too had the nature of the British Indian immigrant population in shape and form. The image of the "immigrant" was no longer an ayah, lascar, or prince, to borrow the title of Visram's book on the pre-1947 period,[78] but now a factory worker.

Going mostly to cities, Indians also became a metropolitan diaspora in England. Very much embedded in urban formations of work and culture, Indian communities themselves embodied many of the highly popularized contradictions and tensions of a "changing London" or a "transformed Birmingham." The timing of the larger-scale migration of Indians to England coincided with a period of massive industrial growth in British cities, and these phenomena were ultimately linked in the British popular imagination as well as in the daily life of Indian immigrants themselves. Indian migrants carried the symbolic weight of economic expansion, geographical growth, and racialized cultures as much as they themselves constructed those developments. Their location in cities also laid the ground-

tus, however minuscule, at a time when the economy was no longer expanding at the same postwar rate as it had in the 1950s. Finally, Indians were located in broader racial contexts, in particular one in which large numbers of Afro-Caribbean peoples were also beginning to be noticed by British society. A series of 1958 riots in the Notting Hill section of London, where white youths had attacked blacks, was only one manifestation of the increasing hostility of whites toward immigrants of color, both Afro-Caribbean and Asian.

Race, as a collection of categories, as a process of subjectification, and as a field of power, structures one telling of a story of Indians in England. The rise of the hostility of white residents toward nonwhite peoples and the construction of immigration as an issue in British political discourses led to the development of new collective social identities in the Indian population. Seen as one group by the British population, Indians, Pakistanis, and later Bangladeshis began to assume the category of "Asian" in a number of different contexts. The dominance of the term "black," again both in British colonial languages and within politically constructed groups of immigrants, began at times to be applied not only to Afro-Caribbean immigrants but also to a wide variety of Asian immigrants, so that nonwhite immigrants as a whole began to constitute a "black" population, in largely political terms.[83] Given the complex debates on Indian racial identity and particularly the desire among immigrants to be identified as "Aryan," the application of blackness to Indians in England was a contested move indeed.

As the Indian population grew into larger and more organized communities all over England, anti-immigrant fervor reached a high pitch, with national and local manifestations. Riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill persuaded national policymakers that violence against minorities was on the rise and that political solutions were necessary to address these issues. Initially, the responses from the Labour Party and the Conservative Party were very distinct, with the Labour Party interpreting the racial violence to necessitate antidiscrimination measures and a firm commitment to a multiracial society, without legislation controlling immigration.[84] The Tories, on the other hand, responded with an express sympathy for those unhappy with changes in the British population, not always articulated in bald racism, but often taking a more problem-solving form: British society could simply not adapt so quickly to recent demographic shifts, and thus needed regulation. For that set of interests, numbers of migrants and population percentages were mobilized in the service of dramatizing change and classifying otherness.

The divergent philosophies of multiracialism and immigration restriction are less important for their association with a particular political party (because that would shift) than for their simultaneity. While the government led by the Conservative Party passed the Commonwealth Im-

migrants Act in 1962 to limit and regulate the entry of immigrants, it was a Labour-dominated government that in 1964 renewed the legislation to control immigration and produced in 1965 a White Paper recommending the further reduction of the number of allowable vouchers for immigrant entry. In 1965, the Labour government, with the support of the Conservative Party, passed a mostly symbolic antidiscriminatory bill that would become the Race Relations Act. The national goal, then, through the 1960s, was to limit the entry of New Commonwealth (colored) immigrants and to manage the changed racial dynamics of British society through a series of proactive antidiscriminatory measures.

On a local level, the experiences of the period reflected general ideologies of multiracialism and racism and also contained specific manifestations. Intense hostility against immigrants resulted in racial attacks on Indians (as well as other immigrants) in areas of high residential concentration, in London especially as well as in cities to the north like Birmingham. In the workplace, employers and then unions actively discriminated against Indian workers.[85] As much as Indians had become a community in Britain, they had also become a minority group, and one that was in many ways despised.

The manifold responses of Indian communities to these local and national crises illustrated the growing stratification and diversification of that group. Just as late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century Indians in Britain had been divided over how to best approach issues of India's sovereignty, so too did mid-twentieth-century Indians experience political differences over their minority status, with perhaps many more issues to process, including generation, gender, and class. Newly middle-class groups eschewed direct conflict in order to secure the broader and long-term goal of assimilation. Younger populations adopted more confrontational tactics, like protesting everyday forms of racism. The affiliations of Indians with other minority groups also reflected a measure of diversity; calling oneself "Indian," "Asian," or "black" would come to suggest a political orientation even more powerfully in the 1970s. Still another reaction within the wider circuit of migrant Indians, who had in some cases not yet come to Britain and in others had only recently migrated, was to turn to the United States as a destination with its own racial conflicts but still free of the weighty legacy of strained relations between the colonizer and the colonized.

New Indians in a New America

The Cultural Festival of India's exhibit "India—A Cultural Millionaire" opened to a room filled with banners of quotations from writers, politicians, and imperial apologists (such as Lord Macaulay). The first quota-

Figure 5. What do we mean by an Indian face? (courtesy BAPS)

tion, from Arnold Toynbee, glibly delineated the undergirding premises of the festival: "It is already becoming clear that a chapter which had a Western beginning will have to have an Indian ending, if it is not to end in the self-destruction of the human race. At this supremely dangerous moment in human history, the only way of salvation for mankind is the Indian way." In a mirror image of Hegel, here India was the solution for the future because it was at once stunningly exotic, wildly diverse, and very old. Accordingly, the first section of the exhibition documented the natural wonders of India with huge photographs and lengthy descriptions of the coastline, the mountains, the rains, rivers and forests, the animals, the flowers, the arts, and finally the faces of people. A descriptive panel asked the question that may have already been in the minds of curious fellow travelers: "What do we mean by an Indian face?" (see fig. 5). And, a Benetton-like photograph was accompanied by these words: "All these faces belong to India. Covering the entire scale of skin tones, from fair to dark, from sharp and squarish features to the roundish mongoloid features of the Gurkhas, India comprises a surprising diversity, matched by no other Nation. Yet a common lustre of hospitality and friendliness binds them to the soul of India that remains eternally One." This construction of a Nation assumed diversity and difference—indeed, even racial difference—while at the same time asserting that spirituality, or "soul," held it all together.

The Cultural Festival of India rehearsed a mythology of Indianness fundamental to the formation of a simultaneously political and cultural nation. Well before independence, the father of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru, expounded on antecedence, diversity, and essence in similar language:

> The diversity of India is tremendous; it is obvious; it lies on the surface and anybody can see it. . . . It is fascinating to find how the Bengalese, the Marathas, the Gujratis, the Tamils, the Andhras, the Oriyas, the Assamese, the Canarese [et al.] have retained their peculiar characteristics for hundreds of

years, have still more or less the same virtues and failings of which old tradition or record tells us, and yet have been throughout these ages distinctively Indian, with the same national heritage and the same set of moral and mental qualities. . . . Ancient India . . . was a world in itself, a culture and a civilisation which gave shape to all things. . . . Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilisation.[86]

But it is impossible to singularly associate this idea of unity in diversity with Nehru, or his time and place. British colonialism employed such mythologies in its exercise of cultural-political power. And none other than Mark Twain was seduced by India's antiquity and multiplicity, that he presumably did not find or perhaps could not see in his own America. Those who emigrated from India to the United States in another period, however, could carry diversity with them and give it another grammar in a place that was developing its own language for inclusion.

