


• CHAPTER FIVE •

# Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations

ERGUN ÖZBUDUN

The record of democratic development in Turkey has been somewhat mixed. On the one hand, Turkey has remained committed to a democratic regime for the last forty years with only relatively brief interruptions. Presently it is the only democratic country in the entire Middle East (with the single exception of the very special case of Israel), as well as in all of Eastern and Southeastern Europe (with the single exception of Greece, whose post-World War II democratic record has not been appreciably brighter than Turkey's). By most socioeconomic indicators, Turkey is a middle-rank, developing country, with a per capita income of about \$1,200. In view of the positive overall relationship between socioeconomic development and political democracy, Turkey is one of the few countries that are more democratic politically than they ought to have been according to the level of their socioeconomic development. However, Turkey's democratic process has been interrupted thrice in the last quarter of a century, which indicates a rather high degree of political instability. At best then, Turkey can be placed in the category of unstable democracies.

If the record of democratic development in Turkey is mixed, so are the factors that may have a bearing on Turkey's overall degree of success with democratic government. Culturally most Turks, elite and nonelite, seem to be committed to a democratic regime; yet this commitment does not always seem to be based on a set of profoundly felt concomitant democratic values, such as tolerance, compromise, and respect for individuality. The military shares the society's commitment to democracy, yet it also displays certain elitist attitudes and a tendency to see itself as the true guardian of the national interest. The major political parties have been nonideological and committed to democracy; yet their leaderships have not always shown a propensity for compromise and accommodation even in the face of a grave and imminent threat to the regime; furthermore, they have not been immune to polarizing influences, as was the case in the 1970s. The society is



relatively homogeneous and well-integrated; yet ethnic or sectarian conflict can sometimes, if rarely, become violent. The rate of economic growth has on the whole been quite respectable; yet economic inequalities have also increased and are continuing to do so; moreover, there seem to exist serious obstacles to sustained economic growth in the future.

#### • THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT •

##### The Ottoman Empire

Turkey differs from most of the developing countries of today in that it never experienced a colonial past. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire—which at its zenith at the end of the sixteenth century comprised the entire Middle East (excluding Iran), North Africa, Southeastern Europe (including Hungary), and southern Russia—left a powerful legacy not only in the contemporary politics of its principal heir, the Republic of Turkey, but also upon those of other “successor states” to the empire.<sup>1</sup> A study of the development of democracy in Turkey cannot therefore be attempted without reference to its Ottoman past.

It is generally agreed that the Ottoman state conformed more closely to a “bureaucratic empire” than to a European-style feudal system.<sup>2</sup> The Ottoman society was divided into two major classes. The *askeri*, literally the “military,” included those to whom the sultan had delegated religious or executive power, namely officers of the court and the army, civil servants and *ulema* (religious functionaries). The *reaya*, on the other hand, comprised all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. “It was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the ‘military.’”<sup>3</sup> This accorded well with the fundamental concepts of state and society in the Ottoman Empire, which held that the social order was of divine origin and hence immutable. It was the sultan’s duty to maintain this order, assisted by the members of the *askeri* class, by keeping everyone in his appropriate social position. Thus the state was above and independent of the society. Political power did not derive from the society, but was imposed upon it by the will of God (in effect, by conquest) from outside.<sup>4</sup> It was this primacy of politics over society that was to affect the nature of social and political changes in the Ottoman Empire for many centuries.

Two features of the Ottoman system reinforced the rigid dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled. One was the recruitment (*devsirme*) system, which was a periodic levy on the male children of Christian subjects, reducing them to the status of slaves and training them for

service to the state. Since these slaves legally became the sultan’s property; and he could take their lives and confiscate their wealth without legal process, they were in no position to challenge his authority. Furthermore, their removal from their former social environments prevented the development of locally entrenched, semiautonomous elements in the provinces.

A second feature, which was also instrumental in maintaining a strong central authority over the large territories of the empire, was the Ottoman land tenure system. This system vested in the state the original ownership of all the land, and limited the rights of the fief holders (*sipahi*) to the collection of taxes and the supervision of peasants under their jurisdiction. In return for the land grant, the *sipahi* were expected to recruit, train, and support a local contingent of soldiers; the fiefs were granted by the central government and could be taken away by it. Furthermore, the largest fiefs (*hass*) were perquisites of office. “The Ottoman feudal system seems to have differed from that of Western Europe chiefly in that the principal feudatories held their lands temporarily, in virtue of their offices. Hence the monarchy was exposed to little danger from the rivalry of this class of its tenants-in-chief.”<sup>5</sup>

Two other significant social groups were the *ulema* (the class of religious scholars), and the merchants and artisans. Although part of the ruling class, the *ulema* differed from the “military” proper and the administrators in that it consisted of freeborn Muslims. However, the *ulema* did not constitute a hierarchy independent of government, since the most important among its members held appointive posts and hence were completely dependent on the state. As for merchants the Ottoman state, unlike its Western European counterparts, did not pursue mercantilist policies and did not favor the emergence of a powerful merchant class. Another factor that hindered the growth of a politically influential merchant class was the “ethnic division of labor.” Non-Muslim minorities took the lead in mercantile activities, especially in international trade. But this group, so important in the development of early mercantile capitalism in Western Europe, was barred from the opportunity of converging such economic power into a significant political role because of the Islamic character of the state.

Thus, with no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and independent merchant class, no powerful guilds, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution (i.e., the administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism. In the West, nongovernmental intermediary social structures operated relatively independently of government and played a cushioning role between the state and the individual. The Church was the foremost of these corporate structures such as the

guilds, free cities, and the like. These had no parallels in the Ottoman Empire.

Islamic law does not as a rule recognize corporate entities. For all the theoretical supremacy of the *sharia* (Islamic law), even the religious class does not have a corporate identity. At least in Sunni (orthodox) Islam it forms part of the state bureaucracy, dependent upon the state for its appointments, promotions, and salaries. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, neither the cities nor the artisan guilds played any autonomous role comparable to their counterparts in Western Europe.<sup>6</sup> This dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled led to a class consciousness very different from that of the West, "that of *askeri* on the one hand and of their opponents on the other. . . . The saliency of these strata replaced the European saliency of strata connected with the production and distribution of goods and services."<sup>7</sup>

The bureaucratic nature of the Ottoman state and the concentration of political power in the hands of the sultan and his military and civilian bureaucrats explain the absence of representative institutions throughout the history of the empire until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This contrasts sharply with the feudal tradition in Western Europe, which contained within itself the germs of representative and constitutional government. Western European feudalism implied a legally defined division of powers between a relatively weak central authority and local centers of power. It also implied some idea of representations for the estates, regardless of the frequency with which assemblies of estates were actually called. To this was added the corporate autonomy of the Church, the cities, and the guilds. From this medieval social and political pluralism and division of powers, it was a relatively easy step to modern constitutionalism, the rule of law, and modern representative institutions.

The Ottoman state, however, was not entirely devoid of the idea of "consultation" in the conduct of governmental affairs. It was an established custom for the Ottoman government to convene an assembly of leading civilian, military, and religious officials to discuss important matters of policy especially in times of stress. While it clearly had no representative character, this body nevertheless gave support to the notion that important policy decisions should be based on deliberations and consultations in a broader council. Such a consultative assembly was institutionalized in 1838 by Mahmud II, in the form of the "Grand Council of Justice." Mahmud's successor, Abdulmecid I, the council was given the responsibility of discussing and drafting new laws on matters of civil rights and taxation. In practice it "successfully operated as the principal Ottoman legislative organ. . . . All the important *Tanzimat* [Reform] decrees and regulations were prepared by it and over ninety percent of its recommendations were promulgated without change."<sup>8</sup>

In the next few decades, known as the "Reform" period in the Ottoman Empire, the development of representative institutions followed two different routes. One was the increasingly important role of the central legislative council and the effort to broaden its social base without, however, introducing the elective principle. The second was the establishment of local administrative councils based on limited elections. The elective principle in local administration was introduced in the Danube Province in 1864 and then extended in 1867 to the rest of the country. This provided for the election of only the lowest level of local officials (commune headmen) but attached semielected administrative councils to the centrally appointed governors of the each of the three tiers of local administration. A somewhat more representative institution was the "general assembly" created for each province. It was indirectly elected with largely advisory powers.<sup>9</sup>

#### The First Ottoman Parliament (1876-1878)

The next step was to be the linking of the effective principle adopted at the local level with the practice of nonelective legislative councils at the center. The first Ottoman legislature based on elections came into being with the constitution of 23 December 1876. Interestingly, Midhat Pasha, the leader of the constitutionalist faction, hoped to be able to convene a parliament even before the constitution was officially promulgated. Therefore, a Provisional Electoral Regulation was promulgated on 28 October while the constitution itself was still being debated in the drafting committee, which was composed of high-ranking civil servants.

Despite the limited and indirect nature of the suffrage and certain incidents of interference in the electoral process by provincial governors, it is generally agreed that the first legislative elections in the Ottoman Empire produced a Chamber of Deputies broadly representative (in a sociological sense) of various national and religious communities. While the Muslims, who outnumbered non-Muslims by a considerable ratio in the country, had a majority in the chamber, the Christians and the Jews were proportionally much better represented. The Turks as an ethnic group were a minority of the deputies as a whole, sharing the Muslims seats with Arabs, Albanians, Bosnians, and others. Although a large percentage of the deputies were former government officials, there were also many others representing other professions.<sup>10</sup>

The Chamber of Deputies had two sessions between 19 March 1877 and 14 February 1878, when it was indefinitely prorogued by Sultan Abdulhamid II. Although officially the fiction was maintained that the constitution was still in force, the Chamber of Deputies was not reconvened until the Young Turk revolution of 1908 forced Abdulhamid to do so. It is impossible to analyze here the full political context of the first experiment with constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire

or the reasons for its failure. Suffice it to say that the introduction of constitutional and representative government was the work of a very small group of reformist government officials and intellectuals; it was based neither on broad support, nor on organized political parties. Consequently, Abdulhamid's prorogation of the chamber did not lead to any strong public reaction. On the contrary his absolutist rule, emphasizing the Islamic character of the state, seems to have been quite popular with the conservative, anti-Western mood of public opinion.

The fundamental political cleavage in the Ottoman Empire until the nineteenth century can be described as a center-periphery cleavage between the political ins and outs. The ins were "the incumbents of the Ottoman institutions. The outs were people who were excluded from the state."<sup>11</sup> Beginning in the eighteenth century, this cleavage was complicated by another one that resulted from the efforts of Westernization. The adoption of, first, Western military technology and, then, Western laws and administrative practices was strongly opposed by the old religious and military elites. This opposition was motivated not only by religious grounds, but also by the fear that such reforms would undermine their power and status in the society. In contrast to the older center-periphery cleavage this one was located at the very center. The Westernization movement undertaken by bureaucrats fractured the old intraelite unity, and produced a conflict that remained for many years one of the principal cleavages in Turkish political life. The political implications of this culture change, first under the Ottoman reformers and then under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, will be discussed more fully below.

