


Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime

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Chile, under the rule of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, experienced the longest single government in the nation's history and one of the harshest dictatorships of the contemporary world. For years after the military coup of September 11, 1973, elections for public office, and even elections within private organizations and associations were circumscribed or monitored by the authorities. The doors of Congress were closed, and all major public decisions were made by the general, officials appointed by him, or a junta consisting of the commanders of the four military services.

Elected local governments, which had dated back to colonial times, were replaced by mayors who served at the pleasure of the commander-in-chief of the army and president of the republic. Even the nation's universities were not spared. Soon after the coup, high-ranking army officers were appointed to head both private and public institutions of higher education, with a mandate to purge government opponents and administer with an iron hand. Political parties were banned or dismantled, and their leaders persecuted. Rights of assembly and free speech were restricted. The press was severely censored, while the authorities made ample use of television to project their own vision of the world. An elaborate security apparatus operating with broad formal and informal powers sent regime opponents into internal and external exile without trial. Thousands were arrested, "disappeared," or killed.¹

Despite serious economic difficulties and international isolation, Chile's authoritarian regime resisted the trend in Latin America back to democratic forms of government. A new constitution, written by a handful of government advisers and ratified in a highly suspect plebiscite in 1980, extended Pinochet's term until 1989 and made it legally possible for him to continue in office until 1997 or beyond. Although the constitutional framework specified the return to elective politics in 1989, the document contained many features that sharply restricted democratic practices and the accountability of government authorities to popular will. It created a powerful executive and a weak Congress and gave the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces veto power over public-policy is-



sues. The Constitution also declared illegal all political parties that advocate philosophical doctrines based on class struggle.²

This state of affairs, though not uncommon in the Third World, was a sharp and historic departure for Chile. Before the 1973 breakdown, the country would have been classified, following the criteria used in this book, as a high success, a stable and uninterrupted case of democratic rule. For most of the preceding one hundred years, Chilean politics had been characterized by a high level of party competition and popular participation, open and fair elections, and strong respect for democratic freedoms. Indeed, Bollen, in one of the most comprehensive cross-national efforts to rank countries on a scale of political democracy, placed Chile in the top 15 percent in 1965, a score higher than that of the United States, France, Italy, or West Germany. For 1960, Chile's score was higher than that of Britain.³

However, synchronic studies such as Bollen's fail to account for the fact that Chile's democratic tradition was not a recent phenomenon but goes back several generations. In the nineteenth century, Chile developed democratic institutions and procedures, setting the country apart from many of its European counterparts, as well as its Latin American neighbors. As Epstein has noted, in Europe "political power was not often effectively transferred from hereditary rulers to representative assemblies no matter how narrow their electorates until late in the nineteenth century."⁴ By contrast, Chile had, by the turn of the century, experienced several decades in which political authority was vested in elected presidents, and Congress wielded substantial influence over the formulation of public policy.⁵ Indeed, from 1830 until 1973, all Chilean presidents were followed in office by their duly elected successors. Deviations to this pattern occurred only in 1891, in the aftermath of a brief civil war, and in the turbulent period between 1924 and 1932, when four chief executives felt pressured to resign in an atmosphere of political and social unrest and military involvement in politics. In 143 years, Chile experienced only thirteen months of unconstitutional rule under some form of junta, and only four months under a junta dominated exclusively by the military. And, though the executive was preeminent in the decades after independence, Congress gradually increased its prerogatives, becoming an important arena for national debate and one of the most powerful legislatures in the world.

Dahl has noted that the development of democracy entails not only establishing institutions for public contestation and leadership renewal, but also popular sovereignty.⁶ In nineteenth-century Chile, citizenship was sharply restricted, first to men who owned property and later to those who were literate. Thus, Chile was only a partial democracy, according to the definition used here, until well into the twentieth century, when women's suffrage was established, the literacy requirement abolished, and 18-year-olds given the right to vote.⁷ It must be stressed, however, that Chile did not deviate substantially from other nascent democracies in extending citizenship. In 1846, only 2 percent of the Chilean population voted, but this figure was comparable to that in Britain in

1830, Luxembourg in 1848, the Netherlands in 1851, and Italy in 1871. In 1876, two years after it had abolished the property requirement, Chile had 106,000 registered voters, compared to 84,000 in Norway for a comparable adult male population. Secret voting was established in Chile shortly after its adoption in Britain, Sweden, and Germany, and before its adoption in Belgium, Denmark, France, Prussia, and Norway.⁸

Reflecting the profound social changes brought about by urbanization, incipient industrialization, and a booming export economy, Chile's middle- and then working-class groups were incorporated into the democratic political game by the second decade of the twentieth century. With the rise of an organized Left, Chilean politics became sharply polarized between vastly different conceptions of what the country's future should be. This division, articulated by powerful and institutionalized parties functioning within the framework of Chile's presidential system, placed increasing strains on democracy. In the 1970s, these strains contributed to the breakdown of democracy soon after the first leftist candidate in Chilean history had been elected to the nation's highest office.

In the aftermath of the defeat of President Pinochet in a plebiscite prescribed by his own constitution, Chile can be characterized as a democratic failure with promise according to the terminology employed by the editors of this volume. Ironically, though authoritarian rule and the sharp divisions that persist in Chilean politics, and the complexities of partisan relationships, have made the transition to democracy unusually difficult, there is reason to believe that because of Chile's long history of democratic practices, once a transition is instituted it may be more durable than in many other countries of the Third World.

The historical overview provides a sketch of the major trends in Chilean politics. It is not intended to cover all periods in equal depth; rather, it gives disproportionate attention to those historical developments that are especially important to making analytical arguments about the development and breakdown of Chilean democracy. Following this is a theoretical assessment of the applicability to the Chilean case of several leading hypotheses generated by social scientists to account for the emergence of democratic politics. The third part analyzes the breakdown of democracy, highlighting those variables that best explain the complex process resulting in the 1973 military coup. The fourth gives an overview of military rule in Chile, explaining how authoritarian politics was first institutionalized and why the transition back to democracy was so slow and painful. It ends by speculating about the future course of Chilean democracy.

• HISTORICAL OVERVIEW •

Origins and Consolidation of Chilean Democracy, 1830s-1960s

As in the rest of Latin America, attempts in Chile to inaugurate republican institutions, based on democratic principles inspired by the framers of the U.S. Constitution, met with resounding failure.⁹ For a quarter-century after Chile's declaration of independence from Spain in 1810, the new nation alternated between dictatorship and anarchy. The war of independence was a prolonged and bloody civil "war to the death," as much as a war to end colonial rule, as many Chileans supported the royalist cause. The final defeat of Spanish forces left the territory's administrative and governing institutions in shambles, and local elites bitterly divided by regional, family, ideological, and personal disputes. Gone were the complex, far-flung patrimonial bureaucracy and the mediating power of the crown, which for centuries had imposed a traditional style of political authority over a distant colony. In 1830, the clear military victory of one coalition of forces permitted the inauguration of a concerted effort to institute political order and encourage economic progress. However, despite the able leadership of Cabinet Minister Diego Portales and military President Joaquín Prieto, and the establishment of a new constitution in 1833, coup attempts and conspiracies continued to plague Chile; Portales himself was assassinated in 1837 by troops he had thought loyal.

Portales' death was widely, though probably erroneously, blamed on interference in Chilean affairs by General Andrés Santa Cruz, the ruler of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation and a powerful rival for hegemony in Pacific commerce. The Bolivian dictator, after gaining control over Peru, had made no secret of his ambition to extend his empire southward. In response, Portales engineered, in 1836, a declaration of war, an unpopular move widely condemned in political circles. Ironically, Portales' death helped galvanize support for the war among disparate Chilean political factions; incensed at foreign intervention, several groups agreed to back an expeditionary force to Peru.

The war effort and the resounding victory achieved by the Chilean military had a profound impact. Individuals of all stations enthusiastically welcomed home the returning expeditionary force. The victory ball at the presidential palace was attended by rival families who had not spoken to each other in years, helping to heal long-standing wounds and forge a sense of common purpose. In the wake of triumph, authorities decreed a broad amnesty and the restitution of military ranks and pensions for those defeated in the civil war of 1830. As historian Encina notes, defeat of the Chilean forces would have magnified political divisions and seriously imperiled the already tenuous governmental stability. Military success gave the Prieto government and Chile's fledgling institutions a new lease on life.¹⁰

The 1837-1838 war had another, equally important consequence for Chile's

political development. It created a national hero, the first Chilean leader to rise unambiguously above factional disputes. General Manuel Bulnes, the embodiment of national unity, was easily able to succeed Prieto in the presidential elections of 1840, a transition facilitated by Prieto's willingness to leave office in favor of his nephew. In his two terms, Bulnes took two important steps to implement the principles set forth in the nation's republican Constitution, principles that were nothing less than revolutionary at the time.¹¹

In the first place, Bulnes refused to rule autocratically, giving substantial authority to a designated cabinet carefully balanced to represent some of the most important factions of the loose governing coalition. And though executive power was paramount, Bulnes permitted growing autonomy of the courts and the legislature. In time, Congress became increasingly more assertive, delaying approval of budget laws in exchange for modifications in cabinet policy. The cabinet's response to growing congressional activism was not to silence the institution but to capture it by manipulating the electoral process. Ironically, while this practice was condemned by opponents as a perversion of suffrage, it contributed to reinforcing the legitimacy of the legislature as a full-fledged branch of government. Eventually, as presidents changed ministers or as political coalitions shifted, even legislatures originally elected through fraud became centers for the expression of opposition sentiments, reinforcing presidential accountability to legislative majorities.

In the second place, Bulnes firmly exchanged his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces for that of civilian president. Under his guidance, the professional military was sharply cut back, its personnel thinned out, and many of its assets sold. Instead, and to the dismay of his former military colleagues, Bulnes poured resources into the National Guard, a force of citizen soldiers closely tied to the government patronage network, who served as a ready pool of voters for government-sponsored candidates. In his last presidential address to the nation, Bulnes proudly described the reduction of the regular army and the expansion of the militia as the most convincing evidence of his administration's fidelity to republican institutions.¹²

The transition to a new president, however, was not easy. Many of the country's elites rejected the candidacy of Manuel Montt, a civil servant and cabinet minister of middle-class extraction, to succeed Bulnes. His candidacy was also rejected by elements in the professional army, who believed Bulnes would support a revolt to prevent Montt's accession to power and thus ensure the continuity of leadership from his native area of Concepción. When a revolt was attempted, however, Bulnes personally led the National Guard to defeat the rebel forces.

With the mid-nineteenth-century development of a new class of government functionaries and political leaders who espoused the liberal creed, the state gained substantial autonomy from the traditional landed elite, the pillar of social and economic power. State autonomy was reinforced by the government's success in promoting economic progress, particularly the booming export trade

in wheat and minerals, which encouraged economic elites to give the authorities substantial leeway in policy formulation and implementation. Just as important, however, the export-import trade gave the authorities a ready and expanding source of income from customs duties, without their having to make the politically risky decision to tax property or income. Ironically, had the Chilean economy been more balanced and less dependent on foreign trade, the state would have been much more vulnerable to the immediate and direct pressures of economic elites. In Chile, economic dependency contributed to strengthening, not weakening, the state.¹³ From 1830 to 1860, customs revenues, which represented 60 percent of all revenues, increased sevenfold, enabling the Chilean state to undertake extensive public-works projects, including constructing Latin America's second railroad, and to invest large sums of money in education, which officials believed to be the key to prosperity and national greatness.

In time, however, the state, rapidly extending its administrative jurisdiction and public-works projects throughout the national territory and actively promoting domestic programs in education and civil registries, clashed sharply with landowners, the church, and regional interests. Discontent in the ranks of the conservative landed elite was such that it led to the formation of the country's first real party, the Conservative Party, in direct opposition to Montt's administration. The Conservatives were committed to preserving the traditional order, and defending the values and interests of the church. At the same time, and also in opposition to the state, a group of ideological liberals, influenced by the Revolution of 1848 in France, pressed to accelerate secularization and decentralization and to expand suffrage and democratization. The secular-religious issue, with state elites taking a middle ground, would become the most salient political cleavage in nineteenth-century Chile, and the basis for crystallizing partisan alignments.

By 1859, discontent with the government from various quarters was such that a disparate coalition, composed of aristocratic Conservatives, regional groups, and the newly formed Radical Party representing the anticlerical and mining interests, challenged the government by force. In particular, the dissidents objected to the widespread state intervention in the 1858 congressional election, in which the government obtained a large majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Once again, however, state officials, with strong support from provincial interests and urban groups, were able to make use of the National Guard to put down the revolt. In the process, they put to rest the lingering center-periphery cleavages that had challenged central authority from the days of independence. The new president, following earlier precedents, granted a national amnesty and incorporated many dissidents into policymaking positions. Even the Radical Party obtained congressional representation in the next election.

The monopoly that the government had obtained over the country's most effective fighting forces made it difficult for Conservatives and other opposition elements to contemplate victory through armed challenge. Because of offi-

cial intervention in the electoral process, moreover, opponents were unable to wrest control of the state from incumbents. Ironically, Conservatives soon realized that they had no choice but to push for expanded suffrage if they were to succeed in capturing the state. Even more oddly, in opposing the government they structured alliances of convenience in Congress with their nemeses, the staunchly ideological liberals, who were worried about electoral intervention and the authorities' refusal to press for increased democratization. This strategic adoption of a "liberal" creed by Conservative forces in a traditional society explains one of the most extraordinary paradoxes of Chilean history: the legislative alliance of ultramontane Catholics and radical liberals, both seeking for different reasons the fulfillment of democratic ideals.