Diverse unities had always, in some way or another, been a stated public ideal of America, though with a working model of novelty rather than antiquity. And especially in 1960s America, newness was being rearticulated on a number of fronts that impacted the flow of Indians and that created the social worlds of multiplicity in which they would be able to claim a place. In 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson signed the momentous Immigration and Naturalization Act in the United States, he ensured that the contours of the worldwide Indian diaspora and the relationship between India and its citizens would change in spectacular fashion, just as it would for other migrant populations. In the context of the civil rights movement and at a time of increasing national attention to discriminatory legislation and applications, quota systems for people of non-European origins seemed yet another symbol of the injustices protested by large segments of black, Latino, Native American, and Asian students and activists. By abolishing the old quota system, the government opened the doors to some 170,000 immigrants from the eastern hemisphere, 20,000 per country annually; the act also allowed entry for relatives of U.S. citizens.[87] The numerical effects of the act were variously forecasted, amounting to only small changes or constituting a racial transformation.[88]

The symbolism of the Immigration Act itself in 1965 was even farther-reaching than its immediately perceptible policy or demographic changes. During this year, the United States was deeply involved in Vietnam, had only recently emerged from two other wars in Asia, and was at the same time crafting an image of itself as the leader of the "free" world. Paternalism—being the nation with "open arms"—virulent anti-communism, and foreign intervention all occurred together. The national and international reverberations of the civil rights movement had contributed to a rearticulation of American mythologies of racial democracy in the early 1960s

and also created backlashes. Confronted by protesters demanding inclusion and equal rights before the law and in the practice of the law, policymakers and scholars both produced a renaissance of new writings on America's pluralistic society and also tried to contain the radical possibilities of civil rights and then black power. African, Asian, Caribbean, and Arab countries, meanwhile, were producing discourses of opposition to U.S. political hegemony all over the world in the nonaligned movement.

The United States readvanced the idea that the nation could comprise many races and ethnicities.[89] Though such formulations resonated with older renderings of diversity, such as the concept of the "melting pot,"[90] they also had certain meanings and contradictions in the immediate context of violent social division and were part of a different vocabulary used in public forums to address a range of cultural transformations. Certainly, the new languages of pluralism contained an anxiety and tentativeness for minority populations already contending with racial injustices at home. But this vision of America, in the form of state rhetoric at home and abroad, and alongside the very act of loosening immigration regulations, held tremendous promise for new immigrants from the third world, most particularly in contrast to the more familiar reality of British efforts to tighten her borders to impede the entry of peoples from the former empire. Here in the United States was an ideal model of diversity that Indians could comprehend and see themselves within, as it seemed to be free from the trauma of British colonialism and disconnected from an earlier history of exclusion. The slate of the past could be washed clean and a set of histories with 1965 as foundational moment could begin, for the United States and for the Indian diaspora.

In the 1960s, members of the first large-scale Indian migration to the United States were greeted by an economy in a period of expansion. The occupational experiences of mostly middle-class and credentialed Indians during this period seemed to match the ideals and actualities of growth and opportunity. Technological transformations meant new jobs in medicine, the sciences (natural and applied), business, and education, for which this group of Indians was exceptionally qualified. As in the early 1900s, Indians came also to a social world deeply stratified by race, and a biracial formation—"black" and "white"—in which there was no clear place for the racial identity of non–African Americans who were not white; this was especially true in the northeast, where most Indians initially immigrated after 1965. The public image of Indians was not a matter of great importance to policymakers or social critics, especially with regard, in relative numbers, to other minority groups, and this ultimately enabled a kind of mobility (both in terms of ethnicity and class) that was denied to Indian immigrants elsewhere, particularly those in urban areas of England.

It was not that India did not exist in U.S. popular culture, but that Indians were yet to be recognized within the complex of an awareness of Indian things. During the 1960s, in segments of middle- and upper-middle-class society, Americans were greatly fascinated with Indian music and Hindu religious spirituality.[91] The Beatles' widely publicized forays into psychedelic visions of Hinduism and sitarist Ravi Shankar's extraordinary popularity in the United States echoed the Boston Brahmins of the early twentieth century, but now found wider audiences and became articulated to a new kind of cultural politics, of openness, of multiculturalism, and of a less rigid personal lifestyle. It is on this level that anthropologist Margaret Mead understood such developments: "Ten years ago it was the thing to be Existentialist. . . . This interest in India is a similar psychological rejection of the United States, only it's more important, I think, and more serious. India, after all, has so much to offer on every level. It's phenomenally rich."[92] Throughout the 1960s, there was a palpable public silence about the relationship between this somewhat exoticized perception of national Indian culture and actual developing Indian communities; and little work has been done on this period, or succeeding ones, to explain whether or not we might consider the two phenomena side by side. I would suggest that it is useful to broadly paint the cultural landscape, as one in which many ideas about America, as well as the rest of the world, were being newly formed, and also where different peoples were newly visible in U.S. cities especially. In this more abstract sense, then, immigrants cannot be far removed from the perception of India. Even more important, migrants themselves have always been deeply invested in how their country of origin is represented. Though Indians in the 1960s were not numerous or organized enough to exert influence over this process, in later years they would certainly create highly politicized programs around the issue of representation.

In the years following the 1946 Luce-Celler bill, which permitted naturalization and thus also small immigration quotas, most Indian students and professionals who qualified settled all over the United States, and owing to their small numbers and their dispersal, they did not form visible communities.[93] The dramatic shift in numbers after 1965 is vital to understanding the more subjective aspects of community transformation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that while 582 immigrants had come from India in 1965 and 2,458 in 1966, in each year following, that number increased by thousands and in 1974 reached 12,795.[94] The striking increase in the numbers of immigrant Indians, and the distinctive character of that shift in class and cultural terms, have led a number of scholars to begin Indian American immigration history in 1965.

Indeed, the thousands of Indians who came to the United States in the decade following 1965—largely concentrated in New York and then

other urban centers, highly educated and professionalized, who began upon their arrival to develop what would become strong ethnic and cultural ties to each other and to Indians all over the world—embodied radically different subjectivities from those immigrants of earlier years. Maxine Fisher was one of the first scholars to lay out the activities of this immigrant formation in New York City in detail, and in that project she noted both the heterogeneity of Indians during this period as well as the inception of local efforts to produce more general "Indian" articulations of immigrant identity.[95] Fisher's detailed and careful study of the activities and ideas producing the early stages of Indian American consciousness, for 1960s and 1970s immigrants, might be creatively juxtaposed to Rashmi Desai's study of early British Indians for comparative purposes. The decade and a half between Indian immigrant flows into Britain and the United States accounts for the groups' relationships with very different worldwide economic and cultural phenomena: in the earlier period, 1947–65, with expanding industrial economies and decolonization, and in the later, post-1965 period, with the imminent rise of post-Fordist economic arrangements and struggles for racial justice at home and abroad. The class characters of the two communities shape how Desai and Fisher describe ethnic association and consciousness; Desai cites workers' organizations, while Fisher underscores the importance of professional identifications. Notwithstanding these differences, through both studies, Indians' urban identity and continued relationships to the homeland form an important subtext for unraveling the "immigrant experience," even in its early stages.