The first Ottoman experiment with constitutional government reflects the emergence of yet another line of cleavage. This one pitted the constitutionalists (called the "Young Ottomans") against the supporters of monarchic autocracy. This was also an intraelite conflict, since both the constitutionalists and the autocratic *tanzimat* reformers came from the ranks of the Westernized, official elite. The Young Ottomans did not represent either the local notables or urban merchants. However, their advocacy of a parliament put them in a dilemma, one that was to be faced by many generations of future modernizers: the modernizers wanted to have a parliament as an alternative (and modern) source of legitimacy. But they soon realized that when a parliament was convened, it "did not increase the power of modernizing officials vis-à-vis the Sultan, but that it rather increased the power of notables against state officials."<sup>12</sup> In fact, the Young Ottomans were often bitterly critical of the abuses of local notables, and charged them with repressing the countryside. The short life of the first Ottoman Parliament provided clear manifestations of the deep conflict between the central bureaucratic elite and the local (peripheral) forces.<sup>13</sup> It is also a good example of

unanticipated and undesired consequences democratization poses for modernizers in traditional or developing societies.

### The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918)

The electoral process was reinstated in 1908 after thirty years of absolutist monarchical rule when military-popular uprisings in Macedonia compelled Abdulhamid II to restore the constitution. This was a victory for the reformist-constitutional wing of the official bureaucratic elite organized in the underground Society for Union and Progress, which in time transformed itself into a political party. Indeed the second constitutional period witnessed, for the first time, the emergence of organized political parties and party competition. The 1908 elections gave the Society for Union and Progress a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Of the other two elections held in this period, only that of 1912 was relatively competitive. Because of the administrative pressures exerted by the Unionist government and restrictions on opposition activities, this election came to be known as the "big stick election." The 1914 election was not contested by any opposition party.<sup>14</sup>

The democratic experiment of the second constitutionalist period is generally too easily dismissed as one that quickly degenerated into an internecine struggle poisoned by coups and countercoups, political assassinations and martial law courts, government manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, becoming finally an outright party dictatorship. While this diagnosis contains a great deal of truth, the same period (especially until the Unionists' coup of 1913) also provided the first extended Turkish experiment with competitive elections, organized political parties, and the parliamentary process. The beginnings of mass politics in Turkey should also be sought in this period. Unlike the earlier military, bureaucratic, intellectual cliques, the Union and Progress, "had too broad a social base and too heterogeneous a class structure to be elitist. . . . The Committee was the first political organization in the Empire to have a mass following and this gave the politics of the day a populist basis."<sup>15</sup> Finally, under the crust of virulent and mutually destructive political struggles of the period, one can discern the beginnings of "issue-oriented politics," which pitted the modernizing, unifying, centralizing, standardizing, nationalist, authoritarian, and statist Union and Progress against three types of opposition: the liberals who favored parliamentary democracy, administrative decentralization, more reliance on private initiative, and a more Ottomanist policy (i.e., a policy aimed at creating an "Ottoman" identity around the common fatherland and dynasty, regardless of religion, language, and ethnicity); religious traditionalists who were opposed to the secularist aspects of the Unionist policies; and the non-Turkish

minorities (whether Muslim or non-Muslim) who felt threatened by the nationalist and centralizing drive of the Union and Progress.<sup>16</sup>

#### The National Liberation Period (1918–1923)

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the Ottoman government collapsed in fact, if not in theory. While the Istanbul government maintained a shaky existence during the Armistice years (1918–1922) under the control of the Allies' occupation armies, a new governmental structure was developed in Anatolia by the nationalists resisting the occupation.

The era of national liberation is a most interesting period in Turkey's constitutional history, and is full of constitutional innovations. Following the arrest and deportation of many deputies with nationalist sympathies by the Allied occupation forces and the consequent dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies on 18 March 1920, Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the nationalist forces in Anatolia, called for the election of a new assembly "with extraordinary powers" to convene in Ankara. This body, called the "Grand National Assembly," was fundamentally different from the Ottoman Parliament in that it combined legislative and executive powers in itself. It was a real constituent and revolutionary assembly, not bound by the Ottoman constitution.

The Grand National Assembly enacted a constitution in 1921. This was a short but very important document. For the first time it proclaimed the principle of national sovereignty, calling itself the "only and true representative of the nation." Legislative and executive powers were vested in the assembly. The ministers were to be chosen by the Assembly individually from among its own members. The Assembly could provide instructions to the ministers and, if deemed necessary, change them.

In the entire Turkish history, the political influence of the legislature reached its peak during the period of national liberation. The theory of legislative supremacy was also followed in practice. The Assembly closely supervised all aspects of administrative activity. Under the most difficult external and internal circumstances, Kemal and his ministers ruled the country in close cooperation with the Assembly and never attempted to ignore it.

In the months following the victorious termination of the War of Independence and the abolition of the sultanate in the fall of 1922, Mustafa Kemal formed a political party based on populist principles, which was named the People's Party (later the Republican People's Party, or RPP). In the 1923 elections it won almost all of the Assembly seats. However, the newly elected Assembly was also far from being an obedient instrument of the leadership. Disagreements on constitutional and other questions soon became manifest. In November 1924, twenty-

nine deputies resigned from the People's Party and formed the Progressive Republican Party. The new opposition party was led by some prestigious generals closely associated with Kemal during the War of Independence. In its initial manifesto the party emphasized economic and particularly political liberalism, including a commitment to "respect religious feelings and beliefs." The manifesto stated its opposition to despotism, and stressed individual rights, judicial independence, and administrative decentralization. It promised not to change the constitution without a clear popular mandate. The Progressive Republican Party was strongly supported by the Istanbul press, and started to set up local organizations in big cities and in the eastern provinces.

Behind these publicly claimed policy differences also lay the personal estrangement of the Progressive leaders from Kemal, and their concern about his growing personal power. At a more fundamental level, however, their opposition reflected a more conservative mentality that Frey sees as typical of postindependence crises in developing countries. Behind all the ideas of the Progressive Republican Party, he argues that "there lay the conservative aim of making the new Turkey—if there was ever to be a new Turkey in any basic sense—conform as far as possible to the customs and traditions of the old. Change was to be gradual and evolutionary, not swift and revolutionary in the Kemalist mode."<sup>17</sup>

#### The Consolidation of the Republic

Justification for crushing the Progressive Republican Party was found in the Seyh Sait rebellion that erupted in eastern Anatolia in February 1925. The rebellion quickly reached serious dimensions. Consequently, the more moderate government of Fethi was replaced by a new one headed by İsmet İnönü, who favored more radical methods to deal with the rebellion. Legislation passed in March gave the government broad powers to ban all kinds of organization, propaganda, agitation, and publications that could lead to reaction and rebellion or undermine public order and security. Martial law was declared, and the Independence Tribunals (revolutionary courts created in 1920 to deal with treasonable activities) were reactivated. The Progressive Republican Party was shut down on 3 June 1925 by a decision of the Council of Ministers, which implicated it in the revolt, although no concrete proof of such connection was established. The suppression of the opposition party and much of the independent press marked the end of the first, semipluralistic phase of the Kemalist regime.

The following period can be characterized as the consolidation phase of the new republican regime. Between 1925 and 1945 the country was ruled by a single-party regime, with the exception of a brief and

unsuccessful attempt to introduce an opposition party, the Free Republican Party in 1930. This was a period of radical secularizing reforms such as the banning of religious orders; the adoption of the Swiss civil code to replace the *sharia*; acceptance of other Western codes in the fields of penal, commercial, and procedural law; the closing of religious schools; the outlawing of the fez; the adoption of a Latin alphabet and the international calendar; the repeal of the constitutional provisions that made Islam the official religion of the state, etc. This consolidation of single-party rule, however, did not involve a doctrinal repudiation of liberal democracy or of liberal values. Extraordinary measures were justified by temporary needs to protect the state and the regime against counterrevolutionaries.

Although the regime's authoritarian tendencies were somewhat intensified after the failure of the Free Republican Party experiment in 1930, most of these tendencies were checked or arrested by the more liberal or pluralistic counterendencies within the single party, the Republican People's Party (RPP). Organizationally the RPP never approached a totalitarian mobilizational party model. Ideologically, it did not provide a permanent justification for an authoritarian regime. Authoritarian practices and policies were defeated not on doctrinal, but on purely pragmatic and temporary grounds. A liberal democratic state remained the officially sanctioned ideal. Institutionally attempts were made to partially open up the nomination and election processes starting from the 1931 elections, such as leaving some parliamentary seats open for independent candidates.<sup>18</sup>

As for its social bases, the RPP has often been described as a coalition between the central military-bureaucratic elite and local notables, the former clearly being the dominant element especially at the level of central government. This alliance was, at least partly, dictated by the circumstances of the War of Independence. These two groups were the only ones capable of mobilizing the peasant majority into a war of national liberation. After the consolidation of the republican regime this cooperation continued, since the Kemalists' emphasis on secularizing reforms did not pose a threat to the interests of local notables. Thus the RPP represented the old center, i.e., the world of officialdom, with some local allies in the periphery. But in contrast to mobilizational single parties, it did not attempt to broaden its social base or to mobilize the periphery.

The Kemalist regime was highly successful, on the other hand, in creating a set of new political institutions, among which the RPP itself and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) stand out as the most important. Elections were also institutionalized and regularly held. The forms, if not the substance, of constitutional government were carefully maintained. All these political institutions survived with

minimal changes in the multiparty era once such a transition was made in the late 1940s. Indeed, political institutionalization under the aegis of a single party provided a kind of "democratic infrastructure" that eventually facilitated the transition to democratic politics.<sup>19</sup> In this sense, the RPP regime can be described as a case of low political participation (mobilization) and high political institutionalization.

Other features of the Kemalist regime in Turkey might have also provided facilitating conditions for eventual democratization. First, the loss of all Arabic-speaking provinces at the end of World War I and the exchange of populations with Greece following the termination of the War of Independence made the new Turkish republic a much more homogeneous state. It thus facilitated the basing of its corporate identity on Turkish nationalism instead of Islamic religion or loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty. Indeed, a reason for the relative failure (compared, for example, with the Meiji restoration in Japan) of Ottoman modernization reforms in the nineteenth century might well have been that such reforms could not possibly have produced sufficient social integration and social mobilization in a multinational and overextended empire. The second facilitating condition was the complete secularization of the governmental, legal, and educational systems under the Kemalist rule. By strictly separating religion from politics the Kemalists created at least a precondition for liberal democracy, i.e., a rationalist-relativistic, rather than an absolutist, notion of politics. Thus it should be no accident that Turkey is the only predominantly Muslim country that is both democratic and secular. Obviously there is a link between Kemalist reforms and those of the nineteenth-century Ottoman modernizers, especially the Young Turks. But the speed, intensity, and scope of the secularizing reforms of the republic clearly surpass those of the earlier eras.