Clearly, the Conservatives did not become democrats because of an ideological conversion, though many with close ties to England had come to believe that parliamentary government was a requirement for any civilized nation-state. But they correctly perceived that representative institutions were in their best interest, and the only real alternative once military solutions to domestic conflicts no longer seemed viable. Conservatives were forced to make the liberal creed their own precisely because they had lost ground to a new political class, which had gained strength by dominating the state. In turn, the pragmatic "liberals" (known as the Montt-Varistas) were not acting irrationally when they resisted attempts to expand suffrage and bar official manipulation of the electoral process. They fully realized that in an overwhelmingly rural society, with traditional landlord-peasant relationships, the Conservatives would beat them at the polls and challenge their monopoly of power.¹⁴

Under the leadership of Conservative José Manuel Irarrazaval, who became a champion of electoral reform, the Right sought to advance its interests through the democratic electoral process, rather than through military conspiracies or direct ties with elements of the central bureaucracy, as was the case in many other countries at the time. As a result, the church, hostile to electoral democracy in much of Latin Europe, also came to accept the legitimacy of suffrage in generating public officials. From a position of strength in Congress, the Conservatives, together with Radicals and ideological liberals and over the objections of the executive, successfully pressed for a series of reforms that restricted presidential power. The president was limited to a single 5-year term, and his veto power was restricted. The adoption of the Electoral Reform Act in 1874 tripled the electorate from 50,000 to 150,000 voters over the 1872 total.¹⁵

Nevertheless, official intervention in the electoral process did not end with electoral reform, and the stakes in controlling the state continued to increase. With its victory in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), Chile gained vast new territory and rich nitrate deposits. Customs duties climbed to over 70 percent of government income, eliminating the need for property taxes and swelling state coffers. President José Manuel Balmaceda (1886–1891) refused to give in to congressional demands that ministers serve with congressional approval. He also balked at proposals that local governments be given substantial autonomy

from the central administration, and that local notables be given control of the electoral process. When his cabinet was censured, Balmaceda sought to govern without congressional approval, adopting the national budget by decree. Finally, a civil war broke out between Congress, backed by the navy, and the president, backed by the army; Balmaceda was defeated in August 1891 and committed suicide.

With the country in disarray and the president dead, a junta headed by a navy captain, the vice-president of the Senate, and the president of the Chamber of Deputies assumed control of the government for three months. This marked the first time since 1830 that political power had been exercised in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution. But the brief period of unconstitutional rule did not involve imposing an authoritarian regime, nor did the military as an institution involve itself in politics except to take orders from civilian leaders. The cabinet continued to be a civilian cabinet, and Congress remained in session with virtually no interruption.

The victory of the congressional forces ushered in almost four decades of parliamentary government (1891–1927), in which the center of gravity of the political system shifted from the executive to the legislature, from the capital to local areas, and from state officials and their agents to local party leaders and political brokers. Politics became an elaborate log-rolling game centered in Congress, in which national resources were divided for the benefit of local constituents. Democratization, implied by these changes, had important effects on the political system. With the expansion of suffrage and local control of elections, parliamentary parties expanded beyond the confines of congressional corridors and became national networks with grassroots organizations.

Just as significant, however, was the emergence of parties outside the congressional arena (in Duverger's terms) in response to increased democratization and to other dramatic changes taking place in Chilean society.¹⁸ While the Conservatives initially gained from electoral reform and were able to dominate the politics of the Parliamentary Republic, they did not foresee that the country's social structure would change so quickly in a quarter-century, and that electoral reform would soon benefit a new group of parties with far different agendas. The urban population, which accounted for 26 percent of the total in 1875, had soared to 45 percent by 1900. Nitrate production, employing between 10 and 15 percent of the population, spawned a host of ancillary industries and created a new working class, which soon found expression in new political parties when the traditional parties, particularly the modern Radicals, failed to provide the leadership required to address its grievances.

Both the state and private employers were slow to recognize the legitimacy of working-class demands and often brutally repressed the infant labor movement. But the openness of the political system, and the sharp competition among traditional parties searching for alliances to maximize electoral gain, permitted the development of electorally oriented class-based parties. By 1921, the year the Chilean Communist Party was officially founded, it had elected

two members to Congress; four years later, it achieved representation in the Senate. Thus, to the secular-religious cleavage of the nineteenth century was added the worker-employer cleavage of the early twentieth century—generative cleavages that would shape the basic physiognomy of Chile's contemporary party system.

The 1920s were years of considerable political upheaval. The invention of synthetic nitrates during World War I led to the collapse of the Chilean nitrate industry, with far-reaching ramifications for the whole economy. The cumbersome and venal Parliamentary Republic fell increasingly into disrepute, criticized by the Right for allowing politics to become corrupt and overly democratic; denounced by the Center and Left for its inability to address national problems. President Arturo Alessandri (1920–1924) violated political norms by becoming an activist president and pressing for change in the face of congressional inaction and opposition. In September 1924, a group of young military officers unsheathed their swords in the congressional galleries, demanding reforms and the defeat of a congressional pay increase. Bowing to the unprecedented pressure, Alessandri resigned his post and left the country in the hands of a military junta—the first time in over 100 years that military men had played a direct role in governing the nation.

Senior officers, however, objected to the reform agenda of their younger colleagues; uncomfortable with the responsibility of governing, they soon began to defer to civilian leaders of the Right. This prompted a national movement to have Alessandri return, backed by younger officers who identified with the September *pronunciamiento*. In January 1925, the president resumed his position, marking the end of the first extraconstitutional government since 1891. During Alessandri's term, the 1925 Constitution was adopted with the expectation that it would increase the power of the president. It was the first full reform of the basic document since the Constitution of 1833, but it also embodied many elements of continuity.

Alessandri's elected successor, Emiliano Figueroa, proved unable to stand up to political pressures and the growing influence of Minister of War Colonel Carlos Ibañez, a military officer who had participated in the 1924 movement. In 1927 Figueroa resigned, and Ibañez was elected with broad support from all major parties, who sensed the country's and the military's demand for a "non-political" and forceful chief executive. During his administration, Ibañez sought to alter fundamentally Chilean politics by introducing "efficient and modern" administrative practices, disdaining the role of Congress in cabinet appointments and resorting to emergency and executive measures, such as forced exile, in attempting to crush labor and opposition political parties. It is important to stress, however, that Ibañez's government was not a military dictatorship. While his authority derived in large measure from support in the barracks, army officers did not govern. The vast majority of cabinet officials were civilians, though most were newcomers to politics who criticized the intrigues of the traditional political class.

Ibañez soon discovered that he, too, could run out of political capital. His inability to curb the influence of parties, and his growing isolation, combined with the catastrophic effects of the Great Depression (in which Chilean exports dropped to a fifth of their former value) and mounting street unrest, finally led the demoralized president to submit his resignation in July 1931. After a period of political instability, which included the resignation of yet another president and the 90-day "Socialist Republic" proclaimed by a civil/military junta that attempted to press for social change, elections were scheduled in 1932. Once again, Arturo Alessandri was elected to a full constitutional term, thereby restoring the continuity of Chile's institutional system. During his second administration, Alessandri was far more cautious than during his first, successfully bringing the country out of the depression with firm austerity measures and reaffirming the value of institutions based on democratic values and procedures at a time when they were under profound attack in Europe.

The 1938 presidential election represented another major turning point in Chilean politics and a vivid confirmation of the extent to which ordinary citizens had become the fundamental source of political authority. In an extremely close election, the Center, in an alliance with the Marxist Left called the Popular Front, captured the presidency, and Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda was elected. Despite the often-bitter opposition of the Right, the government for a decade expanded social-welfare policies, encouraged the rise of legal unionism, and actively pursued import-substituting industrialization through a new Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Corporation for the Development of Production). The trend toward urbanization continued: in 1940, 53 percent of the population lived in cities; by 1970, that figure had increased to 76 percent.

By 1948, the new Cold War climate abroad and the increased local electoral successes of the Communist Party were making both Socialists and Radicals increasingly uneasy. Encouraged by Radical leaders, President Gabriel González Videla dissolved the Popular Front, outlawed the Communist Party, and sent many of its members to detention camps. These actions, combined with the wear of incumbency and general dissatisfaction with the opportunistic Radicals, contributed to the election of Carlos Ibañez as president in 1952 on an anti-party platform. But Ibañez, unable to govern without party support, was forced to shift his initial populist programs to a severe austerity plan that contributed to wage and salary declines. He was succeeded in 1958 by Conservative businessman Jorge Alessandri, the former president's son, who edged out Socialist Salvador Allende by only 2.7 percent of the vote. Alessandri applied more austerity measures, provoking cries for profound reform from a populace tired of spiraling inflation and economic stagnation. In the 1964 presidential elections, fear of the growing strength of the Left led Chile's traditional rightist parties to reluctantly support Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the new Christian Democratic Party, which had replaced the Radicals as the largest party in Chile and the most powerful party of the Center. With massive financial assistance from the United States, the Frei government attempted to implement far-reaching reforms, but

after dissolving their tacit alliance with the Right, the Christian Democrats were unable to increase their share of the vote. In 1970, claiming to have been betrayed by Frei's reformist policies, the Right refused to support Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomic, making possible the election of leftist candidate Salvador Allende and his Popular Unity coalition, with only 36.2 percent of the vote. The Christian Democratic and Popular Unity governments are treated in more detail in the discussion of the breakdown of Chilean democracy, below.

Characteristics of Chilean Politics at Mid-Century¹⁷

By the 1930s, with the rise of Marxist parties at a time of electoral expansion, the Chilean party system, in Lipset and Rokkan's terms, had become complete.¹⁸ In addition to the traditional Conservative and Liberal parties that had emerged from church-state cleavages in the early nineteenth century, and the Radical Party that had developed later in that century out of similar divisions, Communist and Socialist parties had now developed in response to a growing class cleavage. The only new party to emerge after the 1930s, the Christian Democratic Party, was an offshoot of the Conservatives, which sought to address social and economic issues from the vantage point of reform Catholicism.

Yet this "complete" system was characterized by sharp social polarizations in which the organized electorate was divided almost equally among the three political tendencies. Although numerous small parties appeared after 1932, the six major parties continued to dominate politics, commanding over 80 percent of the vote by the 1960s. Elections and politics became a national "sport," as parties became so deeply ingrained in the nation's social fabric that Chileans would refer to a Radical or a Communist or a Christian Democratic "subculture." Parties helped to structure people's friendships and social life. Partisan affiliation continued to be reinforced by both class and religion, so that Christian Democratic elites were more likely to go to Catholic schools and universities and come from upper-middle-class backgrounds, while Socialist elites went to public schools and state universities and came from lower-middle-class backgrounds. Communist strength was heavily concentrated in mining communities and industrial areas, Christian Democrats appealed to middle-class and women voters, while the Right retained substantial support in rural Chile.

The major parties framed political options not only in municipal and congressional elections but also in private and secondary associations. The penetration of parties into Chilean society was such that even high school student associations, community groups, universities, and professional societies selected leaders on party slates. Political democracy helped democratize social groups and erode historic patterns of authoritarian social relations.

It is crucial to stress that there were no giants in the Chilean political system. No single party or tendency could win a majority and impose its will. This pattern had clear implications for the functioning of Chile's presidential system.

Since majorities were impossible to achieve, Chilean presidents were invariably elected by coalitions or were forced to build governing coalitions with opposing parties in Congress after the election. However, because preelection coalitions were constituted primarily for electoral reasons, in an atmosphere of considerable political uncertainty, they tended to disintegrate after a few months of the new administration.

Ideological disputes were often at the root of coalition changes, as partisans of one formula would resist the proposals of opponents. But narrow political considerations were also important. Since a president could not succeed himself, leaders of other parties in his coalition often realized they could best improve their fortunes in succeeding municipal and congressional elections by disassociating themselves from the difficulties of incumbency in a society fraught with economic problems. In the final analysis, only by proving their independent electoral strength in nonpresidential elections could parties demonstrate their value to future presidential coalitions.

Since Chilean presidents could not dissolve Congress in case of an impasse or loss of congressional support, they needed to build alternative alliances in order to govern. Parties assured their influence by requiring that candidates nominated for cabinet posts seek their party's permission (*pase*) to serve in office. Presidents, required continually to forge working coalitions, were repeatedly frustrated by the sense of instability and permanent crisis that this bargaining process gave Chilean politics.

An image of Chile's party system as excessively competitive and polarized, however, is incomplete and inaccurate. The collapse of party agreements, the censure of ministers, and the sharp disagreement over major policy issues captured the headlines and inflamed people's passions. But the vast majority of political transactions were characterized by compromise, flexibility, and respect for the institutions and procedures of constitutional democracy. Over the years, working agreements among political rivals led to implementing far-reaching policies, including state-sponsored industrialization; comprehensive national health, welfare, and educational systems; agrarian reform; and copper nationalization. Agreements were also structured around the more mundane aspects of politics. Congressmen and party leaders of different stripes would join in efforts to promote a particular region or to provide special benefits to constituency groups and individuals.¹⁹

This pattern of give-and-take can be attributed to three mutually reinforcing factors: a pragmatic center; the viability of representative arenas of decision-making and neutrality of public institutions; and the imperatives of electoral politics. Compromise would have been difficult without the flexibility provided by Center parties, notably the Radical Party, which inherited the role of the nineteenth-century Liberals as the fulcrum of coalition politics. The Radicals supported, at one time or another, the rightist presidencies of the two Alessandris in the 1930s and 1960s and governed with support of the Right in the late 1940s. In the late 1930s and through most of the 1940s, however, they allied

with the Left to form Popular Front governments under a Radical president, and in the 1970s, a substantial portion of the party supported Salvador Allende, though by then the party's strength had been severely eroded.

Accommodation and compromise were also the hallmarks of democratic institutions such as the Chilean Congress, whose law-making, budgetary, and investigatory powers provided incentives for party leaders to set aside disagreements in matters of mutual benefit. Indeed, the folkways of the legislative institution, stemming from years of close working relationships in committees and on the floor, contributed to the development of legendary private friendships among leaders who were strong public antagonists. Just as significant, however, were such prestigious institutions as the armed forces, the judiciary, and the comptroller general, respected for their "neutrality" and remoteness from the clamor of everyday politics. These institutions provided an important safety valve from the hyperpoliticization of most of public life. The legitimacy of public institutions was further reinforced by a strong commitment to public service, which extended from the presidential palace to the rural police station. Although electoral fraud and vote-buying by political party machines were common, financial corruption remained very rare in Chilean public life, and the vigilance of the Congress and the courts helped prevent wrongdoing for personal gain by public office-holders.