The high representation of doctors, engineers, and professional scientists in the first decade of the post-1965 Indian immigrant group produced an anxiety back home about the constitution of a national population without the necessary technicians essential to economic growth. Using the term "brain drain" that had previously been used to describe the flows of people from Britain to North America, the Indian government began to decry the tendency of educated and upwardly mobile Indians to move to the United States.[96] The widespread usage of the term accentuates the broader representation of Indians going to the United States, both for those who had already immigrated as well as for countries and populations around the world, in India and in places like Britain and East Africa, where Indians had not achieved quite as pronounced a level of professional success and with such apparent consistency. Indians in America, then, as a public category and actual population, began in the early 1970s to have a particularly eminent role in the diaspora.

The 1970s were marked by a kind of ambivalence through Indian society and government about migration and particularly about how to treat those who had emigrated. A 1973 article in the *Illustrated Weekly of India*

on Indian Americans begins with the observation: "There are 50,000 Indians and Pakistanis in New York. Unlike their compatriots in Europe who do menial jobs and live in congested lodging houses, those in the States are educated, affluent and believe in gracious living. They are to be found in all professions as well as in industry and government service."[97] These authors hold Indians in the United States in high regard because of their class position, in contrast to more working-class Indian populations of Britain, as the reference to "Europe" seems to suggest. Being the beneficiaries of less discrimination also accrues to Indian Americans' value in the authors' eyes: "They are, by and large, valued by their employers, suffer from a minimum of discrimination and are affluent."[98] Special attention is paid to the immigrants' efforts to reconnect to India, by engaging in Indian cultural activities, and in their plans to help those back home; various sections of the piece also document the bevy of representations of India in art, film, and music. For the readers of this article in India, immigrants in the United States appear less as wayward sons than as part of a formation related to the nation and in the interests of the nation.

The project to interpellate the migrant as an extension of the nation was most clearly manifested in the financial initiatives of the Indian government to develop the category of the nonresident Indian, or NRI. In the early 1970s, the Indian state, like many in the third world, faced the increasing concentration of growth in narrow segments of its economy and the approach of stagnation in its broader industrial sectors, all in the context of a balance-of-payments crisis. Indian state officials' convictions in the importance of outside investors existed alongside persisting fears about economic autonomy that had energized and still informed the powerful languages of nationalism. Turning the traditional family remittance from currently petit bourgeois (and in the past, peasant) investment into large-scale capital formation was seen as one solution. The increasing economic success and community coherence of Indian immigrants in the United States, as well as in England and places like Hong Kong and Singapore, came to be seen by India as a less threatening source of funds for expanding economic enterprises, and so the state began actively seeking financial remittances from abroad. In 1973, the Indian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act discussed for the first time in official governmental documentation the "person not resident in India,"[99] and by 1975 members of the Indian Investment Center had begun to approach and hold seminars for immigrant associations in the United States, with the purpose of soliciting monies for new Indian industries.[100]

The term NRI did a great deal of signifying work: it symbolized financial prosperity and the successful Indian community abroad. From this period on, NRI became a common way in India and elsewhere to describe the Indian migrant; its usage was generalized. Understanding the NRI as

a mode of subjectivity, however, requires attention to its origins in an economic program of the Indian nation-state, and the simultaneous glorification of Indian immigrant communities, in a sense as something reflected in the different kinds of 1973 representations, of the Indian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the *Illustrated Weekly of India* article. The nation had begun to aggressively claim its peoples, just as immigrants were expressing complex desires for India.

The process of translating difference and similarity from back home into lived (and represented) experiences in the United States operated through the multiple vectors of regional and religious affiliation, national identity, and spatial distribution. Cultural and political associations all over the United States, but certainly concentrated in California and New York, began to form in the 1970s with various constituencies, such as the Sikh Cultural Society, the Indian Association of Long Island, and the Indo-American Cultural Association of Westchester.[101] The emergence of the Association of Indians in America (AIA) in 1971 signaled the development of a broader formation through an *Indian* identity that serviced some kind of representation within the United States. Not surprisingly, part of the work of the AIA entailed a struggle for the inclusion of a category in the U.S. census for "Indian."[102]

The 1970s were a time of great diversification and significant growth of Indian American as well as Indian British populations. Public discussion of Indian presence was very different in the two nations, though, as American ideology seemed to embrace new immigrants while the state of "Britishness" established more rigid and hostile boundaries to greater influxes of peoples. And this had everything to do with the historical production of these groups in the United States and Britain in racial, class, and national terms. To Americans, Indians brought exotic heritage to bear on the existing diversity of U.S. cultures, and their insertion into middle-class society confirmed notions of immigrant ascent. In the early to middle 1970s in New York, Indian immigrants were in some way representative of transformations of the urban space: the incorporation of "peripheral" areas like Queens and Westchester into the cultural life of the city and the development of ethnic areas throughout a designated *metropolitan* site. Concentrations of Indian shops and services, "Little Indias," developed first in Manhattan, in the East 26th–28th Street and Lexington Avenue area, and a bit later in the Jackson Heights and Flushing areas of Queens. Associations in New Jersey, Westchester, and Long Island grew as credentialed Indian immigrants dispersed into the suburbs, not unlike their white ethnic predecessors. Newspaper and magazine articles celebrated these new and richly diverse urban cultures.[103] Indianness, in contained form, had become part of the U.S. urban and national landscape.

Borders between Peoples, Borders of the State

In a series of exhibits on social pathologies, Cultural Festival participants were asked to approach the limits of national culture. Though the Cultural Festival persistently strove to capture a broadly sweeping (and consuming) vision of India, it did compulsively return to the question of borders. In language resonant, again, of Nehru, the introduction to the exhibits read: "A world without borders seems a wishful dream yet it is possible. . . . First we must understand and eliminate the root reasons that split our world, the real elements that create borders." If most of the festival had to this point been structured around the comforting presence of the Indian nation in a (beautiful) world of multiplicity, these exhibits, however briefly and tentatively, suggested that the construction of Indianness, and its manifestations in community and identity, was by no means a fluid process. For those in England and the U.S. engaged in their own personal and group negotiations around what it might mean to be Indian abroad, the acknowledgment of "borders" came as a welcome reality check.[104]

Of course in the festival, the borders were first turned inward, to the family. Exhibits focused on marital difficulties and the other issues that divide the idealized family unit like "anger," "doubt," and "suspicion." Partly this had to do with the social conservatism of the religious sect that sponsored the festival, and with the notion of Indian culture being advocated. And in fact the family romance was the structure for the nation. But given that the nation here was projected into diaspora, into a context of other social conditions, the festival could not completely occlude the dilemmas that face racialized migrants, though it located that reality secondarily, almost on the margins. One panel description read: "What a distortion we create when we cage ourselves in compartments, saying: I'M BROWN, I'M BLACK, I'M WHITE, I'M YELLOW. Racism is rooted in Prejudice which reflects a grotesque image of humanity. Even a small PREJUDICE is like a Brick that slowly builds up into barriers between Cultures and Races."