Regarding the relationship between the Kemalist reforms and the development of democracy in Turkey, a counterargument can be made to the effect that the traumatic experience of such a momentous culture change, and the deep cleavage between radical secularists and Islamic traditionalists<sup>20</sup> would make a stable democracy very unlikely. It should be stressed, however, that despite the radical nature of Kemalist secularism, it never intended to eradicate Islam in Turkey. It was anticlerical, to be sure, but not antireligious. It aimed at individualization or privatization of Islam, attempting to make it a matter of individual conscience rather than the fundamental organizing principle of the society. Consistent with this, freedom of religion at the individual level was always respected, while organized political manifestations of Islam were strictly forbidden. Judged by these criteria, the ultimate aim of Kemalism seems to have been accomplished, since a majority of believing and practicing Turkish Muslims are now distinguishing between their religious beliefs and their public and political lives, as

evidenced by their voting behavior. Indeed, during the 1970s, fundamentalist Islamic political parties have been able to gain only a small minority of votes.

### Transition to Multiparty Politics and the Democratic Party Period

The transition from authoritarianism to competitive politics in Turkey is highly exceptional in that it took place without a *ruptura*, i.e., a break with the existing institutional arrangements. On the contrary, it is a rare example of *reforma*, where the transition process was led and controlled by the power holders of the previous authoritarian regime.<sup>21</sup> This transition started in 1945 when the RPP regime allowed the formation of an opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), by some of the dissident members of its own parliamentary group. Despite some ups and downs on the road, the process proceeded relatively smoothly and ended in the electoral victory of the DP in the free parliamentary elections of 1950.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to give full account of the transition or to assess its probable causes.<sup>22</sup> While such a momentous change cannot be explained by a single factor, it appears that the potentially democratic aspirations of the RPP regime and President İnönü's firm personal commitment to democratization provided the crucial impulse behind the move. In fact, whenever relations between the RPP old guard (the "bunker") and the DP opposition grew tense, İnönü intervened personally to soften the atmosphere and to reassure the opposition. The most significant of these interventions was his statement on 12 July 1947 after several rounds of talk with the hard-line Prime Minister Recep Peker and the opposition leader Celâl Bayar. The declaration included a promise by İnönü that the opposition party would enjoy the same privileges as the party in power and that İnönü himself would remain equally responsible to both parties as the head of the state.

İnönü's commitment to democratization, in turn, has to be explained by the structural and doctrinal characteristics of the RPP regime. The Kemalist regime evolved into a single-party model without, however, having a single-party ideology. No component of the RPP doctrine provided a permanent legitimation for the single-party system. On the contrary liberal democracy remained the ideal, and authoritarianism was justified only as a temporary measure arising out of the need to defend the Kemalist revolution against counterrevolutionaries. Kemalism as a doctrine was much closer to nineteenth-century liberalism than to the authoritarian and totalitarian philosophies of the twentieth century. Communism and fascism were never seen as models to be imitated. One reason for this might have been that the Kemalist regime was born in the

immediate post-World War I period when democratic ideas and values were at the height of their appeal and legitimacy for the new nations.

The timing of the decision to democratize the Turkish system could have been influenced by favorable changes in the international environment. The victory of the democratic regimes in World War II, and Turkey's need for a rapprochement with the West in the face of the Soviet threat, no doubt provided an additional incentive for transition to democracy. Changes in the structure of Turkish society—notably the growth of commercial and industrial middle classes who favored a democratic regime in which their own party would have an excellent chance to win—on the other hand, do not seem to have played a decisive role in the transition. First, it is not clear why the commercial-industrial middle classes suddenly began to feel fettered under the RPP's statism, if statist policies really worked so much to their benefit. Second, assuming that this was indeed the case, there is no evidence that such internal pressures forced the RPP leadership into this decision. The experience of the Mexican PRI suggests that a pragmatic single party is capable of showing sufficient adaptability to accommodate newly emerging groups.

The DP came to power with a landslide electoral victory on 14 May 1950, also won the 1954 and 1957 national elections (Table 5.1), and remained in power for ten full years until it was ousted by the military coup of 27 May 1960. Socially the DP, led by a group of politicians who played fairly important roles in the single-party period, was a coalition of various types of oppositions to the RPP. It brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives, commercial middle classes and the urban poor, and more modern (mobilized) sections of the rural population. The RPP, on the other hand, retained the support of government officials, some large landowners, and a substantial portion of the more backward peasantry still under the influence of its local patrons. The heterogeneous character of the DP coalition suggests that the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural rather than socioeconomic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters was their opposition to state officials. In this sense, the rise of the DP was a victory of the periphery over the center.

The ideological distance between the RPP and the DP was not great. They differed significantly from each other, however, in their underlying attitudes toward the proper role of the state, bureaucracy, private enterprise, local initiative, and toward peasant participation in politics. While the RPP-oriented central elite had a more tutelary concept of development, the provincial elites around the DP emphasized local initiative and the "immediate satisfaction of local expectations."<sup>23</sup>

Despite the nonideological nature of the partisan conflict relations between the two major parties quickly deteriorated. Especially after the

Table 5.1 Percentage of Votes (and Seats) in Turkish Parliamentary Elections (1950-1977)

| Party  | Elections      |                |                |                |                |                |                |
|--------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|        | 1950           | 1954           | 1957           | 1961           | 1965           | 1969           | 1973           |
| DP/JP  | 53.3<br>(83.8) | 56.6<br>(93.0) | 47.7<br>(69.5) | 34.8<br>(35.1) | 52.9<br>(53.3) | 46.5<br>(56.9) | 29.8<br>(33.1) |
| RPP    | 39.8<br>(14.2) | 34.8<br>(5.7)  | 40.8<br>(29.2) | 36.7<br>(38.4) | 28.7<br>(29.8) | 27.4<br>(31.8) | 33.3<br>(41.1) |
| NP     | 3.0<br>(0.2)   | 4.7<br>(0.9)   | 7.2<br>(0.7)   | 14.0<br>(12.0) | 6.3<br>(6.9)   | 3.2<br>(1.3)   | 1.0<br>(0.7)   |
| FP     | —              | —              | 3.8<br>(0.7)   | —              | —              | —              | —              |
| NTP    | —              | —              | —              | 13.7<br>(14.4) | 3.7<br>(4.2)   | 2.2<br>(1.3)   | —              |
| TLP    | —              | —              | —              | —              | 3.0<br>(3.3)   | 2.7<br>(0.4)   | 0.1<br>(0.7)   |
| NAP    | —              | —              | —              | —              | 2.2<br>(2.4)   | 3.0<br>(0.2)   | 3.4<br>(0.7)   |
| UP     | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | 2.8<br>(1.8)   | 1.1<br>(0.2)   |
| RRP    | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | 6.6<br>(3.3)   | 5.3<br>(2.9)   |
| Dem. P | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | 11.9<br>(10.0) |
| NSP    | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | 11.8<br>(10.7) |
|        | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | —              | 8.6<br>(5.3)   |

Note: In the first row of figures for each party are percentages of the popular vote and in the second row (in parentheses) are the percentages of seats won.

Abbreviations: DP, Democrat Party; JP, Justice Party; RPP, Republican People's Party; NP, Nation Party; FP, Freedom Party; NTP, New Turkey Party; TLP, Turkish Labor Party; NAP, Nationalist Action Party; UP, Unity Party; RRP, Republican Reliance Party; Dem. P., Democratic Party; NSP, National Salvation Party.

1957 elections the DP responded to its declining support by resorting to increasingly authoritarian measures against the opposition, which only made the opposition more uncompromising and vociferous. The last straw in this long chain of authoritarian measures was the establishment by the government party in April 1960 of a parliamentary committee of inquiry to investigate the "subversive" activities of the RPP and of a section of the press. With this, many opposition members were convinced that a point of no return had been reached and that the channels of democratic change had been clogged. The ensuing public unrest, student demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara, and clashes between the students and the police led to the declaration of martial law. This put the armed forces in the unwanted position of suppressing the opposition on behalf of a government for whose policies they had little sympathy. Finally, the military intervened on 27 May 1960, with the welcome and support of the opposition. The National Unity Committee, formed by the revolutionary officers, dissolved the parliament, banned the DP, arrested and tried its leaders, and set out to prepare a new and more democratic constitution.

What is to be blamed for the failure of this first extended experiment of Turkey with democratic politics? One reason lay in the very nature of the DP, which was a coalition of diverse anti-RPP forces. This convinced the DP leadership that the party "could retain its unity only by keeping its ranks mobilized against the RPP. This was realized partly by accusing the RPP of subverting the government through its hold on the bureaucracy, and partly by raising the specter of a return of the RPP to power."<sup>2</sup> A second factor was that the DP leaders, having been socialized into politics under the RPP rule, had inherited many attitudes, norms, and orientations that were more in harmony with a single party than with a competitive party system. These included a belief that a popular mandate entitled the government party to the unrestricted use of political power. Coupled with the Ottoman-Turkish cultural legacy, which hardly distinguished between political opposition and treasonable activity, this attitude left little room for a legitimate opposition.

Perhaps an even more potent factor that eventually led to the breakdown of the democratic regime was the conflict between the DP and the public bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, which was the main pillar of the single-party regime, retained its RPP loyalties under multiparty politics, and resisted the DP's efforts to consolidate its political power. In the eyes of the DP leaders, this amounted to an unwarranted obstruction of the "national will." The bureaucrats, on the other hand, saw it as their duty to protect the "public interest" against efforts to use state funds for political patronage purposes. They were also deeply troubled by the DP government's careless attitude toward the "rule of law," as well as by its more permissive policies toward religious activities, which they considered a betrayal of the Kemalist legacy of secularism. These negative attitudes were shared by civilian officials and military officers alike.

Finally, all bureaucratic groups (again both civilian and military) not only experienced a loss of social status and political influence under the DP regime, but were also adversely affected in terms of their relative income. The DP's economic policies consisted of rapid import-substitution-based industrialization and the modernization of agriculture, largely through external borrowing and inflationary financing. Although a relatively high rate of economic growth was achieved in the 1950s, income distribution grew much more inequitable. Particularly badly hit because of the inflationary policies were the salaried groups. The 1960 coup found therefore an easy acceptance among military officers and civilian bureaucrats for economic as well as other reasons.

### Turkey's Second Try at Democracy (1961-1980)

The 1960 coup was carried out by a group of middle rank officers who,

upon assuming power, organized themselves into a revolutionary council named the "National Unity Committee" (NUC), under the chairmanship of General Cemal Gürsel, the former commander of the army. The NUC declared from the beginning its intention of making a new democratic constitution and returning power to a freely elected civilian government. In spite of the efforts by some NUC members to prolong military rule, the committee kept its promise and relinquished power in 1961 following the parliamentary elections held under the new Constitution and the Electoral Law.<sup>25</sup>

The constitution of 1961 was prepared by the NUC and a coopted Representative Assembly dominated by pro-RPP bureaucrats and intellectuals, reflecting the basic political values and interests of these groups. On the one hand, they created an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of elected assemblies. Such checks included the introduction of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws; the strengthening of the Council of State, which functions as the highest administrative court with review powers over the acts of all executive agencies; effective independence for the judiciary; the creation of a second legislative chamber (Senate of the Republic); and the granting of substantial autonomy to certain public agencies such as the universities and the Radio and Television Corporation. On the other hand, the constitution expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights. Thus it was hoped that the power of the elected assemblies would be balanced by judicial and other agencies that represented the values of the bureaucratic elites, while the newly expanded civil liberties would ensure the development of a free and democratic society.