Finally, the press of continuous elections forced political leaders to turn away from ideological pursuits and attend to the more mundane side of politics, such as personal favors and other particularistic tasks inherent in a representative system. Congressmen and senators had to look after their party brokers in municipalities and neighborhoods, making sure to provide public funds for a local bridge or jobs for constituents. Often political leaders from different parties joined in advancing the common interests of their constituencies, setting aside acrimonious, abstract debates over the role of the state in the economy or Soviet policy in Asia. In Chile, the politics of ideology, rooted in strong social inequalities, was counterbalanced by the clientelistic politics of electoral accountability reinforced by that same inequality. As will be noted below, many of these elements disappeared during the later 1960s and early 1970s, putting the democratic system under great strain and ultimately contributing to its total collapse.

• ORIGINS OF CHILEAN DEMOCRACY: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT •

Because it is one of the few cases in which a democratic government was successfully established in the mid-nineteenth century, and an especially dramatic example of democratic failure, Chile constitutes a valuable paradigmatic case in the effort to construct theoretical propositions explaining the origins, consolidation, and breakdown of democratic regimes. Its theoretical utility is enhanced

by the fact that there are no comparable cases of democratic development outside the Western European–North American context, or among primarily Catholic or export-oriented countries. As a deviant case, which has been largely neglected in scholarly literature, Chile can serve as a useful test for the validity of theoretical propositions generated by observing the experience of other countries, primarily European.²⁰

The most prominent theses aimed at explaining the development of democracy assume that political practices and institutions can be understood by reference to a series of historical, cultural, or economic determinants. It is the central argument of this chapter that such approaches fall short in accounting for Chilean exceptionalism, and that the Chilean case can be best explained by considering political factors as independent variables in their own right. This section will review the "determinants" of democracy embodied in what can be called the colonial-continuity thesis, the political-culture thesis, and the economic-class-structure thesis.²¹ It will then turn to an analysis of those political variables that are most helpful in understanding Chile's political evolution, variables that can add to the development of theoretical propositions to be tested in other contexts.

Naturally, any hypotheses derived from the Chilean case or any single case will remain tentative until subjected to systematic comparative analysis drawing on a broader sample of carefully chosen observations. Without comparative evidence it would be difficult to identify those factors that are generalizable and constitute necessary conditions for the development of democratic practices and institutions, and those that are unique to and ultimately incorrect for explaining the single case.

The Colonial-Continuity Thesis

According to the colonial-continuity thesis, democratic practices will flourish in postcolonial regimes if institutions for self-rule, even if limited, were in place for several generations during colonial times, and if the transition from colony to independent state was accomplished without too much violence and destruction of those institutions. Both these conditions figure prominently in accounts of the outcome of the British decolonization experiences of the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.²² It is clear that this thesis cannot account for the Chilean case. Although Chile was a more isolated colony than the major centers of Spanish rule in the new world, there is no evidence that the colony was able to gain the necessary autonomy to develop institutions of self-rule that would carry it into the postindependence period. Chile was subject to the same patrimonial administration and mercantilistic policies that discouraged expressions of political or economic independence and frowned on participatory institutions as contrary to the fundamental conception of monarchical rule. The colonies were the personal property of the king, subject to his direct control. Moreover, the Chilean wars of independence were profoundly disruptive of the previous

political order, plunging the nation into a fratricidal conflict that tore asunder institutions and political practices that had been in place for generations. Although Chileans later established democratic rule, this accomplishment had little to do with the political experiences gained in colonial times.²³

There is, however, a variant of the continuity thesis that must be addressed because it constitutes the principal explanation found in the historiographical literature dealing with Chilean exceptionalism. According to this thesis, Chile deviated from the pattern that held sway in nineteenth-century Latin America not because its colonial institutions were more liberal, but because its postindependence institutions were more conservative. This argument holds that Diego Portales, the cabinet minister who dominated the government of President Prieto during the 1830s, helped to establish firm and authoritarian rule equivalent to that of the Spanish crown during the colonial era, thus rescuing Chile from misguided liberals enamored with unrealistic federal formulae and excessive freedoms.²⁴ Chile succeeded not because it broke from the colonial past, this argument holds, but because it reimposed that past. Morse articulates the point:

Chile was an example perhaps unparalleled of a Spanish American country which managed, after a twelve-year transitional period, to avoid the extremes of tyranny and anarchy with a political system unencumbered by the mechanisms and party rhetoric of exotic liberalism. . . . [T]he structure of the Spanish patrimonial state was recreated with only those minimum concessions to Anglo-French constitutionalism that were necessary for a nineteenth century republic which had just rejected monarchical rule.²⁵

It is disingenuous to argue, as most Chileans do, that Portales forged Chile's institutions singlehandedly. The minister was in office for only a total of three years, had little to do with drafting the 1833 Constitution, and died in office at a time when his government was under serious challenge.²⁶ Regardless of Portales' role, it is also profoundly mistaken to argue that Chile's concessions to Anglo-French constitutionalism were minimal. The political system established by the Constitution of 1833 was qualitatively different from the colonial system of the past, bearing far greater resemblance to the institutions and practices followed in the North American colonies, and the compromises struck at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia, than to the institutions set up by the Castilian rulers.

In Weberian terms, Chile's new constitutional formula substituted rational-legal authority for traditional authority; that is, it replaced the authority of an hereditary monarch, whose power was inherent in his person by virtue of divinely ordained practices going back generations, with the authority of an elected president whose power derived from the office as defined by law. Moreover, rather than recreating colonial patterns of political domination, nineteenth-century Chilean politics from the outset expanded the concept of citizenship (a radical notion at the time) and affirmed the legitimacy of elected assemblies to claim political sovereignty equally with the chief executive.

When viewed in this light, the achievements of the forgers of Chilean institutionality are very significant in contrast to those of their North American counterparts, who fashioned their institutions and practices by drawing on generations of experience with self-rule within the political framework of Tudor England.²⁷

The Political-Culture Thesis

Perhaps the most influential set of propositions associated with the development of democratic institutions are those that hold that democracy requires a country's citizens, or at the very least its politically active elites, to share the liberal beliefs and values that are the hallmark of the Enlightenment. These include values conducive to accepting the equality of all people and their fundamental worth, values tolerating opposition and the free expression of ideas, and values celebrating the legitimacy of moderation and compromise. In short, they are the values associated with participatory politics as opposed to authoritarian patterns of governance. These political-culture variables have figured prominently in efforts to explain the general failure of democracy in Latin America and in Latin Europe, and the success of democracy in Protestant Europe and the United States. Democracy succeeded in the United States, this argument holds, because the British colonies were populated by settlers already imbued with more egalitarian values stemming from the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation. By contrast, the colonizers of Latin America brought aristocratic and feudal values reinforced by a Catholic faith stressing the importance of hierarchy, authority, corporativism, and the immutability of the traditional social order.²⁸

But if the absence of democracy in Latin America is explained by the lack of appropriate beliefs, how can we account for the Chilean case? Were Chileans, located in one of the most remote colonies of the empire and dominated by an aristocracy of Basque descent, less tied to royal institutions? Or was the Chilean church more liberal or less influential in the social and political life of the colony? None of the historical evidence supports these contentions. To the contrary, Chile's isolation had made the colony one of the most traditional on the continent. Royalist sentiment was as strong in Chile as anywhere else, and troops who fought with the Spaniards to suppress the insurrection were recruited locally. Similarly, the church was as conservative as in other countries and retained the strong backing of the local aristocracy despite its close ties with the colonial power. Chilean elites were no less Catholic than the political elites of other former colonies.²⁹

A variant of the political-culture thesis holds that it is not so much the religious traditions or political practices of the past that condition political beliefs and attitudes, but the authority relations found in secondary spheres of society: the workplace, the family, or the educational system.³⁰ Of particular importance in a predominantly agricultural society are the social relations of production re-

sulting from the country's land-tenure system. Where land is concentrated in a small number of estates with traditional patron-client authority relations, this thesis argues, political values will be hierarchical and authoritarian. Where land is divided more equally and exploited by family farmers and contract labor, political values will be more egalitarian and democratic, facilitating the development of democratic politics. This is the argument that Booth makes in attempting to account for democratic development in Costa Rica.³¹ Dahl echoes this approach when he suggests that the Chilean case can be explained by "considerable equality in distribution of land and instruments of coercion, reinforced by norms favoring social and political equality."³²

However, Dahl's argument also fails to stand up to historical scrutiny. Chile's system of social relations and stratification was one of the most rigid and traditional on the continent, based on large landed estates and semifeudal relationships of authority between landlord and peasant. Authority relations in the family and in the educational system, still under church tutelage, were also authoritarian and hierarchical.³³ The wars of independence disrupted the country's social structure less than they did elsewhere. As Dominguez notes, "Chile lagged behind the other colonies, although it had experienced economic growth and mobilization. Its society had been transformed the least. The social bonds within it remained strong. Centralization had not been advanced nor had society been pluralized. Traditional elites remained strong, and traditional orientations prevailed."³⁴ Throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, the traditional nature of social relations in the countryside remained one of the most striking features of the Chilean social structure. Despite the rise of an urban working class and the democratization of other spheres of social life, rural social relations were not significantly altered until the 1960s, when agrarian reform was finally undertaken as national policy.³⁵

There is no reason to assume that the evolution of democratic politics in Chile in the nineteenth century was due to more "favorable" political-culture variables. The failure of cultural explanations to account for the Chilean case raises serious questions about the underlying assumption that there is a direct fit between societal values and political institutions. It is very unlikely that Chile had societal values comparable to those of Norway, Australia, or the United States (though they may not have been too dissimilar to those found in class-conscious Britain), yet the political outcomes were not dissimilar. Several students of democracy have argued that "stable" democracy is the product not only of liberal and participatory values, but of a mixture of participatory and deferential ones. However, in the absence of a clearly defined set of values that relate to democracy, it is difficult to ascertain which mix is appropriate. As a result, there is a real temptation to engage in circular reasoning: If a particular regime was stable or had the requisite democratic characteristics, it was assumed it had *ipso facto* the appropriate value structure.

Although egalitarian and democratic values were not necessary to structure democratic institutions and procedures, the Chilean case suggests that the exer-

cise of democratic practices over a period of time encourages the development of certain norms of political conduct and reinforces belief in the legitimacy of the rules of the game. As early as the 1850s, Chilean political elites of different ideological persuasions worked together in Congress to advance common objectives, thus developing habits of flexibility and compromise. The Radicals, who were excluded from decisionmaking roles in Argentina until after the 1912 Sáenz Peña law, were invited to serve in cabinets fifty years earlier in Chile.

As an industrial working class developed, moreover, Chilean elites, despite serious objections to accepting the principle of collective bargaining at the workplace and brutal repression of the incipient labor movement, accepted the legitimate role of working-class parties in the arena of electoral competition and eventually in the corridors of power. Democratic institutions came to be accepted by most Chileans as the best way to resolve disagreements and set national policy. By mid-twentieth century, ordinary Chileans took great pride in their civic duties, participating enthusiastically in an electoral process that made Chile distinctive among Third World nations. In sum, Chilean democracy emerged without strongly held democratic values. But the practice of democracy itself instilled norms of give-and-take, tolerance, and respect for fundamental liberties that were widely shared by the population as a whole.³⁶

This does not mean that democratic politics in Chile were centrist-oriented and devoid of sharp conflict. In 1891, after thirty years of domestic tranquility, the strongly felt political antagonisms generated by the executive-congressional impasse spilled onto the battlefield, a conflict that nonetheless pales by comparison with the U.S. Civil War, which also took place eighty years after the Declaration of Independence. The deep ideological disagreements of twentieth-century Chile continuously challenged the country's institutions and practices. The Chilean case and those of other highly polarized political systems like Italy, France, and Finland show that consensus on the fundamentals of public policy can be relatively low, while consensus on the rules and procedures for arriving at policy decisions can be high.

It was not moderation that made Chilean democracy function; it was Chilean democracy that helped moderate political passions and manage deep-seated divisions. A democratic political culture is not an abstract set of beliefs or psychological predispositions governing interpersonal relations in the body politic, but practical and ingrained traditions and working relations based on regularized patterns of political interaction in the context of representative institutions. As will be noted below, with the breakdown of democracy, Chile lost not only representative rule, but the institutional fabric that helped define many of the values of democratic human conduct.

The Economic-Class-Structure Thesis

While there is broad variation in studies emphasizing the economic determinants of democracy, they can be divided into two categories: those relating de-

mocracy to overall levels of economic development; and those focusing on the contribution to the creation of democratic institutions of particular groups or classes that emerge as a result of economic transformations in society.

The first group draws on the insights of "modernization" theory, arguing that economic development leads to more complex, differentiated, secularized, and educated societies, opening the way for the rise of new groups and institutions that find expression in democratic practices.³⁷ In addition, economic growth is said to provide channels for upward mobility and for ameliorating the sharp social disparities found in poor societies, disparities that undermine democratic performance. Empirical evidence for these propositions was advanced in a host of cross-national studies conducted in the late 1960s, inspired by Lipset's classic article on the "economic correlates of democracy."³⁸ The main difficulty with these studies in explaining the Chilean case is that they are ahistorical. Chile in the nineteenth century, like most incipient democracies of the time, was a rural, pre-industrial society with very low levels of personal wealth and literacy, yet it met many of the criteria for democratic performance. In the twentieth century, as several authors have noted, Chile was clearly an outlier, exhibiting many of the characteristics of economic underdevelopment while boasting high scores on democratic performance.³⁹ As Linz has argued, explanations that draw on levels of economic development do not contribute much to our understanding of the origins and development of democratic politics.⁴⁰

Scholars writing in a Marxist tradition have argued that the most important variable is not overall economic development, but the rise of rural and urban middle classes capable of challenging the monopoly of landed elites and breaking their political power. Based on his reflections on the European case, Therborn attributes the rise of democracy to the emergence of agrarian bourgeois groups, giving particular emphasis to "the strength of these agrarian classes and the degree of their independence from the landowning aristocracy and urban big capital."⁴¹ Moore goes further, presenting a more complex argument. For Moore, as for Therborn, the development of a bourgeoisie was central to the development of democracy. However, whether a country actually followed a democratic path depended on how agriculture was commercialized, whether or not it became "labor repressive" or "market commercial."⁴²

As with the political-culture thesis, it is difficult to accept the applicability of the economic-class-structure thesis to the Chilean case. As noted earlier, Chilean agriculture remained "labor repressive" well into the twentieth century, retaining a high concentration of land ownership. And though, as Domínguez notes, Chilean agriculture was geared by the eighteenth century to the export of wheat, wheat production was never commercialized as in North America. As in czarist Russia, it was expanded with only minimal modifications to the traditional manorial system.⁴³ By the same token, and despite some interpretations of Chilean history that stress the rise of an urban bourgeoisie as the key liberalizing force, Chile did not develop a strong and independent urban-based bour-

geoisie before the development of democratic rules and procedures. Although mining interests became powerful and some of the most prominent mine owners were identified with the Radical Party, it is mistaken to identify Chilean mining interests as representatives of a new and differentiated bourgeois class. Other, equally prominent mine owners had close ties to the Conservative Party, and many members of the Chilean elite had both mining and agricultural interests.⁴⁴

However, the most telling argument against the economic-class-structure thesis has already been anticipated in the historical discussion at the beginning of this chapter. The rise of democracy in Chile—including the limitations on presidential authority, the expansion of legislative prerogatives, and the extension of suffrage—took place not over the objections of the conservative landed elites but, as in Britain, at their instigation. If the traditional landowning class, which championed the Roman Catholic church, decided to support suffrage expansion and the development of democratic institutions, then theoretical explanations that hold that democracy emerges only with the destruction of that class are less than adequate. This is a central point, to which we will return.

