



## The Effects of Intrusiveness on Protective Details

Lorena Parada-Valdes MJM

**To cite this article:** Lorena Parada-Valdes MJM (2011) The Effects of Intrusiveness on Protective Details, Journal of Applied Security Research, 6:2, 209-246, DOI: [10.1080/19361610.2011.552006](https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2011.552006)

**To link to this article:** <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2011.552006>



Published online: 31 Mar 2011.



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# **The Effects of Intrusiveness on Protective Details**

LORENA PARADA-VALDES, MJM  
*University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, USA*

*A recent increase in the number of threats against judges has led to the wider use of protective details to safeguard the judiciary. By applying content analysis methods to a random sample of news media accounts mentioning protective details for public figures from March 1999 to March 2009, this article explores (a) a possible relation between the level of intrusiveness of protective details and their success or failure as protective measures and (b) the implications of these findings for anyone requiring executive protection.*

*KEYWORDS* *Executive protection, intrusiveness, protective details, security*

### METHODOLOGY

Research methodology for this article consists of a longitudinal study of U.S. media reports on protective details from March 1999 to March 2009, using context analysis to determine whether a correlation exists between a protective detail's degree of intrusiveness and its success or failure in protecting a principal from harm.

Media reports gathered from primary online search engines, databases, and national newspaper and magazine indexes comprise the research data for this article. This multipronged approach yielded a more complete source list, given that using Internet research engines exclusively may yield as little as 30% of available content (Krippendorff, 2004). Therefore, the media items reviewed come not only from Internet search engines but also from databases such as ProQuest, which include complete indexes for newspapers and newsweeklies of state and national coverage and readership, such as *The*

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Address correspondence to Lorena Parada-Valdes, P.O. Box 6245, Corpus Christi, TX 78466, USA. E-mail: [lorena@lorenaparada.com](mailto:lorena@lorenaparada.com)

*New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *USA Today*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *Time*, *U.S. News & World Report*, and *Newsweek*.

A preliminary pilot review of 25 media articles on protective details from 2000 to 2009 indicated that major incidents involving protective details received national coverage in addition to local coverage, which makes national newspaper and magazine indexes suited for data collection. State newspapers are also included as a source of additional information because research indicates that, although threats against federal judges have increased considerably since 2003, no corresponding statistics exist regarding threats against state judges. It is believed, however, that security incidents may actually be greater in state courts than in federal courts (National Center for State Courts Staff, 2006).

Focusing on U.S. media reports versus reports from the foreign press serves to eliminate the possible effect of cultural bias, because concepts such as intrusiveness, privacy, movement and personal space are culturally bound constructs (Altman & Chemers, 1984; Hall, 1956, 1976; Ting-Toomey, 1999). Edward Hall, the father of proxemics—the study of how spatial interpersonal distances are a product of one’s culture—noted that conversational distances among Latin Americans are much closer than those commonly associated with Americans (Hall, 1956). In a protective detail, which may require an agent to stand only inches away from a protectee, it is easy to see how perceptions of intrusiveness could easily differ among protectees of different cultural backgrounds. Although no research exists on cultural issues pertaining to intrusiveness in executive protection, Tipton and Krause (2007) noted cultural differences pertaining to intrusiveness in the use of biometric technology. Therefore, this study excludes media items from the foreign press and from U.S. sources covering foreign protectees.

The selected 10-year time frame for review, divided into 20 6-month periods, covers important milestones in both the areas of protective intelligence and judicial security. It includes, for example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which transformed executive protection, incorporating a greater emphasis on threat assessment methodology (Ragavan, 2002), and increasing the focus on security in the federal judiciary (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004). It also encompasses a documented increase of violence against the judiciary in the United States since 2003 (National Center for State Courts Staff, 2006), including the shootings of a county judge and his court reporter in Atlanta (Dewan, 2005) and the murders of the husband and mother of a federal judge in Chicago (Wilgoren, 2005b), as well as the sniper attack on a family law judge in Reno (Bellisle, 2006).

One of the difficulties inherent in using media reports for content analysis data is that, as noted by van Driel and Richardson (1988), it is “almost always only the controversies that made the news” (p. 57). Protective details with negative results, or with negative descriptions, may be deemed more newsworthy by their very nature. Successful protective details may receive no

media coverage. Furthermore, protectees concerned about security breaches may never share their feelings—positive, neutral, or negative—about their protective details with the media. In an attempt to provide some balance, the item pool for selection also included journals covering the presidency and the judiciary, as well as articles from government publications—such as agency and congressional reports—which may be more likely to provide information on successful protective details than traditional media outlets. News media reports are likely to provide a protectee’s perspective, whereas a government report may provide a protector’s point of view.

These individual media items—articles, editorial pieces, interviews and reports—serve as the context units for analysis, whereas the recording units coded consist of the following system of enumeration: a single description of a protective detail for a single protectee. This approach takes into account Holsti’s (1969) distinction between recording units as “the specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category” (p. 116), and context units as “the largest body of content that may be searched to characterize a recording unit” (p. 118). The subject-matter categories focused on the various aspects involved in (a) executive protection, including protectee traits, predator traits, the nature of threats, and the type of protective detail; (b) the independent variable, the protective detail’s degree of intrusiveness; and (c) the dependent variable, the success or failure of the protective detail. These analysis categories are exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and independent criteria set forth by Holsti (1969) and Neuendorf (2002).

The steps followed for data analysis conform to Neuendorf’s (2002) flowchart for the typical process of content analysis research. Having operationally defined the intrusiveness of a protective detail (its degree of interference, interruption, or invasiveness of someone’s personal or professional life), as well as the success or failure of the protective detail (its ability to keep a principal free from harm throughout the duration of the protective detail, from onset to conclusion), the next steps in the research continuum involved creating a codebook and coding form, pilot testing both by means of preliminary coding, creating a list of media items to be sampled, performing the coding of the sample items, and ensuring intrarater reliability through the recoding of selected items twice over time. In addition to the codebook and coding form, the actual words used to describe protective details in the media reports analyzed were recorded in a dictionary, tracking the frequency of occurrence of the terms, as well as assigning direction categories to each based on a 5-point nominal scale ranging from 1 (*highly positive*) to 5 (*highly negative*).

The final step in the analysis involved tabulation and reporting. A linear regression model served to analyze the independent variable (Y), the level of intrusiveness of the protective detail, and the dependent variable (X), the protective detail’s success or failure in protecting principals from harm. The independent variable was assessed using a six-point scale, in which a value of 0 equals no intrusiveness and a value of 5 represents extreme intrusiveness.