The 1961 elections, however, gave a majority to the heirs of the ousted Democrats (Table 5.1). The pro-DP vote was fragmented among the Justice Party (34.8 percent), the National Party (14.0 percent), and the New Turkey Party (13.7 percent), while the Republicans obtained only 36.7 percent of the vote. Following a period of unstable coalition governments, the Justice Party (JP) gradually established itself as the principal heir to the DP. In the 1965 elections, it gained about 53 percent of the popular vote and of the National Assembly seats. The JP repeated its success in 1969, when it won an absolute majority of the Assembly seats with a somewhat reduced popular vote (46.5 percent). Thus Turkey appeared to have achieved, once again, a popularly elected stable government.

Toward the end of the 1960s, however, the Turkish political system began to experience new problems. Partly as a result of the more liberal atmosphere provided by the 1961 Constitution, extreme left- and right-wing groups appeared on the political scene. This was followed by increasing acts of political violence, especially by extremist youth groups. The crisis was aggravated by the activities of various conspiratorial

groups within the military. These radical officers, frustrated by the successive electoral victories of the conservative JP, aimed at establishing a longer-term military regime ostensibly to carry out radical social reforms. In fact the military memorandum of 12 March 1971, which forced the JP government to resign, was a last-minute move by the top military commanders to forestall a radical coup.

The so-called 12 March regime did not go as far as dissolving the Parliament and assuming power directly. Instead, it strongly encouraged the formation of an "above-party" or technocratic government under a veteran RPP politician, Professor Nihat Erim. The new government was expected to deal sternly with political violence with the help of martial law, to bring about certain constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the executive, and to carry out the social reforms (especially land reform) provided for by the 1961 Constitution. The interim government accomplished its first two objectives. Political violence was effectively stamped out. The constitution was extensively revised in 1971 and 1973, with a view to not only strengthening the executive authority, but also to limiting certain civil liberties that were seen as responsible for the emergence of political extremism and violence. The interim regime failed, however, in its third objective of carrying out social reforms, not only because of the conservative majority in the Parliament, but also because of the purge of the radical officers from the military in the months following the "12 March memorandum."

The 1971 military intervention can be characterized as a "half coup," in which the military chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly. If one reason for the intervention was the failure of the Demirel government to cope with political terrorism, a more deep-seated cause was the distrust felt toward the JP by many military officers and civilian bureaucrats. Thus, in a sense, the 1971 intervention still reflected the old cleavage between the centralist bureaucratic elite and the forces of the periphery that commanded an electoral majority.

The interim period ended with the 1973 parliamentary elections, which produced a National Assembly with no governing majority. The RPP emerged, after many years of electoral impotence, as the largest party with a third of the popular vote and 41 percent of the Assembly seats (see Table 5.1). The RPP's rise was due on the one hand to the energetic leadership of Bülent Ecevit, who became the party leader replacing the octogenarian İnönü, and on the other to the new social democratic image of the party. As the 1973 voting patterns indicate, the new image of the RPP appealed to urban lower classes. This change signified a realignment in the Turkish party system, as the old center-periphery cleavage began to be replaced by a new functional cleavage. The RPP increased its vote particularly in the former strongholds of the

DP and the JP, and among those strata that up to that time loyally supported the DP and the JP.<sup>26</sup>

The Right, on the other hand, was badly split in the 1973 elections. The JP obtained only about 30 percent of the vote (Table 5.1). The Democratic Party, a splinter group of the JP, received just under 12 percent of the vote, as did the National Salvation Party (NSP). The NSP combined its defense of Islamic moral and cultural values with a defense of the interests of small merchants, artisans, and businessmen. Another new actor in Turkish politics in the 1970s was the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). Although it won only 3.4 percent of the vote in 1973, the NAP grew in the 1970s under the leadership of ex-revolutionary Alpaslan Türkeş (one of the key figures in the 1960s coup) from an insignificant party into a highly dedicated, strictly disciplined, and hierarchically organized political force to be reckoned with. The NAP's ideology combined an ardent nationalism and anticommunism with strongly interventionist economic policies, and its tactics involved the use of militia-type youth organizations seemingly implicated in right-wing terror.

The composition of the 1973 National Assembly made coalition governments inevitable. First a coalition was formed, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, between the social-democratic RPP and the Islamic NSP. The coalition collapsed in the fall of 1974 and was eventually replaced by a "Nationalist Front" coalition under Süleyman Demirel, with the participation of the JP, NSP, NAP, and the RRP (Republican Reliance Party, a small moderate party led by Professor Turhan Feyzioğlu, a former RPP member).

The 1977 elections did not significantly change this picture, although they did strengthen the two leading parties vis-à-vis most of the minor ones. The RPP, which increased its share of the popular vote by eight points, came close to an absolute parliamentary majority. The JP also improved its share of the vote and of the Assembly seats (Table 5.1). The NSP lost about one-quarter of its votes and half of its parliamentary contingent. The Democratic Party and the Republican Reliance Party were practically eliminated. The right-wing NAP grew considerably, however, almost doubling its popular vote while increasing its small contingent of Assembly seats fivefold.

Following the 1977 elections, a Nationalist Front government was formed again under Mr. Demirel, with the participation of the JP, NSP, and NAP. In a few months, however, the Front lost its parliamentary majority as a result of the defection of some JP deputies. Consequently, Mr. Ecevit was able to form a government with the help of these dissident JP members, who were rewarded with ministerial posts in the new government. The Ecevit government lasted about 22 months, resigning in November 1979, when the partial elections for one-third of

the Senate and five vacant National Assembly seats revealed sharp gains by the JP, which won 47.8 percent of the vote while the RPP support declined dramatically (to 29.2 percent). Consequently, Mr. Demirel formed a minority JP government with the parliamentary support of its former partners, the NSP and the NAP. This government had been in office less than one year when it was ousted by the military coup of 12 September 1980.

How can we account for the failure of Turkey's second experiment with democracy? The immediate reason behind the military intervention was the growing political violence and terrorism that, between 1975 and 1980, left more than 5,000 people killed and three times as many wounded (the equivalent of Turkish losses in the War of Independence). Acts of violence, which became particularly acute between 1978 and 1980, also included armed assaults, sabotages, kidnappings, bank robberies, occupation and destruction of workplaces, and bombings. Some forty-nine radical leftist groups were involved in left-wing terror, while right-wing terror was concentrated in the "idealist" organizations with their unofficial links to the NAP. Thus, in a sense, the pattern that had led to the military intervention of 1971 was repeated, only this time on a much larger and more alarming scale. Just as in the early 1970s, the governments of the late 1970s were unable to cope with the problem even though martial law was in effect in much of the country. Martial law under the Turkish constitutional system entails the transfer of police functions to military authorities, the restriction or complete suspension of civil liberties, and the creation of military martial law courts to try offenses associated with the causes that led to the declaration of martial law. Thus it is a constitutional, albeit highly authoritarian and restrictive, procedure. In the crisis of the late 1970s, however, even martial law could not contain the violence. One reason for this was the infiltration of the police forces by right-wing and left-wing extremists. Another was the general erosion of the authority of the state as a result of growing political polarization in the country, as will be discussed below. It should be added here that a harmful side effect of martial law is the seemingly inevitable politicization of the armed forces, or the "militarization" of political conflict, which may pave the way for full-scale military intervention. Indeed, all three military interventions in recent Turkish history were preceded by martial law regimes instituted by civilian governments.

At a deeper level the incidence of political violence reflected a growing ideological polarization in the country. The polarizing forces were the NAP, and to a much lesser extent the NSP, on the right, and many small radical groups on the left. The NSP was not involved in violence, but its use of Islamic themes helped to undermine the regime's legitimacy among those committed to the Kemalist legacy of secularism, including the military. The parliamentary arithmetics and the inability

and/or unwillingness of the two major parties (the RPP and the JP) to agree on a grand coalition or a minority government arrangement gave these two minor parties an enormous bargaining—more correctly blackmailing—power, which they effectively used to obtain important ministries and to colonize them with their own partisans. In fact this seems to be crucial for the crisis of the system. An accommodation between the two major parties would have been welcomed by most of the important political groups in Turkey, including the business community, the leading trade union confederation, the press, and the military, and would have been acceptable to a majority of the JP and the RPP deputies. A government based on their joint support would probably have been strong enough to deal effectively and evenhandedly with the political violence. However, the deep personal rivalry between Demirel and Ecevit, their tendency to see problems from a narrow partisan perspective, and perhaps their failure to appreciate the real gravity of the situation made such a democratic rescue operation impossible. As the experience of many countries has shown, antisystem parties can perhaps be tolerated in opposition, but their entry into government tends to put too heavy a load on the system to be handled by democratic means.

The radical left, unlike the radical right, was not represented in the Parliament, but extreme leftist ideologies found many supporters among students, teachers, and in some sectors of the industrial working class. Just as the JP was pulled to the right by its partnership with the NAP and the NSP, the RPP was pulled to the left by the radical groups to its left. Political polarization also affected and undermined the public bureaucracy. At no time in recent Turkish history had the public agencies been so divided and politicized as in the late 1970s. Changes of government were followed by extensive purges in all ministries, involving not only the top personnel, but also many middle- or lower-rank civil servants. Partisanship became a norm in the civil service, which had retained its essentially nonpolitical character until the mid-1970s.

A related phenomenon that contributed to a decline in the legitimacy of the political system was the *immobilisme* of the governments and parliaments in much of the 1970s. The very narrow majorities in the Parliament and the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions (be it the Nationalist Front governments or the Ecevit governments) meant that new policies could be initiated only with great difficulty. In the context of pressing economic troubles (such as high inflation, major deficits in the international trade balance, shortages of investment and consumer goods, unemployment, etc.), and international problems (such as the Cyprus crisis and the U.S. arms embargo), the inability of governments to take courageous policy decisions aggravated the legitimacy crisis. To put it differently this lack of efficacy and effectiveness

served to delegitimize the regime. Perhaps the most telling example of such governmental failure of performance was the inability of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to elect a president of the republic in 1980. The six-month-old presidential deadlock ended only with the military coup of 12 September. Other examples of lesser deadlocks abounded particularly in matters of economic and foreign policy.

### The 1980 Coup and the 1982 Constitution

From the moment it took over the government on 12 September 1980, the National Security Council (composed of the five highest-ranking generals in the Turkish armed forces) made it clear that it intended to eventually return power to democratically elected civilian authorities. It made it equally clear, however, by words and deeds that it did not intend a return to the *status quo ante*. Rather, the council aimed at a major restructuring of Turkish democracy to prevent a recurrence of the political polarization, violence, and crisis that had afflicted the country in the late 1970s, and thus to make the military's continued involvement in politics unnecessary. The new constitution, Political Parties Law, and Electoral Law prepared by the council-appointed Consultative Assembly—and made final by the council itself—reflect these objectives and concerns of the military and indicate the extent to which Turkey's new attempt at democracy is intended to be different from its earlier democratic experiments.