Here racism was articulated in terms of individual perceptions and images; an almost pre-1960s consciousness was evident in the use of the dated term "prejudice." Vast divisions of economics and history were leveled in the return to the formulation of racism as a problem of attitude. A universalism, in the title of "humanity," made intelligible the apparent contradiction between, at first, derision toward colorist classification, and then acceptance of separate Cultures and Races. Perhaps in the midst of the stress of racialized experience, this was a desirable formulation for middle-class diasporic Indians who were working hard to make a place

for themselves within multicultural nations. And yet the ordeals of racialization were embedded in diasporic memory, as stories of the past and present illuminate.

Indians in 1970s Britain faced more dramatic and material barriers to the creative production of a national identity. Questions of migrant-racial difference had become particularly acute and race had also destabilized again questions of nationality, as English society understood race through colonialism and its effects. That history of India intervened in the developing story of the Indian diaspora in Britain. By the early 1970s, anti-immigrant feeling in resident white English populations and within the Conservative Party had succeeded in producing tighter regulations on the flow of family members and dependents. Yet developments in the world continued to conspire against the efforts of the British state to determine who could come in and who could not. As Kenya began increasingly to favor those who were Kenyan citizens in labor and property ownership in 1967, many Asians, particularly middle-class Indians who had held onto their U.K. passports, began to be assailed as disloyal and greedy and fled to England.

Not included in the categories of the immigration controls prescribed by the 1962 act, this wave of Asian entry reintensified debates on how to control the shape of the national population. Consequently, a 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants bill included a provision that would allow only those who had one U.K. citizen-parent or grandparent to apply for entry outside strict immigration controls; this effectively pushed back within the controls most African Asians who had only attained British citizenship in the first generation. The bill also increased regulations on children under the age of sixteen immigrating to join a single parent, a status that had previously been unrestricted but that was now limited to cases in which children were joining their only surviving parents; the intention behind this was to prevent employable male children coming to Britain to join their male parent workers in the search for jobs.[105]

Tensions in British society among those older residents antagonized by changes in the English social fabric, new immigrants, and the state erupted in 1972, as Britain struggled to deal with Asians who were being expelled from postcolonial Uganda. Recent legal history in the response to Kenyan Asians had on some level prepared for this moment while the international (and relational) legacies of colonialism complicated matters considerably. The 1948 Nationality Act specified only two forms of citizenship, for Commonwealth countries and for Britain and her colonies; the 1962 act reworked and restricted Commonwealth and formerly colonial citizenship by way of immigration control, and the 1968 bill introduced generational connections to England into the requirements, with allusion to East Africans. Ugandan Asians had been entering Britain en masse since

1968; they had arrived both before the implementation of new regulations and later when they were subject to immigration controls as the consequences of Idi Amin's coup d'état started to play out.[106]

Amin's brand of anticolonial, anti-Western, Africanist nationalism interrogated first, Asians' cooperative role during British colonialism and second, their unintegrated commercial and social presence in postcolonial Uganda. In a sense, he brought the past to bear on the present, refusing the historical ruptures that were celebrated in a variety of quarters. The framing of the "Asian problem" by Amin in relation to the history of British colonialism in Uganda posed a different kind of problematic for Britain from the quieter, smaller, and less politically expressed issues surrounding the Kenyan Asian case. The hysterical fear of the destruction (and defilement) of cultural integrity within Asian communities in Uganda and all over formerly British colonial Africa raised the issue of the British state's obligation to its former colonial subjects. When in August 1972, Amin prepared to expel summarily all Asians from Uganda and declared Britain responsible for their resettlement, a political crisis broke out in England over the prospects of admitting thousands of Asians at a time when citizen outrage over immigrant presence was at a high pitch.

The ensuing controversies in both political parties and in newspapers and other cultural institutions engaged, perhaps for the first time, broader conceptual issues of the determination of who was and was not a citizen, and more practically how the postwar British state would come to terms with the legacy of colonialism.[107] Twenty-five years after India's independence, the United Kingdom was finally forced to reckon with the demographic consequences of imperial and racial divisions of labor. The subsequent decision to admit the Ugandan Asians, however, largely evaded these contentious and in some sense unanswerable queries, in part because to declare publicly the porousness and continuity of these histories would be to question the discretion of the British state and its voters to determine the profile of its own population.

In total, some 30,000 Ugandan Asians came to Britain in 1972, in addition to about 13,000 in earlier years,[108] with a much smaller number, about 2,000, going to the United States.[109] While a good number of the British group settled in the city of Leicester,[110] these Ugandans, with different experiences of class and community cohesion, also greatly diversified the population of Indians in general. As solidly middle-class subjects, these people came into Indian spaces and communities with a strong sense of entitlement and skills to develop enterprises in England, and without the possibilities of entering into industrial labor as early Indian immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s had been forced to.

Operating in ways that diverged from other already-settled Indian groups, these Ugandan exiles nonetheless shared many experiences with

other Indians, not only in terms of class as they carved out their own spaces in the service industry, but also in their retreat to India for the construction of an identity. As stateless peoples, many Ugandan Indians began to see the cultural and psychic usefulness of "becoming Indian" and submitting to the sense of a past rooted in a more abstract "homeland." Ugandan and Kenyan Indians brought to existing Indian immigrant communities a set of experiences that both complicated and buttressed pan-ethnic nationalism. The memories of multiple migrations, the histories of indentured labor, the triangulation of colonial sympathies and anticolonial resistance all broadened the discourses of Indian identity. Likewise, during this period, the presence of Indians from the Caribbean—from Trinidad, Jamaica, and Guyana—challenged the linear narratives of class ascendancy being created by an earlier generation of now middle-class Indians in Britain.

Affiliations varied greatly; in some cases, Indians from a variety of different countries saw themselves as primarily "Indian"; in other cases, members of East African and Caribbean communities asserted the specificity of their process of migration, calling themselves Ugandan Indians or Trinidadian Indians, for example. Formations of class and race influenced all identities. While the lines between "newer" and "older" immigrants were on one level formed by socioeconomic position, the influx of "new" middle-class Kenyan and Ugandan Indians altogether complicated the mapping of those divisions by accentuating different experiences of migration, based in African racial landscapes and more attenuated relations with India.