The Political-Determinants Thesis

An examination of various theses dealing with the historical, cultural, and economic "determinants" of democracy suggests that they are not particularly useful in explaining the Chilean case. What is more, the Chilean case, as one of successful democratic development that does not conform to the principal arguments of those theses, raises serious questions about their overall validity. However, from this evidence alone it would be clearly mistaken to argue that these factors play no substantial role in democratic development. A "liberal" colonial tradition, egalitarian values, economic development, and a variegated social structure are undoubtedly conducive to the implementation and acceptance of institutions of self-governance. Indeed, a perspective such as the one advocated here, the political-determinants thesis, which stresses the importance of discrete political variables and even historical accidents as independent variables, need not eschew the economic and cultural constants nor shy away from developing generalizations that relate socioeconomic to political variables. The point is that these cultural and economic variables are hardly determinants of democratic practices. They may very well be important contributory or even sufficient conditions; but they are not necessary ones.

A historical review of the development of Chilean political institutions immediately suggests the utility of the "political-crisis" literature developed by political scientists. According to this literature, all countries face severe challenges in developing democratic institutions and, depending on the timing and sequence of those challenges, have greater or lesser success in achieving democratic stability.⁴⁵ Although the challenges vary in kind and number, most authors view the crises of national identity (creating a sense of national community over parochial loyalties), authority (establishing viable state structures), and partici-

pation (incorporating the citizenry into the political system) as crucial.

In addition, the sequence and timing of the appearance of these problems on the historical scene can seriously affect the political outcome. As Nordlinger puts it, "the probabilities of a political system developing in a nonviolent, non-authoritarian, and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization of the central government, and then the emergence of mass parties and mass electorate."⁴⁶ It can be argued that Chile followed this "optimal" sequence and that the timing was also favorable, particularly with respect to the emergence of the participation crisis, which did not become a critical issue until after central authority structures had been consolidated.⁴⁷

National identity. It is doubtful that Chileans considered themselves a nation before independence, because there were far fewer mechanisms of social communication and exchange than in North America and a far more ubiquitous set of colonial authority structures.⁴⁸ However, the clear-cut military victory in the war against the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, a victory without parallel in Latin America, gave the small, divided nation a powerful new sense of confidence and purpose, creating tangible symbols of patriotism and nationality. These feelings were reinforced with the victory of Chilean forces in the War of the Pacific, which led to the incorporation of large portions of Peruvian and Bolivian territory into national boundaries.

Political authority. Rustow has noted the importance of distinguishing between establishing and consolidating institutions of democracy. Consolidation involves a lengthy process of "habitation," which is not necessarily unitary; there can be reversals and even breakdown.⁴⁹ In consolidating political authority in Chile, five factors were critically important: leadership; state autonomy; government efficacy; civilian control of the armed forces; and conservative support for democratic rules.

The first important element was leadership. General Bulnes, drawing on his command of the most powerful armed forces in the country and his widespread popularity, could have easily used his position to establish personal rule, following the pattern of notable Latin American *caudillos* such as Páez in Venezuela, Rosas in Argentina, or Santa Ana in Mexico. Instead, like Washington in the United States, he insisted on working within the framework of established political institutions and chose to leave office at the end of his term, making way for his successor. His willingness while in office to underscore the autonomy of the courts, accept the role of Congress in policy, and allow ministerial cabinets to formulate the government's program set a precedent for his successor and future administrations, and helped to establish the legitimacy of democratic institutions.⁵⁰

The second important factor was state autonomy. A crucial legacy of Bulnes' and, later, Montt's respect for constitutionally mandated institutions

ticular, where resorting to force to prevent the distribution of power through the expansion of citizenship is a viable option for those elites, the consolidation of democratic authority structures is seriously jeopardized.

Participation. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the consolidation of stable democracy is the expansion of citizenship rights to nonelite elements, and the incorporation into the political process of new groups and classes. Like Britain and Norway, but unlike Latin Europe, the consolidation of democratic institutions in Chile benefited from a gradual extension of suffrage, less in response to pressures from below than as a consequence of interelite rivalries and strategies to maximize electoral gain. Like Britain, but unlike Latin Europe, Chile found in the elites of the Conservative Party the driving force in the first pivotal extension of suffrage in 1874. This took place a dozen years before the French Third Republic teetered on the brink of collapse with Boulangerism, and twenty-five years before the French Right, still resisting republicanism and democracy, became embroiled in the Dreyfus Affair. It also took place forty years before the pope lifted the *non-expedit* that barred Catholics from participating in Italian elections.

The extension of suffrage in Chile clearly benefited the Conservatives who controlled the countryside, but it also benefited middle-class sectors who identified with the growing urban-based Radical Party. Forty-two years before the adoption of the Saenz Peña Law in Argentina, which forced reluctant Conservatives to suddenly expand the electoral system to permit the Radical Party's eruption on the political stage, Chile had initiated the gradual expansion of suffrage, permitting middle-class sectors to become full participants in ministerial and congressional politics.

In a classic case of what Merton calls the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action, the expansion of suffrage in Chile also soon benefited the growing working class.³⁴ But the entry of the working class into politics in Chile was also gradual, coming both after the consolidation of parliamentary institutions and after middle-class parties had become full actors in the political process. Indeed, in the 1910s, suffrage expansion was actually limited by complex electoral rules and byzantine electoral pacts in which the working-class parties became full participants.

The gradual expansion of suffrage and incorporation of new groups in Chile had some clear implications for the country's democratic development. Had the pressure for full participation coincided with attempts to set up democratic institutions, it is difficult to see how these could have survived. At the same time, however, it is important to stress that in Chile, suffrage expansion and party development occurred prior to the growth of a powerful and centralized state bureaucracy. The growth of the public sector was consequently shaped by organizations whose primary goals were electoral success and accountability. This reinforced the viability of representative institutions. Where strong bureaucracies emerged before strong parties or legislatures, as in Brazil

was the development of politics and government service as a vocation. An impressive group of functionaries and legislators emerged who were committed to strengthening and expanding the secular state. By 1860, more than 2,500 people worked for the state, not including local officials, construction workers, and members of the armed forces. All of Chile's nineteenth-century presidents save one had extensive congressional experience before being elected to office, and five who took office before 1886 began their careers in the Bulnes administration. Between Bulnes and Pinochet, only two of Chile's twenty-two presidents were career military officers, and both of those were freely elected with political-party support in moments of political crisis.³¹

The third element was governmental efficacy. Under the leadership of the first three presidents to serve after 1830, the Chilean economy performed relatively well. This not only brought credit to the new institutions and leaders of the independent nation, but more importantly, it gave the government elites time and autonomy to begin state consolidation. By the time important interests sought to stop the expansion of the secular state, it had garnered significant political, financial, and military strength.³²

The fourth factor was control of the armed forces by civilian governmental leaders. By deliberately refusing until after the War of the Pacific to create a professional military establishment, while retaining close political control over an effective national militia, Chilean officials were able to establish a monopoly over the control of force and a tradition of civilian supremacy over the military. The military challenges of 1851 and 1859 were defeated, discouraging dissident elites from gathering their own military force to challenge national authority structures.

The fifth factor was conservative support for democratic rules. This factor is directly related to the development of state autonomy and control of the military. Control of the military prevented aggrieved sectors of the elites from resorting to insurrectionary movements in order to prevent state action or to capture the state by force. Thus such elites, including conservative landholders, were forced to turn to democratic procedures already in place, and indeed to seek their expansion, in order to preserve and advance their interests. Far from being a minor footnote in history, this support of the Chilean conservatives for liberal rules was of central importance. It led to the creation of a Conservative Party, committed to representative institutions, which had no exact parallel in Latin America or Latin Europe.

This leads to a basic proposition: that the origins and evolution of democratic institutions and procedures are determined more by the choices made by key elites seeking to maximize their interests within the framework of specific structural and political parameters, than they are by abstract cultural or economic factors. Chilean elites, initially hostile to democracy, came to embrace democratic rules as a conscious choice for political survival, in the process contributing to the strengthening of those institutions over the years.³³ Where political elites have fewer incentives to support democratic institutions, and, in par-

or Argentina, informal or officially sponsored linkage networks without popular representation were much more likely to develop, encouraging corporatist and authoritarian patterns of interest representation.⁵⁵

In sum, the political-determinants thesis suggests that the development of democracy must be understood as a complex process that owes much to fortuitous events and variables, such as leadership, that defy quantification and precise definition. It is a long and difficult course, subject to challenges and reversals as societal conditions and the correlations of political forces change. Its chances of success are better in some contexts than others and may depend on the timing and sequence of fundamental societal challenges.

In the final analysis, however, democracy involves human choice by competing groups and leaders who must determine whether peaceful mechanisms for the resolution of conflict, based on the concept of popular sovereignty, provide them with the best possible guarantees under the circumstances. More often than not, this choice may stem from an inconclusive struggle for power; a situation of stalemate where there are no clear winners. That being so, democracy can be understood as resulting from a set of compromises—second-preference choices—in which the concurrence of nondemocrats may be as important as the support of democrats. Once democracy is structured, it provides the key rules of the game, defining the parameters for action and the strategies to be pursued by relevant actors. In time, democratic rules may be accepted as the only proper norms for political conduct, but only if democracy continues to provide guarantees to all players, even if it is not the preferred system of all.

• THE BREAKDOWN OF CHILEAN DEMOCRACY •

Chilean Politics and the Dialectic of Regime Breakdown

The breakdown of Chilean democracy did not occur overnight. Several developments contributed to the erosion of the country's system of political compromise and accommodation, even before the 1970 election of President Salvador Allende. These included the adoption of a series of reforms aimed at making Chilean politics more "efficient," and the rise of a new and more ideological Center, less willing to play the game of political give-and-take.⁵⁶

In 1958, a coalition of the Center and Left joined in enacting a series of electoral reforms aimed at abolishing what were considered corrupt electoral practices. Among the measures was the abolition of joint lists, a long-established tradition of political pacts that permitted parties of opposing ideological persuasions to structure agreements for mutual electoral benefit. While this reform succeeded in making preelection arrangements less "political," it also eliminated an important tool for cross-party bargaining. More important were reforms aimed at curbing congressional authority, promulgated in the guise of strengthening the executive's ability to deal with Chile's chronic

economic troubles. Congressional politics were viewed by chief executives and party elites of various political persuasions as excessively incremental and old-fashioned; the antithesis of modern administrative practices. In the name of modernity, the executive was given control of the budgetary process in 1959, and Congress was restricted in its ability to allocate fiscal resources. Indeed, under the Christian Democratic administration (1964–1970), government technocrats pushed strongly to restrict entirely congressional allocations of funds for small patronage projects, even though these represented an infinitesimal portion of the total budget.

The most serious blow to congressional authority came with the constitutional reforms enacted in 1970, this time through a coalition of the Right and Center. Among other provisions, the reforms prohibited amendments not germane to a given piece of legislation and sanctioned the use of executive decrees to implement programs approved by the legislature in very broad terms. More significantly, it barred Congress from matters dealing with social security, salary adjustments, and pensions in the private and public sectors—the heart of legislative bargaining in an inflation-ridden society.⁵⁷

These reforms went a long way toward cutting back on many of the traditional sources of patronage and log-rolling, reducing the most important political arena for compromise in Chilean politics. Again, the principal motivation was to strengthen executive efficiency. It is clear, however, that the 1960 reformers were also convinced they would be able to win the 1970 presidential election and did not want to have to deal with a difficult Congress in which the Left had a strong presence. Ironically, it was the Left that won the presidency, leaving a legislature with reduced powers in the hands of the Right and Center.

Although these changes were significant, they were symptomatic of other far-reaching changes in Chilean politics, the most notable of which was the rise in the 1960s of a new Center party with a markedly different political style. Unlike their predecessor, the pragmatic Radicals, the Chilean Christian Democrats conceived of themselves as a new and vital ideological force in Chilean politics, a middle road between Marxist transformation and preservation of the status quo. The Christian Democrats believed they would be capable of capturing the allegiance of large portions of the electorate from both sides of the political divide, and become a new majority force. In the early 1960s, they began an unprecedented effort at popular mobilization, appealing to women and middle-class voters, as well as factory workers and especially shanty-town dwellers. Their determination to transform the physiognomy of Chilean politics was strengthened by their success in capturing the presidency under the leadership of Eduardo Frei in 1964, in an electoral coalition with the Right, and by their impressive victory in the 1965 congressional race, the best showing by a single party in Chile's modern history. Their success presented a serious challenge to the parties of both the Right and Left. The Right was practically obliterated in the 1965 election, while the Left redoubled its efforts to maintain its constituents and to appeal with a more militant cry to Chile's most destitute citizens.

