

35. Data from an unpublished paper by Carlos A. Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle e Silva, as quoted in dos Santos, "Pós-Revolução Brasileira," pp. 258, 264.

36. On Brazilian party history, see Lamounier and Meneguello, *Partidos Políticos*.

37. See works cited in n. 22, above.

38. Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in *The Breakdown of Democracies*, ed. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

39. The importance of law schools throughout the nineteenth century and up to 1945 is beyond dispute. Resistance to Vargas' Estado Novo and again to the post-1964 military governments gave them a new lease on life. The Brazilian Lawyers Association was a basic reference point for the opposition during the decompression period.

40. A detailed analysis of Geisel's economic and political strategies can be found in Lamounier and Moura, "Economic Policy and Political Opening."

41. Perhaps we can interpret in this light the familiar finding that support for the democratic "rules of the game" is often more a matter of elite ethos than of mass attitudes. On "collective goods" as a tool in political analysis, see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).

42. Even more serious than the influence exerted by such companies is perhaps the lack of coordination that results from their autonomous power, which leads several authors to talk about Balcanization, or feudalization. See dos Santos, *Poder e Política*, p. 123; and Luciano Martins, *Estado Capitalista e Burocracia no Brasil Pós-64* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985), p. 81.

43. The redistributive arena affects income and wealth, consequently producing very visible and highly organized contenders; the regulatory deals with the conditions under which certain activities will be exercised; finally, the distributive is what, broadly, one would call clientelistic politics, based on highly divisible and thus rather invisible decisions. Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (1964): pp.

44. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 50.

45. The important critique of Lijphart's consociational model by A. O. Cintra and Plínio Dentzien, in *A Ciência Política nos Anos 80*, ed. Bolívar Lamounier (Brasília: Editora da Universidade, 1982).

46. Article 2 of the Constitutional Act of Finland states that the legislative power shall be exercised by Parliament together with the president and that the supreme executive power is vested in the president of the republic.

47. The West German system is clearly proportional, but the principle has been operationalized so as to allow for a "personalized" (majoritarian) choice of half the seats allocated to each party. No less important from our point of view is the choice of the other half by means of closed lists, in order to enhance the authority of the party as such over individual candidates.

48. Of course, we are here discussing long-run prospects. The new Constitution (October 5, 1988) has lifted the restrictions that the military had imposed on congressional powers—including those pertaining to economic and budgetary matters. But a full appreciation of the new Constitutional structure and its possible impact on democratic development requires another essay.

• CHAPTER FOUR • Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without Democracy

DANIEL C. LEVY

Alone of the countries examined in this volume (and exceptional in the series, *Democracy in Developing Countries*) Mexico has had no significant twentieth-century experience (and precious little prior experience) with democratic rule. Instead, Mexican politics has displayed considerable disdain for the public competition and accountability integral to liberal democracy. Nevertheless, Mexico merits inclusion in our comparative study for three reasons: (1) the nation's overall importance; (2) theoretical insights distinguishing the bases of democratic and stable civilian rule; and (3) notable if uncertain democratizing developments in recent years. The first reason is obvious; this chapter will focus on the others, especially the second reason.¹

The dominant theme here is that many factors commonly associated with good prospects for democracy have been present in Mexico without promoting that result. Moreover, the very achievement of Mexico's major political success—stability—has presented obstacles to democratization. Naturally, observers have long realized that democracy and stability are empirically and analytically separable. But a strong tendency lumps the two together as one desired outcome. Many of the hypotheses orienting this comparative project illustrate this tendency. Although distinct measures are developed for democracy and stability, democratic stability appears as the key dependent variable.

Among recent attempts to explore difficulties in achieving democracy and stability together, some have concentrated on why democracies fall. For other nations discussed in this volume, but not Mexico, we can analyze democratic periods, democratic breakdown (or consolidation), and "redemocratization." Another line of inquiry concerns the conditions under which authoritarian regimes become democratic.² But the literature on that process deals overwhelmingly with military regimes—typically very exclusionary and coercive—and to a limited extent with narrow personalistic regimes. Unlike either "bureaucratic-authoritarian" or personalistic rule, Mexico's authoritarianism has much of the institutionalization, breadth, forms, pacts, and legitimacy often associated with democratic government.

In fact, many factors associated with democratic stability have promoted,

1976); José Murilo de Carvalho, "As Forças Armadas na Primeira República: O Poder Desestabilizador," Belo Horizonte, UFMG, *Cadernos do Departamento de Ciência Política* no. 1, March 1974. On the nineteenth-century National Guard, see Fernando Uricoeschea, *O Minotauro Imperial* (São Paulo: Difel, 1978).

12. Control of the credentials commission (Comissão de Verificação de Poderes) of the federal chamber was the key to the system, since through it undesirable deputies eventually elected in the states would not be allowed to take up their position. This became popularly known as *degola* (beheading). Souza provides an excellent treatment of this question: "If the sedimentation of the [state] oligarchies was essential to consolidate the federation, it was also the reason for its future weakness. Contrary to the imperial framework, rotation in power among static oligarchies now became impossible." See Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, "O Processo Político-Partidário na Velha República." In *Brasil em Perspectiva*, ed. Carlos Guilherme Mota (São Paulo: Difel, 1971), p. 203.

13. There is an extensive literature on the Revolution of 1930. Especially useful for our purposes is Campello de Souza, "Processo Político-Partidário." See also Boris Fausto, ed., *O Brasil Republicano*, 3 vols. (São Paulo: Difel, 1978, 1982, and 1983); Hélio Silva, *A Revolução Traída* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1966); and two volumes of conference proceedings: UFRGS, *Simpósio sobre a Revolução de 1930* (Porto Alegre: Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul, 1982); and UnB, *A Revolução de 1930: Seminário Internacional* (Brasília: Editora da Universidade, 1982).

14. Nunes Leal, *Coronelismo*, p. 170-171.

15. Protofascism is used here in the same sense given to it by James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism* (New York: Free Press, 1969), Ch. 2. He deals with important theoretical precursors, such as Gumplowicz, Pareto, and Mosca, stressing their antiparlamentarianism, their view on the relation between elite and mass, on the function of political myths, and the like.

16. On the corporatist "regulation" of citizenship, see Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *Cidadania e Justiça* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus, 1979). Comprehensive accounts of the corporatist features of the labor relations system can be found in P. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971); and Amaury de Souza, *The Nature of Corporatist Representation: Leaders and Members of Organized Labor in Brazil* (Ph.D. Diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978).

17. The name of Gilberto Freyre comes readily to mind in connection with race relations and nationality in Brazil. On these themes, see T. Skidmore, *Black into White* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). The impact of these developments in Brazilian political culture was of course enormous in the 1930s and as a support to the Estado Novo. The factual importance of these core beliefs has been recognized quite broadly in the ideological spectrum since then. On intellectuals and culture policy in that period, see Simon Schwartzman et al., *Tempos de Capangema* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1984); Sérgio Miceli, *Intelectuais e Classe Dirigente no Brasil (1920-1945)* (São Paulo: Difel, 1979); Lúcia Lippi de Oliveira, *Estado Novo—Ideologia e Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982).

18. On the downfall of the *Estado Novo*, see Mario do Carmo Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos no Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Ômega, 1976); T. Skidmore, *Política in Brazil: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Peter Flynn, *Brasil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1975). On the UDN, see Maria Vitória Benevides, *UDN e Udenismo* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981).

19. The literature on Vargas' second government is surprisingly small. In addition to the works of Flynn and Skidmore, already cited, see Maria Celina Soares D'Araújo, *O Segundo Governo Vargas, 1951-1954* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982); and Edgard Carone, *A República Liberal II* (São Paulo: Difel, 1985).

20. Useful data on bureaucratic growth under the Estado Novo can be found in Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, *Estado e Partidos Políticos*. On economic policymaking from the 1930s to the mid-1950s, see John Wirth, *The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970); and Luciano Martins, *Pouvoir et développement économique au Brésil* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1976).

21. J. G. Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building," p. 284.

22. An overview of these hypotheses and of the relevant literature can be found in Bolívar Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, *Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática: O Caso Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1986), sect. 4. Rigorous analysis of the crisis leading to 1964 was pioneered by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *The Calculus of Conflict: Impasse in*

Brazilian Politics (Ph.D. Diss., Stanford University, 1974). Important works for the understanding of executive-legislative relations in the 1950s and early 1960s include: Celso Lafer, *The Planning Process and the Political System in Brazil* (Ph.D. Diss., Cornell University, 1970); Maria Vitória Benevides, *O Governo Kubitschek* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976); and Lúcia Hippolito, *PSD: De Repostas e Reformistas* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1984).

23. On the ambiguities of military-directed institution-building after 1964, see Juan Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil." In Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil*; Bolívar Lamounier, "Authoritarian Brazil revisited"; Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, *Poder e Política: Crônica do Autoritarismo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1978). Roett synthesized those ambiguities as follows: "In Brazil, although the latitude given to the civilian political process is severely compromised, it does exist. The commitment to political participation—limited, elitist, and manipulable as it is—is strongly rooted in Brazilian constitutional history. Geisel's efforts at decompression were part of that historical belief that there should be a more open system." See Riordan Roett, "The Political Future of Brazil," in *The Future of Brazil*, ed. William Overholt (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978).

24. Before independence and especially before the intensification of mining, in the early eighteenth century, the local chambers (*câmaras municipais*) were almost exclusively made up of landowners and had virtually unlimited authority, concentrating executive, legislative, and judiciary functions. Their members were chosen by means of a crude electoral system set forth in the *ordenações* of the Portuguese Crown. During the nineteenth century, detailed regulations were established to control local and statewide elections. Needless to say, the franchise was limited and voting was not secret. In addition, the empire kept the tradition of not allowing a clear distinction between legislative and executive functions at the local level: an elected local executive would appear only under the republic, and especially after 1930.

25. On bureaucratic continuity, see Raimundo Faoro, *Os donos do Poder* (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1958); for a comparative analysis, see Merquior, "Patterns of State-Building"; on the military organization, see Coelho, *Em Busca da Identidade*.

26. See Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, "A Pós-'Revolução' Brasileira." In *Brasil: Sociedade Democrática*, ed. Hélio Jaguaribe (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1985).

27. Sylvia A. Hewlett, "The State and Brazilian Economic Development." In Overholt, *Future of Brazil*, p. 150.

28. Russett calculated Gini coefficients for inequality in land tenure circa 1960 in forty-seven countries and found Brazil to be the thirty-sixth from low to high concentration. See Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics." In *Readings in Modern Political Analysis*, ed. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 150-162. There is no reason to assume that landed property is less concentrated today than in the 1960s. What did happen was that agrarian social relations became thoroughly capitalist. Landed property in Brazil was never "feudal" in a technical sense. Land was essentially used for capitalist purposes; i.e., to produce for a market or to function as a reserve of value in a highly inflationary economy. True, social relations were often paternalistic and exploitative, but this, too, is now undergoing rapid change.

29. The literature on growth and income distribution in this period is, of course, voluminous. A convenient starting point is Ricardo Tolipan and Artur Carlos Tinelli, eds., *A Controvérsia sobre Distribuição de Renda e Desenvolvimento* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1975); see also Edmar Bacha, *Os Mitos de uma Década* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1976); Clarence Zuvekas, Jr., "Income Distribution in Latin America: A Survey of Recent Research," Center Essay no. 6, Center for Latin America, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, July 1975; and World Bank, *World Development Report 1983 and World Development Report 1986* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

30. Douglas H. Graham, "The Brazilian Economy: Structural Legacies and Future Prospects." In Overholt, *Future of Brazil*, p. 122.

31. World Bank, *World Development Report 1986*, Table 24, pp. 226-227.

32. See José Serra, "Ciclo e Mudanças Estruturais na Economia Brasileira do Pós-Guerra." In *Desenvolvimento Capitalista no Brasil—Ensaio sobre a Crise*, no. 2, ed. L. G. Belluzzo and Renata Coutinho (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1983), p. 64.


33. The following account of class structure in relation to the corporatist system draws heavily on dos Santos' important essay, "Pós-'Revolução' Brasileira."