Despite and through the rapid diversification of immigrant communities, the late 1970s and early 1980s brought into being new formations and articulations of identity. Indian youth, particularly in areas of high Indian concentration like Southall, developed forms of resistance that took shape through new forms of racial consciousness that had international reference points, through black power movements of the United States, and national meanings, in connections with West Indians.[111] Many Indians also participated in leftist and antiracist organizations like the Institute of Race Relations and theorized the relationship between race and leftist politics.[112] Working with issues of race foregrounded the need for coalitional activities with other groups for activist Indians and also kept alive issues of class that many increasingly middle-class Indian groups eschewed. These developments in England might be seen as helping to construct complex identity maps for Indian migrants. Ethnicity, race, and nationality, and the overlapping spaces therein, provided important though shifting coordinates for subjects to locate themselves in new and old places.

In developing a sense of group identity, or peoplehood, there has to be a reckoning with the past, an articulation to the present, and an imagination of the future; the choices Indian migrants made in that process had a great deal to do with lands of settlement.[113] In the United States, the process of identity formation for post-1965 Indian migrants entailed a functional silence around a prior history of Sikh workers. Given the small numbers of the early group of Indians, relative to other immigrant and minority groups during the period, it seems at first glance somewhat curious that they should not have revived the knowledge of Punjabi Indians migrating for work to California in the early 1900s in order to claim a kind of historical continuity of "Indians in the United States." But early Punjabi immigrants had not left behind large visible communities, even in California, that could participate in the process of establishing connective power with newer groups, and had not forged public proclamations of ethnic solidarity or even identity in the ways that other immigrant groups had. Even when Indianness was important, it remained within the relationship of Indians to the emerging nation-state of India, not through a referencing of a local experience in or an articulation to the United States.

The differences between the post-1965 and early 1900s Indians were also too profound to allow for the conflation of the groups. Most significant, the class background of Punjabi workers who came to the United States to engage in agricultural work and other manual labor sharply distinguished this group from the more professional and middle-class Indians in a North American imaginary, much as it had and would back home in India. Divisions in India between those who worked with their hands and those who had the credentials to avoid that kind of work were scrupulously maintained in the form of educational access, government representation, and caste and other cultural institutions. Indeed, it is hardly likely that those Indians who had moved to the United States for financial betterment and with the promise of class ascendancy would seek out connections to a group of laborers that had suffered racial and economic discrimination. Finally, the East Coast location of the larger group of post-1965 immigrants was, literally, a long way from the Pacific Northwest and California history.

Indians in the United States in large part eschewed a racial category of Asian American that might have drawn meaning from the elaboration of homologous histories of a pre-1965 period. Numbers illustrate important aspects of this dilemma; while by 1978, the number of immigrants from India had reached 19,100, much higher than the number for Chinese (14,500) and Japanese (4,500) immigrants for that year, the total number of those of Indian origin since 1820 was still 163,000, much less than the corresponding numbers for Chinese (523,000), Japanese (406,000), and Filipinos (390,000).[114] Indians' relatively small numbers with regard to

large and already established Asian groups obviously played some role in the absence of identifications with Asianness.

But identificatory strategies were very much in flux. While those in the Association of Indians in America (AIA) pushed for the recognition of "Indianness" in the U.S. census, others clung to descriptive models of whiteness that were seen to bestow a kind of cultural power, in a manner reminiscent of Bhagat Singh Thind's citizenship case. These various positions were staked out in the context of the 1970s, when what it meant to be a "minority" following vigorous civil rights movements, implementation of affirmative action policies, legacies of discrimination, and profound changes in urban populations was yet to be fully worked out. Debates within the Indian American community bore the marks of these complex historical developments. A 1976 exchange of letters to the editor in the *New York Times* illustrates these points. Under the headline "Denying Racial Heritage," Ranjan Borra decried the AIA's protest of the decision of the Federal Interagency Commission to categorize Indians as Caucasian: "While Indians continue to be racially discriminated against in many other parts of the world, it must be considered no small honor to have been given this rightful recognition of their national distinction in a country other than that of their birth and ancestry. . . . It is time Indians abroad, especially in the United States, merged with the mainstream on grounds of racial affinity and not walk with the motley crowd of the minorities."[115] In this scheme, being recognized as a national-racial group, as Indian-Aryan, allows entree into another nation, of the United States. The desire for whiteness is apparent, as is a kind of disdain for being a minority. But it also seems important to read in these 1976 comments the presence of another historical experience of the diaspora, namely, contemporary events in East Africa, wherein Indians had been expelled from countries in which they occupied the category of racial Other and had not joined the "mainstream." The trauma of that rupture, from elsewhere, might in fact influence this writer's concern with an Indian diaspora in the United States.

Manoranjan Dutta, in another letter, takes a different and more presentist tack. As president of the AIA, Dutta's charge is a more direct orientation toward inclusion in the United States polity, and various forms of representation for Indians. Dutta distances himself from the racial chauvinism of Borra: "The suggestion . . . that to be in the mainstream of the American life one has to belong to the Caucasian race is an insult to all sensible persons"[116]; the multiracial America is the ground in which claims for Indian Americans must be made. Dutta expresses the need for a proper counting of Indians in the United States, under their own category in the census, and as well a more pan-Indian sensibility, "so that Caucasian and

non-Caucasian Indian immigrants can continue to share their common heritage." Yet the head of this national association of Indians is also careful to instantiate Indians within the existing political possibilities of the time, which means the periodic affiliation with the category of "Asian American," particularly as affirmative action programs recognize Asian Americans. For these purposes, Dutta writes, "America's multiracial, pluralistic society has drawn on immigrants. . . . The Asian-American population, a small fraction of the total population, remains a minority for all administrative purposes . . . and the Indian immigrants shall be honored to join this class, to which they naturally belong." Both 1976 letters anticipate discrimination against Indians and minoritization in the United States, though with divergent solutions. Not far from the minds of these writers were the experiences of Indians in other countries, like Kenya, Uganda, and Britain.

Within the trappings of the former British empire, Indians were always and already racialized; unlike their U.S. counterparts, they could not have even imagined existing in the national-racial space of English whiteness. But 1970s Britain, too, was undergoing changes into a more pluralistic sense of itself. Racial uprisings, other forms of community rebellion, and popular and scholarly writings had prompted government studies and commissions that translated the need to respond to social change into a more generalized "multicultural," antiracist program, implemented in educational curricula, the Greater London Council, and measures to prohibit or at least discourage discrimination in employment and housing. Among the many important and complex effects of these developments was the rise of ethnicity as a concept, and as an identity for British minority groups. An emphasis on origin and cultural specificity—the building blocks of ethnicity—was appealing to those newly middle-class Indian groups who were invested in stressing their assimilative achievements and for whom the more insurgent racialization model threatened to propel them into prescribed alliances with Afro-Caribbeans, and support of labor struggles as well as relationships with working-class elements of their own population.