The constitution was submitted to a popular referendum on 7 November 1982. The extremely high rate of participation (91.27 percent) was, no doubt, partly due to the provision that those who did not participate would forfeit their right to vote in the next parliamentary elections. The constitution was approved by 91.37 percent of those who voted. The counting was honest, but the debate preceding it was extremely limited. The council limited debate only to those views expressed with the purpose of "improving the draft constitution" and banned all efforts to influence the direction of the vote. The constitution was "officially" explained to the public by President Kenan Evren in a series of speeches, and any criticism of these speeches was also banned. Another unusual feature of the constitutional referendum was its combination with the presidential elections. A "yes" vote for the constitution meant a vote for General Evren for a seven-year term as president of the Republic, and no other candidates were allowed. It is generally agreed that the personal popularity of General Evren helped increase affirmative votes for the constitution rather than the other way around.

The election of General Evren as president was one of the measures designed to ensure a smooth transition from the National Security Council regime to a democratic one. Another such transitional measure

was the transformation of the National Security Council into a "Presidential Council"—with only advisory powers—for a period of six years, starting from the convening of the new Grand National Assembly. Also, during a six-year period, the president has the right to veto constitutional amendments, in which case the Grand National Assembly (GNA) can override the veto only by a three-fourths majority of its full membership. Finally, the constitution provides restrictions on political activities of former political leaders. The leaders, deputy leaders, secretaries-general, and the members of the central executive committees of former political parties are not allowed to establish or to become members in political parties, nor may they be nominated for the GNA or for local government bodies for a period of ten years. A less severe ban disqualifies the parliamentarians of former political parties from establishing political parties or becoming members of their central executive bodies (but not from running for and being elected to the GNA) for a period of five years. These bans were repealed by the constitutional referendum of 6 September 1987.

In addition to such transitional measures, the constitution introduces highly restrictive provisions on political activities of trade unions, associations, and cooperatives. Thus there can be no political links between such organizations and political parties, nor can they receive financial support from each other. Political parties are also banned from organizing in foreign countries (obviously, among the Turkish residents of those countries), creating women's and youth organizations, and establishing foundations. Also the 1982 Constitution transformed the office of the presidency from a largely ceremonial one, as it was under the 1961 Constitution, into a much more powerful one with effective autonomous powers. Although the political responsibility of the Council of Ministers before the GNA is maintained, the president is given important appointive powers (particularly, in regard to certain high-ranking judges) that he can exercise independently of the Council of Ministers. Also he can submit constitutional amendments to popular referenda and bring about a suit of unconstitutionality against any law passed by the GNA. The constitution did not go as far as the "French" 1958 Constitution, however, in strengthening the presidency. The system of government remained essentially parliamentary rather than presidential.

The National Security Council regime also adopted a new electoral law which retained the "d'Hondt" version of proportional representation with some important modifications. The d'Hondt formula is also known as the highest-average system. Briefly, it ensures that in a constituency no reallocation of additional seats would take place to increase proportionality. The "d'Hondt" system, in its classical version, slightly favors larger parties, but the modifications introduced by the new law made such effect much stronger. The most consequential novelty of the new

law is a national quotient (threshold) such that political parties obtaining less than 10 percent of the total valid votes cast nationally will not be assigned any seats in the GNA. This provision is designed to prevent the excessive proliferation of political parties which, in the opinion of the council, contributed significantly to the crisis in the 1970s. The ruling council indicated on various occasions that it preferred a party system with two or three parties, which would ensure stable parliamentary majorities. Another novelty of the Electoral Law is the "constituency threshold," according to which the total number of valid votes cast in each constituency is divided by the number of seats in that constituency (which varies between two and six), and those parties or independent candidates that fail to exceed the quotient are not assigned any seats in that constituency. The combined effects of national and constituency thresholds favor larger parties.

### Return to Competitive Politics and the 1983 Elections

The provisional article 4 of the Law on Political Parties gave the National Security Council the right to veto the founding members of new political parties (all former political parties had earlier been dissolved by a decree of the council). The council made use of this power in such a way that only three parties were able to complete their formation formalities before the beginning of the electoral process and, consequently, to compete in the GNA elections. Notably, two new parties that looked like credible successors to the two former major parties (namely, the True Path Party as a possible successor to the JP and the Social Democratic Party to the RPP) were thus eliminated from electoral competition, although both parties were allowed to complete their formation after the nomination process was over. Earlier, another successor party, the Grand Turkey Party, established or joined by a large number of former high-ranking JP figures, had been banned outright by the council. The provisional article 2 of the Electoral Law also required parties to have established their organizations in at least half of the provinces in order to qualify for electoral competition.

As a result of such qualifications, only three parties could contest the GNA elections held on 6 November 1983. These were the Motherland Party (MP), the Populist Party (PP), and the Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP). The MP is led by Turgut Özal, an engineer and economist who occupied high technocratic positions under Demirel, including the post of undersecretary in charge of the State Planning Organization. Özal became the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs in the Bülent Ulusu Government during the National Security Council rule. The PP was led by Necdet Calp, a former governor and undersecretary in the prime minister's office. The NDP leader, Turgut Sunalp,

was a former general who served, after his retirement, as the Turkish ambassador in Canada.

The November 1983 elections resulted in a clear victory for Mr. Özal and his party. The MP won 45.2 percent of the total valid votes cast and 52.9 percent of the 400 assembly seats. Although a majority of the MP votes presumably came from former JP supporters, it appears that the MP also received votes from the supporters of the former NSP, NAP, and even the RPP. The PP came out as the second largest party with 30.5 percent of the vote and 29.3 percent of the seats, which was a better result than most observers expected. The PP appears to have gained the votes of a large majority of the former RPP voters. The main loser in the elections was the NDP. Despite the high expectations of its leadership, the NDP finished a poor third with 23.3 percent of the vote and only 17.8 percent of the seats. This seems to be related to the fact that most voters perceived the NDP as an extension of military rule, or as kind of a "state party," an image that the party leadership did not try to dispel. By contrast the MP was seen as the most spontaneous or the least artificial party of all three. In this sense, the election outcome can be interpreted as reflecting the desire of a majority of Turkish voters for a rapid normalization and civilianization.

The transition process proceeded smoothly following the elections. The legal existence of the National Security Council came to an end, the council members resigned their military posts and became members of the new Presidential Council. Mr. Özal was duly invited by President Evren to form the new government, and he received a comfortable vote of confidence from the GNA. Despite the speculations to the contrary, the new MP government did not include any independent ministers close to or favored by the military. Another MP deputy, Mr. Necmettin Karaduman, was easily elected speaker of the GNA, again disproving speculations that Mr. Ulusu (a former navy commander and the prime minister during council rule) was favored by the military for that prestigious post. Once in office, Özal started to put his economic liberalization program into effect with characteristic speed and boldness. One of the first laws passed by the GNA allowed all established parties (including the True Path and the Social Democratic parties) to contest the local government elections held in the spring of 1984. These elections confirmed the popularity of the MP. Thus, with the 1983 elections, civilian government has been restored and a new phase in Turkish politics has started.

### An Appraisal

On the basis of the above historical analysis, Turkey's overall degree of success with democratic government can be described as "mixed" or

"unstable." Democracy has been the rule in the last forty years, but has been interrupted thrice since 1960. Democratic rule is now in place, however, and there appears to be no immediate threat to its existence. A more positive evaluation is also suggested by the fact that of the three interruptions one was only partial, and the other two were of relatively short duration. Furthermore, in both cases, the military rulers declared from the beginning their intention to restore democracy. That they faithfully kept their promises is even more significant. Thus the democratic process was interrupted not by fully developed authoritarian regimes, but by interim military governments that aimed to effect a "reequilibration of democracy." The overall trend then has been *not away but toward* democratic government.

The transition in 1983 followed the pattern of *reforma* rather than *ruptura* or even *ruptura-pactada*, *reforma-pactada*, as did the transitions in the periods of 1946–1950 and 1960–1961. In fact it was even a purer case of *reforma* than the earlier ones. In the 1946–1950 transition the RPP government and the DP opposition at least agreed upon a new electoral law prior to the crucial elections of 1950. In 1960–1961 period the military government actively collaborated with the two opposition parties in making the new constitution and the electoral law. In the most recent transition, on the other hand, the National Security Council excluded all organized political groups from any meaningful role in the transition. The 1982 Constitution was prepared by the National Security Council itself in collaboration with an all-appointed, no-party Consultative Assembly, and the November 1983 elections were held under conditions carefully controlled by the council.

This process of transition and the new constitution as its product have been questioned by important sectors of Turkish public opinion. Of the three present major parties the MP is the strongest supporter of the new regime, although it has indicated that it was not against certain relatively minor constitutional amendments. The True Path Party of Mr. Demirel favors more substantial constitutional changes. The Social Democratic Party (which became the Social Democratic Populist Party after its merger with the Populist Party) strongly criticizes restrictions on civil liberties and union rights, and advocates a more rapid normalization. There is substantial agreement, however, that the transition to democracy is genuine (although to some, yet incomplete), and that the 1982 Constitution may serve as the basis of the new Turkish political regime with some (more or less important) modifications.

### • THEORETICAL ANALYSIS •

What are the historical, cultural, social, economic, and political factors

that favored or impeded the development of democratic government in Turkey? Since Turkey is a case of mixed success, it stands to reason that the following list is also a mixed one.

### Political Culture

Two important features characterized the Ottoman political culture. One was the predominance of status-based values rather than market-derived values.<sup>27</sup> This was the outcome of the "bureaucratic" nature of the Ottoman Empire, which was described above. Briefly stated, the fundamental relationship under Ottoman rule between economic power and political power was essentially the reverse of the European historical experience: instead of economic power (i.e., ownership of the means of production) leading to political power (i.e., high office in the state bureaucracy), political power provided access to material wealth. However, the wealth thus accumulated could not be converted into more permanent economic assets because it was liable to confiscation by the state. Despite the growth of a substantial commercial and industrial middle class under the republic and especially in the last forty years, such status-based values still persist. The impact of this historical-cultural legacy on the development of democratic government in Turkey has been, on the whole, negative, since the predominance of status-derived values contributes to the strengthening of an all-powerful centralized state and hinders the development of a "civil society."

Another feature of the Ottoman cultural legacy has been the dichotomy resulting from the cultural division in Ottoman society between the palace (great) culture and the local or provincial (little) cultures.<sup>28</sup> They represented two very distinct ways of life, with different operational codes, different symbols (state versus village and tribe), different languages (highly literary and stylistic Ottoman versus simple spoken Turkish), different occupations (statecraft versus farming and artisan-ship), different types of settlement (urban versus rural), different literary and artistic traditions (*divan* literature and court music versus folk literature and music), and sometimes different versions of Islam (highly legalistic orthodox Islam versus often heterodox folk Islam). The nineteenth-century reforms and the Westernization movement did not eliminate, but perhaps further exacerbated, this cultural dualism by making the elite culture even more alien and inaccessible to the masses. Linguistic differences even among the Muslim subjects of the empire further contributed to this cultural fragmentation. Finally, the *millet* system that gave the ecclesiastical authorities of non-Muslim communities substantial control over their communal affairs without, however, granting them participatory rights meant that these communities maintained and developed their own cultures quite autonomously from the

central or "great" culture. All this led to a low level of social and cultural integration of the Ottoman society.