34. See dos Santos, "Pós-'Revolução' Brasileira," p. 258; see also Carlos A. Hasenbalg, *Discriminação e Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 1979).

in Mexico, a civilian authoritarian rule that has managed the most impressive political stability in all Latin America regardless of regime type. No other major Latin American nation has sustained civilian rule throughout the postwar period; Mexico's predates that period. In terms of our measures of stability, no regime in the region matches Mexico's in durability and legitimacy built through periods of change, conflict, and challenge. Despite recent developments, including increased challenges and decreased support, efficacy, and effectiveness, Mexico has ranked in the category of stable polities, albeit bordering on partially stable. Unlike Latin American systems that are partially stable because they have not consolidated new regimes, Mexico's difficulty concerns erosion of previous consolidation.

Assessments of stability have been clearer than assessments of democracy in Mexico. The latter have been excessively influenced by dominant paradigms in comparative politics in general and Latin American studies in particular. An irony is that interpretations of Mexican politics have changed so much while the system itself has remained remarkably stable. In line with burgeoning literature on political development, Mexico was typically depicted in the 1950s and most of the 1960s as incompletely but increasingly democratic. Probably the most cited work emphasized an evolution toward Western democracy in rising interest-group activity, participation, inclusiveness, national identity, legitimacy, and functional specialization, alongside declining personalism. Mexico fell short on its citizenship base and leadership selection largely because the regime had pursued "suitable social and economic conditions" before democratic goals, but those conditions had made Mexico ready for democracy.³ Subsequently, however, Mexico was almost consensually depicted as authoritarian, with democratic tendencies not ascendent. Linz's seminal work on authoritarianism was widely employed by Mexicanists, and Mexico was even overzealously tied to bureaucratic authoritarianism. Recently, interpretations of complex blends of authoritarianism and pluralist forces have been developed.⁴

From 1945 to 1985, Mexico ranked between third and seventh among twenty nations on the best-known (if controversial) ratings for Latin American democracy.⁵ Mexico ranks much lower in this volume, however, as all the other cases except Chile currently fit our basic definition of democracy. Mexico falls far short on three elements of democracy, though some qualification is pertinent in each case: (1) Mexico has lacked meaningful and extensive competition among organized groups for major government office, though competition is increasing; (2) participation does not reliably extend to leadership selection through fair elections, though neither is that element entirely absent and elections are regular; and (3) civil and political liberties have been insufficient to guarantee the integrity of competition and participation, but they have been significant and variable rather than minimal. Similarly, Mexico falls into the lowest category (failure/absence) in this study's six-part "summary scale" of democratic experience because there has been no extended period of democracy, and little immediate prospect for it. However, democratic space has increased in re-



cent years, and the future is far more uncertain than it has been for decades.

Regarding this study's classification of democratic stability, Mexico comes closest to the "hegemonic party" system. The dominant party does not tolerate genuine challenges (i.e., alternatives) to its rule, it claims almost all subfederal posts, and electoral fraud is common. Still, the party does not regularly take the high vote percentage cited for hegemonic systems. More broadly, our overall definition of democracy is heavily weighted toward electoral dimensions, long a weak area for Mexico. Thus, the Mexican case shows some significant features of "semidemocracies," including substantial room for expression, and suggests that hegemonies are not necessarily the least democratic of authoritarian nations.

This chapter identifies basic roots of Mexico's complex system of stable civilian rule without democracy, and more specifically considers the editors' hypotheses about stable democracy. Finally, it analyzes prospects for democratization and the role the United States might play.

First, however, a preliminary qualification must be inserted here. This chapter was written before the 1988 electoral campaign took shape and hurtled towards an exciting, unprecedented finish. In the election's immediate aftermath, no serious observer has more than questionable ideas about most of the implications for democracy. What is clear is that the elections were the most competitive in spirit and result of any in modern Mexican history and that they vastly increased uncertainty about the future of Mexican politics. Even if Mexican politics undergo transforming changes, however, it will be important to understand the long-standing reality that preceded (and undoubtedly would help shape) those changes.

• AN UNDEMOCRATIC PAST: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS •

Mexico's political heritage is authoritarian. There is less democratic precedent to analyze than in any other country considered in this volume; viable democratic rule has been virtually absent. A point highlighted by Wiarda in the Dominican case is particularly relevant in the Mexican case: Democratic experiments historically proved ineffective, in contrast to certain authoritarian periods.

Great precolonial civilizations, such as the Aztec, presaged a pattern of relatively strong authoritarian rule. Spain's centuries-long rule was similar in that respect. Some observers see not only precedent but causal roots in these experiences. According to Octavio Paz, the Aztec *tlatoani* introduced imperial, priestly, institutional rule, and colonialism introduced Arabic-Hispanic reverence for the personal *caudillo*: "I repeat: there is a bridge that reaches from *tlatoani* to viceroy, viceroy to president."⁶ And much has been made of the contrast between authoritarian and "liberal" colonizations by Spain and England, respectively.

Independence (1821) brought neither democracy nor stability. Federalist-centralist conflicts were among the most important. The lack of stability crippled hopes for economic growth, which in turn contributed to further instability. Despite examples of autonomous local rule, liberal projects were weak. Liberal rule was extremely short-lived, as was the presidency of Valentín Gómez Farias in the 1830s, until the Reform (1855–1876). The Reform is probably the closest Mexico has come to democracy. It featured a belief that democracy (however restricted) was compatible with stability and growth; a liberal constitution; substantial liberties; some significant elections; and some socioeconomic mobility and educational expansion alongside attacks on large landholders, including the church. On the other hand, the Reform was limited in mass inclusiveness and hostile to Indian communitarianism. Yet, democracy often begins with public contestation restricted to certain groups. Mexico's liberal experiment failed because it could not build sufficient strength. French imperial intervention, though eventually beaten back, was debilitating. Mostly, liberal democratic forms were used by antidemocratic forces. Regional *caciques* used decentralized authority to block reform. As it often has in Latin America, Congress represented *cacique* and other oligarchic interests in conflict with a liberal executive.⁷ The weakness of liberal experiments with decentralized political authority would not go unnoticed by twentieth-century leaders.

Always fragile, the Reform faded after leader Benito Juárez's death (1872). A split over the 1876 presidential succession opened the way for a military coup. Porfirio Díaz became supreme dictator. For the first time, independent Mexico achieved political stability and economic growth. The regime was repressively authoritarian: Gone were free elections; diminished was freedom of the press. Commonly for Latin America, some democratic formalities were preserved, but Díaz's reference to Congress as his herd of tame horses was indicative of the basic realities. The *porfiriato*'s positivist notions of progress through permanent evolution, accompanied by economic growth without distribution and political stability without democracy, offer broad historical parallels to the contemporary regime.

Among factors ultimately bringing down the *porfiriato* (1910), contemporary optimists about democracy might speculate on both repressiveness and economic growth leading to calls for democracy; but the main reason for the regime's fall was its unwillingness to allow political mobility among the elite. In any case, Díaz's fall was precipitated by his quickly inoperative pledge not to seek reelection in 1910. Francisco Madero held Díaz to his rhetoric about free elections, and Díaz's attempts at electoral fraud were his end. Madero won Mexico's uniquely free (if still limited) election and became president (1911–1913). He led those whose agenda was "a return to '57," the Reform constitution, and "free suffrage, no reelection." Considerable democracy blossomed. For example, Congress was autonomous of the executive and the scene of powerful debates among very antagonistic forces. Division of power (federalism) and separation of power (including judicial review) were important for Madero.

But such democratization proved largely irrelevant for Mexico. Democratic, competitive structures did not lead to the destruction of Porfirian forces including *caciques*, governors, bureaucrats, the military, and a partially revitalized church. Madero even appointed former Díaz aides to government positions, while he tended to exclude revolutionary groups. In other words, this democratic leader, so popular in 1911, neither destroyed the old order nor constructed a viable new one. Although a good deal of the literature on transitions to democracy stresses the need for pacts among elites, probably the major weakness in Madero's approach, reflected in his inattention to socioeconomic problems, was failure to strengthen democratic forces by adding a mass base. Of course, whether Madero could have successfully done so is unknown. After his assassination (covertly aided by the United States), other leaders would incorporate the masses—undemocratically.

Years of revolutionary warfare among various armies brought mass mobilization and, especially, death and destruction. By 1916, a million Mexicans had died, and nearly as many had emigrated. Compared, for example, to Emiliano Zapata's peasant army and its demands for land reform, Venustiano Carranza's ultimately victorious constitutionalists were not committed to fundamental socioeconomic change. In subsequent years, some observers would even question whether a real revolution had occurred. In any case, the revolution would become a symbol of mass involvement, progressive change, and nationalism, skillfully manipulated by the regime to bolster its legitimacy. By 1940, the revolution would be "institutionalized," the fragile stability forged since 1916 safely deepened. Two crucial factors in building this postrevolutionary stability were pacts among those elites not destroyed by the revolution, and organized integration of mass groups.⁸

President Carranza only partly recognized these two necessities, but he accepted provisions that gave the 1917 Constitution strong mass appeal as a legacy of the revolution. These included a minimum wage, an 8-hour workday, workman's compensation, land reform, and notable nationalist measures. Equally significant, the Constitution ambiguously blended democratic aspirations with authoritarian realities: popular sovereignty; free elections; guarantees for individual rights; federalism; separation of powers; and a potent national government in general and presidency in particular.

Between them, Carranza's two powerful successors, Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles extended the state's ties to and control over mass agrarian and urban labor interests. Yet, when their terms ended (1928), the regime's stability was still much in doubt. All three presidents had plotted to rule beyond their constitutional terms; two had been assassinated. Major groups still competed violently; and none was powerful enough to end the nation's political stalemate.

At this point, Mexico experienced two moments of great political leadership, the kind in many ways associated with democratic consolidation. The leadership that stabilized Mexico's civilian rule would be undemocratic in

means (not unusual in democratic consolidations) but also in ends. First, Calles engineered a grand pact among elite power-holders. Convincing them that without compromise they faced defeat or endless uncertainty, he brought them to support creation of a civilian institution (the party) that would centralize authority for the regime on the basis of bargains, including elite circulation through peaceful means. Second, ironically, Calles' successor had to block his personalistic attempt to regain and perpetuate his rule.⁹ Although Calles had the edge among elites, Lázaro Cárdenas fortified the incorporation of the masses, as he won their allegiance not only to himself but to the regime. Critically, however, Cárdenas was not responding to autonomous demands from below. His modes were corporatist; he was in fact a proclaimed opponent of bourgeois democracy.

By the time the immensely popular Cárdenas peacefully relinquished power to a moderate successor (1940), the regime was sufficiently institutionalized to pave the way for more than a quarter-century of maximum strength and stability, followed finally by increasing weaknesses but not instability.

• CIVILIAN RULE WITHOUT DEMOCRACY •

This section analyzes four topics identified as crucial to democratic development. For each, I explore how basic features have evolved and operate, how they serve civilian stability but not democracy, and what challenges have recently emerged in Mexico.

State-Society Relations

State relations with mass groups approximate "state corporatism" much more than pluralism.¹⁰ The regime has significant control over organizations that bring the masses into the system. Participation and interest-group demands are seriously limited. In fact, much of the Mexican population is unorganized and politically "marginal"; it does not express discontent, or it asks for help from a political mediator without demanding rights. Even formal, organized groups often react to more than participate meaningfully in policy formation.¹¹

Encapsulating mass organizations obviously is antithetical to democracy. It also greatly limits the democratizing option available in Venezuela's *trienio* when the AD party could organize peasants and workers. Those groups have already been organized in Mexico, into an undemocratic party. On the other hand, the early incorporation of mass groups has promoted stability. It has given the regime a wide base, which has been used to boost the regime's autonomy from business. Mainly, however, incorporation has made organized dissent on the Left extremely difficult. Such dissent threatens other regimes, particularly when mass mobilization leads to elite fears and military coups. The Mexican

regime has repeatedly been able to effect austere economic policies that would bring revolt in other nations.¹² Thus, the regime's mass base has sustained civilian rule even while it has been undemocratic. Additionally, because major threats have been forestalled in Mexico, the regime has been able to use less repressive force than have many other authoritarian regimes in Latin America.