Once in office and heartened by their electoral success, the Christian Democrats sought to implement their "revolution in liberty" by disdaining the traditional coalition politics of the past. They were particularly hard on the now-diminished Radicals, refusing any overtures for collaboration. Unlike the Radicals, they were unwilling to tolerate clientelistic and log-rolling politics or to serve as an effective bridge across parties and groups. Although they enacted critical copper "Chileanization" legislation in concert with the Right, and agrarian reform in coalition with the Left, the Christian Democrats went out of their way to govern as a single party and refused to deal with opponents unless they had to. At the same time, they expended large amounts of state resources and vast amounts of U.S. foreign-aid funds on programs that were clearly designed to enhance their electoral superiority at the expense of both Right and Left.³⁸

The Christian Democrats' rigid posture added to the growing radicalization of elites on the Left (particularly the Socialist Party), who feared the electoral challenge of the Center party, and to profound resentment among elites on the Right, who felt betrayed by the reforms, especially in land redistribution, enacted by their erstwhile coalition partners. Radicalization of the Left was also profoundly affected by international events, notably the Cuban Revolution, which set a new standard for the Latin American Left to emulate.

Had the Christian Democrats succeeded in becoming a genuine Center majority, the increased ideological tension would not have had such serious institutional repercussions. But despite vast organizational efforts and extraordinary levels of foreign aid from the Johnson administration in Washington, which was anxious to promote Chile as a showcase of democracy on a continent fascinated by Cuba, they did not succeed in breaking the tripartite deadlock of Chilean politics.

As a result, even when it became apparent that the Christian Democrats would not be able to win the 1970 presidential election in their own right, they were unable to structure preelection coalitions with either the Right or the Left. The bulk of the Radical Party joined in supporting Salvador Allende, who stunned most observers by edging out rightist Jorge Alessandri by a plurality of 36.2 percent to 34.9 percent of the vote. Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomic received only 27.8 percent of the vote.

The election of Allende was not the result of growing radicalization or political mobilization. Nor was it due, in Huntington's terms, to the inability of Chile's political institutions to channel societal demands. Allende won even though he received a smaller percentage of the vote than he had received in his loss to Frei in the two-way race of 1964. Electoral analysis suggests that a greater percentage of newly mobilized voters voted for the Right than for the Left. The election results simply underscored the repercussions of the failure of the Right and Center to structure a preelection coalition.³⁹

Because no candidate received an absolute majority, the election had to be decided in Congress, forcing the creation of a postelection coalition. Christian Democrats joined legislators of the Left in confirming Allende's accession to

the highest office in the nation. But the president's minority status, and his lack of majority support in Congress, meant that like other presidents before him, he would have to tailor his program to the realities of coalition politics in order to succeed, even though the very reforms that the Right and the Christian Democrats had enacted made such compromises more difficult. But compromise was easier said than done. Important elements in the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP) coalition, including Allende's own Socialist Party, were openly committed to a revolutionary transformation in the socioeconomic order and the institutional framework of Chilean politics. Furthermore, the coalition was unwieldy and fractious, with parties and groups competing as much with one another for spoils and popular support as with the opposition.

At the same time, Allende's election touched off an extraordinary reaction from other sectors of Chilean society, who feared a pro-Moscow, Marxist-Leninist system might be established in Chile, to their detriment. They encouraged sabotage, subversion, and foreign intrigue. On both sides of Chile's divided party system, the commitment to change or preservation of the status quo now exceeded the commitment to the principles and practices of Chile's historic democracy.

Under these circumstances, structuring a Center coalition committed to social change within the framework of traditional liberties and democratic guarantees was crucial to the system's survival. However, like the Christian Democrats before them, many leaders of the UP coalition became convinced that bold use of state power could break the political deadlock and swing the balance to the Left. This misconception led them to enact a host of ill-conceived redistributive and stimulative economic measures, which aggravated inflation and generated serious economic difficulties. When combined with measures of questionable legality to bring private business under state control, these policies alienated not only Chile's corporate elite, but also small businessmen and much of Chile's middle class.

In an atmosphere of growing suspicion and violence, the lines of communication between leaders and followers of opposing parties eroded, accentuating the polarization of Chilean politics. At several key junctures, and despite pressures from both sides, attempts were made to forge a Center consensus and structure the necessary compromises that would have saved the regime. But Center groups and moderate politicians on both sides of the political divide abdicated their responsibility in favor of narrower group stakes and short-term interests. The involvement of "neutral" powers, such as the courts and the military, only served to politicize those institutions and pave the way for the military coup—a coup that undermined the very institutions of compromise and accommodation moderate leaders had professed to defend. With the failure of Congress, parties, the courts, and other state institutions to serve as viable arenas to resolve conflict, politics became more and more confrontational; contending groups resorted to mobilizing ever greater numbers of their followers to "prove" their power capabilities. Politics spilled out of the chambers of government onto

the streets, exacerbating an atmosphere of fear and confrontation.⁶⁰

The Chilean breakdown was a complex and dialectical process, in which time-tested patterns of accommodation were eroded by the rise of a Center unwilling to bridge the gap between extremes, by the decline of institutional arenas of accommodation in the name of technical efficiency, and by the hardening of ideological distance between leaders with radically different conceptions of a good society. It was also the product of gross miscalculations, extremism, narrow group stakes, and the lack of courage in key circumstances. Breakdown was not inevitable. While human action was severely circumscribed by the structural characteristics of Chilean politics and by the course of events, there was still room for choice for a leadership willing to prevent the final denouement. Nor did most Chileans want a military solution to the country's problems. Surveys taken in the weeks before the coup indicated an overwhelming support for democracy and a peaceful outcome of the political crisis.⁶¹

Political Structures and Regime Breakdown: A Critique of Presidentialism

Although it was not inevitable, the breakdown of Chilean democracy raises serious questions about the viability of particular institutional forms of governance in democratic regimes. It is a premise of this chapter that in Chile there was an inadequate fit between the country's highly polarized and competitive party system, which was incapable of generating majorities, and a presidential system of centralized authority.⁶²

The starting point for this argument must be a recognition that through much of the twentieth century, presidentialism in Chile was in crisis. By definition, a presidential election is a zero-sum game that freezes the outcome for a fixed period of time. In Chile, the winner invariably represented only a third of the electorate, and yet, as the head of government and head of state, he felt responsible for the national destiny as the embodiment of popular sovereignty. As minority presidents, however, Chilean chief executives received weak legislative support or outright congressional opposition. And since they could not seek reelection, there was little incentive for parties, including the president's, to support him beyond mid-term. The fixed terms for both president and Congress contributed to an atmosphere of ungovernability and a feeling of permanent crisis, alleviated only by the willingness of centrist parties or politicians to provide last minute reprieves to beleaguered presidents in exchange for ambassadorial appointments or concessions on policy.

Paradoxically, the response to this problem of governance was to seek an increase in presidential power. The resolution of the country's pressing social and economic problems required strong leadership, it was argued, and such leadership should not be thwarted by ideological wrangling and the narrow partisan interest of the parties and the legislature. However, increased presidential power only aggravated the problem by further reducing arenas for accommoda-

tion and by making executive-legislative relations more bitter. Indeed, the stronger the power of the presidency as a separate constitutional actor, the greater were the disincentives for structuring presidential support among parties and groups jealous of their autonomy and future electoral prospects.

In Chile, there was an inverse correlation between the power of the presidency and the success of presidential government. The stronger the president, the weaker the presidential system—a perverse logic that came to a tragic head in the Allende years. A parliamentary system of government would have defused the enormous pressures for structuring high-stakes coalitions around a winner-take-all presidential option, which only reinforced political polarization. At the same time, it would have eliminated the stalemate and confrontation in executive-legislative relations. Had Chile had a parliamentary regime in the early 1970s, Allende's government might have fallen, but democracy would have survived. The working majority in Congress that elected Allende to the presidential post would have had to continue for him to have retained his position. This was not out of the question. The Christian Democrats were close to the UP government on many key points of substance, as attested by the near-agreements at several key junctures of the unfolding drama of the UP years. And, had the coalition collapsed, it is quite likely that a Christian Democrat, or perhaps a member of the small Leftist Radical Party, would have formed a new government with support from elements on the Right.

It is important to stress that parliamentary politics would have had the opposite effect of presidential politics on party distance. It would have contributed to moderating Chilean politics by reinforcing the time-honored traditions of give-and-take honed by generations of politicians. Moderate leaders on both sides of the congressional aisle would have gained strength, encouraging centripetal drives toward coalition and compromise, rather than being outclassed by maximalist leaders who thrived in the public arenas of high-stakes electoral battles. Moreover, legislators of all parties would have thought twice about abandoning hard-fought coalition arrangements if they had faced the prospect of immediate reelection, and the greater accountability of having been part of an agreement to structure executive authority.

The considerations should be borne in mind by political leaders of both Right and Left in discussing the transition back to democracy after military rule. Ironically, as will be noted in the next section, the very prospect of a presidential election is one of the principal obstacles in structuring a return to democracy in Chile.

• MILITARY RULE IN CHILE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REDEMOCRATIZATION •

With the collapse of democracy, Chile was abruptly transformed from an open and participatory political system into a repressive and authoritarian one. Few

Chileans could have imagined in September 1973 that military intervention would lead to a government so alien to institutions and traditions dating from the nation's founding. Fewer still would have believed that Chile would produce an authoritarian regime capable of outlasting other contemporary military governments on the continent, or that General Pinochet, the obedient commander who assured President Allende of his undivided loyalty, would achieve a degree of personal power rare in the annals of modern dictatorship. How could this transformation have taken place? What has happened to Chilean institutions under military rule? What are the prospects for transition back to stable democracy?

Soon after the coup, it became clear that Chile's military commanders, with no personal experience of direct involvement in politics, were not about to turn power back to civilian leaders after a brief interregnum. From the outset, they articulated two basic aims.⁶³ The first was to destroy the parties of the Left and their collaborators. The Chilean military did not interpret its intervention as a simple military coup aimed at replacing a government, but as an all-out war to crush an enemy that it believed had infiltrated close to half the population. However, military leaders were convinced that it was not only foreign Marxists who were to blame for Chile's predicament. They thought the Left had been able to make inroads because of the inherent weaknesses of liberal democracy, which they saw as encouraging corruption and demagoguery. Thus, their second objective was to engineer a fundamental restructuring of Chilean political institutions and political life, aimed at "cleaning" impurities from the body politic while creating a new political order of committed and patriotic citizens, dedicated to modernizing the country and projecting its grandeur to a hostile world.

The junta had a clear idea of how to pursue its first objective; it simply took the years of training, awesome firepower, and many contingency plans that had been developed to protect the constitutional government, and applied them to the new task of finding and neutralizing the enemy. Military units moved in to "clean up" neighborhoods that were strongholds of the Left, as if they were securing enemy territory during wartime.⁶⁴ Thousands of party leaders, trade union officials, and community activists associated with the parties of the Left were "neutralized" through arrests, exile, and, in some cases, death. Labor unions were sharply circumscribed, parties were banned or declared in "recess," and internal elections were prohibited or closely monitored in all private organizations including professional associations and nonprofit agencies. Citizens, who during the Allende years and before had been repeatedly enlisted for one cause or another, now turned inward and avoided public affairs entirely, either out of fear of reprisals or outright support for military rule. Politics, which for generations had revolved around parties and interest groups that penetrated all levels of society, was now confined to small groups of individuals and cabals in the inner corridors of power. One of the most highly mobilized societies in the world became one of the most demobilized.

The junta, however, had a much hazier conception of how political power

should be structured, no experience in governing, and no precise blueprint for its foundational program. In the first months and years, the military governed in an *ad hoc* and arbitrary fashion, at times racked by internal tension. Gradually, however, the commanders succeeded in establishing a degree of national political authority rare among Latin American military regimes. Ironically, a major reason for this achievement was that, in contrast to other bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone, the Chilean military successfully invoked Chile's tradition of political stability and concern for legality to reinforce its own political control. By drawing on the ubiquitous power of the Chilean state and utilizing constitutional principles from Chile's presidentialist tradition, while, at the same time, restoring the principle of military obedience to constituted authority, Chile's commanders were able to structure efficient, if not fully legitimate, governing institutions. An important ingredient of this process was elevating General Pinochet to the role of president of the republic, while he retained his posts as commander-in-chief of the army and a voting member of the four-man junta. Further aiding the consolidation of political rule by Pinochet and his colleagues was the successful effort to implement far-reaching socioeconomic transformations of a more revolutionary nature than those attempted by their elected predecessors.⁶⁵

It should be stressed that Pinochet did not resort to populist or charismatic rule, as did Juan Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, nor was power based on developing a corrupt political machine like those of Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner or the Somoza clan of Nicaragua. In Chile, the consolidation of political power and one-man rule was due to four fundamental factors. First, Pinochet and his advisers were able to draw on the framework of traditional constitutional legality to justify one-man rule. Second, they could rely on the disciplined and hierarchical nature of the armed forces and the growing power of the secret police. Third, they enjoyed the strong and uncritical support of much of the business community and sectors of the middle class. And fourth, they were able to take advantage of continued sharp divisions in the opposition, which continued to fuel widespread fear among influential Chileans that an end to military rule would permit the Left to resurge and once again challenge the socioeconomic status quo.

Constitutional Tradition and the Rise of Pinochet

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and the director general of the Carabineros (Chile's paramilitary police) constituted themselves as a governmental junta, which would exercise executive, legislative, and constitutional authority through unanimous agreement of its members. General Pinochet was selected to be junta president by virtue of his position as leader of the oldest military branch. He argued initially, however, that the junta presidency would rotate on a periodic basis among the commanders. Junta members also agreed to divide up policy areas so that each

of the services would handle the affairs of different ministries. Even the appointment of university presidents was parceled out among the services, so that Pinochet named the army general who became president of the University of Chile, while Admiral Merino appointed one of his own colleagues to the top post at the Catholic University.