In light of these deeply fractured histories, how could a "unity in diversity" that the Cultural Festival proposed, that Mark Twain's romantic India conjured forth, or even that multiculturalism idealized, contain the Indian diaspora? Unity in diversity presumes, on the one hand, continuity, and on the other, stability. Post-1965 Indian migrants in the United States did not wish, in their production of a history of themselves, to include early 1900s Indians in California; what has been Indian in America, then, becomes discontinuous. Multiculturalism cannot fully account for that complexity, just as the emanation of an Indian past from

the festival makes for a disjunctural relationship with these histories, precisely because of the rather different senses of narrative time and affiliation. And as much as Indians from Uganda or Kenya might have attempted to claim membership in the story of Indianness in diaspora, their traumatic date of entry, 1972, is not only a boundary crossing for their own group, but also a source of disruption for the broader historical narrative. India and Indianness are in flux in the diaspora, while stability is the feel of the nation that the Cultural Festivals seek to create. And yet both models held their distinct appeal for migrants creating identities in the United States and England.

New and Old Identities

Current debates on issues of different peoples within state boundaries may often unwittingly accept the newness of the phenomenon of diversity. British colonial strategies in India give diversity a historical depth, and in fact allow us to see the Cultural Festivals within a broader trajectory of political and cultural practices. In the 1860s and 1870s, the British colonial government undertook a massive ethnographic enterprise to document the varied forms of Indian culture and Indian peoples.[117] This "People of India" project, instead of pointing to the difficulties of national cohesion, provided justification and information for colonial rule. The careful attention to historical and cultural detail of the different peoples of India in no way asserted national similarity but instead proposed that these British subjects were highly diverse. Surprisingly, also absent in this text was any effort to make the peoples or their characteristics analogous.

Similarly, the British colonial administration's 1877 Imperial Assemblage to institute Queen Victoria as the royal head of India heralded diversity rather than submerging it. Lord Lytton, the viceroy of India at that time, remarked at the Assemblage that one could see the splendid results of royal rule in the very empire, "multitudinous in its traditions, as well as in its inhabitants, almost infinite in the variety of races which populate it, and of the creeds which have shaped their character."[118] These examples concretized and propagated the construction of India for the British empire, for the Indian aristocracy, and for the outside world as well. The British colonial administration shrewdly understood that nation formation and a concrete though broad proposition of what was Indian would establish the terms of the debate and ultimately make an extremely diverse entity conquerable.

Bernard Cohn suggests that British colonial authority was exercised as much through an idiom as through sheer physical suppression and that this specifically British idiom served to codify what was Indian for western

eyes.[119] This became a more general discourse on India for those inside and outside India; governing a diverse group of peoples while respecting the plethora of (discrete) cultural traditions has been the lexical means for the Indian state to maintain a relative degree of legitimacy, and for it to contain dissent. When the 1985 and 1991 Cultural Festivals spectacularize the same Indianness that the British themselves formulated, the lines between "colonial" and "postcolonial" textuality are not at all clear. Establishing authority over the traditional and the modern, by instantiating Indianness in the present with new technologies and references to diasporic contexts, the festivals, too, enacted a number of conflations that spoke to the contradictions of migrant culture.

The situation of Indians in England by the 1980s had shifted in many important ways. They had achieved the highest per capita incomes of all ethnic groups in England, had almost fully moved into nonmanual labor, and had produced professionals at double the rate of white British citizens.[120] Indians were increasingly associated with economic success and counterposed to less successful Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, as well as Afro-Caribbean and African peoples. The effective extraction of an identity from broader groupings, like Asian or black, constitutes the formation of non-Muslim Indian ethnicity at this historical moment.

In the United States, the Indian population was also changing. Beginning in the late 1970s and extending through the 1980s, Indians became more visible, more organized, and more diverse. Departing considerably from the celebratory coverage of years past, a 1977 New York Times article, entitled "Immigrants from India Find Problems in America,"[121] documented the hostility faced by new immigrants as well as the dilemmas surrounding assimilation and the preservation of Indian culture. Less credentialed migrants entering an economy in recession began to appear in a wider variety of professions, and even clustered in businesses like news stands, motels, and gas stations.[122] The status of the prototypical Indian immigrant was no longer so undeniably middle or upper class; it depended on a range of factors that included time of migration, area of residence, and occupation.

The concentration and growth of this population also began to be felt regionally, both for the group itself and also for other possibly referential populations. Indians were most numerous in New York, California, and Illinois, with large concentrations in New York City, Los Angeles, San Fransisco, and Chicago,[123] but their status as Asians fluctuated within those figures. In New York, they were the second most numerous group of Asian Americans (surpassed only by Chinese Americans), while in California they were outnumbered by Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese, and in Illinois by Filipinos. In New Jersey, which had the fourth largest Indian population in the United States, the number of Indi-

ans was larger than any other Asian American group. Many college organizations, political interest groups, and social formations began to name themselves Indian American.[124] The consolidation of an Asian American politics, and the resulting process of identification, occurred in the late 1960s through the movement of mostly second- and third-generation East Asian groups, well before the arrival en masse and community cohesion of Indian immigrants.[125] Ethnicity as a concept and identity rooted in national/regional categories began to assume dominance, most especially in the face of racial categories; even "blackness" became reconstructed into the quasi-ethnic grouping of "African American."

The late 1980s, however, interrogated and complicated the choice of ethnicity over race as Indian Americans became visible targets of racial violence. A group called the "Dotbusters" emerged in Jersey City and other New Jersey suburbs to declare their hatred of Indian presence in what had previously been majority white and Latino spaces; a number of physical attacks against less wealthy Indians elicited greater consciousness of American hostility to local Indian communities. Students and political groups composed largely of second-generation Indian Americans responded to the situation more quickly than first-generation groups who felt that they had a good deal to lose in being identified as victimized minorities.[126] Arrangements of race and class, at times overlapping and at others widely divergent, provided a complex framework for Indians to negotiate the influence of factors like relative success, education, racialization, and political solidarity in the production of self and group identities.

In both the United States and British Indian communities, class formation has been an important axis of difference. Representations of elite British Indians and lower middle-class shop owners, though constructed along independent trajectories, resonate with an earlier period in which it was difficult to capture the world of lascars and at the same time sons and daughters of the Indian upper class. In the United States newspaper vendors and motel owners of the 1970s and 1980s could still be embraced and incorporated into the American dream, but poorly paid service workers who entered a bit later were more difficult to write into triumphalist narratives of the nation. And the new Indian millionaires in California's Silicon Valley are yet another kind of population diversification and tell an altogether different story of immigrant ascent.[127]

Indian immigrants functioned within broader possibilities of what is American or British, among other national mythologies, and this has profoundly impacted what is received as the coherence or content of identity. The comparative arrangements of multiculturalism, in which spaces exist for imagining oneself in many different worlds, allow for a great deal of flexibility in the contemporary moment. And race and ethnicity, as intrinsically ambivalent and contingent processes, are open to continual

negotiation, particularly as the question of who and what a migrant is changes over time. In a 1996 piece on the op-ed page of the New York Times entitled "Under My Skin," Sunil Garg seems to reiterate the concerns that Ranjan Borra had thirty years earlier: "I am a person of color—or at least that is how people often categorize me. . . . Certainly I am brown. My parents emigrated from India. . . . But I have never seriously thought of myself as a brown man or as a person of color."[128] By 1996, the taxonomic ground for Indian identity had shifted considerably, and while Garg seeks a script outside that of "racialized victim," he is much more inclined than Borra was in 1976 to be an ethnic minority; the arrangements of a fully formed multicultural society required a different kind of address, and Garg responds in the requisite language: "As the ethnic and racial composition of our nation changes substantially, we need to understand and relate to one another, regardless of the color of our skin."[129] The ideal here of a postracial future is echoed by Indian conservative and public intellectual Dinesh D'Souza, who habitually employs his own immigrant background to authorize his critiques of the development of multicultural education.[130] While these renderings of immigrant identity discomfort progressive political groups and intellectuals, they symptomatize an enlarged public sphere in which Indian American and perhaps all ethnic identities are being invented. This "new" ethnicity is also a claim on a developing discourse on race that, to be sure, is far more complex than in times past, and has in some ways to contend with racialized and internationalized migrants as part of the mix.