As one of two major organized mass groups (the peasantry is the other), labor verifies the pattern of state corporatism. Labor power, including access to rewards, is concentrated in one dominating union, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which Cárdenas carefully grafted onto the official party. Crucially, labor was incorporated and granted benefits from above, more than independently organized for the conquest of rights.¹³ Labor leaders have helped make Mexican unions "moderate" but neither autonomous nor democratic. Occasionally, when independent labor movements have threatened to become powerful, the regime has resorted to severe repression (as in the late 1950s); but usually the regime has relied on the undemocratic internal structure of organized labor and its ties to the regime.¹⁴ A big challenge has emerged, however, with the economic crisis of the 1980s. As Waisman points out in this volume, Argentine labor corporatism worked to give the government support only as long as the workers reaped the benefits of redistribution. In Mexico, the regime has long carefully funneled benefits to organized labor, but real wages have recently plummeted.

However formidable, corporatist controls are far from complete. Even official trade unions often bargain hard for benefits, and some leaders have increased their criticism of regime policies. Further, independent labor movements have precedent and recently became usually active, at least until economic setbacks in the 1980s. Attention has focused on the electrical workers' *Tendencia Democrática* and parallels for telephone workers, miners, and teachers. Third, the CTM's share of the organized work force is diminishing, and the regime's economic opening of the 1980s could further weaken it.

Whereas qualifications must be made to a corporatist view of state-labor relations, such a view is fundamentally inappropriate for state-business relations. Reasonable scholarly debate exists over past relations. Some "peak" business associations have been established by government, mandatory in inclusiveness, and dependent (on government) in matters ranging from subsidies to leadership selection. But a good case can be made that domestic business, even including older associations such as the Confederation of Industrial Chambers and the National Chamber of Manufacturing Industry, has long worked with government because of mutual self-interest and "inducements" more than coercion and "constraints"; has been economically strong and politically able to influence regulatory, trade, and other policies; and has expressed a "sectorial consciousness" involving some "adversary relationship with political elites."¹⁵ In any case, this more pluralist view holds for newer associations, such as the Entrepreneurial Coordinating council and the Mexican Employers' Confederation, and increasingly for traditional ones. The economic populism of President

Luis Echeverría in the early 1970s weakened state-business ties by scaring and alienating business and by hurting the economy. Today, harsh and repeated business criticism of the regime simultaneously jeopardizes political stability and shows considerable freedom of expression.

Juxtaposition of business and labor relations with the state illustrates how the balance between freedom and corporatist controls usually depends on social class. Consider highly educated groups. Granted, dependency on the state goes far beyond what is found in the United States in terms of employment opportunities and professional associations. But intellectuals and other professionals have been much freer than workers to control their affairs and even to criticize the government. Despite the potential corporatist tie of depending almost fully on the state for income, Mexico's public universities have substantial though circumscribed autonomy from government. Furthermore, groups within the public universities have considerable freedom of expression and power to affect institutional policies, as the massive and successful student demonstrations against academic reforms proposed in 1986 illustrate.¹⁶ Private universities, holding roughly 15 percent of the nation's more than 1 million enrollments, add significantly to state-society pluralism.¹⁷

What, then, of the infamous events of 1968, when the government killed hundreds of protesting university students? The slaughter was a watershed in views about Mexican democratization: It convinced many of the regime's unalterably repressive nature. But my view is that limits on protest are not so fixed. Behavior that lies within the "logic" of this authoritarian system is not inevitable behavior; at other times, other Mexican leaders have been more tolerant. To be sure, the student protests of 1968 were unprecedented for the widespread questions they so actively raised about the lack of democracy in Mexico. And 1968 serves as a chilling and restraining reminder of the state's possible violent response to protest, a response much more commonly visited on poorer groups.¹⁸

One rule demarking zones of permitted and unpermitted freedoms can be identified as central to Mexico's exclusion from the democratic category: Organized dissent that poses a realistic alternative to the regime is forbidden. Violations usually bring harsh repression along with co-optation. Even this formidable restriction leaves some room for pluralism and, especially, individual freedoms.¹⁹ Religion provides an example of both the restrictions and the possibilities. After the revolution broke the church's tremendous political-economic power, a *modus vivendi* allowed it considerable autonomy in religious-cultural-educational affairs—beyond what the Constitution ostensibly permits. In turn, the church has not been allowed the opposition voice heard in Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in Latin America—though some Mexican church leaders have recently supported opposition party calls for democratization with free elections. Meanwhile, individuals are free to worship (or not) as they please, and several religious and ethnic minorities have significant group autonomy. Mexico has no official religion.

Of course, some such societal freedoms (e.g., private schooling and freedom to travel) lack a direct political component or offer opportunity for the privileged only. Nonetheless, evidence of increased vibrancy and inclusiveness in political life abounds. As president, Echeverría criticized the nation's basic development model. Under José López Portillo (1976–1982), Mexico enjoyed an unusually open (though still partly managed) debate over whether to join the GATT. Under Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988), the freedom to advocate alternative policies reached new heights, though presidential claims that policy was often made through popular consultations were mere pretense. The 1988 electoral campaign then opened considerably more space for free expression.

While this tendency to use the increasing democratic space has been most evident among privileged groups (as in middle-class organizations on environmental issues), it also extends to popular sectors. A basic factor has been disenchantment with government, particularly given the consequences of continued economic crisis. (A catalyst was the earthquakes of 1985; the government appeared impotent in reacting.) Some see scars and challenges that go beyond 1968 and could promote "an initial democratization of Mexico's political institutions."⁷⁰ Individuals have formed associations to deal with urban problems such as homelessness, tenant conditions, schooling, and other public services. Although spontaneous association has considerable precedent in Mexico, one wonders whether a new era has begun. Recent behavior can be contrasted to Fagen and Tuohy's well-known depiction of "depoliticized" urban life, where management substitutes for politics and most people believe that government should or will handle their political affairs.⁷¹ The new vibrancy in Mexican politics alters traditional state-society patterns associated with stability; indeed, it has resulted from both the state's success in modernizing and diversifying society and from its declining legitimacy.

My points about societal freedom—its limits and growth—are illustrated by analysis of the media. First, outright repression and censorship exist. Despite the pluralism apparently offered through the multiplicity of outlets, mostly private, dependence on government is insured through official control of newsprint and the need for licenses. Mostly, however, smooth state-media relations reflect overlapping elite interests. Mutual interests on "macro" orientations such as growth and stability without major redistribution are supported by "micro" support through government advertising revenue, corrupt stipends for reporters, and the like. In return, government has counted on fairly favorable reporting and a lack of the information a citizenry needs for responsible democracy with accountability. Where the media come closest to escaping such restrictions, we tend to see elite pluralism. Most independent publications, including newspapers (e.g., *Uno Más Uno* and *La Jornada*), magazines (e.g., *Proceso* and *Nexos*), and academic books are not only expensive but appeal to the educated minority. Electronic media are much safer in content. Television's conservative banality is crucial. Thus, the most vigorous areas of contestation are the ones that reach the least inclusive audience. Additionally, considerable room

exists for fundamental Marxist critiques of the immutable state but much less for practical critiques including policy alternatives.⁷² Where coverage of such alternatives is found, it is often in the cautious form of citing what various officials and others have said, avoiding in-depth analysis.

Nevertheless, coverage of true dissent is increasing. Repression of the nation's leading independent newspaper in 1976 has been followed by the greatest media freedom contemporary Mexico has known. It has included investigative reporting and public opinion polls concerning increased cynicism about government, and prominent calls for widespread democratization. All this, however limited, contributes to a new era of democratic challenge.

Government Centralization

In turning now from state-society relations to the structure of the government, we turn from elements intrinsic to democracy to elements hypothetically associated with democracy. That is, a system with widespread freedoms and pluralism is more democratic than one in which state corporatism rules society, whereas decentralized governments can exist in undemocratic systems and centralized governments can exist in democratic systems.

The editors have hypothesized a strong association between decentralization and democracy. The Mexican case is perhaps supportive of the hypothesis, but only indirectly, as it combines centralization with the absence of democracy. Much clearer is that centralization—geographically and in the presidency—has been crucial to civilian stability. As González Casanova's classic analysis showed, Mexico's antiliberal government structure must be viewed in historical context. Mexico City-based presidentialism with a hegemonic party ended military and legislative conspiracies as well as divisively unstable rule by regional and other *caudillos*. "Respect for the balances of power would have been respect for the conspiracies of a semi-feudal society."⁷³

Establishing central authority and national identity and security is a major problem for new nations. Mexico was unsuccessful in the nineteenth century. Into the 1920s and even 1930s, regional and village strongmen ruled outside the grasp of Mexico City. Such decentralized power had nothing to do with democracy; nor did the ensuing geographical centralization of power. Although aided by transportation and communication advances, a key was decisive political leadership by the likes of Obregón, Calles, and Cárdenas. Overcoming centrifugal antidemocratic forces is often a prerequisite to democratic consolidation. In Mexico, it proved crucial to stability but not democracy.

Mexico formally has a federalist structure with thirty-one states (plus the Federal District), which in turn are divided into over 2,000 supposedly free municipalities. State political structures parallel the national except that their legislatures are unicameral. In practice, a range of daily and other activities are handled by states, and the federal government usually intervenes only when conflicts are not locally contained. However, the very infrequency of explicit

interventions reflects (as we saw in state-labor relations) ongoing national government control over basic policy. In essence, presidents appoint the official party's gubernatorial candidates and depose troublesome governors. National cabinet ministries have delegates in each state, and stationed military officers represent national authority. States have very limited funds and depend on the national government for most of them. Similarly, municipalities depend on states and the national government regarding leadership and funds, and funds are very unevenly disbursed; most municipalities lack income beyond very small appropriations and fees from licenses and fines. Political careers have been made in Mexico City, not at the grassroots.

Electoral patterns have illustrated the centralized hold.²⁴ First in 1958, then in 1967, and especially since the 1977 reform, several opposition victories have been allowed at the municipal level. But the opposition has not gained a single governorship. And the official party still holds roughly 95 percent of the municipalities. Sometimes, as after the leftist victory in Juchitán, Oaxaca, the regime uses violence to oust the municipal opposition. Usually, the centralized party-government structure itself limits the importance of municipal opposition victories.

Centralization has recently come under strong attack, however. Disaffection runs especially high in the industrial north, though Mexico does not face the separatist threats that undermine stability in some Third World nations. Many Mexicans consider decentralization necessary for increased participation and democratization (suggesting some parallel to what Hartlyn finds for Colombia). Decentralization in implementation and, more controversially, in decision-making is increasingly linked to regime effectiveness and stability as well. Latell even portrays a fundamental split between "federalists" and "centralists." The former include many business and conservative opposition party leaders joined by a minority of government officials. President de la Madrid, while duly citing the historical necessity of centralization, called it "a grave limitation": "Centralist mentalities have become obstacles that distort democracy."²⁵ His administration claimed to have expanded municipal autonomy and increased access to local resources. In its 1988 campaign, the official party made decentralization a major theme.

But obstacles to decentralization remain enormous. Centralization goes beyond political to economic and social realms; economic crisis makes it hard to invest in decentralization; party leaders, governors, and many other government officials have vested interests in centralization; political traditions carry weight. Overall, decentralization involves risks. Even if overcentralization now threatens stability, sudden decentralization might threaten it more.

Centralization of power in Mexico City has meant centralization of power in the presidency. Constitutional provisions about the separation of powers within the federal government have had no more impact than provisions about the division of powers between federal and state governments. Mexico achieved stability not by defying authoritarian tendencies toward the enormous

concentration of authority in one leader but by limiting the leader's term. Apt are references to Mexico's "king for six years." The president has been central to policymaking, agenda setting, conflict resolution, key appointments, control over the party, and so forth. He heads a vast network of federal agencies (employing 17 percent of the nation's workforce), including many "parastatals."²⁶

Cardoso even called the Mexican president perhaps more powerful than any Southern Cone military president.²⁷ Such assessments probably underestimate three factors, however. One is the comparative limits of the Mexican state's control over society; the Mexican president can be no more powerful than his government. Second are the terrible disorders, rivalries, and duplications rampant in the Mexican federal bureaucracy. Third is the erosion of presidential strength in the last two decades, reflected in increasing attacks on presidents, once unthinkable, and widespread beliefs about the failures of at least the last three presidents. In fact, the last presidential "giant" was Miguel Alemán, who left office in 1952.