To be sure, the republic made important strides in bridging the gap between elite and mass cultures. In particular, the last forty years of multiparty politics helped to integrate the mass electorate into national political life. "The distributive and the redistributive functions of government received increasing emphasis, while the prevalence of the extractive function began to decline. Second, as an outcome of the first point, the citizens became more interested in national political life and came to identify themselves more closely with national political institutions of which political parties were the main example."<sup>29</sup> Still, the lingering elitist attitudes within sectors of the centralist bureaucratic elite have produced tensions in the political system and remain dysfunctional for the development of democratic government.<sup>30</sup>

There are other features of the Ottoman-Turkish political culture that are also incongruent with a democratic political system. It has been argued, for example, that "there is an element in Turkish political culture to which the notion of opposition is deeply repugnant." Turks have shown a predilection for organic theories of the state and society, and solidarist doctrines found easy acceptance among the Young Turk and Kemalist elites. The Kemalist notion of "populism" meant a rejection of class conflict and a commitment to establish a "harmony of interests" through paternalistic government policies. This "*gemeinschaft* outlook," present in both elite and mass cultures, finds perhaps its most poignant political expression in the excessive "fear of a national split." Indeed, one of the most frequent accusations party leaders hurl at each other is "splitting the nation."<sup>31</sup> Thus it appears that the notion of a loyal and legitimate opposition has not been fully institutionalized at the cultural level. The line separating opposition from treason is still rather thin compared to older and more stable democracies. The tendency to see politics in absolutist terms also explains the low capacity of political leaders for compromise and accommodation. Whether such low tolerance for opposition is comparable in the long run with the institutionalization of liberal democracy is open to question.

A related tendency is the low tolerance shown for individual deviance and heterodoxy within groups. In other words Turkish political culture attributes primacy not to the individual but to the collectivity, be it the nation, the state, or one of its subunits.<sup>32</sup> Individuality and deviance tend to be punished, conformity and orthodoxy rewarded in bureaucratic agencies, political parties, and even voluntary associations. Finally, most social institutions (families, schools, trade unions, local communities) display authoritarian patterns in their authority relations. This tends to create incongruences with the democratic authority patterns in the governmental sphere and to undermine stable democracy.<sup>33</sup>

On the more positive side, however, there seems to be a widespread consensus that the legitimacy of government derives from a popular mandate obtained in free, competitive elections. A democratic system is seen as the natural culmination of a century-old process of modernization and especially of the Kemalist reforms, the purpose of which was to create a Western type of secular, republican, modern state. In addition to this long-standing elite commitment to democracy, the peasants and the urban lower classes have come to see competitive elections as a powerful means to increase socioeconomic equality and to promote their material interests. A survey among some Istanbul squatters demonstrated, for example, that a substantial majority of them believed in the importance of voting and found political parties useful especially as channels of communication with government.<sup>34</sup> This attitude reflects a realization that a noncompetitive system would be less responsive to their group demands. Although there was a great deal of public anxiety over increasing political polarization and violence in the late 1970s, a majority of Turkish voters do not seem to hold the democratic system responsible for the crisis. Furthermore, in spite of such polarization, a centrist political orientation has remained strong among Turkish voters. In a 1977 pre-election survey, 26.8 percent of the respondents placed themselves at the center, 27.7 percent at the left of center, and 24.6 percent at the right of center. About a fifth of the respondents (20.9 percent) claimed that they had no opinion on this question. If we assume that "don't knows" indicate a lack of interest in ideological politics, then close to half of all Turkish voters can be placed at the center.<sup>35</sup> While few people would like to go back to the circumstances that prevailed before the 1980 coup, there does not seem to be broad popular support for a prolonged authoritarian solution.

### Historical Development

Certain historical factors favor the development of democratic government in Turkey. As the first part of this chapter demonstrates, the first movements toward representative and constitutional government started more than a century ago. Even if we discount the brief periods of democratic government under the Ottoman Empire and the early republic, the present competitive political system has been in existence for forty years with relatively short interruptions. A generation born in the multiparty period and socialized into democratic values has already reached positions of authority in governmental as well as nongovernmental spheres. Following Huntington we may argue that such longevity, or "chronological age," has helped to institutionalize democratic organizations and procedures.<sup>36</sup>

That Turkey did not have a colonial past, unlike most of the Third

World countries, is also a favorable historical factor for democratic development. Democratic institutions were not imposed from outside, but are seen as a natural outgrowth of internal political processes, which tends to increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the elites and the masses.

One may argue that some sequences of political development favor the emergence of democratic institutions more than the others. It has been posited, for example, that the optimum sequence is to establish national unity (identity) first, then central government authority, and then political equality and participation.<sup>37</sup> Turkish political development followed this optimum course. Simultaneously with the creation of the Turkish Republic in place of the multinational Ottoman Empire, the question of identity was effectively solved in favor of a Turkish national identity. The already highly developed central governmental institutions of the Ottoman state were further strengthened under the republic and penetrated more deeply into the society. The expansion of political participation took place a generation later in the mid-1940s, and proceeded within the already existing institutional framework of elections, legislatures and parties.

### Class Structure

The distribution of wealth and income appears to be highly unequal in Turkey. It is markedly so between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, within each of these sectors, between cities and rural settlements, and among geographic regions. A substantial proportion of the Turkish population has been, and remains, in a condition of low-end poverty. A study estimated that in 1973 38 percent of all Turkish households were below the subsistence level. Ownership of land is also highly unequal. Another 1973 study found that 22 percent of rural households were landless. About 42 percent of all rural households own very little land or no land at all, and the land owned by this 42 percent makes up less than 3 percent of total privately owned land. Conversely, households with 1,000 or more acres of land, constituting only 0.12 percent of all rural households, own 5.27 percent of total privately owned land. Land distribution is particularly unequal in the eastern and southeastern regions, which display markedly feudal features.<sup>38</sup> Overall income inequality seems to have further increased in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.

On the more positive side one may cite the existence of a rather substantial educated urban middle class of entrepreneurs, professionals, and bureaucrats, as well as a large group of middle-sized farmers. Under the liberal labor legislation that followed the 1961 Constitution, the number of unionized workers rose rapidly from less than 300,000 in 1963 to over 2.2 million in 1977. Thus the percentage of unionized workers

reached 14.8 percent of the total economically active population and 39.8 percent of all wage earners.<sup>39</sup> Other alleviating factors ("dampening mechanisms") included the relatively high rate of economic growth (see below) and the availability of "exit" possibilities. Apart from more than a million Turkish workers (over 2 million together with their dependents) who have emigrated to Western Europe and to a much lesser extent to Middle Eastern countries, mass rural-to-urban migration helps to ease distributional problems in rural areas and reduces the propensity to resort to the "voice" option, that is, corrective political action.<sup>40</sup> Also contributing to the general lack of effective collective action aimed at income redistribution in rural areas are the strong in-group feelings and the absence of class-based politics among Turkish peasants who still compose roughly half the labor force. In some of the least developed regions (e.g., the east and the southeast), where land and income inequality is greatest and redistributive action is most needed, the low level of social mobilization and the strength of patron-client relationships tend to make peasant political participation more mobilized and deferential than autonomous and instrumental. In some areas (e.g., central Turkey), relative equality of landownership together with overall poverty also works against emergence of class cleavages among peasants by producing a "corporate village" pattern. This may explain why the social democratic RPP, which has based its appeal on the promise of a more egalitarian income distribution and has greatly increased its urban strength between 1969 and 1977, has not been able to achieve nearly the same degree of success in rural areas.<sup>41</sup>

#### National Structure (Ethnic and Religious Cleavages)

The breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I made the present day Turkey an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously much more homogeneous country than its predecessor. Over 99 percent of its population profess Islam; an estimated 15 percent belong to the Alevi (Shiite) sect, the rest are Sunnis. The Alevis are concentrated in the east central region and have tended to support the RPP. The Unity party, formed in 1968 to represent the Alevis, has not fared well electorally. Its vote declined steadily from 2.8 percent in 1969, to 1.1 percent in 1973, and 0.4 percent in 1977. In the atmosphere of political polarization in the late 1970s, this sectarian cleavage led to violent clashes in several localities, the worst of which was the Kahramanmaraş incident in which about 100 people lost their lives. The only large linguistic minority is the Kurdish-speaking minority (again an estimated 10 percent to 15 percent), which is concentrated in the eastern and southeastern regions. Although a few thousand separatist guerrillas are currently active in the region, a very large majority of Kurdish speakers

seem to be well integrated into Turkish society. There is no political party that specifically represents the interests of the Kurdish-speaking population. The voting patterns in these regions are not markedly different from the rest of the country except that personalistic and clientelistic influences are much stronger there because of economic underdevelopment and feudalistic social structure. Sectarian and linguistic cleavages do not coincide and mutually reinforce each other, however, since most of the (minority) Alevis are Turkish speakers, and a large majority of Kurdish speakers are Sunnis. Furthermore, neither of them coincide with class cleavages except that the eastern regions are in general much poorer than the rest of the country.

#### State Structure and Strength

One of the principal legacies of the Ottoman Empire is the strong and centralized state authority. The political center composed of the sultan and his military and civilian bureaucrats sought to eliminate all rival centers of power. The resulting situation has been referred to as the "absence of civil society," which means the weakness or absence of corporate, autonomous, intermediary social structures. The number of voluntary associations in Turkey rose tremendously in the multiparty era from a mere 802 in 1946 to 37,806 in 1968.<sup>42</sup> Yet organizational autonomy and the level of organizational participation in such associations are still much lower than in Western European and North American democracies. The relative ease with which interim military regimes abolished parties, restricted union rights, co-opted or neutralized professional associations, and curtailed the autonomy of universities testifies to the weakness of corporate structures.

The weakness of civil society is also evident in the weakness of local governments. The vast territories of the Ottoman Empire were ruled not by local bodies, but by centrally appointed governors. The first semielected, local administrative councils came into being, as we have already seen, only in the second half of the nineteenth century. As for the cities the Ottoman state had no tradition of independent, autonomous municipalities. Nor did the republic attempt to change this centralized system. Although a law passed in 1930 enabled local communities to establish municipal governments, the whole system of local administration remained highly centralized. Local governments, especially municipalities, gained some vitality in the multiparty era. Nevertheless, their autonomous powers have been very limited, central control over their activities (called "administrative tutelage") exceedingly strict, and their financial resources totally inadequate. In this sense both provincial administrations and municipalities have had to depend very heavily on the central government.<sup>43</sup>

Historically the state has also played a dominant role in the economy. This Ottoman legacy was further reinforced under the republic when the Kemalist regime initiated a policy of economic interventionism (statism) in the 1930s. Statism meant the direct entry of the state into the fields of production and distribution. Public economic enterprises started to be created in those years and grew rapidly. Despite the greater emphasis on the private sector in recent decades, such enterprises still produce about one-half of the total industrial output. Both under the Ottoman state and the early republic, private accumulation of wealth depended, in large measure, on position in or access to the state.