Similarly, the dependent variable was assessed using a 5-point scale ranging from -2, which equals the failure of a protective detail resulting in the death of the protectee, to +2, which equals the success of a protective detail, in which the protectee fell under absolutely no harm. A scatter plot was used to see whether there an association existed between both variables by showing whether  $Y = f(X)$ . In addition, a Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient analysis was used to corroborate the results of the linear regression analysis.


## RESULTS

An Internet and database search of media reports from March 1999 to March 2009 yielded a total of 278 U.S. news reports on protective details for American public figures. From these, 93 media reports, or 33.4% of the total item pool, were selected through random sampling techniques for content analysis and coding.

From the random item pool, 45 news reports contained specific references to the intrusive nature of protective details, thus constituting a purposive sample derived from the random sample initially generated. The ensuing analysis of these 45 context units yielded the scatter plot shown in Figure 1, based on the data listed in Table 1.

For Figure 1 and Table 1, intrusiveness levels are defined as follows:

0. Absent/Inapplicable (INAP) (select if there was no protective detail)
1. Nonintrusive (protective detail causes no interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life)



**FIGURE 1** Proportion of intrusiveness levels of protective details and their degree of success or failure.

**TABLE 1** Correlations between levels of intrusiveness and degrees of success or failure of protective details, as described in a selection of U.S. media reports from March 1999 to March 2009

Protective detail	Intrusiveness (X)	Success (Y)	Protective detail	Intrusiveness (X)	Success (Y)
001	5	+2	024	5	3
002	5	+2	025	5	3
003	4	+2	026	4	4
004	5	+2	027	4	+2
005	5	-2	028	0	0
006	5	+2	029	4	+2
007	5	3	030	0	0
008	5	3	031	5	4
009	5	-2	032	5	3
010	5	+2	033	4	2
011	5	+2	034	4	3
012	5	+2	035	4	3
013	5	+2	036	4	3
014	5	3	037	4	3
015	5	3	038	4	3
016	5	3	039	4	3
017	5	3	040	4	3
018	5	3	041	5	2
019	5	+2	042	3	3
020	5	+2	043	4	3
021	5	+2	044	1	+1
022	5	+2	045	4	3
023	5	3			
		Totals (Σ)	45	195	102

2. Minimally intrusive (protective detail causes minimal interruption or interference in protectee’s personal or professional life, e.g., use of technology or CPTED)
3. Moderately intrusive (protective detail causes moderate interruption or interference in protectee’s professional or personal life, e.g., escort to workplace)
4. Highly intrusive (protective detail causes high degree of interruption or interference in protectee’s personal or professional life, e.g., 24/7 protection for weeks at a time)
5. Severely intrusive (protective detail causes severe interruption or interference in protectee’s personal or professional life, e.g., 24/7 protection for extended periods, such as years, use of armored vehicles, use of bomb-sniffing dogs, inability to travel or work with ease)
- 6 N/A—not ascertained

Degrees of success or failure are noted according to the following values:

- 2 Failure resulting in death of protectee
- 1 Failure resulting in injury of protectee

- 0 Absent/INAP
- +1 Success—protectee is attacked but unharmed
- +2 Success in which protectee is neither attacked nor harmed
- 3 N/A—not ascertained
- 4 Other

The linear regression model yields the following regression equation:

$$y = 0.2969x + 0.9802$$

A calculation of the Pearson's product-moment correlation produced an  $r$  value of 0.291, an  $r^2$  value of 0.084, a slope of 0.297, a  $y$  intercept of 0.9802, and a standard error of estimate of 1.1926.

Both methods of analysis show a positive correlation between levels of intrusiveness and degrees of success or failure, albeit not a particularly strong correlation. These results therefore need to be regarded with caution and may simply point to a need for further research in this area as opposed to definitive conclusions on a correlation. Examining a hypothesis by various research methods is always highly desirable, because a triangulation of methods can reinforce a researcher's conclusions (Neuendorf, 2002).

One alternative research method that may be advisable to corroborate a positive correlation would be a protectee survey, perhaps among state and federal judges who have received protection at some point in their judicial career. Conducting a survey of the judiciary presents unique challenges, such as how to survey professionals of high stature in society who are not always available for interviewing and who may not, for a variety of reasons, respond to mail surveys in large numbers. Yet, when done systematically and with strong emphasis on the training of interviewers and coders, judicial surveys are an effective and important means of obtaining data on the judiciary (Labin et al., 2001). Such a survey might provide the means corroborating a positive correlation between the two variables studied in this research project.

In addition to the aforementioned numerical models, the analysis of the content of the media items included the preparation of a dictionary of terms describing intrusiveness, found in Appendix C. The creation of this dictionary posed several unexpected challenges but revealed interesting information about private and public perceptions about the intrusiveness of protective details.

First, although descriptors tend to fall under the grammatical category of adjectives, dictionary entries include all parts of speech, because there are nouns and verbs intricately linked to how people describe protective details that reveal their perceptions of the detail's effectiveness. Verbs such as *lurk*, *shepherd*, *hover*, and *guard*—all used to describe an agent's proximity to a protectee—carry great depth in meaning and can shed light on the source's perceptions of a protective detail, sometimes in ways that an adjective never could. The same premise applies to nouns. The use of noun phrases such

as *dog handlers*, *explosive ordinance technicians*, and *metal detectors* all convey the level of seriousness and intrusiveness that a protective detail may entail, even though they would not necessarily carry the same force in a different context or examined in isolation. Furthermore, they might be assigned different values depending on how they are perceived by a protector, who sees them as assets to his work, or by a protectee, who may either see them as nuisances or obstacles, or as life-saving benefits.

Ascribing values to terms in isolation proved to be an impossible and undesirable task, because no word can be truly examined for meaning without regard to its content (Hall, 1976). The dictionary therefore includes not only the descriptor term, but also its surrounding context, because the same term may have more than one value—sometimes even opposing values—depending on contextual clues. Furthermore, dictionary entries may have multiple values, depending on the various contexts under which they appear. Although the dictionary notes the frequency of use of each term, examining the frequency of use may be of limited utility, because the term is used in multiple contexts and with various shades of meaning, often unrelated to a protective detail. One example of such a term is *watch*, appearing 40 different times in the random sample, and receiving opposing values of +2 and -2, because the idea of being watched was seen as both an asset and a liability, depending on the source of the commentary.

Commentary sources also played a crucial role in the assignation of descriptor values. A predator such as John Hinckley, Jr., who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and later stalked President Jimmy Carter, considered the closeness of agents in a protective detail to be a deterrent (Abrams, 2001). From his perspective, the adjective *close* would therefore be assigned a negative value. A protector, however, who knows that an agent's proximity shields a protectee from a potential assailant, would place a high positive value on the same word. A protectee just saved from an attack because an agent was close would give a high score to the word *close*, whereas a protectee who finds the agent's proximity overbearing would give the same word a strongly negative value.