The presidency nonetheless has remained very powerful, largely because Congress and the judiciary have been so weak. Congressional debate and opposition continued into the 1920s but died with regime consolidation. Although taken opposition reappeared in 1940, executive initiatives have been approved unanimously or overwhelmingly. A function of Congress has been to show the rule of law in legitimizing executive action. Since the 1970s, however, political reform has expanded opposition representation, and one sees some coalition building, revelations about unpopular government actions, and greatly expanded debate.²⁸ The opening has included the appearance of cabinet officers to answer questions posed by the legislative opposition. Still, the legislature has lacked the openness or, especially, the power found in democracies. I must add, however, that the opening may well have grown dramatically in 1988. Opposition parties gained nearly half the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (as Table 11.1 will show) plus its first Senate representation, and vigorous protests were seen. However cloudy the prospects for policymaking power remain, unprecedented openness seems certain.

The judiciary has played a more important role than has the legislature (until recently) but also a limited one. It has been a place for privileged actors to protect their interests even against executive initiatives, particularly in the case of landlords working against land reform. Although it has handled disputes among citizens, it has not limited executive authority by interpreting the Constitution or executive actions. Nor has it, for example, yet dealt seriously with electoral fraud. No parallel has emerged for the liberalization occurring in the legislature. "Judicial reform" refers basically to speeding up the decision-making process. It has not referred to increasing autonomy from the executive.²⁹

Given common patterns of both Latin American politics and Mexican history from independence until roughly the 1930s, however, the main reason that government power is centralized in the presidency is that the military is subordinated. In the postwar era, only Costa Rica rivals Mexico in degree of subordina-

tion. Outside Mexico, subordination is generally associated with the establishment and defense of democracy, as in Costa Rica. But Mexico produced no Figueres, no democratic rule. Nonetheless, skilled political leadership was crucial in establishing civilian supremacy.

Presidents Obregón, Calles, and Cárdenas, themselves revolutionary generals (like all presidents until 1946, at least nominally) adeptly timed and executed measures to subordinate the military. These included: purges and other forced retirements and transfers (which minimized loyalty to given officers); welcome opportunities for corruption within the service and for business employment outside it; dependence on government salaries and social security; professionalization; cuts in military funding; creation of a viable political party; and incorporation of mass organizations into civilian structures. And since 1946, all presidents have been civilians.

Since the institutionalization of the regime, there have been no coups or serious threats of coups. The military has not been a powerful interest group blocking policies it does not like and forcing others. Its share of government expenditures has been famously low. The military has not been integrated with the civilian Right. All these factors distinguish Mexico from most of Latin America and help us understand the nation's stability.

Some signs of increasing military strength have recently appeared in role, stature, funding, modernization, and appointments of retired generals.³⁰ Still, a major change in the military's role remains very unlikely. The civilian regime would probably have to weaken so much as to need continual assistance to quell protests over austerity or electoral fraud. To this point, the Mexican military has loyally sustained rather than threatened civilian rule, but its loyalty is not to democracy.

The Party and Electoral Systems

Integral to both state corporatism and centralization is the dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The editors hypothesize that deeply institutionalized competitive parties are conducive to stable democracy. The PRI is deeply institutionalized. It has held power longer than any other party in Latin America and has reached widely into society. Yet this institutionalization has been conducive to a distinctly undemocratic stability. It has helped to encapsulate groups and to preclude alternative institutionalized parties.

From independence until the revolution, parties were mostly political clubs. The elections in which they participated "were not a mechanism of popular voting but a legitimization of military force."³¹ Of seventy-one governments (1823-1911), only seventeen were elected by constitutional norms. Even these involved indirect elections, open balloting, and so forth. The elected president almost always came from the incumbent party or group. Nonetheless, all new governments felt obliged to seek popular-constitutional legitimization through elections. Again, democratic ideology is juxtaposed to undemocratic reality.

Even after the revolution, parties continued to be weak, transitory, dependent on a single leader, without mass bases, and multitudinous. Then, however, a new party, continually juggled and deepened from 1929 to 1946 (when it became the PRI), replaced anarchic conflict and made elites play by institutionalized and legal rules. From 1929 to 1933, the number of parties dropped from fifty-one to four.³² Mass organizations were incorporated. Civilian rulers built a strong institution that could organize and distribute resources, thus helping to subordinate the military. Such developments are often associated with transitions to democracy, but in Mexico, competition among elites did not encompass open public contestation, and mass incorporation was corporatist.

Not surprisingly, then, the PRI has not concentrated on the functions expected of democratic parties. Its main mission has been neither to aggregate nor to articulate demands. It has not truly competed for power. Although it has always been—"until now"—"in power," the PRI has not had a major role in policymaking. Instead, it has concentrated on other party functions but has directed them to the service of the government of which it is really a part (even though party and government personnel are formally distinct). These functions include mobilizing support for the regime; suppressing dissent; gathering and manipulating information; distributing welfare and patronage; engaging in political socialization and recruitment; handling particularistic grievances; and providing an ideological rationale for government action. Unlike what one expects of democratic party systems, PRI's hegemonic rule has sustained socioeconomic inequalities, and the PRI wins its largest vote from the least privileged groups.

But the PRI has stumbled into critical difficulties. Once more, we see where new challenges to political stability suggest increased hopes for democratization. So integral is the PRI to the regime that all the regime difficulties already cited (e.g., the beleaguered presidency and the need for decentralization) are PRI difficulties as well. In fact, the PRI is crucial to the overall crisis of the "political class" that has so adeptly managed key aspects of Mexico's postrevolutionary affairs.³³ The party is not legitimizing the regime as it once did. Very high abstention rates (roughly 50 percent in 1979 and 1985) and the PRI's declining share of the votes cast illustrate the problem (see Table 11.1). In fact, PRI's decline suddenly accelerated in 1988 when even official tallies gave the party only a slim majority in the presidential vote and in congressional seats. One could imagine the PRI as the "party of pluralities," flanked by a powerful Right and Left. PRI's invincibility appears shattered.

PRI's crisis is a culmination of both relatively sudden problems, such as the imposition of austerity, and long-run problems. Perhaps a party built to handle a basically rural and uneducated society is ill-equipped for modern Mexico. Perhaps a party established without true democratic functions finds itself unprepared to compete openly for citizen support.³⁴ Efforts to reform the PRI naturally produce further tensions within the party.

In truth, most PRI reforms (at least until now) have been aimed less at

If democracy has been weak within the PRI, it has also been weak in the party system overall. Granted, opposition parties have existed and some have expressed considerable dissent. But until recently, they have served mostly to legitimize PRI-regime rule. In fact, opposition parties were largely government-created in the 1940s and 1950s. Co-optation was the norm at least until the 1970s.

On the Left, legal parties have usually been tied to the left wing of the PRI. The Popular Socialist Party, historically connected with mainstream labor, is the main example. Since the 1970s, however, independent leftist parties have arisen. The Communist Party, formed in 1919 but denied electoral registration from 1945 to 1979, has been the major party in recent socialist coalitions. But at least until 1988, the coalitions repeatedly split (as on whether to join rightist parties in pressing for free elections). Moreover, even when united, the electoral Left has had very little mass appeal.³⁶ This weakness reflects the lack of an organized independent Left in Mexican society, particularly given the state corporatism encapsulating labor and the peasantry. But in 1988 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (son of the revered ex-president) led dissident leftist PRI members into a powerful coalition with mostly leftist parties (although perhaps the campaign was as "populist" as "leftist"). The official count gave the coalition a startling second place with over three in ten votes. If (but it is not an easy if) the coalition could be solidified at local levels, and show itself not to be primarily a perfunctory or protest phenomenon, Mexico could take a major step toward multi-party democracy.

As Table 4.1 shows, the Right has had a much stronger sustained electoral presence, concentrated almost fully in one party. The National Action Party (PAN), formed in 1939, has functioned mostly as an institutionalized opposition, not pressing seriously to defeat the PRI. Recently, though, a significant

- a. 1946 was the PRI's first year: PRI forerunners had claimed 98% and 94% of the
- b. The PAN was not the major opposition winner.
- c. Since 1964, opposition scars have been based on outright district victories but over
- d. The PAN did not field a candidate.
- e. Starting in 1979, the new PR procedure took effect; I report the simple plurality
- f. Preliminary results for 1988 show the PRI claiming just over half the presidential
- the votes (31%) and the PAN with just over one-sixth (17%), and claiming 260

YEAR	PR1	PAN	PR1	PAN	OTHER
1946 ^a	78	^b	—	—	0
1952	74	^b	—	—	2
1958	90	9	—	—	3
1961	89	—	90	172	5
1964	—	—	86	175	20 ^c
1967	86	14	83	176	20
1970	—	—	80	178	20
1973	—	—	70	189	25
1976	99	^d	80	196	20
1979	—	—	70 ^e	296	43
1982	72	16	69	299	51
1985	—	—	65	289	41

Sources: Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 199–200; Secretaría de Gobernación, *Diario Oficial*, various; Comisión Federal Electoral, "The PAN, the Private Sector, and the Future of the Mexican Opposition," in *Mexican Politics in Transition*, ed. Judith Gentelman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming), Table 11.3, drawing on various sources.

c. Since 1964, opposition seats have been based on outright district victories but overwhelmingly on PR; I show the total figures. d. The PAN did not field a candidate. e. Starting in 1979, the new PR procedure took effect; I report the simple plurality vote rather than the separate, but quite close, PR vote. f. Preliminary results for 1988 show the PRI claiming just over half the presidential vote (51%) followed by the leftist Cardenas coalition with nearly one-third of the votes (31%) and the PAN with just over one-sixth (17%), and claiming 260 of 500 Chamber seats (with 139 for the leftist coalition and 101 for the PAN).

portion of the party has favored all-out competition in a democratic setting. Joined by the independent Left, the PAN advocates honest elections. It takes the lead in championing federalism and the separation of powers. Unlike the PRI, it selects candidates rather openly. Like the PRI and the opposition in general, however, the PAN usually fails to offer specific alternatives to PRI-government policies. Indeed, its ideology (including links to Catholic thought) has usually been ambiguous, though a business orientation is increasingly marked. The PAN's appeal is limited to certain regions, particularly in the north and urban areas, and to privileged groups. It does not even run candidates in many districts around the nation. It does not attract a major portion of labor or the peasantry the way, for example, some Christian-democratic parties have done (e.g., in Chile and Venezuela). Much of its vote has been a protest vote.

Opposition parties have gained more freedom and importance with the reforms inaugurated in 1977 and modified in 1986. Previous electoral reform had been very limited. Universal suffrage was achieved in 1954 and 1973 reforms on a 1918 base. Since 1963, the regime has reversed a 1929-1954 trend that greatly inhibited opposition-party formation and representation. The 1977-1986 reforms went much further with democratization. They allowed parties to register more easily and granted public funds and free media time. Most dramatic, however, was the procedure for modified proportional representation in the Chamber of Deputies. While 300 seats were still determined by plurality vote by district, first 100 and then 200 seats were open to a PR system; whereas the 100 were reserved for minority parties, the 200 were not, but then the majority party was restricted to a 350-seat maximum.³⁷ Even critics on the Left and the Right have generally acknowledged that the electoral system now provides more freedom, information, exposure, and alternative positions. Indeed, the 1988 elections indicated how profound the changes facilitated by the reform might be.