Divergent interpretations of British Indian experience were expressed in the multiple terms Indian, Asian, and black British. Most of all, these identity categories were a way to evaluate racialization historically and in more contemporary terms. Describing all peoples from the Indian subcontinent, "Asian" had links to the languages of British colonialism, particularly as it did not recognize distinctions between post-1947 nations; its racial effect came, most obviously, from the sense of all South Asian peoples being phenotypically similar, as well as the similarity of this term to that in the project of dividing the world's populations into three major racial groups. Indian, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani people in Britain also described themselves as Asian, not only because they had been explicitly named as such in Britain, but also to represent a collective racial interest—mitigating national divisions from back home, and distinguishing from Afro-Caribbean and African populations. But many, including some in a younger generation, sought out connections with other former colonial subjects and those who were similarly excluded from the category of whiteness and, in effect, Britishness. The effort to launch a critique of British society through the desire for inclusion alongside racial difference was crystallized in the assumption of the term "black British." This was

particularly true in the sphere of cultural production; many British Indian filmmakers, artists, and musicians saw themselves as part of this black British constituency. The rise of second and third generations of Indians, the various points of origin—in the subcontinent, in the Caribbean, and in East Africa—and the broad stratification of class position all gave rise to the growing sense of diversity in the Indian community, of multiple answers to the question of what it means to be Indian. Writers and intellectuals began to speak of Indian and migrant subjectivity as hybrid, as composed of discrete and complex parts.

Caste, region, language, and religion have also attenuated pan-Indian identifications in a population that is experiencing tremendous growth. In the 1980s and 1990s especially, global integration gave way as much to increasing diversification as to tighter circuits of influence. Changes in the geopolitical context laid bare the longings of many regional and ethnic groups, like Sikhs and Muslims in India, to create social space in the form of real and imagined international communities for independence and/or enhanced civil and economic rights. If immigrants of an earlier period moved with relative ease from a regional affiliation to an identification with India, it was because this shift was specified by the processes of nationalism that created the nation-state, with which colonized peoples were well acquainted through insurgent movements for independence. Today, for many migrants, regionalism may be alternatively counterposed to or function in the service of the nation. At any rate, national fissures are pronounced in daily life, and the choice of how to articulate a response to that reality remains a contested one.

India in Its Diaspora

The unpaid workforce for the 1991 Cultural Festival in Edison was composed of 2,600 men, women, and youths who spanned a range of middle-class occupations; professionals and college students had taken between three and twelve months off to work on the festival, in some cases performing mundane tasks like selling food. Various Indian American organizations had solicited volunteers, with some people coming from India, Britain, and East Africa and others from off the street. The mechanisms for inclusion, then, were both flexible and thorough.[131] This figure of 2,600 volunteers was constantly rehearsed, in festival literature, on the website, and in conversation. To be sure, it was an impressive number, but coupled with a notion of local voluntarism, it conferred legitimacy to the festival as a diasporic formation with broad forms of membership. And Bochasanwasi Shree Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha

(BAPS) has also been very keen to stress that youths volunteered, to suggest that there is an appeal of Indian culture across generations.[132]

Given the wide diversity of people working on the festival, there was a striking degree of content similarity in comments about the festival.[133] At times, it seemed that only regional accents distinguished the men, women, Indians, Indian Americans, Indian British, teenagers, businessmen, English majors, and CEOs from one another. When these people were asked a wide variety of questions regarding the size of the festival, the makeup of the workforce, and the projected audience of the festival, they answered directly and specifically; but any questions about the hierarchical structure of the organization or the sentiments in the ranks were shunted to evocations of the greatness of Indian culture and the prominence of Pramukh Swami Maharaj, the spiritual saint of BAPS. The presentation of India at the Cultural Festival was meticulous and studied. Volunteers scrupulously policed the exhibitions.[134] The sadhus, or priests, maintained ultimate financial, administrative, and ideological control over the event. The functionaries had no knowledge of financial details, yet the festival had an extremely organized process for collecting money; tickets for food and crafts were sold in only a few booths at a central location at the beginning of the festival.

The control of BAPS and the omnipresence of Hinduism suggest agendas both inside and outside the West. The Swaminarayan Temple represents a Hindu religious sect that has been growing in India and among Indian immigrants since the 1950s. But as Raymond Brady Williams has noted: "A tension exists between the oft expressed view that the message of the Swaminarayan religion is universal truth for persons of all cultures and religions and the fact that the religion is restricted in membership primarily to Hindus from Gujarat and functions to maintain cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity."[135] Unlike other Hindu religious sects, like the Hare Krishnas, the Swaminarayan does not conduct itself in the manner of attracting non-Indians, nor necessarily non-Gujaratis, suggests Williams. Its address to the diaspora, then, is highly specified regionally and culturally, despite the group's seeming investment in a broader Indianness. In the United States, the majority of Indian festivalgoers were northern and western Indian. In light of turbulent conflicts in India, the submergence of regionalism in the material presentation of the festival was astonishing. The only physical indication that the state of Gujarat might be of special interest to the architects of the festival was in the larger space accorded to that state's pavilion in "India—a Cultural Millionaire." The whole and integrated India was of primary concern to the festival ideology in a context where nations matter. The link between that national articulation and religious absolutism was suppressed by the text of the festival (and by the ever-persistent myth of Hindu tolerance),

but also by the festival organizers themselves. When BAPS met in January 1990 to discuss the development of the following year's festival, they suggested five aims to promote Indianness and universality, none of which even mentioned Hinduism.[136] BAPS, in this festival, reproduced the Indian nation's consumption, occlusions, and repressions of regional/religious/ linguistic difference and provided a blueprint for the kinds of exclusions that might occur in diaspora, too.

The concluding paragraphs of the promotional material for the British festival indicated a specific kind of transnational agenda: "This Festival will contribute immensely toward eliminating race and religious differences in today's society. We are confident that the citizens of the United Kingdom will welcome this event."[137] In the context of 1980s debates about the extent to which British Indians should claim a racialized ethnicity, the festival seemed to take a particular stand, "to eliminate difference." Nowhere in this text were there familiar markers of racial identity, like the terms "Asian" or "black," nor was there any reference to specific episodes of British Indian history. The foregrounding of a timeless Indianness was the festival's choice for ethnic identity, as it may have been the choice for many middle-class British Indians at the time. And in Edison the presence of Indian immigrants had generated hostility from racist gangs, with posters affixed to buildings surrounding the festival area that read: "Bindi go home. Who are you going to call? Dotbuster."[138] In the midst of lavish celebrations of Indianness and a collective desire to render this event an unqualified success, the president of the Indo-American Cultural Society for Middlesex County (in which Edison is located) explained the racializing posters as a response to parking problems created by the festival.[139] Clearly, the Indianness projected in this production could not easily accommodate race.