The strong relation between a term's positive or negative connotation and its context and source of commentary point to the need to examine perceptions of protective details from all points of view: those of protectees, protectors, the media, and the general public. The need for such an analysis also arises from a general examination of the context of the general coverage of protective details in the random item pool. News items discussed protective details from a variety of angles: their effectiveness, their cost to the taxpayer, their necessity, and even examined the relationship between protector and protectee.

The protector–protectee dyad is worthy of special attention, as it is a recurring theme throughout the item pool. Some of the news coverage focuses on the positive: in the cases of President Reagan (Wilmot, 2004),

Judge Lefkow (Schmich, 2005) and Susan Ford, daughter of President Gerald Ford (Ferguson, 2001), articles focused on the closeness and the bond of affection between each of the principals and their protectors. Other items, however, focused on the cost to taxpayers. Several items, for example, provided scathing commentary about the security expenses involved in the protection of Texas Governor Rick Perry, and criticized the perceived lack of protection when an alleged act of arson damaged the Governor's Mansion in Austin (Fikac, 2007; Fikac & Scharrer, 2008; Root, 2007; Selby & Novak, 2007). Still other news coverage examined the apparent confusion surrounding the roles of protectors, sometimes perceived as nothing more than glorified chauffeurs or valets, as was the case in the protection of Environmental Protection Agency director Christine Todd Whitman (Heilprin, 2003) and in the case of former Federal Judge and current Attorney General Michael Mukasey (Jordan, 2007). The unique character of the protector–protectee relationship is generally unexplored in executive protection research and may be an avenue of investigation that could yield useful information. Some research in this regard already exists (Cooper, 2006), which indicates that this is a topic worthy of further review. Other potential dyads for study include the protector–predator dyad and the protectee–predator dyad, also covered in the media during the period selected for this research. Even a potential triad emerges—the protector–protectee–predator triad—the study of which could potentially shed light on how to improve the success of protective details.

Just as it was hard to quantify descriptors of protective details according to their positive or negative nuances, it was also difficult at times to quantify levels of success or failure. There were instances wherein a protectee managed to stay alive and unharmed, but harm befell family members, as in the case of Judge Lefkow (Wilgoren, 2005a). In another case, First Lady Laura Bush reported that on one occasion, while President George W. Bush staged a surprise visit to the troops in Iraq over Thanksgiving, she called his protective detail to inquire about his well-being, only to find that they were unaware of his trip and assumed he was spending the holiday at the family ranch in Crawford, Texas (“The nation: First Lady calls,” 2003). Although the President was unharmed and safe, how can one qualify the protective detail as successful when the protectors were not sure where their protectee was? These difficulties in determining success tended to be the exception rather than the norm, however, and generally the content of the article allowed for coding success with clarity and accuracy.

Another variable that presented coding difficulties because of a lack of information was that of race, be it that of the protectee or the predator. The news media in general has guidelines for race reporting, in which a person's race is not mentioned unless it is relevant to the story being reported or unless an event is the first of its kind for a particular racial group (Goldstein, 2002). The only news items reporting protectee or predator race were those pertaining to Matthew Hale, a white supremacist convicted of issuing a death

threat against federal Judge Joan Lefkow (Paulson & Knickerbocker, 2005), and President Barack Obama, the nation's first African American president (Burton & West, 2008).

Some of the media items reviewed revealed details about protective details that, in the wrong hands, could serve to harm a protectee. One good example of this trend was a news story about New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's subway travel habits. The report stated, "Turns out that one of the city's best-kept secrets is that our billionaire mayor rides the subway to and from work every day," and included the train number, station and time of day in the story, along with the number of security guards accompanying him ("To these victors go the grudges," 2003).

In sharp contrast, however, several news items cited security concerns as a factor in not revealing details about executive protection. Although this lack of data does not lend itself to optimal content analysis, it is excellent news for those providing security and for their protectees, as security leaks into the media could have deleterious effects for principals, their workplaces, and their homes.

Although many news articles cited law enforcement as the source declining to provide details about security (Preston, 2004), there was one instance in particular where the media item seemed purposely not to report details that could pose a threat to a protectee. In this instance, a comment was made by Texas Governor Rick Perry, when criticized over the size of the house he selected as temporary quarters after the gubernatorial mansion was burned by arson. His exact words were as follows: "But there's 21 members of the governor's protective detail that use up probably a good third of the space" (MacLaggan, 2007). It is clear that revealing the exact number of agents on his detail was not good operational security on Perry's part. Although many media outlets quoted Governor Perry verbatim, one news report quoted him as saying, "But you know, there are [numerous] members of the governor's protective detail who use up probably a good third of the space" (Hoppe, 2007).

This example would seem to indicate that journalists self-monitor the information they provide in the media for security purposes. Although there is no mandatory ethical code for journalists, the Society of Professional Journalists has a voluntary Code of Ethics that seeks, among other things, to "minimize harm" by recognizing that "gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort" (National Center for Courts and Media, 2007; Society of Professional Journalists, 1996). Perhaps this guideline led the journalist in question to abstain from reporting a security detail unwisely revealed by a protectee.

It is all too easy for protectees, during contacts with the media, to inadvertently reveal highly sensitive information that could jeopardize their own lives, the lives of their families, and the security and well-being of everyone who works around them, just as Governor Perry did.

One instance, pertaining to the judiciary, involved a 2005 Public Broadcasting Service interview with U.S. District Judge Jane Roth, of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and former head of the U.S. Judicial Conference Security Committee. During the interview, which focused on the safety of judges, Judge Roth provided, in response to the reporter's questions, detailed information on which U.S. Marshals carry weapons in the courtroom, and on the type of security measures she has in her residence—including the breed of guard dog she has to protect her home (Werner, 2005). This level of detail could potentially have placed Judge Roth and her family at tremendous risk. Furthermore, her comments essentially jeopardized the safety and operations of the U.S. Marshals Service and placed every person in the courtroom in danger. The transcript is still, to this date, readily available for anyone with a computer to read on the PBS Web site. Anyone with a grudge against the court system could easily use this information against the judiciary, and the Internet now provides generalized access to this kind of data in perpetuity. Perhaps measures of protection need to include training protectees to safeguard sensitive security information, be it in their interactions with the media or with any unauthorized person.

A closer examination of the number of media items and resulting protective details, according to time period, shows an increase in the number of protective details reported since 2003, a trend that was first noted by the National Center for State Courts (2006). Table 2 illustrates this increase.