Why the opening? Mostly, the regime tried to arrest its declining legitimacy and respond in a controlled way to cries for democratization. Moreover, the regime wanted to make sure that dissent is institutionalized, not spontaneous.³⁸ Possibly, the regime also hoped to strengthen the electoral Left a bit to offset the PAN's growth. Nonetheless, to understand the regime's purposes is to understand that it still contemplated no full-blown democratization. Thus, several "reform" provisions aimed at insuring the PRI a legislative majority even were it to gain fewer than half the votes; a major problem is continued PRI dominance on the electoral body that supervises elections. Additionally, certain PRI leaders have blocked measures such as imposing reform on states.³⁹

The regime's disposition to increase freedom, choice, and competitiveness in the party system without democratically risking its rule has been verified in recent elections. Those of 1979, 1982, and 1983 were unusually clean. Opposition strength increased to where, in 1983, it captured mayoralities in five state capitals. Putting the best face on it, regime and PRI leaders claimed proof of competitiveness. Led on by presidential pledges to honor electoral results, and

by foreign press and governmental attention stimulated by recent democratization in Latin America, many looked toward imminent elections for much further democratization (including opposition governorships). How unrealistic they appeared in the 1984-1987 period. Resorting to an unspectifiable but apparently ample degree of fraud, the PRI took all cities in question in 1984, and all governorships in the next two years. Regime officials denounced critics of the elections for promoting foreign models at the expense of national sovereignty.

The regime would strengthen oppositions but, unlike true democratizers of the Betancourt stripe, not to the point that those oppositions could win.⁴⁰ For the real function of Mexican elections is still not to select parties, leaders, and policies through open choice, but rather to offer the hope, mobility, and regularized renewal necessary to maintain support for the regime.

Increasingly, however, voices are being raised against ratifying rather than democratic elections. Protest intensified with the 1986 Chihuahua elections. Hunger strikes, roadblocks, demonstrations, boycotts, and repeated denunciations ensued. The bishop ordered church closed one Sunday (though the Vatican overruled him). Clearly, protest was not limited to the PAN. Nor was it transient. On the contrary, the imposed PRI rulers in Chihuahua have had a hard time. Nationally, civic groups, religious leaders, and independent leftist parties joined the PAN in an unprecedented national alliance. They focused their attention on one issue—free elections. They established a National Forum for Effective Suffrage. They made specific proposals, including ones dealing with electoral financing and supervision. The regime, they said, "has for many years paralyzed national democratic development."⁴¹

And all this preceded the 1988 elections. Pressures for free and honest elections have become (and will likely remain) stronger than ever before. In fact, debate over fraud brought Mexico near a constitutional brink in 1988 as repeated large demonstrations and severe confrontations emerged over ratifying the reported results, access to stored ballots (blocked by the military), and calls for immediate new elections. So hard did major oppositions press their claims that some believe the regime ultimately bought acquiescence largely by committing itself in negotiation to more democratic procedures in future elections. In sum, prospects for free, clean elections are stronger than ever, but they are still uncertain.

Performance and Support

Until the 1970s at least, Mexico's strong civilian rule brought widely envied economic success and societal support. Like many nations in Latin America, Mexico relied heavily on import substitution. Unlike others, Mexico achieved average annual economic growth of over 6 percent from 1940 to 1970, and held its inflation low (under 5 percent annually) in the latter half of the period.

Economic growth promoted enormous social change. Today, roughly two-thirds of the population live in urban communities of 2,500 or more. Only about

one-third of the labor force remains in agriculture. A large middle class has developed, though it is still dwarfed by the lower class. Mexico has pulled itself to an average position among the larger, relatively developed Latin American nations with its 65-year life expectancy at birth, its infant mortality rate of fifty-six per 1,000 live births, its 83-percent adult literacy, and its dramatic improvements in caloric intake, access to primary schools, and energy consumption.⁴³ In turn, the regime has used economic growth in playing a prominent if selective role in social modernization. Even amid socioeconomic crisis in 1986, the president could point out that 86 million school textbooks were distributed free that year, while one in three Mexicans was in school, and that, from 1970 to 1986, the average number of years of schooling for the over-fifteen population had doubled (from three to six).⁴⁴

Of course, even official national figures show not just progress but underdevelopment. Moreover, these figures obscure regional and class inequality, both tragically high in Mexico. Such outcomes have been consistent with Mexico's striking internal contrasts in the distribution of power and freedom. In fact, government policies have contributed to inequalities. Promotion of capital-intensive industrialization has brought severe problems for rural Mexico and for employment of the less privileged. Hyperurbanization often means urban dwellers also suffer from a lack of piped water and sewage systems, and from increasing water, soil, and air pollution. Government social expenditures and services have been very unequally directed, in ways that reward some potentially dangerous groups while repressing and marginalizing others. Health benefits for unionized workers are a good example. Consistent with Mexico's elite pluralism, a wide network of private organizations, including schools, universities, and hospitals are available for the privileged.⁴⁵ Consequently, economic successes under civilian rule have been compatible with what a World Bank study called one of the world's worst profiles of income distribution.⁴⁶ As Table 4.2 shows, the profile did not improve even during decades of growth and selective mobility.

Table 4.2 Income Distribution in Mexico, 1950-1977^a

Income Group (deciles)	Percentage of Income Earned	
	1950	1977 ^b
1-2 (lowest 20 percent)	4.7	3.3
3-5	12.7	13.4
6-8	23.7	28.2
9-10 (highest 20 percent)	58.9	55.1

Source: Daniel C. Levy and Gabriel Székely, *Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); Table 5.6, based on data from ECLA for 1950 and 1963, and Mexico's Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto for 1977.

a. Similar but even more extreme data are reported in Werner Baer, "Growth with Inequality: The Cases of Brazil and Mexico," *Latin American Research Review* 21, no. 2 (1986): p. 198.

b. 1977 is the last year for which data are available. Although debate exists over whether distribution improved in the immediately ensuing years, it has certainly worsened in the last few.

Thus, or at least thus far, hypothesizes linking economic growth to the likelihood of democratic government are not supported in Mexico. Nor does Mexico fit the bureaucratic-authoritarian notion that dependent industrialized development leads at a certain point to instability followed by military rule. Instead, Mexican economic and social modernization has long reinforced stable, undemocratic civilian rule. Still, significantly, such modernization has also increased pressures for democratization.

However much long-term socioeconomic modernization brings pressures, it is probably the recent economic reversal that has most clearly brought pressures. Economic crisis dominated the 1980s. Many see its roots in policies designed for political, not economic, efficiency that built support from business, the middle class, organized labor, and even less privileged groups: protracted import substitution; a variety of credits and subsidies (e.g., for energy, universities, public transportation); low taxes; and bloated public employment. Unfortunately, the government's income increasingly failed to meet its expenditures and huge borrowing resulted. Added to all this, world oil prices fell sharply. And so, Mexico came to face a foreign debt of over \$100 billion, blocked and even negative growth, inflation rates of roughly 100 percent, and socially devastating declines in employment and real wages.

No one knows how much economic disaster will undermine political strength. What we do know is that careful manipulation of the fruits of economic success has long been associated with political strength and high support levels. That manipulation long helped sustain a myth of continual progress, which provided legitimacy. In fact, Mexicans have taken pride in their political system and credited it for many of the social and personal material successes they have seen, despite cynicism about politicians and low evaluations of the daily performance of government. Even much of the Left has granted legitimacy for the regime's progressive record in some socioeconomic and particularly nationalist matters.⁴⁶

A decline in long-standing legitimacy is illustrated by attitudes toward corruption; perhaps an increasingly modernized society has decreasing tolerance for it. In any case, corruption is a target of broadly rising popular discontent with a struggling system. And corruption is a target because it recently exceeded vaguely institutionalized limits, under President López Portillo. Thus, de la Madrid made what appeared to be the most serious in a line of presidential commitments to curb corruption. Some measures were taken, such as requiring financial statements from top government appointees and punishing a few ex-officials. By virtually all accounts, however, the clean-up campaign was disappointing. Explanations are varied but, historically, corruption has figured in the regime's performance and legitimacy. We have already seen that opportunities for corruption helped bring the military under civilian control. Additionally, corruption has provided some flexibility in an often unresponsive bureaucracy. It has provided an incentive for major and minor actors to seek rewards within the system and to rely on the peaceful turnover of personnel. It

has provided glue for many implicit political pacts among elites and has been integral to patron-client and state-society relationships.

Whether corruption on the Mexican scale is compatible with significant democratization is uncertain. I think it is not. At the same time, corruption is illustrative of factors that may now increasingly undermine legitimacy even as the system has not yet found satisfactory alternatives, democratic or otherwise.

• THEORETICAL ANALYSIS •

I have tried to show how several factors commonly associated with democratic stability have in Mexico long contributed to stable civilian rule that is not democratic. I have referred throughout to this study's hypotheses about democracy, but I now summarize the argument in the explicit context of those hypotheses. A major problem in so doing is that the hypotheses deal with factors that contribute to democracy, whereas Mexico is not a democracy. Repeatedly, we identify where Mexico has lacked a characteristic associated with democracy, but that offers only indirect evidence to sustain the hypothesis.

Political Culture and Legitimacy

We have seen that political legitimacy in Mexico has been high, though diminishing. Mexicans have been remarkably accepting of their political system. Whether because of a national trait of stoicism, or the fear of disorder, or belief in the regime's positive orientations, Mexicans have at a minimum not rebelled even when their aspirations have been long frustrated, and many have maintained pride in their system.⁴⁷

With respect to democratic values, works on Mexico's "national character" have often depicted hierarchical, authoritarian, submissive, and other undemocratic inclinations. They suggest that such character traits help promote Mexico's authoritarian politics; political culture both explains and legitimizes the political system. On the other hand, most social scientists have been either skeptical or hostile to such interpretations. I am inclined to the Purcells' position: Political culture appears to reinforce the system but it is "striking how much of Mexican politics can be comprehended by a model of the rational political actor."⁴⁸ Others argue that the political culture is basically at odds with the political structure. They find that Mexicans support participation and dissent and oppose censorship.⁴⁹

If evidence on deep values remains inconclusive, evidence on behavior is not. Mexico's regime has not been precariously superimposed on a society filled with democratic practices. The society never was so constituted, and the revolution brought new and strong but mostly undemocratic institutions. State corporatism goes hand-in-hand with hierarchical, authoritarian rule inside mass institutions such as unions. And it goes hand-in-hand with limited mass participation, encapsulated and restricted to official channels; patrimonial networks;

and petitions rather than aggregated demands. Allowing for recent signs of increased grassroots participation, the rule has been to hope that government acts. Efficacy increases with socioeconomic status, however.⁵⁰ Participation by elites is much freer and more influential, but elite institutions (media, intellectual publications, businesses, private schools, and universities) often operate undemocratically. Pluralism exceeds democracy.

Yet elites display a behavioral norm hypothesized (in this book and elsewhere) to be powerfully associated with democracy. This is the disposition to compromise. Ongoing politics confirm our historical (postrevolutionary) evidence of flexibility, bargaining, moderation, restraint, and pacts that avoid "fights to the finish."⁵¹ In Mexico, acceptance of such norms has contributed to regime consolidation and stability without democracy. First, though elite pacts in democracies often limit mass participation, Mexico's corporatist mass inclusion is distinctly antidemocratic. Second, the restraint in the elite pacts has covered the exclusion of open, organized competition for rulership.

Overall, my view is that the Mexican case presents interesting information on the relationship between political culture and democracy, but not information that strongly confirms or disconfirms major project hypotheses.

Historical Sequences

Mexico scores low on the historical dimensions associated with democracy. Mexico lacks sustained, successful democratic precedents. In fact, it has had few experiments with democratic government. If the present regime has precedents, they are chiefly authoritarian. Where it democratizes, it innovates.

Moreover, Mexico has not followed Dahl's favored route of early liberal contestation followed by mass incorporation.⁵² Rather, Calles, Cárdenas, and others adeptly incorporated mass organizations into a corporatist system. If elite pacts in nations like Venezuela have limited the masses' ability to obtain socioeconomic benefits, Mexico's pacts excluded democracy. Mexico's pacts were aimed at controlling masses mobilized by the revolution and established viable, perhaps ingenious, alternatives to open elite contestation for power. Such is the conventional scholarly wisdom on sequences, which I accept. However, if one were to highlight the persistent marginality of unorganized Mexico and perhaps the rise of new groups, or if one were to reserve "inclusiveness" for a more independent mass participation, then Mexico might rank low on that dimension. In that case, recent political reforms expanding contestation, coupled with longer-standing and expanding personal freedoms, might then give some sense of liberalization preceding inclusiveness.