This combination of factors, namely the absence of powerful, economically dominant interests able to capture the state and use it to serve their own purposes, and the weakness or absence of corporate intermediary structures, had important consequences for subsequent modernization. First, it led to what is known as the "autonomy of the state," meaning that the state apparatus is not the captive or the handmaiden of any particular social class, but possesses sufficient autonomy to make decisions that can change, eliminate, or create class relationships. This autonomous state, unhampered by established class interests and strong corporate structures, has a high capacity to accumulate and expand political power and to use it for the economic and social modernization of society. The implications for the development of democratic government are not, however, nearly as positive. As has been argued above, an autonomous, bureaucratic state is much less likely to develop democratic political institutions than a postfeudal society in which feudalism and the system of representation of estates left a legacy of autonomous groups with corporate identity and rights.

The nature and autonomy of the state in Turkey also means that the costs of being out of power are extremely high. Because of the high degree of governmental centralization and the large role of the Turkish state in the economy, "those in government have access, directly or indirectly, to an immense amount of resources in relation to the resource base of society, which they can distribute."<sup>4</sup> Conversely, a party that is out of power tends to get weakened since it does not have access to political patronage resources.

The Turkish state, strong and centralized as it is, has generally been effective in maintaining public order. When it was faced with widespread terrorism and violence as in the late 1970s, however, it had to turn to the army by declaring martial law. This may be related to the fact that police forces, being within the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, are more susceptible to political influences and, sometimes, even to infiltration by extremist groups, as was the case in the late 1970s. Especially in a politically charged atmosphere, therefore, police action is not considered as impartial and as legitimate by the public as military action.

Indeed the Turkish armed forces are broadly representative of the society as a whole. They are not dominated or controlled by any particular social group or political force. They are strongly committed to the legacy of Atatürk and to a modern, national, secular, republican state. More so than in many Latin American countries, they also have been committed to democratic principles, as attested by their voluntary and relatively rapid relinquishment of power to freely elected civilian authorities after each intervention. They display, however, certain ambivalent attitudes toward democracy, characteristic of the military in other developing nations. In the elitist tradition described above, they tend to see themselves as the true guardians of the national interest, as opposed to "partial" interests represented by political parties. They also consider themselves the protectors of national unity that, in their opinion, is often endangered by the divisive actions of political parties. These attitudes, which signify a deep distrust of parties and politicians, are clearly reflected in those provisions of the 1982 Constitution aiming to limit the power of political parties. Similarly, the constitution's numerous restrictions on trade unions and voluntary associations suggest that the military's conception of democracy is more plebiscitary than participatory. In short the military, reflecting the larger society's somewhat ambivalent values toward democracy, seem to share both a belief in its general appropriateness and desirability for Turkey, and some of the antiliberal, antidemocratic, intolerant attitudes embedded in the Turkish political culture.

### Political Structure

Some aspects of the political structure in Turkey have been positive in their implications for democracy but others have been negative. On the positive side the major political parties have been moderate and nonideological. Despite the polarization in the late 1970s, the ideological and social distance between the two major parties has not been great. Major political parties have not sponsored or condoned acts of political violence, nor have they called for military intervention. However, the JP's coalition partnership with the NAP in the late 1970s forced it to be reticent about the right-wing terror.

Extremist parties, such as the NAP and NSP, have not had a significant electoral following. However, those parties played an important role in the 1970s because of the peculiar parliamentary arithmetic that resulted from the system of proportional representation. Although there were only four significant parties in the 1977 National Assembly, the system displayed the functional properties of extreme multipartism. Instead of the centripetal drive of moderate multipartism, the basic drive of the system seemed to be in a centrifugal direction. Standards of

"fair competition" fell significantly and there was a corresponding increase in the "politics of outbidding."<sup>43</sup>

No major interest group is excluded from representation in the political system through a party or party faction. The constitution states, however, that the "constitutions and programs of political parties shall not be incompatible with the territorial and national integrity of the state, human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles of a democratic and secular Republic." To this is added a more specific provision banning parties that aim at establishing the sovereignty of a particular class or group, or a dictatorship of any sort. Thus the constitution excludes from political competition communist, fascist, religious, and separatist parties. Political parties that violate these bans shall be closed by the Constitutional Court. Trade unions are also prohibited from establishing political linkages with political parties. They cannot engage in political activities, nor can they support or receive support from political parties.

A strong and independent judiciary has developed, including a Constitutional Court with full powers to declare an act of parliament unconstitutional. The 1961 Constitution took special care to safeguard the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature and the executive. The 1982 Constitution broadly maintained the same principle with some, relatively minor, modifications. Security of tenure for judges and public prosecutors has been recognized by the 1982 Constitution in identical terms as those of its predecessor, according to which "judges and public prosecutors shall not be dismissed or retired before the age prescribed by the Constitution; nor shall they be deprived of their salaries, allowances, or other personal rights, even as a result of the abolition of a court or a post." Personnel matters for judges and public prosecutors, such as appointments, promotions, transfers, and disciplinary actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, itself composed primarily of judges nominated by the two high courts in the country and appointed by the president of the republic.

A vigorously free and independent press strongly committed to democratic principles has developed. The press has, in general, maintained its independent attitude and commitment to democracy even in times of interim military governments, although martial law entailed severe restrictions on the freedom of the press. With the transition to a civilian regime in November 1983 and the subsequent lifting of martial law, the press has strongly reasserted itself. It has shown willingness to publicize domestic and foreign criticism of human rights practices.

On the basis of the preceding observations we may conclude that, of our set of variables, that which pertains to political structures is probably the most favorable one to democratic government in Turkey.

### Political Leadership

Turkish political leaders have, in general, been committed to the democratic process, and have denounced acts of violence and disloyalty against it. They have also, in general, been reasonably effective and honest in governing. On the other hand, as our historical analysis has demonstrated, they have not, as a rule, shown a high capacity for accommodation and compromise in containing political conflict and managing political crises and strains. On the contrary their failure to do so seems directly responsible for both the 1960 and 1980 military interventions. In 1960, the deterioration of relations between the government and the opposition parties led to widespread public unrest that in turn triggered off the coup. Similarly, prior to the 1980 intervention, a coalition government based on the two major parties, or at least some broad understanding between them, would probably have satisfied the military and held off their intervention. This unwillingness to compromise seems partly a function of the political cultural characteristics and partly of the high costs of being out of power in Turkey.

### Development Performance

The rate of economic growth in Turkey has been comparatively high, if somewhat uneven. In the 1950s and the 1960s the average annual rate of real GNP growth has been about 7 percent. Turkey was hard-hit, however, by the oil shock in 1974 and the subsequent "worldwide recession, concomitant with deteriorating terms of trade and continuation of trade policies geared more toward import substitution than export encouragement, including an exchange rate regime that discouraged inflows of capital and workers' remittances." Thus the GDP growth rate fell 2.4 percent in 1978, and declined further 0.9 percent in 1979, and 0.8 percent in 1980. Moreover, the rate of inflation reached 70 percent in 1979 and above 100 percent in 1980.<sup>44</sup> With the introduction of comprehensive reform measures in January 1980, whose chief architect was Turgut Özal (then the director of the State Planning Organization), economic growth has resumed at a modest rate of about 5 percent. These new policies aimed at greater reliance upon market forces and an easing of governmental interventions in the economy. They continued to be pursued by the military regime of 1980-1983, under which Özal was made the deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs, and obviously since November 1983 when he came to power at the head of his new Motherland Party.

The relatively high rate of economic growth since the transition to competitive politics has been one of the "dampening mechanisms" that discouraged the political participation of low-income strata. It seems,

however, that the benefits of growth have been quite unevenly distributed across regions, economic sectors, and social classes. Nevertheless, it is not the case that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer; rather they both got richer, but the rich got richer at a faster rate.<sup>47</sup> The implications for the future of democracy of this economic development performance will be discussed in the next section.

#### International Factors

Turkey's close alliance with the West since the end of the World War II has generally, but only indirectly, supported democratic developments in the country. Turkey has become a member of the NATO, of the Council of Europe, and an associate member of the European Community. These relations have meant linkages between Turkish political parties, parliaments, trade unions, business and professional associations, armed forces, and their Western European and North American counterparts. Over two million Turks living in Western Europe (a very large majority in the Federal Republic of Germany) provide another, and vitally important, link between Turkey and the West.

While all these relations and linkages provide stimuli for democratic development, their effects have been far from decisive. Turks are proud and nationalistic people who do not like to be dictated to from abroad. A good example of this is that criticisms by the European Community, or the Council of Europe, or individual Western European governments of certain undemocratic practices during and after military rule usually create unfavorable reactions, even among those Turks who may be similarly critical of the same practices. The point is often made that Turkey will remain a democracy not to please its European allies, but because its people believe that this is the most appropriate form of government for their country. Nevertheless, the thought lingers no doubt in the minds of many Turkish leaders that an authoritarian Turkey, isolated and excluded from the club of European democracies, will probably experience greater difficulties in its international relations. The breakdown of authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s makes the position of a pro-Western but authoritarian European country extremely lonely and uneasy.

#### • FUTURE PROSPECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS •

##### Policies Promoting the Growth of Civil Society

In view of the positive and negative factors discussed above, what kinds of policies and political/economic developments would be most likely to support, nurture, and sustain democratic government? If one of the

most serious obstacles to democratic development in Turkey is the historical legacy of an exceedingly centralized, overpowering state and the concomitant weakness of civil society, then policies that aim at establishing a healthier balance between the state and the society will clearly be functional for democratic development. One obvious area where the state's role can, and probably should, be reduced is the economy. The market-oriented economic policies of Mr. Özal are important steps in that direction. Greater reliance on market mechanisms, greater emphasis on expanding exports instead of an inward-turned, import substitution economic strategy, realistic exchange rates, and a sharp reduction in bureaucratic controls over private economic activities are the main ingredients of the new economic policy. Bold and far-reaching as these innovations are, one should not expect a sudden and radical diminution in the state's role in the economy. The state economic enterprises, which presently produce almost half of the entire industrial output, will be there to stay in the foreseeable future. If, however, their management is somehow given sufficient autonomy and left outside the scope of direct government intervention, this will help to lower the stakes of politics and reduce the winner-take-all, zero-sum character of political competition.

Another set of policies promoting the growth of civil society would be the strengthening of local governments. One recent positive development in this regard has been the substantial increase in their revenues after 1980 through the allocation of a greater share of public funds. If local governments are seen with less suspicion by the central government and given greater powers and responsibilities, they will no doubt play an important role in socializing people into democratic values. Such a development will also mean a more effective power sharing between the central and local bodies and, consequently, an effective check on the power of the central government. Finally, it will lower the stakes of political competition, since an opposition party that controls important municipalities will be able to render some patronage services to its constituents and thus maintain a certain level of political influence.

A third group of policies with the same overall effect would be those that would promote the growth of voluntary associations. As we have pointed out above, the number of voluntary associations increased very rapidly during the years of multiparty politics. The impact of this development on democratic government has not been entirely functional, however, since many associations displayed a propensity for overpoliticization. Instead of articulating the common interests of their members, many of them came to be dominated by small, politically motivated cliques, and became instruments of polarized political struggle. It was not a rare occurrence in the 1970s to see the members of the same professional group (including even the police forces) divided between

extreme right and left-wing "professional" associations. Some of the restrictive provisions of the 1982 Constitution on voluntary associations, which may well seem excessive from a liberal democratic point of view, are understandable on the basis of this past experience. One may conclude, therefore, that the constitution aimed at a certain "depoliticization" of the society in general and associational activities in particular. Whether this aim can be accomplished without impeding democratic development remains to be seen. On the one hand, a vigorous life of voluntary associations and professional organizations is a prerequisite for democratic development. On the other, the overpoliticization of such associations has been a polarizing factor in recent Turkish politics. The optimum combination for democratic development would be some middle course between the two.