Pinochet, however, moved swiftly to assert his position as more than *primus inter pares*. Although Air Force General Gustavo Leigh was, in the early days, the most articulate, visible, and headline member of the junta, Pinochet proved to be more politically skillful and ambitious.⁶⁸ But, Pinochet owed his ascendancy to more than his personal qualities. Ministers and other governmental officials automatically turned to the junta leader for direction, as they had always done to Chile's constitutional presidents. Soon, Pinochet was far better informed than the other junta members about government issues and began to make day-to-day decisions, including top government appointments, without consulting his colleagues. The growing junta staff, which he "generously" provided the junta from the ranks of the army, and the increasingly assertive secret police, both reported directly to Pinochet.

At the same time, key Conservative civilian and military legal advisers, even some of those who worked for other junta members, became increasingly uncomfortable with the concept of collegial rule, fearing that divided authority would lead to incoherent policies and regime instability. Ironically, they were profoundly influenced by Chilean constitutional law and the traditional practices of a strong presidential system. They could not conceive of a system of authority that did not reproduce the structure of Chile's presidential constitution, with its clear separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Working directly with Pinochet, they gradually proposed to the junta, which was overwhelmed by legislative detail and legal and policy complexities, the adoption of several measures aimed at "rationalizing" military rule in conformity with constitutional doctrine.

The most important of these was Decree Law 527 of June 26, 1974, which directly took the constitutional framework of the 1925 Constitution and applied it to the military government. It specified that the junta would exercise legislative and constitutional powers, while the junta president would have executive power as "Supreme Chief of the Nation."⁶⁹ The judiciary, which had shown a strong willingness to support the coup and defer to the armed forces on issues of personal liberties, would remain independent though subject to funding authorizations provided by the junta. Although the other commanders objected to Pinochet's new title, they went along with the measure, persuaded that it was necessary for the efficient administration of a country whose legal corpus was designed for a presidential regime. They were startled and displeased when Pinochet unexpectedly called a ceremony in which he donned the presidential sash.

Although the new statute was designed to institutionalize military authority by providing it with the legitimacy of Chile's presidentialist constitution, it

failed to institute a genuine separation of powers. While Pinochet became the nation's chief executive, he continued to serve as one of the four junta members. Since all junta measures required a unanimous vote for adoption, any junta member could block legislation he did not approve of. Because Pinochet could resort to widespread executive authority to implement policy initiatives, the unanimity rule clearly worked in his favor. He could either work with the junta or ignore it; but the junta could not function without his consent. As the chief executive to whom ministers, government officials, and an expanding presidential staff reported, Pinochet had incomparably better information than did his colleagues. The junta soon became a weak legislature overwhelmed by initiatives from a large and complex state, ably administered by political and economic advisers and a growing secret police—all of whom owed exclusive loyalty to the president.

As Pinochet's powers grew, his relationship with the junta became more and more conflictive. General Leigh in particular bitterly opposed Pinochet's ambitions and growing prerogatives, as well as the growing influence over public and economic policy of a group of free-market economists protected by Pinochet. Leigh blocked, in mid-1977, Pinochet's proposal to have junta laws approved by a majority rather than by unanimity. At the end of that year, he also blocked Pinochet's request for junta approval of a referendum endorsing "President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile" in the face of widespread international criticisms of Chilean human-rights policy. Leigh perceived this as a move on the president's part to gain popular legitimacy for his mandate and to increase further his supremacy over the junta. Pinochet, in the face of junta objections, called the referendum anyway, invoking executive authority.

The tension between Pinochet and Leigh worsened as the two men continued to clash. But the president, making use of his now-considerable powers of persuasion, was able to get the other junta members to side with him against General Leigh. On July 28, 1978, with the support of the other two junta members, he forcibly and illegally removed General Leigh from office, risking an open and armed confrontation with the air force in order to accomplish his ends.⁷⁰ With this coup within the coup, Pinochet resolved his principal obstacle to unipersonal control of the Chilean state, control that was formally embodied in a legal foundation that reflected the constitutional practices of the past and gave the general the authority of Chile's traditional presidents without the constraints of a democratic political order.

With the defeat of opposition within the government, Pinochet moved with more confidence to design a new constitutional framework for the country's and his own future. In early 1980, a group of conservative legal advisers sent a constitutional draft to the Council of State for approval and revision. The draft, though based on the 1925 Constitution, called for a further increase in presidential authority, including a provision that reduced the autonomy of legislative bodies, and another that enabled the president to appoint several members of the Senate. The Constitution also created a National Security Council, com-

posed primarily of the armed forces commanders, with the authority to rebuke any governmental institution, elected or nonelected, if its actions were deemed to be a threat to the national security. Finally, it outlawed parties and politically banned individuals for supporting doctrines that are based on the notion of "class struggle" or that "violate the integrity of the family."⁶⁹

The Council of State also proposed a number of transitional provisions, calling for a return to democracy and open presidential elections by 1985. Although a Congress would be named before then, Pinochet would be allowed to continue as president until that date. However, Pinochet rejected these proposals. He made it clear to his advisers that he wanted a document that would enable him to stay in office at least until 1997, or through two more 8-year "constitutional" terms. When his advisers hesitated on the grounds that such a formula would be widely rejected even by the political Right, Pinochet agreed to a compromise whereby the four armed forces commanders (including himself) would select his successor in late 1988 or early 1989, subject to ratification in a popular plebiscite. But he managed to alter the Constitution in one way that made it easier for him to remain in office: The document specifically exempts him, by name, from the provision barring Chilean presidents from succeeding themselves in office.⁷⁰ In a 1980 plebiscite, held without electoral registration and in a climate that gave opponents few opportunities to challenge the government publicly, the new Constitution was approved by the voters, establishing Pinochet *de jure* as the most powerful leader in Chilean history.

Military Obedience to Authority

Ironically, military obedience to governmental authority, a second important factor in Chile's long democratic tradition, also abetted Pinochet's efforts at consolidating dictatorial supremacy. During the UP years, Chile's armed forces had become increasingly politicized, as officers openly called for the resignation of commanders unwilling to move to overthrow the constitutional government. Pinochet himself was forced to shift at the last minute from a position of loyalty to the elected government to support for a coup when he realized that "his" generals were in open revolt. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, military leaders moved quickly to reestablish the lines of authority within the institution and to stress the professional and "nondeliberative" character of the armed forces.

Pinochet proved his shrewdness by retiring those members of his cohort who had led in planning the coup, while at the same time promoting officers who had remained loyal to the institutional chain of command. He thus eliminated potential rivals among officers who had, ironically, forced the military to intervene, while seeking to mold the officer corps into a loyal group of followers completely beholden to Pinochet for their careers. All colonels promoted to the rank of generals were required to provide the army commander with a signed letter of resignation, which Pinochet could use at any moment to end a general's career.

But, loyalty was assured with more than the threat of sanctions. Under military rule, officers enjoyed privileges that they had never dreamed of. In addition to increases in pay and fringe benefits, officers could look forward to attractive rewards such as ambassadorships or membership on boards of public and semipublic corporations. Government service provided military men with responsibility and status they had never before enjoyed in the nation's history.⁷¹

More important for regime stability than the privileges accorded officers was the reestablishment of traditional norms of obedience to authority and hierarchy of rank, practices that had eroded in the turbulent final months of the Allende government. This meant that to a degree unheard of in other military regimes the Chilean authorities were able to establish a sharp separation between the military as institution and the military as government.⁷² High-ranking officers were often brought into governmental positions that ranged from cabinet posts, heads of state agencies, and ambassadorships, to university presidencies and local governorships.⁷³

However, once in government service, officers no longer took orders from their immediate military superiors but reported instead to their superiors in government, either military or civilian. As government officials, they could discuss policy with their military and civilian counterparts but were barred from discussing these matters with military colleagues serving a strictly military command. Indeed, officers in the military line of duty could be dismissed from the services for discussing politics or policy with fellow officers or with civilians. And for the duration of the Pinochet years, military men were not allowed to remain for long periods of time in governmental duties, continuously being rotated back to military command. Officers who were not deemed to be completely reliable found that their careers were terminated, cutting short a chance for a lucrative and prestigious post and retirement with high pensions. By serving both as president and commander-in-chief of the army with direct responsibility over the institution, and by strictly observing the separation of the military as government from the military as institution, Pinochet avoided the inherent tensions that develop in military regimes between officers occupying government positions and those serving in the institution itself.⁷⁴

Aiding the general's ascendancy and ability to control the armed forces in the early years was the growing power of the secret police. The DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional or National Bureau of Intelligence), under the direction of Colonel Manuel Contreras, a close friend of the Pinochet family, soon became a law unto itself. It eliminated with efficient brutality the clandestine leadership of leftist parties in Chile and carried out with impunity a series of high-risk political assassinations abroad, aimed at silencing prominent critics of the regime. But DINA's power extended beyond its role in fighting the resistance movement. The secret organization came to be feared in military and governmental circles as DINA agents reported on the personal lives and political proclivities of prominent officers and advisers. It soon developed its own cadres of experts in fields including economic policy, as DINA officers sought to take

control of sectors of the Chilean state, particularly the nationalized industries. Pinochet made use of Contreras' services to counter other advisory groups and to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis the junta and the military.⁷⁵

Regime Support in the Business Community

The durability of Chile's military regime cannot be understood without understanding the strong support for the military in key sectors of Chilean society. Business groups have been profoundly affected by economic policies that have transformed the Chilean economy from a state-supported, import-substituting industrialization model to an export-oriented economy with low tariff barriers and few government subsidies. Although many Chilean businessmen went bankrupt because of these policies and became bitter opponents of the regime, the bulk of the business community remained a strong pillar of the military government. In particular, the government gained powerful new supporters in a new breed of dynamic business leaders who flourished with the opening of Chile's economy to the world market. For Chile's business leaders, democracy had meant the electoral triumph of political forces bent on destroying them. No matter how objectionable the Pinochet government was, it remained a far preferable alternative to the uncertainties of democratic politics. Many people in Chile's middle classes, despite serious reverses, shared these views.

It should be stressed that the business community, while supporting the government, had little direct influence in the formulation of public policy. Policies were made by an economic team that had the complete confidence of the president, and substantial latitude to implement policies without consulting affected groups. The use of a group of neutral technocrats with no strong constituency support, but with a clear and sophisticated understanding of economic policy, helped insulate the president from societal pressures and demands, contributing further to state autonomy and to his increasing powers.

Political Polarization and a Fragmented Opposition

The coup that ended Chile's long trajectory of democratic politics was applauded by many sectors of society, while condemned by others. Chile's rightist parties welcomed the new authorities and soon agreed to disband, confident that the military would represent their interests. The Christian Democrats, Chile's largest party, reluctantly accepted the coup as the inevitable result of the Popular Unity government's policies. However, Christian Democrats were not prepared to accept the diagnosis of the country's new rulers that democracy was also at fault and that military rule should be maintained for an indefinite period of time. Soon, the Christian Democrats began to join the parties of the Left in strong criticisms of the regime's human-rights abuses and its redrafting of the nation's institutional structures. By the late 1970s, Christian Democrats were able to begin a dialogue with elements on the Left, as both groups

attempted to come to terms with their collective responsibility in the failure of Chile's political order.

It was not until 1983, however, that Chile's political parties reasserted themselves, signaling that the regime's efforts to obliterate them from national life had failed.⁷⁶ The spontaneous protest movement, begun at the urging of a group of labor leaders, surprised the party leadership as much as it surprised the regime. The government's swift repressive measures against labor, rendered vulnerable by high levels of unemployment, opened the door for the party leadership to gain control over the burgeoning opposition movement. In the moderate opposition, the Christian Democrats sought to create a broad alliance with small groups on the Right and Left in order to structure a proposal for an alternative government that would press the armed forces to negotiate. On the Left, the Communist Party, which had countenanced an armed strategy against the regime, sought to mobilize popular discontent through increasingly militant protests in the expectation that the regime would capitulate.

This division, between those that sought peaceful mobilization in order to engage in negotiations with the authorities and those that sought sharp and even violent confrontations in order to render the country ungovernable, is the key to understanding the paralysis of Chile's opposition after 1983.⁷⁷ When the regime's intransigence led important sectors on the Right to join with the center and moderate Left and sign a National Accord for Transition to Democracy in 1985, calling for free elections and significant modifications in the 1980 Constitution, the fragile alliance failed. Some groups accused the Right of trying to halt political mobilization in Pinochet's favor; others accused the Left of trying to undermine possible negotiations with the armed forces while alienating middle-class support for the opposition.

At the root of this division is the continued polarization of Chilean politics between a strong Marxist Left, which advocates far-reaching socioeconomic reforms, and a rejuvenated Right, which refuses to have any of the economic gains of authoritarianism threatened. While significant political learning took place in broad quarters of Chilean party life, with Socialists embracing democratic practices as important ends in their own right, and Christian Democrats vowing not to pursue single-party strategies for their own gain, mistrust remains high as elements on both extremes press for radically divergent solutions.

Antidemocrats on both sides made it difficult for centrist forces to pursue concerted policies. Moderate Socialists feared that too many concessions to the regime would lead to a loss of support among the faithful, who might be attracted by the more militant line of the Communist Party or socialist groups affiliated with them. Democratic rightists have feared that they would be isolated and outflanked by Pinochet supporters who argued that any compromise with the opposition is nothing but an opening to the Communist Party. The Christian Democrats, in turn, were immobilized by sharp internal divisions over fears that the party might move too close to either the Left or the Right. The same logic of polarization that made it difficult to maintain a Center consensus and finally

helped bring Chilean democracy crashing down in 1973 conspired against structuring a broad and coherent opposition movement to force the military from power. Widespread rejection of the Pinochet regime as illegitimate could not translate into an early return to democracy for lack of a clear alternative.⁷⁴

• PROSPECTS FOR REDEMOCRATIZATION •

Paradoxically, it was the regime that provided the opposition with a rationale for unity and a means to define the transition process in its favor. Although no opposition leader accepted the legitimacy of the plebiscite formula spelled out in the 1980 Constitution, calling instead for open and fair presidential elections as soon as possible, by 1987 most seemed resigned to accepting the plebiscite as a fact of political life. At first, opposition leaders called on Chileans to register in the electoral roles, while still pressing for open presidential elections. Gradually and reluctantly, they began to call on their followers to register to vote NO in the plebiscite that would ratify the individual chosen by the armed forces chiefs to serve the next 8-year presidential term beginning on March 11, 1989.⁷⁵

The Communist Party and sectors of the socialist Left strongly objected to this "participation in the legality of the regime." They were convinced that registering and voting would simply serve further to legitimize the regime, since they felt that the authorities would not permit a negative result and would resort to fraud if necessary to impose their candidate.