Class, Ethnic, and Religious Cleavages

Key hypotheses on class structure and cumulative cleavages do not suggest favorable conditions for democracy in Mexico. The distribution of wealth is terribly unequal, as data on income show. Despite massive land reform, large agri-

business and an impoverished, massive peasantry divide the land very unequally in terms of both the size and desirability of plots. Mexican agriculture is not characterized by middle-class farming. Moreover, many cleavages are cumulative. A common disadvantaged profile would include low-income, Indian-Mestizo, peasant, and rural south.

Indians form the largest ethnic minority, perhaps 10 percent of the population (depending on definition), though ethnic diversity is largely determined by the "European-Indian" mixes among Mestizos. The revolution brought some respect for Indian identity, and pockets of self-governance exist (with some direct democratic selection of leaders and policies). Mostly, however, the Indian population continues to be either marginalized or integrated into a servile underclass, despite some mobility for individuals. In turn, the "rule of law" and the state are often seen as oppressive alien forces by Indian communities. Of interest are increasing signs of ethnically based political demands.³³ Overall, however, Indian distinctiveness hardly translates into pluralist politics.

The regime has been effective in defusing the destabilizing potential of great societal diversity and cumulative cleavages. One way has been to grant autonomy to groups and institutions (e.g., religious) that avoid mainstream politics. This, of course, fits Linz's now classic notion of authoritarian regimes.³⁴

Second, the regime handles much of its politics in ways that cut across class cleavages—not on basic distributive policies but on symbolic and organizational ones. Symbolically, it has successfully used nationalism even if the concept means somewhat different things to different groups. Organizationally, it has structured itself on "vertical" patron-client relationships. This reinforces hierarchy and other undemocratic societal norms. The "formation of horizontal alliances based on common class interests is impeded" and the relationships serve "to maintain the separation between ideology and its social base."³⁵

Third, as noted earlier, the regime has been sophisticated in managing privileged groups differently from other groups. Allowing for important flexibility, and other qualifications, state relationships with mass organizations are corporatist, whereas state relationships with elite groups are much more pluralist. But autonomous elite organizations have not usually been run democratically, nor, perhaps more to the point, have they pressured for democratization. Instead, they have normally accepted a stable nondemocracy that has granted them considerable material reward and a substantial if restricted degree of freedom.³⁶

State Structure and Strength

Although state strength is a necessary condition for democratic stability, it is not sufficient. Lack of strength may doom a democratic experiment, but in Mexico state strength has meant the stability of an undemocratic system.

Building authority was a historic accomplishment of the postrevolutionary

regime. The regime's stability is unique in both historical and comparative perspective. The regime has centralized power, maintained order, and preserved civilian rule. It has created an adept political class, while controlling mass groups and excluding organized challenges to its rule. Nonetheless, the state has not been the nearly omnipotent political force that much of the literature on Mexican authoritarianism has depicted. Its power has been limited by business and the middle class, and it has had to work out deals and make compromises with organized labor and even with less privileged groups. We have seen, for example, that the state lacked the capacity to tax sufficiently to pay for the political bargains it struck. A further qualification is that the regime's legitimacy and strength have substantially weakened in recent years.

One element in the regime's political strength was its early and sustained control over key parts of the economy. Unaccompanied by great bureaucratic professional autonomy from partisan politics, such statism is hypothesized to diminish prospects for democracy. However, it is simply impossible to know whether a causal relationship holds in Mexico, though the idea is in vogue in some business circles. What is clearer is that statism promoted civilian stability. It provided populist legitimacy; the nationalization of oil (1938) is a notable example. And it gave the regime tremendous political leverage.

Even though the Mexican economy has for the most part been privately owned, the state has owned such sectors as oil, mining, electricity, railroads, and, since 1982, banks. It has been heavily involved in regulation, subsidies, public investments, public credits, and so forth. It has established institutions such as the Central Bank (1925), the National Development Bank (1934), and a tremendous network of parastatal agencies. Measures such as the public expenditure's share of GDP show even a recently expanded state role (22 percent in 1970 to 44 percent in 1983).³⁷ But de la Madrid undertook a reversal. Citing counterproductive political effects of statism but concerned chiefly about economic crisis and inefficiencies, the president repeatedly cut state expenditures, employment, and subsidies. He sold off many state enterprises and brought Mexico into the GATT. His selection of Salinas de Gortari as his successor was apparently aimed at sustaining this historic change in economic policy. The consequences for democratization remain uncertain.

Political Structure and Leadership

The structural reality of Mexico's undemocratic civilian rule has been overwhelmingly centralized. Mexico's has been a presidential system with only limited roles for the judiciary, the legislature, and state and local government. More liberalism, though still restricted, has been evident regarding the rule of law, freedom of the media, and other liberties. But the party system was long characterized by PRI hegemony and integration with the regime. The PRI has generally been pragmatic. It has been at least somewhat inclusionary and has built a multiclass base. It has kept the vote for extremist parties very small. Yet, like

other successes of the centralized party-regime, these have served civilian stability without democracy. Earlier interpretations of a political structure purposefully or ineluctably evolving into liberal forms have proved naive. On the other hand, the recent ineffectiveness of centralized forms has raised interesting speculations about future changes in Mexico's political structure.

Like the political structure, political leadership in postrevolutionary Mexico has proven unusually effective, and this effectiveness has been crucial to sustaining civilian rule without democracy. In fact, leadership and structure have been intertwined. Leaders have created and respected structures strong enough to condition behavior but flexible enough to allow for change and continual leadership.

Mexico takes second place to no nation in the skill and will of leadership to build a viable civilian system out of a past characterized mostly by weak political rule. I have highlighted the formative leadership acts of Carranza, Obregón, Calles, and Cárdenas in establishing legitimate, inclusive, centralized, civilian rule. Their acts provide powerful evidence for those political scientists who have championed the resurgence of "politics" and "choice" as major variables in studies of development. For example, Almond and Mundt write that a rational prediction from coalition theory would have pointed toward a military coup in the 1930s, but Cárdenas pulled off the "most striking" leadership success discussed in their volume featuring choice in a number of nations.³⁸ But unlike leaders in the Venezuelan case or in contemporary Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American nations, Mexico's civilian leaders have not acted out of a commitment to democracy. On the contrary, some Mexican leaders have been hostile to democracy as a foreign, unworkable model, whereas others have been indifferent, and still others see democracy as an ideal too risky for Mexico today. Yet another view, however, is that realities have changed to where blocking democratization has become too risky.

Political learning has been crucial to Mexico's civilian success, but: (a) most of its leaders have not set democracy as their goal; and (b) the lessons have been undemocratic ones. Again, unlike Venezuela, with its *trienio*, not to mention Argentina, Brazil, and (at an extreme) Uruguay, Mexico has not had a modern liberal experiment that made headway before failing. Mexico would have to look back to the Reform for even a mixed record with liberal politics; the Madero interlude at the beginning of the revolution represents more recent failure. Most of the nineteenth century and the first two revolutionary decades suggested to elites the impracticality of decentralized systems and the dangers of excessive competition among elites. The revolution also impressed on them the need for elite pacts to forestall devastating actions by the masses.

By definition, an institutionalized system does not require continual acts of great formative leadership. Instead, Mexico managed to create a strong political class. This class has boasted many of the traits of successful professions: comparative autonomy, status, authority, and power; and control over training and rites of entry. Since the 1940s (with due qualifications for the deterioration

elaborated above), Mexico's leaders have shaped politics in ways largely associated with establishing or even the smooth functioning of democracy. Yet for each aspect, the shaping has been distinctly undemocratic. The party has incorporated and legitimized but has also encapsulated. Sexennial rule has guaranteed mobility, turnover, renewal, and flexibility, but not public choice of leaders. Leaders have denounced disloyalty to the system and violence against the system, but have regarded some democratic dissent as disloyal and have used violence against peaceful dissenters. They have contained conflicts and managed crises enviably, but their tools have been predominantly undemocratic. Formative leaders shrewdly forged pacts among conflicting elites, and subsequent leaders have continually bargained, compromised, and disciplined themselves and their followers to accept less than optimal outcomes. Such procedures have excluded democratic opponents, limited mass participation, and often worked against mass material interests. Leaders have also subtly varied their approaches (depending on time, place, policy field, and constituency) in ways that show a greater sensitivity to and understanding of the public than most authoritarian regimes have, but such sophistication is not synonymous with democracy. Thus, we see corporatism mixed with pluralism, repression with co-optation and acquiescence, and continuity with flexibility.

Development Performance

Political leadership also played a major role in establishing Mexico's decades of high growth with low inflation. Legitimacy, stability, and incentives were crucial, though so were repression and sanctions. Why did sustained growth (inconsistency and reversal are recent phenomena) not produce democracy?

One explanation concerns Mexico's failure to attain the kind of sustained growth hypothesized to promote democracy, growth whose fruits are well distributed. Mexico's have been horribly maldistributed. A middle class has grown, but its commitment to democracy remains debatable (as it does in comparative politics generally), and much of Mexico's middle class has been dependent on the state. Moreover, the rise of the middle class has not been part of a generalized equalization of wealth or a broad movement involving coalitions with mass groups. In fact, a second possible explanation for the lack of democratization is that the growth argument is by itself irrelevant to democracy, or even that growth may serve the interests of reigning undemocratic regimes. In Mexico, growth has contributed to the legitimacy and power of such a regime. It has allowed it to manipulate, reward, and claim credit.

A third explanation, compatible with the first two, is that growth can help efforts at democratization (perhaps is even vital to them) but is just one factor and therefore insufficient.³⁹ I am inclined to believe that changes brought about by sustained growth in Mexico eventually promote pressures for broad democratization, that they in fact have contributed some to liberalization. In short,

there is much to conventional development theses about an association between growth and social change, and between both and the chances for democracy.⁶⁰ Still, chances are far from certainties and it is difficult to gauge effects. The record shows that decades of growth produced comparatively limited pressures for democracy in Mexico, and more limited results. The strongest calls for democratization have come since growth was reversed.

To sum up, growth may well increase the chances for democracy eventually, but for a long time it may well shore up almost any regime. After all, the fall of Latin American authoritarian regimes, like Latin American democracies, has been tied to economic failure more than success. In Mexico, growth has been integral to the stability of civilian authoritarian rule.

International Factors

As with so many other variables in this comparative study, international factors hypothesized to be conducive to democratic stability have, in Mexico, long been conducive to stability without democracy. For one, Mexico has not been a significant target of external subversion since the regime consolidated power. But such fortune is much more likely to sustain than to create democracy. Second, the major source of diffusion—given realities of geography, continual back-and-forth migration, trade, investment, and cultural and media might—has long been the United States, a democracy. Third, Mexico has been a recipient of extraordinary foreign assistance from the United States and other democracies, though the emphasis is recent. Whereas the second and third realities are postulated to have democratizing influences even on undemocratic systems, Mexican leadership has limited the degree of political dependency and influence that accompany economic dependency on the United States.

Protecting itself from leftist subversion has been one reason for Mexico's progressive foreign policy. The only Latin American nation not to break diplomatic relations with Communist Cuba, Mexico was never targeted the way Bolivia, Venezuela, and others were. Comparatively sympathetic to the Sandinistas and to the guerrillas in El Salvador, Mexico again achieved an at least tacit agreement that leftists outside Mexico would not encourage independent leftists inside.