**TABLE 2** Number of protective details per media items reviewed, according to time period

Time period	Media items reviewed	Protective details
March 1999–August 1999	1	4
September 1999–February 2000	6	10
March 2000–August 2000	4	6
September 2000–February 2001	6	6
March 2001–August 2001	3	14
September 2001–February 2002	1	1
March 2002–August 2002	5	11
September 2002–February 2003	5	9
March 2003–August 2003	3	3
September 2003–February 2004	6	27
March 2004–August 2004	6	8
September 2004–February 2005	1	1
March 2005–August 2005	8	38
September 2005–February 2006	5	5
March 2006–August 2006	4	5
September 2006–February 2007	4	4
March 2007–August 2007	5	7
September 2007–February 2008	5	5
March 2008–August 2008	12	13
September 2008–February 2009	3	3
Totals	93	180

**TABLE 3** Protectee professions, as described in the media item pool, from March 1999 to March 2009.

Profession	Number of protectees
President	37
Vice president	10
Cabinet member	3
State leader	37
Local leader	8
Media celebrity	0
Author	0
Federal judge	39
State or local judge	1
Other public figure	13
Relative of public figure	8
Not employed	0
Retired	1
Presidential candidate	2
Vice presidential candidate	5
Not ascertained	2

Although there does not appear to be an increase in the number of media items devoted to protective details, the number of protective details increases sharply after 2003. The content analysis research does not provide reasons for this general upward trend, nor does the literature.

The highest number of protective details occurred in the time period between March and August of 2005, a figure that can be explained by the amount of coverage focusing on the case of federal Judge Joan Lefkow, whose husband and mother were murdered in her home (Wilgoren, 2005a). News items during that period tended to not only cover Judge Lefkow's situation, but also delved into the cases of other judges, as well as prosecutors and defense attorneys, who also received protective measures. A review of protectee professions reveals this group under the category "other public figure."

Federal judges constituted the largest population of protectees as noted in Table 3, followed by presidents, state leaders, and other public figures—including attorneys and prosecutors. Research on judiciary protection should perhaps not just center on the protection of judges, but should also encompass the protection of attorneys. Such an expansion in scope might yield information of value for executive protection in general.

Two cases of attacks on the judiciary that were notably absent from the item pool were those of Fulton County Judge Rowland Barnes, murdered in Atlanta, Georgia (Dewan, 2005), and Nevada family Judge Chuck Weller, wounded by a sniper in his chambers (Bellisle, 2006; Hengstler, 2006). Only one news item mentions Judge Barnes (Leonard, 2005), but in relation to the Lefkow murders, which occurred only 11 days before Judge Barnes' death. A report by the Fulton County Courthouse Security Commission (Fulton

County, 2005) makes no mention of any protection in place for Judge Barnes. It does note, however, that the judge and deputies protecting the courthouse knew of threats made by the assailant, Brian Nichols. It was agreed by all the parties, however, that Nichols' defense attorney was the most vulnerable and arrangements were made to have extra deputies available at the next court hearing. Sadly, no mention was made of providing Judge Barnes with a protective detail. In the case of Judge Weller, an Internet search does not provide any information that would indicate that he was under protection at the time he was attacked. Because no reports were found indicating that either Judge Barnes or Judge Weller had a protective detail at the time of the attacks staged against them, it explains why an Internet or database search of articles would not have included any media items pertaining to their cases.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Research results indicate a positive correlation between intrusiveness levels and degrees of success or failure of protective details, but more research is necessary, ideally through other research methods such as protectee surveys, to ascertain the strength and validity of this potential correlation.

The dearth of resources on protective details points to a need to develop more research in executive protection. Several new areas of research have emerged from this study that merit further investigation. They include the effect of culture on executive protection in general, and judicial security in particular, as well as a closer look at how different groups—protectees, protectors, the media, and the public at large—perceive and understand the need for protective details.

An examination of the various relationships involved in the protection process—the dyadic relationships between protectee and protector dyad, protector and predator, and protectee and predator are vital for a better understanding of the dynamics of executive protection and may serve to improve the effectiveness of protective details. Furthermore, the triad formed by the interrelationships of a predator, a protector and a protectee may also elucidate better protection methods.

For the judiciary, not only should the protective details of judges be the objects of research. Defense attorneys and prosecutors also face dangers and are placed under protection as a result. Understanding the protective process from their perspective may serve useful for the field of executive protection at large.

Last, it is of utmost importance to develop awareness in protectees, protectors, and the media of the need to protect secure information that could endanger a protectee if it were to fall into the wrong hands.

The protection of the judiciary is essential to maintain the rule of law and the justice system. In their own way, those who wear black robes and those

who wear silver stars—judges and their protectors, respectively—defend the judicial system by performing their duties daily in spite of the dangers those duties may entail. Their protection represents the protection of the values the United States holds dear.

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## APPENDIX A

### Sample Code Sheet

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CODER ID \_\_\_\_\_001\_\_\_\_\_ CODING DATE \_\_\_\_11/03/09\_\_\_\_\_

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Coding category Code

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- I. Media report information
  - A. Item ID number
  - B. Item date
  - C. Media report type
  - D. Item length (word count)
  - E. Item's degree of focus on protective details
- II. Protectee characteristics
  - A. Gender
  - B. Race/ethnicity
  - C. Age
  - D. Professional position
  - E. Number of years employed
  - F. Number of protective details in the past
  - G. Number of inappropriate communications and contacts (IC&Cs) received
  - H. Number of assaults suffered in the past
- III. Predator characteristics
  - A. Gender
  - B. Race
  - C. Age
  - D. Criminal history
  - E. Mental illness history
  - F. Number of predators Exact number (if provided) \_\_\_\_\_
- IV. Characteristics of inappropriate communications & contacts (IC&Cs):
  - A. IC&C
  - B. Type of threat
  - B. Method of delivery
  - C. Number of previous IC&Cs made
  - D. Number of current IC&Cs made
  - E. Date(s) of current IC&Cs
- V. Protective detail characteristics
  - A. Duration
  - B. Date(s) of protective detail
  - C. Presence of a threat
  - D. Geographic location
  - E. Setting
  - F. Nature of activities protected
  - G. Use of human resources in implementation
  - H. Number of agents deployed
  - I. Use of technologies in implementation
  - J. Use of bomb-sniffing dogs
  - K. Use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design techniques
  - L. Number of contact hours per day
  - M. Level of acquaintance between principal and protector
- VI. Intrusiveness of protective detail
  - A. Level of intrusiveness of protective detail
  - B. Words used to describe protective detail (list textually for inclusion in dictionary in the space below)
  - C. Source of comments on intrusiveness

- VII. Success/failure of protective detail
- A. Degree of success or failure
  - B. Evasive actions by protectee towards protective detail
  - C. Refusal of protection by protectee
  - D. Discontinuation of detail
  - E. Source of discontinuation of protective detail
- 

## APPENDIX B

### Codebook

#### **UNIT OF DATA COLLECTION:**

Data units consist of a single description of a protective detail for a single protectee, contained in a media item. If a media item contains more than one description of a protective detail, or if it describes protective details for multiple protectees, it will be coded more than once, with separate code sheets for each single description of a protective detail.