Moderate opposition leaders, on the other hand, argued that the plebiscite represented a valuable tool for popular mobilization and an important opportunity to try to defeat the regime at its own game—the only viable alternative for an opposition that had not succeeded in overthrowing the dictatorship through other means. Reluctantly they agreed to go further than asking citizens to vote: They also proceeded to register their political parties according to government regulations, which limited in several ways the autonomy of party organizations and forced them to engage in a national campaign to collect signatures from potential members, many of whom feared committing themselves publicly to a particular party or movement. Party registration was necessary to entitle opposition groups to name poll watchers to monitor the fairness of the election. The principal groups to register were the Christian Democrats and a loose coalition of Left-of-Center groups that called itself the Party for Democracy.

By December 1987 it became clear Chileans were prepared to register and vote in large numbers, forcing party leaders to structure a united effort in an attempt to win the NO vote in the plebiscite. A massive television campaign on the part of the authorities and growing evidence of the use of public resources to bolster the official candidate helped further to galvanize opposition groups into action. The Communist Party soon became isolated as its allies on the Left decided to join the NO command.

In governmental circles there was considerable speculation that Pinochet

might not be the candidate selected by the four commanders-in-chief (including Pinochet as commander of the army). Many leaders on the Right felt that the government needed to project its institutions into the future without being tied to the figure of one man. They also feared that Pinochet was too controversial a leader, one around whom the opposition could unite in a simple zero-sum decision. An alternative candidate, preferably a civilian, would contribute to dividing the opposition and depersonalizing the regime. Two of the four commanders shared this view.

In late August 1988, however, Pinochet was named the candidate. He was determined to be selected and used the force of his personality and the weight of his office to obtain the designation. Leaders on the Right had not been willing to go too far in proposing an alternative for fear of antagonizing the chief executive. Businessmen who were still heavily indebted to the state were not about to jeopardize key loans by coming out publicly for an alternative. Without strong vocal support from the Right for another candidate, the dissenting commanders were not able to press for an alternative, particularly since Pinochet's supporters argued effectively that he was the country's most prominent figure and could win popular support.

Government and military leaders were confident that an improved economy, a massive housing and public-works program, and a saturation television campaign would tip the balance in favor of the regime. In particular, they felt that most Chileans did not want uncertainty and the fear of a return to a Marxist government; that television and other media could effectively remind them of the dangers of not supporting the regime. Furthermore, key government officials and advisers in both the military and civilian sectors repeatedly stressed that their evidence pointed to a strong victory for Pinochet as the only candidate to appear on the ballot. They noted that the disarray and divisions in the opposition would only strengthen the government's position.

The Chilean authorities came under considerable pressure internally and internationally to stage a fair contest, even though the plebiscite formula was widely criticized as undemocratic. Chile's tradition of fair and free elections, combined with the military regime's own desire to assert its legitimacy, contributed to the structuring of virtually fraud-proof voting procedures. The contest was unequal, however, because the government used substantial resources for media efforts on behalf of its "record" and made ample use of the authority of provincial leaders and mayors to give an advantage to the YES campaign. The opposition was able to turn to television only in the last month, after Pinochet had been officially nominated, and then was restricted to fifteen minutes of free air time a day, to be shared in equal amounts with the YES campaign.

To the surprise of most people, particularly in the government, the opposition groups mounted an extraordinarily successful media and door-to-door campaign in the last few weeks before the elections. With limited resources and relying on volunteer workers, they successfully countered the "fear" campaign of the government by stressing a positive and upbeat message. NO came to denote

happiness and the future, while the YES campaign remained mired in the past. The drive to produce advertisements, recruit poll watchers, to set up an effective parallel vote count, and to conduct door-to-door campaigns cemented further the unity of the sixteen parties that formed the NO command. International support, particularly through the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, channeled through the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, contributed important resources for the media campaign and for the computer system designed to monitor the electoral count.

The victory of opposition forces by a 12-percent margin was a stunning achievement. Ninety-seven percent of the registered voters (representing 92 percent of the eligible population) went to the polls, and the opposition won in all but two of the country's twelve regions. Pinochet lost among most categories of voters, including women and provincial dwellers.

Two elements were critical in making it possible for the NO vote to win and to derail plans by some elements close to Pinochet to create a climate of violence that they hoped would lead to canceling the plebiscite. First, elements in the military and in the civilian political Right expected a fair contest and would not have tolerated any disruption of the process. Pinochet was the most powerful person in the country, but Chile's institutions were not "personalized." Even in the army, institutional loyalties and respect for "legality" were more important factors than allegiance to the ambitions of the commander-in-chief. Second, opposition leaders were successful in persuading voters to stay home, waiting calmly for results on election night, and to celebrate peacefully the next day. The violence that some elements in the regime had expected simply did not materialize. The Communist Party played an important role by insisting that its own militants refrain from organizing street demonstrations.

The election showed clearly how easy it is for an authoritarian regime to engage in collective self-delusion. Countless polls and newspaper accounts suggested that once the voters got over their skepticism about the election's fairness, the NO vote stood a good chance of winning. And yet, Pinochet, his advisers, and his supporters in the military and the business community were absolutely convinced that the government could not lose. All the information transmitted up the chain of command was designed to reinforce the president's wishes, to the point that negative information was filtered out. Often, however, it was difficult for the authorities to perceive such information; citizens were for the most part not forthcoming when asked their views by individuals with official credentials. A generalized contempt for politics and politicians, even those supporting the regime, made it difficult for officials to sense the mood of the country.

The victory of the NO vote in the plebiscite augurs well for Chile's democratic future. Had Pinochet been ratified for another 8-year term the country might have become ungovernable. A large percentage of the population would not have accepted the plebiscite as legitimate, and some sectors, in the aftermath of the opposition failure, would have renewed their calls for violence. At

the same time, Pinochet would have had to govern with an elected Congress, one in which the opposition would have played a substantial role. The evolution of Pinochet from military commander and authoritarian leader to civilian president, albeit with strong executive powers, would not have been easy.

With the opposition victory, the country will hold open presidential elections at the end of 1989. What is unclear at this writing is whether, before the election, opposition leaders and government officials will be able to agree on some fundamental changes in a Constitution that is not accepted as democratic by opposition leaders. Although opposition leaders hope to obtain those changes, arguing that the victory represents not only a defeat for Pinochet but also for his "constitutional itinerary," fundamental changes are unlikely precisely because the military sees the Constitution as one of its principal legacies to the country. Changes will come only with the election of a democratic president and a Congress with constituent powers, and provided that the opposition is able to gain majorities in those elections. An opposition majority is more likely if the parties that structured the NO campaign can agree on a presidential candidate and a transition formula. Such an opposition, which would represent the reconstruction of a Center consensus in Chilean politics, would permit a return to democratic practices with broad majority support.

Should the coalition of the Center-Left, which supported the NO vote in the plebiscite, fail to present a common program and candidate, Chileans will face a presidential contest with candidates representing each of the traditional "thirds" of Chilean politics: a Marxist Left, a social democratic Center, and a pro-business Right. The country would thus run the risk of being governed once again by a president without majority support, facing hostile majorities in the Congress—a formula that might lead to decisional paralysis and political confrontation and place significant pressures on the armed forces to resolve the conflict through extraconstitutional measures. Given the strength of the three political tendencies of the Chilean electorate, constitutional experts should seriously entertain the option of creating a parliamentary form of government, where Center coalitions can more easily be formed and where the country's future is not at the mercy of a president who was either elected for a fixed term without a majority mandate or who has lost a majority mandate.

Despite the continued polarization of Chilean politics, the transition may be easier than that of other countries for several reasons. In the first place, the strong tradition of democratic rule that existed before the regime breakdown and was so eloquently manifested in the plebiscite will help Chileans return to democratic practices. Institutions of democratic governance in Chile do not have been new-forged as they do in many other Latin American countries; they need to be restored. Second, Chile's armed forces, even after a decade and a half of military rule, have not become politicized. The sharp separation of the political from the institutional roles of the military under Pinochet makes it possible for the institution to return to its professional pursuits without becoming involved in the daily political tug of war of a democratic regime. This does not

mean that the Chilean armed forces would be reluctant to intervene in politics again should they feel that "national security" is threatened. There is strong evidence that the Chilean officer corps is less committed than in the past to respecting democratic rules and procedures. However, the institution itself is not fragmented and politicized and is likely to intervene only in a serious crisis. Third, the Chilean armed forces retain substantial prestige despite deep resentment against the authorities in some sectors. Of particular importance is the fact that the institution was not directly compromised by the "dirty war" of the security police that led to the most flagrant human-rights abuses. Demands for an accounting for human-rights abuses and justice for the guilty will not create a serious rift between civilian authorities and military leaders. Finally, Chile begins its transition with a relatively good economic picture compared to that of its neighbors. Chilean economic planners succeeded in reordering the Chilean state so that it operates more efficiently. They have also encouraged an impressive new class of entrepreneurs able to compete in world markets. Although these economic successes were made possible by strong authoritarian practices, including curbing labor rights and imposing policies with strong regressive tendencies, planners under a democratic regime will not face the same intractable economic problems that their Argentine neighbors faced when coming to power. The challenge to maintain growth and efficiency, while at the same time tending to the real demands for greater social justice, will tax the abilities of the most skilled leaders. But, Chileans in the aftermath of the 1988 plebiscite seem determined to return to their historic democratic practices with a renewed realism and hope for the future.

• NOTES •

1. There are few general treatments of the military regime in Chile. The best single study is Manuel Antonio Garretón, *El proceso político chileno* (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1983). Useful edited volumes are those by Manuel A. Garretón et al., *Chile: 1973-1980?* (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1980); and J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). The literature on the human-rights situation under the Chilean military government is voluminous. The most complete record is that provided by the publications of the Vicaría de la Solidaridad, dependent on the Archbishopric of Santiago (see the annual reports). The most comprehensive and authoritative overview of the human-rights record of the Chilean government is provided by the Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, in its *Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Chile* (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1985). The commission estimates that approximately 1,500 people were killed after the coup (see *Informe*, p. 54). The Vicaría has documented 668 cases of individuals who disappeared after being arrested in the period 1973-1985. The number killed in Chile may be closer to 3,500, as many deaths and disappearances may not have been reported, particularly in rural areas. Most rural towns visited by the author appear to have lost a few people after the coup, in some cases because of private feuds or reprisals on the part of landowners.
2. A valuable sourcebook on the 1980 Constitution is Luz Bulnes Aldunate, *Constitución política de la República de Chile: Concordancias, anotaciones y fuentes* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1981). For a "legislative history" of the Constitution see Sergio Carrasco Delgado, *Genesis y vigencia de los textos constitucionales chilenos* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1980).

3. Kenneth A. Bollen, "Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy," *American Sociological Review* 45, no. 3 (June 1980): pp. 370-390. See also Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relations of Economic Development to Democratic Performance," *American Journal of Political Science* 17, no. 3 (August 1973): pp. 611-621; and his "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 39, no. 1 (February 1974): pp. 29-44.
4. Leon Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 192. For a discussion of the rise of parliamentary opposition in Western Europe, see the excellent collection in Robert Dahl, ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). See also Dahl's *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).
5. Some countries, including Britain and Norway, developed political contestation with parliamentary responsibility influence after Chile did. Others, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, began to develop parliamentary influence at around the same time. The Swedish king was able to choose ministers without regard to parliamentary majorities until 1917, though the parliament's views were taken into consideration earlier. Italy was not unified until the 1860s and did not establish a system of parliamentary rule until the 1880s. Republican France dates from 1871, and many observers, noting the importance of the Napoleonic bureaucracy, question the degree of authority wielded by the French parliament. Because of the importance of the monarchies in Europe, Chile comes closer to the United States in the origins and evolution of its political institutions. For historical discussions of these issues, see Dahl, *Political Oppositions*; and Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970).
6. See Dahl, *Polyarchy*, ch. 1. Dahl's definition informs the discussion of democracy in Chapter 1 of this volume.
7. Women were able to vote in national elections for the first time in 1952. The voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 and illiterates were given the right to vote with the constitutional reforms of 1970. The best discussion of Chilean electoral practices can be found in Federico Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). The 1970 reforms are discussed in Guillermo Piedrahíta Richards, *La reforma constitucional* (Santiago: Ediciones Encina, 1970). The intricacies of the electoral system are described in Mario Bernaschina G., *Carriella electoral* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1958). For an overview of electoral participation, see Atilio Borón, "La evolución del régimen electoral y sus efectos en la representación de los intereses populares: El caso de Chile," *Estudio* no. 24 (Santiago: Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política y Administración Pública, FLACSO, April 1971).
8. Voting data for Europe can be found in Stein Rokkan, *Citizens*. Voting data on Chile is found in J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratization via reforma: La expansión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985). This is the best study of the critical decisions that led to suffrage expansion in Chile in the nineteenth century, underscoring the important role of the Conservatives in that process. As such, it is an important revisionary study in Chilean historiography.
9. This section draws extensively from J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile and the Breakdown of Democracy," in *Latin American Politics and Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pp. 234-249. The author is grateful to J. Samuel Valenzuela for his contribution to this work and to much of the thinking that is reflected in this chapter. See also Arturo Valenzuela, *Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977), ch. 8.
10. Francisco Antonio Encina, *Historia de Chile*, vol. 9 (Santiago: Editorial Nacimiento, 1941-1942), p. 493; cited in Arturo Valenzuela, *Political Brokers*, p. 175.
11. This thesis is at variance with standard interpretations that attribute to Diego Portales a pivotal role in forming the Chilean institutional system. See Arturo Valenzuela, *Political Brokers*, ch. 8; and his "El mito de Portales: La institucionalización del régimen político chileno en el siglo XIX," in *La transición a la democracia en América Latina*, ed. Fernando Molina (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, forthcoming).
12. Chile, *Documentos parlamentarios correspondientes al segundo quinquenio de la administración Bulnes, 1846-1850*, vol. 3 (Santiago: Imprenta del Ferrocarril, 1858), p. 795.
13. Some of the generalizations from the "world-system" and "dependency" literature to the effect that dependent capitalist development leads to weak states does not fully apply to the Chilean case.
14. This section draws heavily on Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela "Los orígenes de la democracia: Reflexiones teóricas sobre el caso de Chile," *Estudios públicos* 12 (Spring 1983): pp. 3-39; and J. S. Valenzuela, *Democratización*.