Into the bargain, such progressivism has enhanced legitimacy by demonstrating independence of the United States. Given a historical legacy of military conquest (costing Mexico much of her good land) and an ongoing contrast of wealth and culture, it is not surprising that Mexicans would feel alienation as well as respect for their neighbor. Something seen as a U.S. model—and liberal democracy as defined in this book fits here—is not simply seen positively. Moreover, to the degree that the United States has leverage stemming from its might, its priority for Mexico has been stability, not democratization. So, despite the fact that it has depended on the United States for almost two-thirds of its imports and exports, roughly 80 percent of its tourism, and roughly

70 percent of its foreign investment, Mexico has maintained a notable degree of independence from U.S. influence.⁶¹

• PROSPECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS •

However much cited variables may have contributed to sustaining civilian stability without democracy, Mexican politics is changing. Of course, it has constantly changed, and one of the strengths of the system and its leadership has been the flexibility to modify a stable system. The question here is whether contemporary changes will add up to more than adaptation within a nondemocracy. In an important sense, factors that have reinforced stability have blocked democratization. That does not prove, however, that they will always do so. Nor does it suggest that instability is likely to produce democracy.⁶² Major change is a necessary but insufficient condition for democratization.

Positive Prospects for Democratization

Numerous political uncertainties represent some hope for democratization. First, the erosion of undemocratic practices opens at least some possibility of democratic alternatives and strengthens opposition voices. Second, the regime's realization that traditional bases of stability are endangered can stimulate liberalizing moves aimed at protecting stability. Third, some of the uncertainties themselves involve a degree of opening. To be sure, the second and third points involve liberalization rather than transformation toward a democracy, as defined here. Nevertheless, just as Mexico has enjoyed several aspects of democracy, so it may increase the degree of democracy. Moreover, continued liberalization may, in turn, increase the pressures for such practices as free elections among truly competitive alternative parties. In fact, one can imagine the 1988 elections reinforcing many factors considered here as favorable to democratization.

The following recapitulates some of the major recent political changes that involve uncertainties. Regarding state-society relations, the degree of freedom (e.g., media freedom) has expanded. Middle-class, business, and even grassroots popular groups have organized more autonomously and become much more critical of the regime. Regarding centralized regime power, the presidency has been tarnished, the legislature is increasingly a forum of debate and dissent, and perceptions are widespread that geographical centralization is excessive, and that significant decentralization must somehow be achieved. Regarding the party system, the PRI (like the political class overall) has lost much of its strength, while an independent Left has appeared and the independent Right has grown substantially. For the middle class in particular, elections have become times of delegitimation more than popular affirmation. Pressures for honest elections are strong, perhaps undeniably so in the aftermath of the 1988 elections. The party and electoral reforms inaugurated in the 1970s have helped

open the system significantly but have not settled the issue of how far the opening will go. Regarding the regime's performance, legitimacy has eroded and the economy—long central to the regime's strength—has fallen into crisis. Economic opening, even if ultimately successful in purely economic terms, might well reduce the regime's tools of control.

Political reform, uncertainty, and (regime) weakness have contributed to increased calls for democratization. Such calls are not new, of course. For years, some observers argued that democratization was necessary for socioeconomic development and, therefore, for political stability. These observations have not fared well, but perhaps they are valid in the long run. Or perhaps circumstances have changed enough in Mexico that they are now becoming valid. At any rate, previous calls for democratization have not been nearly as widespread and sustained as today's. Nor did they enjoy the degree of free space for development that dissenters now have.

Naturally, proponents of democratization are not united. They do not hold identical views of what democracy means, nor how to pursue it (though the broad coalition formed, in 1986, reinforced in 1988, around the banner of truly free elections is significant). Voices on the Right argue in terms partly consistent with major hypotheses of this project: a highly centralized state with massive power concentrated in an unchecked presidency, which exercises extensive corporate controls over society and the economy, is incompatible with democracy. By contrast, most of the Left argues that democratization requires a large and revitalized state assuming a central role in economic policy and social change. But many on the Right want merely a return to a successful undemocratic state that grants concessions to business, suppresses labor, and so forth. And many on the Left couple demands for a revitalized state with demands for increased autonomy of societal organizations and for internal democratization within labor unions, neighborhood organizations, and other institutions. Finally, one may question the sincerity of certain democratic banners on both the Right and the Left. For some, such banners are but a tool in the play for power. For others, democracy is a worthy pursuit, but principally a means toward higher priorities. Thus, some business leaders see democracy largely as a way to weaken government and achieve growth and profits, and some intellectuals see democracy as a means of mass mobilization to achieve better socioeconomic distribution and, eventually, socialism.

Another way to see hopeful signs for democratization is to focus on the many ways in which Mexico ranks high on variables associated with democracies. In terms of our variables, my thesis has been that Mexico shows that many of the variables are compatible with a civilian rule that is effective, stable, and undemocratic. That thesis has allowed, however, that Mexico's high standing on some of the variables may have built certain pressures for democratization. The notion of "zones" of lower and higher probabilities for democracy may be useful in assessing Mexico's future. Economic growth, industrialization, urbanization, the growth of a middle class, increased education and other

indices of rising expectations among even the poorer classes, the persistence of at least formal structures of liberal government, growing if still inconclusive evidence of some political cultural affect for democracy—these and other factors put Mexico in a higher zone of probability for democracy than would have been the case even a couple of decades ago.⁶³

Recent research on transitions to democracy also suggests some hopes for democratization in Mexico, though O'Donnell rightly labels Mexico "a type by itself" (largely because the regime is so institutionalized). First, authoritarian regimes constantly evolve. Second, transitions usually occur through evolution, not sudden overthrows. Third, democracy usually results from stalemate and dissensus, not from a clear plan based on consensus. Fourth, these transitions usually begin with elite calculations and initiatives, not independent mass mobilization. When the regime initiates liberalization, it runs risks of losing the initiative amid rising expectations and mobilizations, but it can sometimes control the pace of change, experiment, retreat, and so forth. Fifth, democratization often emerges from situations with seemingly low probabilities for it.⁶⁴ In sum, the lack of a clear or massive movement toward democracy in Mexico does not preclude democratization. And the experimental, evolutionary, regime-led notion of transition could allow further societal liberalizations involving press freedom, criticism (short of organized mass alternatives to the regime), and party and electoral reform. Reform within the PRI, expanded representation for oppositions, and opposition victories in localities and even states could occur without immediate threat to the regime's rule. Nor after the shock of 1988 does it seem naive to speculate on even the transfer of national government to the opposition, or at least on opposition appointments to cabinet positions.

The Brazilian case is particularly interesting for speculations on Mexico.⁶⁵ Brazilian authoritarian rule was comparatively long and economically successful on its own terms, with massive inequalities. Repression was comparatively limited in the years prior to transition. In fact, constitutional forms persisted almost throughout the dictatorial period, and the limited term of the presidency proved significant. Elections took on increasing importance even as the regime manipulated the rules. Transition was stimulated by long-term factors, but an economic downturn critically undermined support for the regime. Nonetheless, unlike some other cases, democratization was not precipitated by mass mobilizations but by elite accommodations. In short, the Brazilian case illustrates how democratization need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. This fact can make the prospect less threatening for the Mexican regime, which realizes that some political changes are necessary.

Negative Prospects for Democratization

But the factors that point away from full-blown democratization remain weighty. This is especially evident if we refer to democratization as a transition

toward democratic government and not just further liberalization. Obviously, transformation is less common than continuity. Beyond that, Mexican authoritarianism has been uniquely long-lasting and institutionalized. Unlike other authoritarian regimes, Mexico's has always justified itself as permanent (albeit evolving) rather than transitory *en route* to democracy.

Whereas factors commonly associated with democracy are found in Mexico, others are not. Mexico lacks significant experience with democratic government (though I would emphasize the potential importance of increasing experience with liberalizing politics). Despite its declining legitimacy, the regime has not been discredited in the dramatic way that sometimes leads to democratic transitions (e.g., in Argentina) or that leads major actors to value democracy as an alternative system of rule. Not all the rising criticism of the Mexican regime concerns its lack of democracy. The political-cultural attachment of the masses to democracy is questionable, and elites have given uncertain evidence of such attachment. Opposition parties, indeed organized oppositions in general, have usually been limited. Corporatist controls have precluded both independent mass-based institutions (unions or parties) and sudden mobilization of the unorganized. The state retains a large role in politics and the economy. And poverty remains widespread, wealth painfully concentrated.

Prospects for any liberalization are also limited because of the risks of transition.⁶⁶ Fear is a central notion in the relevant literature; in Mexico, the fear of transition has dominated the perceived need for or benefits of transition. To be sure, even before the 1988 elections some in the regime, as well as critics, believed that the system required major changes. President de la Madrid spoke repeatedly of how changes in demographics, urbanization, education, communications, and class structure have created "a new vigor in society," a greatly expanded "civil society" that requires political changes. As in Colombia, a widespread perception is that conditions that called for structures of restricted, stable civilian rule have been superseded. But, also as in Colombia, powerful political incentives are built into the status quo. Even the "soft-liners" within the Mexican regime have focused on modernizing measures (including liberalizing ones) that would not produce a liberal democracy. Cornelius writes that the regime, and indeed the elites in general, regard two-party or multiparty competition for and alternation in power as an alien concept.⁶⁷ "Democracy" has meant the PRI as the "party of majorities," with opposition voice allowed. Some argue that a return to economic normalcy is all that is required for politics to return to normal. And many, whatever their ultimate hopes, believe that times of great economic change, and of some inevitable political change, require steady reliance on established political structures and practices.

Crucially, fear of transition is not limited to the regime or even the elites overall. As Monsiváis has emphasized, the regime has succeeded in portraying alternatives to it as disasters, as fascism, communism, or anarchy.⁶⁸ Anarchy is perhaps particularly frightening to many Mexicans, perhaps because of the nation's history. Consequently, another point about democratization in nations like

Venezuela is relevant in Mexico, again with a twist. As Levine writes in this volume, "a major reason for Venezuela's democratic stability is that citizens realize they 'can afford little else,' given authoritarian alternatives. In Mexico, many citizens have found that they could well afford something other than democracy: Their system has provided them with relative social peace and political tranquility, economic growth, mobility, selective rather than pervasive repression, a degree of political liberty, and substantial national pride.

In sum, the prospects for democracy are brighter than they have been since the revolution. And yet, they are very uncertain. The prospects for stability are perhaps dimmer than they have been for several decades. And yet, they are bright, remaining brighter than the prospects for democracy. Such contrasts reflect the way Mexico's strong, undemocratic political system has long functioned.

U.S. Policy

If democratization merits increasing serious attention, but democracy still appears only a possibility in Mexico, what should the United States do? The conventional scholarly wisdom has been: not much. I concur.

I do not believe that all attempts by one nation to encourage democracy in another are wrong, but I do believe that several demanding criteria ought to be present. They usually are not. First, a viable alternative to the present regime must exist. Second, that alternative should be more democratic than the present regime. Third, a rather limited role by the foreign nation should have a high probability of making a substantial positive impact.

None of these conditions has characterized the case of Mexico and the United States, although the first two points could be debated in light of the 1988 elections. Much of this chapter has concerned why no viable alternative to the regime has been organized. Leading opposition parties and groups have not proved their democratic credentials. And even if U.S. policymakers believed a viable and democratic alternative existed, their efforts would likely have either an insignificant or negative impact. For one thing, the Mexico-U.S. relationship is particularly sensitive, given historical, geographical, economic, and cultural realities. For example, President Wilson's military interventions and threats in the early revolutionary years contributed to turmoil, not democracy, and left a legacy of mistrust about the democratic giant to the north. In the early 1980s, perceptions that Ambassador John Gavin and U.S. Republican Party leaders supported the PAN probably hurt that opposition party, as the PRI identified it with a still-arrogant, interfering neighbor.

Beyond the particular sensitivities of Mexico-U.S. relations lie broader obstacles to government efforts to encourage democracy. Whitehead concludes that in peacetime, the overall international role in democratization is subordinate; U.S. efforts in Latin America have with reason been viewed as "showcase" and short-term.⁶⁹ Whether or not the United States deserves any credit for

Corporatism?" In *The New Corporatism*, ed. Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 93-105.