#### **DEFINITIONS:**

**Protectee:** the person requiring executive protection measures (also referred to as the **principal**).

**Protective detail:** a security assignment protecting a public figure, including members of the judiciary, at home, in the workplace, or during travel, ranging from escorting a protectee to the workplace to providing the protectee with round-the-clock protection for extended time periods (adapted from United States Marshals Service, January 2007).

**Threat:** a type of inappropriate communication explicitly expressing intended violence. The threat may be direct (e.g., “I will kill you”) veiled (e.g., “You’ll get what’s coming”) or conditional (e.g., “You must do what I say, or else I will . . .”); adapted from Calhoun, 1998; Fein & Vossekuil, 1998).

**Assault:** the threat or use of force causing someone to fear imminent harm or physical injury (adapted from Black’s Law Dictionary, 2001).

**Inappropriate communication or contact (IC&C):** any message of a questionable or suspicious nature that causes concern, even without constituting a threat, made verbally, in writing, through another person, or through suspicious activities. Threats are but one type of inappropriate communication (adapted from Calhoun, 1998; Calhoun & Weston, 2003).

**Predator:** a person who may have the interest, motive, intention, and capability of mounting attacks against public officials and figures (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998).

**Intrusiveness:** a protective detail's degree of interference, interruption, or invasiveness of someone's personal or professional life, based on a rating scale ranging from no intrusiveness to high levels of intrusiveness.

**Success/failure of a protective detail:** the detail's ability to keep a principal free from harm throughout the duration of the protective detail, from onset to conclusion, and measured through a rating scale, ranging from failure (*inability to protect a principal from harm for the duration of the detail*) to success (*ability to protect a principal throughout the full term of the detail*).

### **COMPLETING THE CODE SHEET:**

**Coder ID:** List the ID number of the coder filling out the code sheet.

**Coding Date:** Provide the date the code sheet was completed.

### **I. Media Report Information**

**A. Item ID Number:** Write the media item's four-digit ID number, found on the top right side of the item's first page, and corresponding to the item's electronic file name.

**B. Item date:** List the item date, using the format mm/dd/yyyy. If no date is provided, write "n.d."

Note: The item date may differ from the date or dates of the protective detail, or the date of the incident leading to the assignment of a protective detail. Refer to Section IV, Item E, and Section V, Item B to note such dates if they appear in the article.

**C. Media Report Type:** Indicate the type of media item coded, according to the following list:

1. News article
2. News transcript
3. Editorial
4. Interview
5. Government agency report
6. Government publication
7. Journal article
8. Magazine article
9. Press agency report
10. Other
11. N/A (not ascertained)

**D. Item Length:** Calculate the media item's word count by using the Word Count feature in Microsoft Word. Note the length of the news item according to word count by selecting from the following list:

1. Under 600 words
2. 601–800 words
3. 801–1000 words
4. 1001–1200 words
5. 1201–1500 words
6. 1501–1800 words
7. 1801–1999 words
8. Over 2000 words

**E. Item's Degree of Focus on Protective Details:** Indicate whether a protective detail is the item's main or secondary topic.

1. Main topic
2. Secondary topic
3. N/A (not ascertained)

## II. Protectee Characteristics

**A. Gender:** Note the protectee's gender. If the article does not note gender, code as 3, even if the protectee's gender is common knowledge. It is acceptable to use grammatical articles (he/his, she/her) to determine the gender as stated in the article and to use the protectee's name to determine gender.

1. Male
2. Female
3. N/A (not ascertained)

**B. Race/Ethnicity:** Provide the protectee's race or ethnicity. If the article does not note race, code as 3, even if the protectee's race is common knowledge.

1. White
2. African American
3. Hispanic
4. Asian/Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Other
7. N/A—not ascertained

**C. Age:** Specify the protectee's age.

1. 0–20 yrs
2. 21–40 yrs
3. 41–60 years

4. 61–80 years
5. 81 years and above
6. N/A—not ascertained

**D. Professional Position:** Report the protectee’s job or professional status during the time of the protective detail. If the protective detail is assigned to a presidential or vice-presidential candidate, code as 14 or 15, respectively, even if they are also serving simultaneously as a cabinet member or state leader. If the protectee is retired and protected, code as 13; if, however, the article refers to a protective detail while still employed, code under the position held during the protective detail.

1. President
2. Vice president
3. Cabinet member
4. State leader
5. Local leader
6. Media celebrity
7. Author
8. Federal judge
9. State or local judge
10. Other public figure
11. Relative of public figure
12. Not employed
13. Retired
14. Presidential candidate
15. Vice presidential candidate
16. N/A—not ascertained

**E. Number of Years Employed:** Indicate the protectee’s years of employment at the time of the protective detail.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 0–5 years
2. 6–10 years
3. 11–15 years
4. 16–20 years
5. 21 years and above
6. N/A—not ascertained

**F. Number of Protective Details in the Past:** Note the number of protective details experienced by the protectee prior to the detail described in the media

item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1–3
- 2. 4–6
- 3. 7–10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A—not ascertained

**G. Number of Inappropriate Communications and Contacts (IC&Cs)**

**Received:** Note the number of inappropriate communications and contacts received by the protectee. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1–3
- 2. 4–6
- 3. 7–10
- 4. and above
- 5. N/A—not ascertained
- 6. Multiple IC&Cs, but number not specified

**H. Number of Assaults Suffered in the Past:** Note the number of assaults previously suffered by the protectee. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1–3
- 2. 4–6
- 3. 7–10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A not ascertained

**III. Predator Characteristics:**

**A. Gender:** Note the predator’s gender. If no predator is mentioned, code as 4.

- 1. Male
- 2. Female
- 3. N/A—not ascertained
- 4. No predator mentioned

**B. Race:** Provide the predator's race or ethnicity. If no predator is mentioned, code as 8.

1. White
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Asian/Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Other
7. N/A—not ascertained
8. No predator mentioned

**C. Age:** Specify the predator's age. If not stated in the media item, code as 6 (N/A, not ascertained). If no predator is mentioned, code as 7.