Both the British and U.S. Cultural Festivals of India were unambiguously directed at diasporic Indians, and mainstream publications recorded this fact.[140] But the diaspora receiving this cultural production was hardly a passive receptacle; its members generated their own challenges from different conceptual and representational sites. Articles in Indian migrant newspapers noted that neither the Taj Mahal nor the Golden Temple of Amritsar, architectural representations of alternative regional-religious (Muslim and Punjabi-Sikh) traditions, were among replica structures of the festivals,[141] effectively questioning the inclusiveness of the representation of a historical "India." And a major axis of contestation to this nation, as to all nations, was gender. Women objected to the Swaminarayan practice of seating men and women separately at religious events; as a female delegate to one of the conferences put it, "I think they have already built concrete borders between men and women. . . . Women are not being treated at par with men, and as a woman I am very much offended."[142]

Whether associated with the political state of the homeland or the cultures of the diaspora, nation necessarily is exclusive in its very structure. Repressive mechanisms, be they the policing of popular protest, the surveillance of dissent, or the control over cultural representation, are not just a distortion of an ideal, but a necessary means to maintaining the unity that always threatens to disintegrate. Given that the festivals were embedded in the project of building a nation, it cannot be a surprise that they enacted the exclusions—of gender, regionalism, religion—that might open up counternarratives to the story being told. This, however, is not to diminish the fact that nation is an incredibly powerful force, to which many submit with full knowledge of its inherent limitations. In a way this is the very contradiction of diaspora, too, that it constructs itself through an identification with the homeland, even when the homeland is an acknowledged fiction.

The Cultural Festivals' story was on some level successful because it was able to seize upon extant longings and the political-cultural force of nationalism within migrant communities. That desire for the nation comes not only from a "homeland" but also from the local conditions, in which to have a nationalized identity is to have a place in a cultural or social order and to be able to participate in interest group politics, as "ethnics." Visiting the Cultural Festival in Edison was a range of world political leaders: the governor of New Jersey, U.S. congressional representatives, a British Minister of Parliament, a cabinet minister from Kenya, and others who spoke simultaneously about India and Indianness in the world. Keith Vaz, the British (Asian) Minister of Parliament, depicted the festival as "India created in the world . . . the greatest event by the Indian community in America."[143] What is clear is that in the conceptual-political world in which migrants live, Indianness has a cross-temporal legibility— it can be read and understood in terms of the past, present, and future— that other forms of subjectivity may not.

The Past, Present, and Future of India Abroad

The Cultural Festivals of India very materially manifested what is by now a theoretical truism: that nation is far too expansive a concept to remain within state-geographical boundaries. And the experience of these events also shows how as various colonial empires developed and eroded, and as the world has become realigned very much continuously with those imperial relationships, the concept of nation has provided a helpful and necessary salve for migrants all over the world. As Homi Bhabha has so aptly put it: "The scraps, patches, and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a national culture."[144] What the festivals brilliantly

achieved was a delicate balance between the pedagogical (the intimations that "this is India") and the performative, that dynamic process by which both viewers and actors could elaborate their cultural longings in a distinctively public space. As cultural identity must be located in a place and time, advertisers must provide a story for that place. Narration became an ideological process for the purpose of providing a functional and national history of India. Articulation through other nations (the United States and Britain) was the subtext of identity, or Indianness. And a text like the Cultural Festival operated through a special compression of time and space. It portrayed the dynamics of culture by breaking apart the easy separation between strategies of the colonizer and colonized. The story being told was colonial, postcolonial, and migrant at one and the same time. The festival took the mythology of "unity in diversity" and grafted it onto contemporary locations, rehearsing the historical coincidences and simultaneities of U.S., British, and Indian nationalities. Even popular articles in the *Times* of London were able to see the profound disjunctures between those efforts and the lived experiences of Indians in the diaspora. Multiculturalism may need nation, but diaspora is more complex than a singular nation.

It is against and alongside the tightly conceived occasions of the Cultural Festivals that various other stories, created histories, of the Indian diaspora may be posed. Though the festival was able to speak to a desire for unity central to the diaspora, the histories of movement capture a subjective experience that escaped its elaborate productions. Most profoundly, the transformative psychic power that nationalism has exercised for Indians before and after 1947 is one that may be repeated and recalled at the moment of migration. In this way and others, histories are drawn on to create complex notions of memory that support the formation of migrant identity. The reason for providing such detailed stories of movement is, then, to suggest that they function as more than background. Those stories have created understandings of self and group that function in moments of cultural transformation and translation; they are a conceptual site in which to become Indian. The dates on the one hand describe actual occurrences, and on the other metaphorically structure the beginning and the end of a narrative of displacement, and become a powerful means for many people to imagine how a community is formed. The stories of movement, through time, are also a way for Indian migrants to understand themselves and create new forms of subjectivity. As Michel de Certeau put it: "History is probably our myth. It combines what can be thought, the 'thinkable,' and the origin, in conformity with the way in which a society can understand its own working."[145]

The festival's history is of one nation, of India, projected into the diaspora. Yet as that story has taken shape within a diasporic circuitry that

is our concern here, it becomes clear that three nations are in formation: India, the United States, and Britain, just as migrant communities themselves have been forming. Rendering all those nations as contingent and flexible may challenge dichotomized understandings of nationalism as subversive or reactionary, though exclusions remain stubbornly exposed. In a global framework, Indian independence has shadowed American nationality; citizenship in India has enabled Indians to imagine becoming American. This has led to a transformed sense of what it means to become a citizen. In the postwar period, and as multiculturalism has become the cultural apparatus of globalization, in both the United States and Britain, nationality becomes a language of inclusion, in more than one nation. Desires for unity meet up with experiences of multiplicity, and in that encounter nationality can also become deeply conflicted.

The global space exists here not simply as a set of locales from which and to which peoples move, but instead as a constant force for migrants: this is *lived* diasporic history. While much of this book focuses on the post-1947 period, the lines between historical periods are not unporous: stories that draw upon the past refuse to be bound by dates. These points about history are essential to understanding what makes Indians not only groups of migrants but a complex set of diasporas. Members of Indian diasporas went to a festival about a historical India not only because it had been directed at them, but also because it elaborated some of the stories that they needed to bridge the distance between their past and present. When New Jersey governor James Florio said at the closing ceremony of the Edison festival that it gave him his "shortest visit to India without jetlag,"[146] he articulated the compressions of time and place that histories of India and Indianness have enacted in the diaspora. In spite of, or perhaps because of, that fact, citizens of the diaspora still look for India in the places where they stand.