15. In 1863, the total electorate was about 22,000. By 1878, the electorate had expanded sevenfold. See J. S. Valenzuela, *Democratization*, pp. 118–119.
16. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. xxiii–xxvii.
17. This section draws heavily on Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), ch. 1.
18. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 50–56.
19. For a discussion of this, see Valenzuela, *Political Brokers*.
20. An exception to this generalization is Dahl's *Polyarchy*. Not only has Chile been neglected in the broader literature, Latin America in general has been left out. The volumes of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council had only a few studies dealing with Latin America, and Latin America did not figure prominently in the theoretical efforts of the 1960s. In his excellent study of parties in Western democracies, Epstein acknowledges that a few Latin American countries meet his criteria for inclusion but leaves them out "mainly because the whole of Latin America is customarily treated along with developing nations" (emphasis added). See Epstein, *Political Parties*, p. 4. For a discussion of the place of Latin America in the literature on comparative politics, see Arturo Valenzuela, "Political Science and the Study of Latin America," in *Windows on Latin America: Perspectives from Six Disciplines*, ed. Christopher Mitchell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
21. These terms are designed to group in analytically similar categories propositions that are sometimes advanced in more discrete fashion. They are drawn from previous work of the author on the subject, some of which has been done in collaboration with J. Samuel Valenzuela. I have attempted to address within each category the relevant variables advanced in this book. I do not treat what can be called the national-cohesiveness thesis because it is not as relevant to the Chilean case. Ethnic, regional, and center-periphery cleavages were defused in the early half of the nineteenth century.
22. The importance of gradual evolution without significant upheaval is stressed by Dahl in *Polyarchy*, pp. 40–47. The continuity of institutions from the colonial period is one of the points advanced by Seymour Martin Lipset in his provocative study of the United States, *The First New Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 106–107. For a discussion of differences in the colonial experience, see Rupert Emerson's classic *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).
23. Chile inaugurated a polyarchy through a struggle for independence that led to the collapse of the remnants of the old colonial regime, and not, as Dahl holds, through an evolutionary process comparable to that of England or Sweden. In this sense, the Chilean case is closer to that of France than England. See Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 42.
24. See Frederick Pike, *Chile and the United States, 1880–1962* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 11. The literature on Portales is voluminous. An influential work that argues this thesis is Alberto Edwards Vives, *La Fronda aristocrática* (Santiago: Ediciones Enciclopedia, 1936), pp. 50–51. For a sampling of views, see B. Vicuña Mackenna, J. Victorino Lastarria, and R. Solomayor Valdés, *Portales: Juicio histórico* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1973).
25. Richard Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in *The Founding of New Societies*, ed. Louis Hartz (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 163–164. See also Hartz's comments on the Chilean case on p. 88 of that work.
26. For an elaboration of this argument see Valenzuela, *Political Brokers*, ch. 8.
27. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), ch. 2.
28. David Martin argues that "the incidence of pluralism and democracy is related to the incidence of those religious bodies which are themselves inherently pluralistic and democratic. . . . Such bodies . . . are much more prevalent in the Anglo-American situation than elsewhere. . . . In Russia and Latin America democratic and individualistic Protestantism arrived late in the process and could not have an important effect." See his *A General Theory of Secularization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 25. For an influential essay dealing with Latin America along these same lines, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," in *Elites in Latin America*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). See also Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics*, 25, no. 2 (January 1973): pp. 206–235. For a classic work that links liberal values stemming from the Protestant tradition with the growth of democracy in the United States, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955).

29. See Jorge I. Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) for a discussion of some of these points.
30. Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in a Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).
31. See Booth's chapter on Costa Rica in this volume.
32. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 140.
33. For a description of Chile's hacienda system, see George M. McBride, *Chile: Land and Society* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1936). For the origins, the classic study is Mario Góngora, *Origen de los inquilinos del Valle Central* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1960). See also Arnold J. Bauer, *Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest to 1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
34. Domínguez, *Insurrection*, p. 141.
35. See Robert Kaufman, *The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950–1970* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); and Brian Loveman, *Struggle in the Countryside: Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919–1973* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
36. Chile is a good illustration of Dankwart Rustow's argument that democracies must go through a "habituación" phase before they are consolidated. See his "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970): pp. 337–363.
37. See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958). See also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *American Sociological Review* 29 (June 1964): pp. 375–387.
38. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (March 1959): pp. 69–105. For collections of articles on "empirical democratic theory," see J. V. Gillsiepie and B. A. Nevold, eds., *Macroquantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development and Democratization* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1971); and Charles Cnudde and Deane Neubauer, eds., *Empirical Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Markham, 1969). For an excellent review of this literature, see Leonardo Morlino, "Misura di Democrazia e di Libertà: Discusione di Alcune Analisi Empiriche," *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 5, no. 1 (April 1975): pp. 131–166.
39. See, for example, Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review* 28, no. 2 (April 1963): pp. 253–264; and Bollen, "Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy."
40. Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsky (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1975), p. 182. As Dahl notes, the United States in the nineteenth century did not meet the development criteria but met the political criteria. See Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 72.
41. Goran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," *New Left Review* 103 (May–June 1977): p. 3–41. Therborn adds that the rarity of bourgeois democracy in capitalist Third World countries is due to the vulnerability of commodity-oriented economies, which give the "indigenous bourgeoisie little room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the exploited classes." In such contexts there is an "intertwining of capitalist with feudal, slave or other pre-capitalist modes of exploitation . . . impeding the development of impersonal rule of capital and free labor market, thereby seriously limiting the growth of both the labor movement and an agrarian petty bourgeoisie." Ibid., pp. 1, 32. Although he is not dealing with the development of democracy *per se*, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that peripheral states in the world system were much weaker in part because the social structure of export economies did not permit the development of bourgeois sectors. See his *The Modern World System*, 2 vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980.)
42. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). As he notes, for democracy to emerge, "the political hegemony of the landed upper class had to be broken or transformed. The peasant had to be turned into a farmer producing for the market instead of for his own consumption and that of the overlord. In this process the landed upper class either became an important part of the convulsions of revolutions (France) or civil war (U.S.). In a word the landed upper classes either helped to make the bourgeois revolution or were destroyed by it." Ibid., p. 429–430. Moore's analysis, though brilliant in scope, leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity. For a valuable critique, see Theda Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," *Politics and Society* 4 (Fall 1973): pp. 1–34. See also Joseph V. Femia, "Barrington Moore and the Preconditions for Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 2 (Janu-

ary 1972), pp. 21-46; and Ronald Dore, "Making Sense of History," *Archive Européennes de Sociologie* 10 (1969): pp. 295-305.

43. See Dominguez, *Insurrection*, p. 131.

44. Influential works of Chilean historians in this vein include Julio César Jobet, *Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Latinoamericana, 1965); and Hernán Ramírez Necochea, *Historia del movimiento obrero en Chile, antecedentes siglo XIX* (Santiago: Editorial Austral, 1956). The most fully developed version of this thesis is in Luis Vitale, *Interpretación marxista de la historia de Chile* (Frankfurt: Verlag Jugend und Politik, 1975). Maurice Zeitlin's *The Civil Wars in Chile: 1851 and 1859* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) draws uncritically from the work of Vitale and others.

45. See Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971). For a volume of essays applying the framework to particular cases, see Raymond Grew, ed., *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). Influential earlier studies that anticipate the arguments in these books include Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967); Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: and Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Roger Munde, eds., Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). Although some of these works focus on political development more generally, and not on the development of democracy as such, their framework is oriented toward democratic regimes rather than other regime types.

46. Eric Nordlinger, "Political Development, Time Sequences and Rates of Change. In *Political Development and Social Change*, 2d ed., ed. Jason L. Finkle and Robert W. Gable (New York: John Wiley, 1971), p. 458. This argument is made in Rustow, *World of Nations*, pp. 120-123.

47. Of the three crises, the most difficult to deal with is that of national identity. Its definition is imprecise and in the absence of survey-research data it is virtually impossible to find empirical evidence to document its relative strength. Much of this analysis has to be speculative and informed by general historical accounts. Particularly useful in capturing the mood of Chile in the early period is the work of Diego Barros Arana, which is also an eyewitness account. In particular, see his *Un decenio de la historia de Chile*, 2 vols. (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1906.)

48. See Richard Merritt, "Nation-Building in America: the Colonial Years." In *Nation-Building*, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); and Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*, 2d ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966). Lipset discusses the question of national identity in the United States in his *First New Nation*, ch. 2.

49. See Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy."

50. For a discussion of Washington's impact, see Lipset, *First New Nation*, pp. 18-23.

51. For lists of all Chilean presidents, cabinet officials, and members of Congress from independence until the 1940s, see Luis Valenzuela Avanza, *Anales de la república*, 2 vols. (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1951). Most presidents had extensive parliamentary experience.

52. On the question of efficacy, see the arguments of Juan J. Linz in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 20-21.

53. For an elaboration of this argument, see Valenzuela and Valenzuela, "Orígenes de la democracia."

54. R. K. Merton, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," *American Sociological Review* 1936, 1: pp. 894-904.

55. This point is made in Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde, "Presidentialist Politics and the Decline of the Chilean Congress." In *Legislatures in Development: Dynamics of Change in New and Old States*, ed. Joel Smith and Lloyd Musolf (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), p. 194.

56. The material in this section is taken from the author's *Breakdown*. For other books on the Chilean breakdown, see Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile* (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977); Ian Roxborough, Phil O'Brien, and Jackie Roddick, *Chile: The State and Revolution* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977); and Manuel A. Garréon and Tomás Moulian, *Andrés Bello y el proceso político: Las fases del conflicto en Chile (1970-73)* (San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centro-Americana, 1978). The last named is drawn from the comprehensive and detailed daily account of the most important events of the Allende administration, published in Manuel Antonio Garréon et al., *Cronología del período*

1970-73, 9 vols. (Santiago: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1978); an invaluable publication including extensive indices to parties, individuals, and events. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a host of primarily more polemical works were published. For a review essay of thirty-one books, see Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *Latin American Research Review* 10 (Fall 1975): pp. 155-176.

57. See Valenzuela and Wilde, "Presidentialism and Decline of Congress," pp. 204-210.

58. The most comprehensive study of U.S. involvement was conducted by the U.S. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) of the 94th Congress, 1st Session. See its *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973* (Washington, DC: Government Printing, 1975).

59. The fact that Allende received fewer votes in 1970 than in 1964 suggests that his victory was not due to an increase in popular discontent and mobilization fueled by a worsening socioeconomic crisis. An examination of socioeconomic indicators in the late 1960s does not support the argument that the lot of the average Chilean was becoming worse or that political mobilization was exceeding historic levels. Survey data also supports the view that a majority of voters would have preferred a Center-Right to a Center-Left coalition. Huntington's thesis, in *Political Order*, that political order collapses when political institutions are too weak, is not supported by the Chilean case. Chile's parties prior to the election of Allende were very strong (perhaps too dominant), and political mobilization was the product of deliberate strategies on the part of the parties and the government to bring people into the political process, rather than the product of widespread discontent or anomic behavior. In Chile, the election of Allende and the economic and social crisis of the Allende years was more the product of the sharp political crisis rather than vice-versa. For a full elaboration of this argument, see my *Breakdown*, ch. 3. An article that argues that mobilization in Chile became excessive is Henry Landberger and Tim McDaniel, "Hypermobilization in Chile, 1970-73," *World Politics* 28, no. 4 (July 1976): pp. 502-543.

60. For the concept of neutral powers, see Linz, *Breakdown*, pp. 76-80. For a discussion of the growing confrontation, suggesting that mobilization was more the result of political crisis rather than its cause, see Valenzuela, *Breakdown*, p. 34.

61. Seventy-two percent of those polled thought Chile was living through extraordinary times, but only 27 percent of the respondents felt the military should be involved in the political process. See Valenzuela, *Breakdown*, p. 65. The Chilean case suggests that even where democratic norms are widespread and deeply rooted in a society, political crisis resulting from institutional struggles and competing claims can seriously erode democratic practices. A democratic political culture is no guarantee for the maintenance of democratic institutions.

62. This argument is elaborated in Arturo Valenzuela, "Orígenes y características del sistema de partidos políticos en Chile: Una proposición para un gobierno parlamentario," *Estudios Públicos* 18 (Fall 1985): pp. 87-154; and my "Hacia una democracia estable: la opción parlamentaria para Chile," *Revista de Ciencia Política* 7, no. 2 (1985): pp. 129-140. The author is grateful to Juan Linz for his reflections on this subject. See the suggestive discussion in Linz, *Breakdown*, pp. 71-74; and his "Democracy, Presidential or Parliamentary: Does It Make a Difference?" Paper presented at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 3-6, 1987.

63. This section draws on the author's forthcoming book with Pamela Constable, *By Reason or By Force: Pinochet's Chile*.

64. This section is based on interviews, conducted in August 1987, with high-ranking military officers who commanded troops during the coup and were responsible for "cleaning up" or "neutralizing" Santiago neighborhoods.

65. A valuable discussion of the neoconservative economic policies applied by the Chilean military regime is Pilar Vergara, *Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1985).

66. This section is based on extensive interviews with advisers close to the junta and General Pinochet in 1973-1978.

67. For the text of Decree Law 527, see Eduardo Soto Kloss, *Ordenamiento constitucional* (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1980), pp. 145-153.

68. These observations are based on interviews conducted with General Leigh in Santiago, Chile, during November 1985. An excellent published interview is in Florencia Varas, *Gustavo Leigh: El general disidente* (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1979). Pinochet retired eighteen air force generals before finding one who would accept his action and replace Leigh on the junta. Had