1. 0–20 yrs
2. 21–40 yrs
3. 41–60 years
4. 61–80 years
5. 81 yrs and above
6. N/A—not ascertained
7. No predator mentioned

**D. Criminal History:** Indicate the presence of a criminal history in the predator's background. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0. If no predator is mentioned, code as 3.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained
3. No predator mentioned

**E. Mental Illness History:** Indicate the presence of a history of mental illness in the predator's background. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0. If no predator is mentioned, code as 3.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained
3. No predator mentioned

**F. Number of Predators:** Indicate whether the article denotes more than one predator. If not noted in media item, code as 2. If none, code as 0. If no

predator is mentioned, code as 4. If an exact number of predators is given, please note on the space provided.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Single predator
2. Multiple predators (list exact number, if provided)
3. N/A—not ascertained
4. No predator mentioned

#### **IV. Characteristics of Inappropriate Communications & Contacts (IC&Cs; adapted from Calhoun, 1998):**

**A. IC&C Type:** If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Explicit threat
2. Non-threatening, but causing concern
3. Assault on protectee
4. Attempted assault on protectee
5. Damage to protectee's property
6. Damage to protectee's workplace
7. Other
8. N/A—not ascertained
9. A combination of above

**B. Type of Threat:** Select the description that most closely fits the current threat(s) stated in the media item. If the threat falls into multiple categories, code as 10. If not noted in the media item, code as 12. If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 12. If there was an assault or attempted assault, but no threat is mentioned, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Direct (if the threat clearly designates the victim and the perpetrator, such as "I'll kill you.")
2. Veiled (if the threat is unclear as to the victim and/or the perpetrator)
3. Immediate (if the threat's time frame is immediate. Look for words such as "today," "tomorrow," or "soon.")
4. Deferred (if the threat time frame is delayed by time or condition, such as "in ten years," or "if you find me guilty.")
5. Physical (if the threat explicitly expresses intent to cause physical harm)
6. Intangible (if the threat does not explicitly express intent to cause physical harm)
7. Specious (if threat is not accompanied by evidence of action)
8. Enhanced (if there is evidence of an effort to carry out the threat)

9. Violent (if there was violence against a victim or property in carrying out the threat)
10. A combination of any of the above
11. Other
12. N/A—not ascertained

**B. Method of Delivery:** Indicate how the IC&C was delivered. If there is no IC, code as 0. If the media item notes an IC&C but does not state a delivery method, code as 8. If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Through informant
2. Verbal/by telephone
3. In writing
4. Verbal/face-to-face
5. Electronic (e-mail, Internet)
6. By mail
7. Other
8. N/A—not ascertained
9. A combination of the above

**C. Number of Previous ICs Made:** Note the number of IC&Cs made by the predator in instances prior to the protective detail described in the media item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

1. Absent (none)/INAP
2. 1–3
3. 4–6
4. 7–10
5. 11 and above
6. N/A—not ascertained
7. Multiple threats but number not specified

**D. Number of Current IC&Cs Made:** Note the number of IC&Cs made by the predator in the incident leading to the protective detail described in the media item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 1–3
2. 4–6

3. 7–10
4. 11 and above
5. N/A—not ascertained
6. Multiple threats but number not specified

**E. Date(s) of Current IC&C(s):** Follow the instructions on the code sheet to note the exact date, date range, or approximate date of the IC&C(s) if indicated in the media item. If the media item does not provide a date, code as 4. If none, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Exact date provided in article (If yes, list date on space provided in code sheet)
2. Article provides a date range (example: August 21–23, 2008) (If yes, list date range on space provided in code sheet)
3. Article provides an approximate date/date range (example: late August, 2008)
4. N/A—not ascertained

#### **V. Protective Detail Characteristics**

**A. Duration:** Indicate the range of duration of the protective detail. If the media item does not indicate the assignment of a protective detail, code as 0. If the item indicates the presence of a protective detail but does not state its time frame, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. days or less
2. 8–14 days
3. 15–30 days
4. 31–60 days
5. 61–90 days
6. 91–180 days
7. 181 days and longer
8. N/A—not ascertained

**B. Date(s) of Protective Detail:** Follow the instructions on the code sheet to note the exact date, date range, or approximate date of the threat(s) if indicated in the media item. If the media item does not provide a date, code as 5. If the media item describes multiple protective details, fill out a separate code sheet for each one.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Exact date provided in article (If yes, list date on space provided in code sheet)

2. Article provides a date range (example: August 21–23, 2008) (If yes, list date range on space provided in code sheet)
3. Article provides an approximate date/date range (example: late August, 2008)
4. Article provides a start date but no end date
5. N/A—not ascertained

**C. Presence of a Threat:** Indicate the presence of a threat that led to the assignment of the protective detail. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained

**D. Geographic Location:** Select the geographic region where the protective detail occurred. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not disclose the detail's location, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Northeast
2. Midwest
3. South
4. West
5. Overseas or in U.S. territories
6. N/A—not ascertained
7. A combination of the above

**E. Setting:** Choose the setting where the protective detail occurred. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not disclose the detail's location, code as 5.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Workplace
2. Home
3. During travel
4. A combination of above
5. N/A—not ascertained
6. Other

**F. Nature of Activities Protected:** Note the types of activities protected by the security detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not state the nature of the activities protected, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Professional
2. Personal
3. Both
4. Other
5. N/A—not ascertained

**G. Use of Human Resources in Implementation:** Note whether the protective detail involved the use of agents or other personnel involved in executive protection. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not list an amount, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained

**H. Number of Agents Deployed:** Choose the range that most closely describes the number of agents utilized in the protective detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no agents were deployed, code as 0. If the media item does not list an amount, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 1–3
2. 4–6
3. 7–10
4. 11 and above
5. N/A—not ascertained

**I. Use of Technologies in Implementation:** State whether the protective detail required the use of technology, such as alarm systems, GPS monitoring, radio frequency monitoring, CCTV, or computers. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the protective detail did not require the use of technology, choose 0. If the media item does not indicate the use of technology, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained

**J. Use of Bomb-Sniffing Dogs:** Note whether the protective detail involved the use of canines trained to detect the presence of bombs or other explosive devices.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A—not ascertained

**K. Use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Techniques:** Indicate the use of CPTED techniques in the protective detail, such as clearing shrubbery away from windows or installing lights operating with a movement sensor.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A—not ascertained

**L. Number of Contact Hours per Day:** Choose the range closest to the number of contact hours between the protectee and the protectors during the course of the day.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. 1–4
- 2. 5–8
- 3. 9–12
- 4. 13–18
- 5. 19–24
- 6. N/A—not ascertained

**M. Level of Acquaintance between Principal and Protector(s):** Select the range that best describes the degree of acquaintance between the principal and the protector(s). If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not state the degree of acquaintance, code as 7. If the item notes acquaintance without noting the length of time involved, code as 6.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Unacquainted
- 2. Acquainted for under 90 days
- 3. Acquainted for 91 days to 1 year
- 4. Acquainted for over 1 year but less than 5 years
- 5. Acquainted for over 5 years
- 6. Acquainted for an unspecified length of time
- 7. N/A—not ascertained

## **VI. Intrusiveness of Protective Detail**

**A. Level of Intrusiveness of Protective Detail:** Select the degree of intrusiveness based on the descriptions provided by the media item, if any. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no descriptive details regarding intrusiveness are provided, code as 6.