#### **Policies Promoting Governmental Stability and Efficiency**

It has been pointed out that the crisis of democracy in the late 1970s was due, at least in some measure, to the fragmentation of the party system and to the resulting fact that parliamentary balance was held by small antisystem parties. To this was added the incapacity of the political system to initiate new policies to meet new challenges, because of the narrow and heterogeneous governmental majorities in parliament. Two sets of institutional measures taken by the military regime of 1980-1983 may prove to be helpful in preventing the recurrence of a similar situation. One is the change in the electoral system. The adoption of a 10 percent national threshold for representation in the Grand National Assembly, together with various other features of the electoral system that favor major parties, make it extremely difficult for more than three significant parties to be represented in parliament. Given the tendency of the Turkish party system to coalesce around two major and non-ideological parties, this change is likely to remove one major polarizing factor.

The 1982 Constitution has also taken certain measures to increase governmental stability by strengthening the Council of Ministers vis-à-vis the Assembly. For example, while the vote of confidence taken following the formation of a new Council of Ministers does not require more than an ordinary majority, a vote of censure requires an absolute majority of the full membership of the Assembly. Furthermore, in a vote of confidence only negative (meaning no confidence) votes are counted (articles 99 and 111).

A much more consequential novelty of the constitution designed to increase governmental stability concerns the scope of the power of dissolution. The 1961 Constitution permitted the executive branch to

call new elections for the National Assembly only under very exceptional circumstances. This limited right of dissolution did not offer any help in cases of protracted government crisis when no majority coalition could be formed. The 1982 Constitution empowers the president to call new elections when a government cannot be formed within forty-five days either at the beginning of a new legislative assembly or after the resignation of a government. The constitution has also adopted a new procedure in the selection of the president of the republic to prevent the kind of deadlock witnessed in 1980.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, the broadening under the 1982 Constitution of the law-making powers of the executive is designed to increase the efficiency of government. This power was given to the Council of Ministers for the first time by the 1971 amendment of the constitution, under which the Council of Ministers could issue ordinances or decrees that could amend existing laws. The 1982 Constitution further expanded the power to issue such ordinances. The enabling act of Parliament defines the purpose, scope, and principles of ordinances and prescribes the period during which they can be issued. In contrast to the 1961 Constitution, the enabling act does not have to specify which provisions of the existing legislation can be amended or repealed by ordinance. The 1982 Constitution also empowers the executive to issue a special kind of law-amending ordinances during periods of martial law or state of emergency. They differ from ordinary ordinances in that they do not require a prior enabling act and, even more important, they are outside the scope of review by the Constitutional Court. Both ordinary and emergency ordinances are subject, however, to review by the assembly.

#### **Policies Promoting Economic Growth and Equity**

It has already been mentioned that the relatively high rate of economic growth in the 1950s and the 1960s has been one of the positive factors supporting democratic development. However, the dominant economic development strategy of the era presents a close resemblance to the one pursued by some relatively developed Latin American countries, notably Brazil and Argentina, during the populist semiauthoritarian regimes of Vargas and Peron, with the same negative implications for democracy. In both cases, economic development strategies were based more on import substitution (of essentially consumer goods) than on export encouragement. One reason given for the emergence of military-bureaucratic-technocratic regimes in these countries in the 1960s and the 1970s is the economic difficulties and bottlenecks associated with this kind of development strategy (industrial dependence on imported inputs and government protection; inability to export, leading to foreign exchange shortages, and then to unemployment and economic stagnation).

As the economic pie got smaller, political conflict became more virulent, the populist coalition broke down, and the middle classes came to see the demands of the popular sector as excessive. The resultant military-technocratic regimes tended to restrict political participation by suppressing or deactivating the urban popular sector, and to follow growth policies that increased socioeconomic inequality.<sup>49</sup>

Thus similarities between the Turkish case on the one hand, and the Argentine and the Brazilian ones on the other are unmistakable, with the exception that the military regime was of much shorter duration in Turkey. The most appropriate policy to avoid a repetition of this vicious circle seems to be an economic growth strategy encouraging exports and export-oriented, internationally competitive industries, combined with an effort to increase equity. While Mr. Özal's economic policies have been highly successful on the first front, they have not been marked by a strong concern for equity. Thus the concluding remarks of an earlier study on the political economy of income distribution, still seems valid:

With the equity tensions rising, it is abundantly clear that any optimistic scenario for distributional politics in the near and medium terms must be premised on a speedy, confident resumption of economic growth. Only with an expanding pie can the reslicing due to be demanded be reasonably peaceful and satisfying. An optimistic scenario, then, would posit such growth resumption . . . . But then it would also posit a leadership that would add to growth policies far more vigorous and sweeping redistributive reforms than have been yet accomplished. Failing this, the outlook appears to us bleak—along either of the two courses we see events branching. Either the forces favoring redistribution will strengthen their hold on political power and, lacking growth, will force a more equitable sharing of poverty. Or, alternatively, a more authoritarian regime [probably of a military variety] will intervene to repress both redistributive and participatory demands. The first of these less attractive cases, absent growth, would be very likely to induce a switch to the second. And whether the resort to it were immediate or delayed, it would thwart, for an uncertainly long time, Turkey's reach toward a more just and democratic system. Our profound hope is that both can be avoided—by a timely and bold adoption of the growth-with-equity alternative.<sup>50</sup>

## Conclusion

As stated above, Turkey is one of the few countries that are more democratic politically than they ought to have been according to the level of their socioeconomic development.<sup>51</sup> This should be explained mainly by the strong elite commitment to democracy and the relatively favorable political structural factors, the elite commitment was the major factor in the crucial transition from authoritarian rule in 1946–1950 period. It was also instrumental in keeping the three military interventions either partial or of relatively short duration. Indeed, interruptions in the democratic process were more in the nature of reequi-

libations of democracy than full-blown authoritarian interludes.<sup>52</sup> Thus normalization proceeded more rapidly after the elections of November 1983 than most observers expected at the time. All four parties banned by the military regime have now been revived under new names, with the difference that the two old major parties have two competing heirs each (the Motherland and the True Path parties for the JP; the Social Democratic Populist and the Democratic Left parties for the RPP). The new electoral system with its high national threshold, however, is likely to force similar parties into merger in the long run. Given the fact that the pre-1980 polarization was the work mainly of small extremist parties and groups, their elimination from representation in Parliament may well turn out to be a stabilizing factor. The constitutional ban on the political activities of trade unions and on their establishing linkages with political parties, on the other hand, is not viewed as desirable or legitimate by the social democratic parties. It is to be expected that the most likely course of events in the next few years would be the consolidation of democracy, with the expansion of civil and union rights by means of relatively minor changes in the constitution.

## • NOTES •

1. A comprehensive continuing study sponsored by the Center of International Studies of Princeton University attempts to analyze the legacy of the Ottoman Empire upon its successor states.
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3. Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 44. The following analysis borrows extensively from my *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 25–29.
4. Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma (The Development of Secularism in Turkey)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1973), pp. 27–28.
5. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. 1, part 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 52.
6. Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (June 1969): passim; Clement Henry Moore, "Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser's Egypt," *Comparative Politics* 6 (January 1974): pp. 204–208.
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45. Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 139-140; Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 2 (April 1981): p. 233.
46. Turkey: *The Problems of Transition* (Bath: A Euromoney Special Study, 1982), pp. 49-50; Zvi Yehuda Herslag, "Economic Policies," in Klaus-Detlev Grothuesen, ed., *Türkei* (Göttingen, 1985: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht), pp. 346-369.
47. Özbudun and Ulusan, *The Political Economy*, passim.
48. As under the 1961 Constitution, if no presidential candidate obtains a two-thirds majority of the full membership of the Grand National Assembly on the first two ballots, an absolute majority of the full membership will suffice on the third ballot. But under the new procedure, a fourth ballot, if necessary, will be held only between the two leading candidates, and if the fourth ballot does not produce an absolute majority, the Assembly will dissolve automatically and new general elections will be held immediately (article 102).
49. Especially Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973); Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 23-24.
50. Özbudun and Ulusan, "Overview," p. 20.
51. See, for example, Tatu Vanhanen, "The State and Prospects of Democracy in the 1980's," (Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Paris, 15-20 July 1985). Vanhanen hypothesizes that "the fundamental factor affecting the nature of political systems is the relative distribution of economic, intellectual and other crucial power resources among various sectors of the population." He measures such distribution by a composite index called "Index of Power Resources" (IPR) and finds a strong correlation between the IPR score and political democracy. Turkey's calculated IPR score is 7.8, considerably lower than those for some South European and Latin American democracies: Greece (20.2), Spain (15.0), Argentina (15.7), Uruguay (17.0), Venezuela (11.0), etc. It should also be pointed out that the IPR score itself seems to be strongly correlated with the more conventional indicators of socioeconomic development.
52. See especially, Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 87-97.

11. Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation in Turkey," in Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (İstanbul: Bogaziçi University Publications, 1975), p. 139. See also, Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102, no. 1 (Winter 1973): pp. 169-190; Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire, with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 1 (1980): pp. 81-104.
12. Akarlı, "The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon," p. 143.
13. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (July 1972): pp. 263, 268-270.
14. Feriç Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 143-144.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.
16. Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation*, pp. 38-41.
17. Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 326.
18. For details, see my "Turkey," in Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds., *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987), pp. 328-368.
19. İtler Turan, "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic," (Paper presented to the Third International Congress on the Economic and Social History of Turkey, Princeton University, 24-26 August 1983), pp. 6-11.
20. Nur Yalman argues, for example, that the dispute between rationalism and tradition "happens to be especially bitter in Turkey. It is rare to see such virulent opposition to a country's own traditions and history." "Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey," *Archive européenne de sociologie* 10 (1969): p. 45.
21. Juan J. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of Consolidation of Political Democracy," (Paper presented to the IPSA Round Table, Tokyo, 29 March to 1 April 1982), pp. 23-41.
22. For details see my "Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy in Turkey, 1945-1950," (Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Paris, 15-20 July 1985).
23. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, pp. 196-197.
24. Turan, "Stages of Political Development," p. 17.
25. Ergun Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper in International Affairs, 1966), pp. 30-39.
26. Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation*, passim; Özbudun, "Voting Behaviour: Turkey," in Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Özbudun, and Frank Tachau, eds., *Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters, and Elites* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 107-143.
27. Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture," pp. 258-281.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 270-281.
29. Turan, "Stages of Political Development," p. 29.
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33. Harry H. Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy*, (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Monograph no. 10, 1961).
34. Kemal H. Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 205-211.
35. Üstün Ergüder, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Behavior in Turkey," (Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Moscow, 12-18 August 1979), pp. 13-15.
36. Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 13.
37. Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change," *World Politics* 20 (1968): pp. 494-520; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 120-132; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), ch. 3.