11. On political marginality, see Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico*, tr. Danielle Salti (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 126-134; on reacting, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, *The Mexican Profit-Making Decision: Politics in an Authoritarian Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

12. See Evelyn Stevens, *Protest and Response in Mexico* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 276-277, on how activists have been unable to attract mass followings. On the consequences of early incorporation, see Robert R. Kaufman, "Mexico and Latin American Authoritarianism," in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Wiener, *Authoritarianism in Mexico* (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1977), pp. 220-221.

13. See, for example, Jesús Silva Herzog, *La revolución mexicana en crisis* (Mexico City: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1944), pp. 22-34; and for a similar point on peasants, see Gerit Huizer, "Peasant Organization in Agrarian Reform in Mexico," in *Masses in Latin America*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 445-502.

14. Raúl Trejo Delarbre, "El movimiento obrero: Situación y perspectivas," in *México, hoy*, 5th ed., ed. Pablo González Casanova and Enrique Florescano (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1981), pp. 128-130.

15. Dale Story, *Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 105, 195. See also John J. Bailey, *Governing Mexico: The Statecraft of Crisis Management* (London: MacMillan, forthcoming), ch. 6.

16. On intellectuals, see Rodric A. Camp, *Intellectuals and the State in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); on public universities, see Daniel C. Levy, *University and Government in Mexico: Autonomy in an Authoritarian System* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

17. While this case cannot settle the debate over whether national political democratization requires democratizing society's associational life, it is pertinent that Mexico's mass-based organizations are notoriously undemocratic. For example, both labor and peasant elections are controlled and corrupt. Practice varies among the associations of more privileged classes; many media, intellectual, and student associations are far from open and free. See, for example, Camp, *Intellectuals*, p. 225.

18. See especially Sergio Zermeno, *México: Una democracia utópica: El movimiento estudiantil del 68* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1978). My views and further citations are found in Levy, *University*, pp. 28-33, 39-41.

19. In Frank Brandenburg's apt label for the regime, "liberal Machiavellian," "liberal" refers to tolerance more than the Dahl/O'Donnell-Schmitter sense of contestation. Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 141-165. Disturbing evidence of intolerance has long come from brutal repression of peasant actions and, recently, from reports about human-rights abuses including torture.

20. Jorge G. Castañeda, "Mexico at the Brink," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Winter 1985-1986): p. 293.

21. Richard Fagen and William Tuohy, *Politics in a Mexican Village* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

22. Levy and Székely, *Mexico*, ch. 4.

23. González Casanova, *Democracy*, p. 68.

24. Alvaro Arreola Ayala, "Elecciones municipales," in *Las elecciones en México: Evolución y perspectivas*, ed. Pablo González Casanova (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1985), pp. 330-336. While some observers find local political participation minimal, others see competition within the PRI that includes citizen support for political wings or for candidates proposing popular policies (e.g., improvement of water or electrical systems).

25. Brian Latell, *Mexico at the Crossroads: The Many Crises of the Political System* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, June 1986), pp. 23-25; Miguel de la Madrid, *Los grandes problemas nacionales de hoy* (Mexico City: Editorial Diana, 1982), p. 139.

26. Bailey, *Governing*, ch. 4. See also, on presidential power, Jorge Carpizo, *El presidencialismo mexicano*, 3d ed. (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1983).

27. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 42-43.

28. Kevin J. Middlebrook, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America*, p. 140.

29. Norman Cox, "Changes in the Mexican Political System," in *Politics in Mexico*, ed. George Philip (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 20; Scott, *Mexican Government*, pp. 267-271.

30. A prominent recent source is David Ronfeldt, *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment*, Monograph Series 16 (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1984).

31. Gustavo Ernesto Emmerich, "Las elecciones en México, 1808-1911: Surfragio electivo, no reelección," in González Casanova, *Elecciones*, pp. 54-64.

32. Luis Javier Garrido, *El partido de la revolución institucionalizada 1929-45* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1982); González Casanova, *Democracy*, p. 34.

33. This class has been comparatively distinct from the nation's economic elites, despite greatly overlapping interests. Martin C. Needler has compared it to the East European "new class" described by Dylas, except that it has been more legitimate and effective in its ownership of state power. See Needler, *Mexican Politics: The Containment of Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 131-133. Intertwined with the official party, the political class has lacked career service and merit characteristics, but its strength has been tied to its politicization. Recently, however, the class's coherence has been weakened by a surge of technocrats who rise to high posts based on special educational credentials rather than apprenticeship with the party, elective office, public universities, mass organizations, and so forth. See, for example, Rodric A. Camp, "The Political-Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System," *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 1 (1985): pp. 97-118. Additionally, economic opening and diminishing ratios of state expenditures to GDP could mean diminished resources to reward and sanction (e.g., through subsidies and protectionism).

34. Bailey, *Governing*, ch. 7.

35. Implemented reforms have been limited to measures such as selecting candidates with local appeal and varying selection methods. PRI candidates for some 1984 municipal posts were selected after open party assemblies or secret votes rather than just by appointment from above. See Cox, "Changes," p. 28. The PRI has issued some statements critical of government economic policy.

36. On leftist weaknesses and platforms, see, for example, Barry Carr, "The PSUM: The Unification Process on the Mexican Left 1981-1985," in *Mexican Politics in Transition*, ed. Judith Gentleman (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming).

37. Congressional opposition parties unanimously voted against the 1986 legislation, calling it more marginal maneuvering than democratization. For details on the 1977 reform, see Luis Villoro, "La reforma política y las perspectivas de democracia," in González Casanova and Florescano, *México, hoy*, pp. 355-357. On the 1986 reform, see Juan Gerardo Reyes, "Iniciativa de MMH al Congreso," *Excelsior* (November 4, 1986). PR was first authorized in 1963, but the opposition could barely qualify.

38. Villoro, "Reforma," pp. 355-357; and Middlebrook, "Political Liberalization," pp. 126-128. Middlebrook concludes (p. 143) that the regime operated "from a position of strength." That is true in comparison with many transitions in Latin America, but his own analysis properly identifies challenges to which the Mexican regime felt compelled to respond.

39. Some states then chose reform anyway. See Jorge Madrazo, "Reforma política y legislación electoral de las entidades federativas," in González Casanova, *Elecciones*, pp. 293-302.

40. Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Facts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions: Latin America*, p. 217.

41. Advertisement in *Proceso* (September 1, 1986). On Chihuahua, see, for example, Francisco Ortiz P., "Baeza, acorralado," *Proceso* (June 8, 1987).

42. 1980 data from Bela Belassa, et al., *Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America: Summary, Overview, and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986), pp. 56-57. For 1985, see Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1986 Report* (Washington, DC: IDB, n.d.), p. 314 (on Mexico); see also Table 1.1 herein.

43. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, "Cuarto informe de gobierno," *Comercio Exterior* 36, no. 9 (1986): p. 760.

44. See, for example, Daniel C. Levy, *Higher Education and the State in Latin America*.

Private Challenges to Public Dominance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 114-170.

45. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1980* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1980), pp. 156-157.
46. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Culture in Mexico: Continuities and Revisionist Interpretations," in *The Civic Culture Revisited*, ed. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), p. 375. See also Fagen and Tuohy, *Political*, pp. 38-39, 136-137.
47. The three respective explanations of acceptance are emphasized in, for example, Paz, *The Other*; Fagen and Tuohy, *Politics*; and Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture* (1963). Observers are divided on whether there has been a significant increase in civil disturbances.
48. Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F. H. Purcell, "State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?" *World Politics* 32, no. 2 (1980): pp. 204-205. See Craig and Cornelius, "Political," pp. 341, and 385-386, fn. 35, on the different positions. A prominent recent example of the causal political-cultural approach, bitterly denounced in Mexico, is Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans* (New York: Knopf, 1985).
49. John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, "The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A Reexamination," *Latin American Research Review* 19, no. 1 (1984): pp. 110-113. The authors report uniformly strong democratic values, though less among women, the less-educated, and the working class than in the middle class. But their data come from developed urban areas known for dissent from the PRI-regime. Also, expressed values do not seem quite so at odds with the system when one acknowledges that it permits some degree of free expression, demonstration, etc.; it does not permit organized alternatives, and the one issue on which the authors report a majority of undemocratic responses was on critics seeking office. Craig and Cornelius, "Political," pp. 348-350, report conflicting data regarding "working-class authoritarianism." Finally, the *New York Times*, November 17, 1986, reported that a poll of 1,576 Mexicans showed "envy" of U.S. democracy and economic strength, but in fact only 16 percent cited democracy as the main point.
50. Rafael Segovia, *La politización del niño mexicano*, 2d ed. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1982); Craig and Cornelius, "Political," p. 369. Family socialization and interrelations are often described as intolerant and undemocratic. However, the introduction of more participatory educational practices (e.g., Montessori schools) may have a democratizing influence.
51. In a sense, then, elites have developed a degree of "trust" in their pacts even though interpersonal trust is low. On the generally low degree of trust in Mexican society, see Craig and Cornelius, "Political," p. 372.
52. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).
53. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, "Los pueblos indígenas: Viejos problemas, nuevas demandas," in González Casanova and Florescano, *México, hoy*, pp. 100-107.
54. Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsky (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
55. Respective quotations from Larissa Lomnitz, "Social Structure of Urban Mexico," *Latin America Research Review* 16, no. 2 (1982): p. 69; and Purcell and Purcell, "State and Society," p. 226.
56. Elite autonomous organizations do not usually serve as "training grounds" for democracy. The public university is the best example of a substantially autonomous organization that has trained most of Mexico's (undemocratic) political elite. Relevant skills are the ability to mobilize and manipulate mass groups, bargaining, and leadership.
57. Bailey, *Governing*, Table 6.1.
58. Gabriel A. Almond and Robert J. Mundt, "Crisis, Choice, and Change: Some Tentative Conclusions," in Almond and Mundt, *Crisis*, pp. 635, 637.
59. The Mexican case is pertinent to the ongoing debate about the role of oil in Venezuela's success with democracy. Levine's chapter in this volume is certainly accurate in asserting that oil is not enough. Mexico was one of the world's top producers in the 1920s and has been again recently. In fact, oil may have helped save Mexico's undemocratic system. But it may also contribute to pressures for democracy and, as in Venezuela, oil and growth could potentially help democratic rule consolidate.
60. Perhaps Mexico's unequal socioeconomic development has facilitated autonomous political participation for some privileged groups alongside mobilized participation by mass groups.

See Samuel P. Huntington and Joan Nelson, *No Easy Choice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). Such a view appears consistent with this chapter's corporatist-pluralist contrasts.

61. I give my views on how Mexico's foreign policy has contributed to stability and on the growing challenges that policy faces in "The Implications of Central American Conflicts for Mexican Politics," in *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years*, ed. Rodéric A. Camp (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 235-264.

62. On prospects for stability, see especially Camp, *Political Stability*.

63. Whether "success" by itself would ever undermine an authoritarian regime, particularly a well institutionalized one, is an interesting but perhaps remote question. More pertinent is whether success sets the general conditions for democracy to the point that crises (economic disaster, military defeat, scandal) leading to instability, or at least turmoil, may in fact lead to democratization.

64. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," pp. 5, 15; and Luciano Martins, "The 'Liberalization' of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil," p. 72, both in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions: Latin America*; and, especially, O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), pp. 48-72; also, Alfred Stepan, "Paths Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 72-74.

65. See Lamounier's chapter in this volume, and also Martins, "Liberalization," pp. 72-74.

66. The theoretical argument is developed in Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions*, pp. 47-63; and in O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions*, pp. 7-16, 48-49.

67. Wayne A. Cornelius, "Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: Mexico, 1976-1985," in Gentelman, *Mexican*.

68. Carlos Monsivais, "La ofensiva ideológica de la derecha," in González Casanova and Florescano, *México, hoy*, p. 315. This underscores Przeworski's point ("Some Problems," pp. 50-53) that perceptions of alternatives as well as of the present regime are critical to choices about pushing for transition.

69. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 20, 44. Whitehead also writes (p. 43): "Mexico provides a particularly significant litmus test of American priorities. Does it not remain an open question in that country how much democracy of the conventional liberal democratic variety would be tolerable to Washington policymakers?" It does, but when will Mexico put the United States to that test?