- 0. Absent/INAP (select if there was no protective detail)
- 1. Nonintrusive (protective detail causes no interruption or interference in protectee’s personal or professional life)

2. Minimally intrusive (protective detail causes minimal interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g., use of technology or CPTED)
3. Moderately intrusive (protective detail causes moderate interruption or interference in protectee's professional or personal life, e.g., escort to workplace)
4. Highly intrusive (protective detail causes high degree of interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g., 24/7 protection for weeks at a time)
5. Severely intrusive (protective detail causes severe interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g., 24/7 protection for extended periods, such as years, use of armored vehicles, use of bomb-sniffing dogs, inability to travel or work with ease)
6. N/A—not ascertained

**Words used to describe protective detail.** List the descriptive words and phrases textually on the code sheet in the space provided. The coding dictionary will include all descriptors collected from the code sheets.

**Source of comments on intrusiveness:** Note who provides the description of the protective detail's level of intrusiveness in the media item. If the source is unclear, note as 7. If no comments were made regarding intrusiveness, code as 7. If there was no protective detail, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Protectee
2. Protectors
3. Family member
4. Acquaintance
5. Document author
6. Other
7. N/A—not ascertained
8. Multiple sources

## VII. Success/Failure of Protective Detail

**Degree of success or failure:** Select the degree of success or failure of the protective detail according to the values listed below. Base your selection on the descriptions provided by the media item, if any. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no descriptive details regarding success or failure are provided, are provided, code as 3. If the protectee was unharmed but a family member or a member of his workplace team was harmed, code as 4.

- 2 Failure resulting in death of protectee
- 1 Failure resulting in injury of protectee
- 0 Absent/INAP
- +1 Success—protectee is attacked but unharmed
- +2 Success in which protectee is neither attacked nor harmed
- 5 N/A—not ascertained
- 6 Other

**Evasive actions by protectee towards protective detail:** If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item notes evasive actions by the protectee, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of evasive actions by the protectee, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A—not ascertained

**Refusal of protection by protectee:** If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item indicates that the protectee refused protection in any way, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of refusal of protection by the protectee, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A—not ascertained

**Discontinuation of detail:** If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item mentions the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A—not ascertained

**Source of discontinuation of protective detail:** Note who discontinued the protective detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item states that the protective detail was discontinued, but does not note the source, code as 6. If the media item makes no mention of the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 7.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Protectee
- 2. Law enforcement authorities
- 3. Family member

4. Acquaintance
5. Other
6. N/A—not ascertained
7. No mention of discontinuation
8. More than one source listed above

## APPENDIX C

### Dictionary of Descriptors of Protective Details

The following dictionary is a compilation of terms used to describe the intrusiveness of protective details, gleaned from a random selection of media items published from March 1999 to March 2009. Each entry includes the term used as a descriptor, its frequency of use in the item pool, the context in which the term appeared in the referenced media item, and the source using the term.

Each term, within each of its contextual units, is assigned a descriptive value on the basis of the following categories:

- +2 Highly positive
- +1 Positive
- 0 Neutral
- 1 Negative
- 2 Highly negative

Term	Frequency	Contextual unit	Source	Value
advance agent	2	"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordinance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support" (Burton & West, 2008).	author	+2
anonymity	9	"... if agents were forced to testify, it would compromise their anonymity and jeopardize their proximity to the president" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	author	+1
around the clock	11	"Federal marshals shadowed the prosecutor, who doesn't want to be identified, around the clock for a month" (Ove, 2003).	author	+2
		"... federal marshals camp around the clock waiting, waiting, waiting for the next terror or, more probably, for the next time the judge is ready to step outside to Barnes & Noble or the hair salon."	author	+2
at all times	4	"... covered at all times ..." (Zolt, 2000).	protector	+2
attracted to	1	"... close by at all times ..." (Zolt, 2000).	author	+2
bodily	2	"... there was wide speculation among Susan watchers that she had become attracted to one of the Secret Service agents assigned to protect her" (Ferguson, 2001).	author	+2
brother	14	"... the agent may have to move the president bodily-place his hands on hips or shoulders-so as to direct him away from an assassin's knife or bullet" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
bug	1	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail. ... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2
		"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might	author	-2
canine officer	1	about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
change	46	"... the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion, and even by K-9 officers" (Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002).	protectee	-2
chauffeur	13	"... it would change my style of campaigning and how it would limit what we might do" (Preston, 2004).	author	-1
		"Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur Lefkow around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch" (Schmich, 2005).	author	-1
close	82	"... close by at all times ..." (Zolt, 2000).	author	+1
		"Hinckley said that he was dissuaded from shooting Carter because the Secret Service entourage was protecting him so closely."	predator	-2

Term	Frequency	Contextual unit	Source	Value
coach	3	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail. . . . In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2
comings and goings	3	"... the comings and goings of Susan and her protective detail" (Ferguson, 2001).	author	-1
confidence	10	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable" (Abrams, 2001).	protectee	+2
		"The visit had provided great pleasure to an enfeebled FDR, but it would never have taken place had he felt more remote from the agents or believed that they might betray his confidence."	author	+2
confidentiality, confidential	22	"... tradition of silence and confidentiality" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
		"... confidential nature of the material to which the agents were exposed" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
constantly	7	"... the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
continuous	3	"Mrs. Johnson's residency at the LBJ Ranch meant the continuous presence of her Secret Service protective detail" (Wilson, 2007).	author	0
countersniper	3	"... the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion" (Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002).	author	+2
		"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support" (Burton & West, 2008).	author	+2
covered	9	"... covered at all times" (Zolt, 2000).	protector	+2
		"it covered Vice President Cheney's every move." (Ragavan, 2002).	other	+2
different	47	"... life as they know it would still be normal. It would just be slightly different" (Fuchs, 2000).	protector	-1
discretion, discreet	4	"... the intimacy that depends on total discretion" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
dlog handler	1	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable" (Abrams, 2001).	protectee	+2
		"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support" (Burton & West, 2008).	author	+2
duty	30	"... what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+1
elite	13	"... the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion" (Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002).	author	+2

envelope	2	"... profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
explosive	12	"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support" (Burton & West, 2008).	author	+2
flanked	2	"... walking down a Chicago street flanked by federal marshals" (Schmich, 2005). "In the hallway, she stands flanked by marshals, like an actor poised for curtain call (Schmich, 2005)."	author author	-2 -2
friend	93	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail. ... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2
grated	1	"... the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
guard	87	"... the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
hamper	2	"The agents ... constantly hamper his ability to interact with the voting public (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
handyman	1	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail. ... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2
hear, heard	98	"... hear conversations with our family or guests that might about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
hide, hiding	3	"... what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties" (Abrams, 2001). "... to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002). "There's no hiding behind a chief of staff or a protective detail" (Moscow-Pullman Daily News, 2009).	author author author	0 -2 -2
honorable	5	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable" (Abrams, 2001).	protectee	+2
hover	6	"... while they hover around the bridal shop, the theater or the grocery store with their sunglasses and their cell phones" (Schmich, 2005).	author	-2
informer	1	"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
interaction, interact	8	"... private presidential speech or action in the Oval Office, in his bedroom, in his limousine, or in his interactions with foreign leaders in Washington or abroad" (Abrams, 2001). "The agents ... constantly hamper his ability to interact with the voting public" (Abrams, 2001).	author author	+2 -2
intimacy	1	"... the intimacy that depends on total discretion" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2

Term	Frequency	Contextual unit	Source	Value
intrusive, intrusion, intrude	9	"Will any president accept such intrusive behavior" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
		"The agents intrude on his privacy" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
		"... a panic button was installed under a table near Owens's desk so she can summon help if there is an intrusion" (Mosk, 2001).	author	-2
life	56	"... a protective detail for life" (Zolt, 2000).	author	+2
		"... observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
lifestyle	2	"... a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign."	protectee	-2
	36	"The polite tenderness they exchange sometimes looks a lot like love" (Schmich, 2005).	protectee	+1
love	3	"Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur Lefkowitz around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2
		"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support" (Burton & West, 2008).	author	+2
metal detector	3	"... the agent may have to move the president bodily" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
	38	"it covered 'Vice President Cheney's every move" (Ragavan, 2002).	other	-2
move	16	"If a President feels that Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what they might have seen or heard, then it is likely that the President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
		"... life as they know it would still be normal. It would just be slightly different" (Fuchs, 2000).	author	+2
normal	19	"... observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	protector	-2
	10	"... shift his travel plan" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
observe	38	"... replan his travel route if required" (Abrams, 2001).	author	0
	2	"... he complained that he 'was really a prisoner now.'" (Abrams, 2001)	author	-1
prisoner	53	"... private presidential speech or action in the Oval Office, in his bedroom, in his limousine, or in his interactions with foreign leaders in Washington or abroad" (Abrams, 2001).	protectee	-2
		"... a President could not count on privacy" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
private, privacy		"The agents intrude on his privacy" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
		"All gone, along with her privacy, her autonomy" (Schmich, 2005).	author	+2

privilege	64	"... protective function privilege" (Abrams, 2001; Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002; Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	author	+2
proximity	7	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable" (Abrams, 2001).	protectee	+2
		"... if agents were forced to testify, it would compromise their anonymity and jeopardize their proximity to the president" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	author	+2
rat out	1	"... you guys ratted out the president" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	protector	-2
regret	8	"... regretted needing it" (Preston, 2004).	protectee	-2
relationship	35	"... the president's relationship with his protectors" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
		"... to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	author	-2
restrict,	15	"... restrict him from leaving his limousine until it is safe" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
restriction				
risk	20	"... a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign" (Preston, 2004).	protectee	-2
secrecy	1	"The agents ... see risk where none exists" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
security	523	"Secrecy existed from the time the service first assumed its protective role" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+1
see, seen	85	"He would much have preferred less security than more" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
		"... what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties" (Abrams, 2001).	author	0
		"The agents ... see risk where none exists" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-1
		"... to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky" (Ragavan, Schmitt et al., 2002).	author	0
serious,	26	"We took it seriously" (Ove, 2003).	protectee	+2
seriously				
severe	7	"... a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign" (Preston, 2004).	protectee	-2
shadow	6	"Federal marshals shadowed the prosecutor, who doesn't want to be identified, around the clock for a month" (Ove, 2003).	author	+2
shepherd	2	"Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur Lefkow around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch" (Schmich, 2005).	author	-2
shift	21	"... shift his travel plan" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-1
		"Their schedule may be grueling; when the president is abroad, an eight-hour shift may stretch to eighteen or twenty-four" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
silence	9	"... tradition of silence and confidentiality" (Abrams, 2001).	author	+2
snitch	1	"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2

(Continued on next page)

Term	Frequency	Contextual unit	Source	Value
sobering	2	"... a sobering reality" (Ove, 2003).	author	+2
space	16	"... a sobering experience" (O'Connor & Rucker, 2005). "But there's 21 members of the governor's protective detail that probably use up a good third of the space" (Root, 2007).	protectee protectee	+2 -2
squealer	1	"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might be about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
stool pigeon	1	"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might be about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
surround, surrounded	13	"... profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him" (Abrams, 2001). "In her solitude, she feels surrounded; in her loneliness, robbed of the right to be alone" (Schmich, 2005).	author author	-2 -2
tight travel	8 65	"... profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him" (Abrams, 2001). "... shift his travel plan" (Abrams, 2001).	author author	-2 -1
trust	38	"... replan his travel route if required" (Abrams, 2001). "... an atmosphere of trust" (Abrams, 2001). "The President trusted Mike Reilly (chief of the White House detail) more than most of his cabinet (Abrams, 2001). "The marshals are there to make her less afraid, but their presence tells her to be wary. Wary of her reflex even now to trust" (Schmich, 2005).	author author author	+2 -2 -2
uncomfortable	2	"... profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him" (Abrams, 2001). "If a President feels that Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what they might have seen or heard, then it is likely that the President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby" (Abrams, 2001).	author protectee	-2 -2
unobtrusive wary	1 4	"... as unobtrusive as possible" (Zolt, 2000). "The marshals are there to make her less afraid, but their presence tells her to be wary. Wary of her reflex even now to trust" (Schmich, 2005).	protector author	+2 -2
watch	40	"... the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion" (Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002). "Now she's watched, always watched. By the media. The marshals. Who knows who else" (Schmich, 2005).	author author	+2 -2
wiretapper	1	"... the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human 'bug,' squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might be about on private or policy matters" (Abrams, 2001).	author	-2
zealous	2	"... the most zealous protection" (Ragavan, Bradley et al., 2002).	author	+2