These are not the Drones you are seeking.

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DEDICATION

 I dedicate this thesis to my parents especially to my mom. Without the support of my dad, who pushes me to my limit and always tells to reach for the stars. For my mom who I know is looking down from heaven.

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

These are not the drones you are seeking

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Each day there are applications built for improvement in the areas of law enforcement, research and development, and in other areas of Homeland Security. From the different types of fighting mechanisms that the world has developed over the years such as the crossbow, rifles, fighter jets, atomic bombs, there have been many advances in technology that has helped the military. The one piece of technology that has developed that has contributed to the military is the usage of drones. Drones, to the military, are known as unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs or can also be considered remotely piloted aerial systems or for short RPAS. The use of drones has risen exponentially since the year 2001. This thesis therefore seeks to explore how drones have altered the manner in which the US prosecutes its targets. This is essential as misusing drones, despite their contributions, risks limiting their utilization in severe scenarios hence leaving their mission up to ground forces or manned aircraft. Case studies of drones used in Afghanistan, Mali, Yemen and Pakistan were used to evaluate the three hypotheses on the effect of the seeming reliance and proliferation of the US on drones.

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Chapter One

Introduction

There has been an exponential rise in growth in the use of drones, commonly referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles since the year 2001. This thesis therefore aims to analyze how UAVs have altered the manner in which the US prosecutes its targets. Alternatively, this thesis postulates that the benefits of drone technology leads to its frequent use but can also lead to its misuse. P.W. Singer, for instance, argues that the reduced risk to people and the simplicity with which a target may be engaged, alters the calculus in coming up with a decision on where and when to conduct a war-like act. Consequently, the utilization of drones should be conducted according to the transparent policy manning its utilization. Yet again, the utilization of force applied from unmanned aerial vehicles should comply with the overall strategies of the US. This is critical to analyze as misusing drones, despite the benefits drawn from them, risks limiting their utilization in scenarios severe to manned aircraft and ground forces in aftermath engagements.

**Statement of problem**

Leveraging all strategies of national power to provide protection to the security of the US is a mainstay of the previous two presidential administrations. Unmanned aerial vehicles have forwarded an aggressive strategy to focus on under-governed and austere nations without the putting the lives of human pilots at risk, and without utilizing combat forces in other regions. This thesis’ chapter analyzes how unmanned aircraft vehicles have altered the manner in which the US prosecutes its targets as such:

1. Is it the unmanned aerial vehicles that are a challenge, or it is its implementation that are a challenge.
2. Can unmanned aerial vehicles be utilized in regions such as North Africa, in the lieu of manned aircraft
3. Are unmanned aerial vehicles better suited for counterterrorism (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

The three topics above were selected to comply with one another in the following way. The evidence argue that the unmanned aerial vehicles are a progression naturally, of a technologically superior military, and the party responsible for any wrongdoing is from the person’s operation the drones; hence, a transparent policy should man its utilization to make sure that unmanned aerial vehicles’ reputation is not entirely negative. In short, if unmanned aerial vehicles are utilized according to the transparent policy manning their utilization, and UAVs are being misused then it is human decisions that are at fault for misuse of the technology. . As there is proliferation of drone technology and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles get increasingly relied upon, analyzing the utilization in lieu of ground forces in regions such as North Africa is an effective next step. Summing up that unmanned aerial vehicles will not entirely replace the essence of engagement of the people on the ground, evaluating the role of unmanned aerial vehicles in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations is a logical next step for the last chapter. The final chapter reiterates previous arguments that a concise mission must be evaluated in order to make sure that the drones are effectively utilized by the military. A concise and clear mission, accompanied by a transparent policy manning the use of drones, gives appropriate and effective guidelines for the utilization of force in achieving the strategic goals of the US, and also preserving the UAVs’ reputation as an invaluable asset rather than a liability that fuels an insurgency or raising the ranks of terrorist organizations.

 Chapter Two

 It Takes More Than a Joystick

Introduction

Within the last decade, the battlefield landscape has significantly been altered. Transformations can be viewed all the way to the method and frequency of communication with families, friends and relatives back home, from military uniforms across the services. Perhaps, the major dramatic alterations can be viewed with the weapons being used. Drones symbolize the technological advancements on the battlefield to offer support to ground forces and also the lurking presence of America for the people on the run. As the US continues to retrograde operations in the nation of Afghanistan, majority of the American citizens anticipate for the safe return of the forces of America; the essence of drones in the battlefield should also be supported. This is essential as the unmanned aerial vehicles will possibly play a critical role in the aftermath of military operations- in humanitarian assistance and on the battlefield. Leaving the nation of Afghanistan with the unmanned aerial vehicles burdened with a connotation that is negative, may give rise to problems in their utilization in aftermath engagements.

This chapter explores whether the problem is with the drones or the drones’ implementation. UAVs have undoubtedly altered the manner in which the US prosecutes its targets. They give the decision makers unprecedented range of alternatives, from giving actual-time footage of a goal, to giving hours upon hours of near air support for the ground troops, and probably the most controversially, to attack focus in sovereign states- all while removing the risk to a human pilot. Drones critics make some compelling claims, but further research is required to give the difference between key analytic and conjecture judgments with basis on evidence. The claims against their utilization range to facilitating an insurgency from being less than honorable.

The claim ought to have the ability of defining a policy guiding the utilization of the unmanned aerial vehicles- not that the UAVs make it too simple to violate the basic human rights or conduct war acts. Drones may be the lynch pin to a successful key humanitarian mission or to a , dangerous mission involvingor biological or chemical warfare. Therefore, it is critical to make sure that the perception of the technology’s use remains positive and free of any negative connotations. This chapter therefore makes attempts in countering the negative claims against the unmanned aerial vehicles and if there is truth in the theory, it anticipates offering support to their evolution as a necessity in implementing a technologically superior military.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. To begin with, the literature review evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of drones as presented in the present literature and starts to explore the causal relationship of the utilization of the unmanned aerial vehicles and its extent of support for utilization. As a continuation, to highlight the previous implication and successes of drone activity, a case study shows the nuances of their utilization- their application in Yemen. On top of this, the case study also contains empirical evidence that gives support to the argument that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in a progression, (natural), in the military technology development and hence should replace it as a legitimate tool in the military capabilities’ arsenal. Third, the section of analysis presents a thorough review of the crucial comments and reflects on the unmanned aerial vehicles progression, (natural), within the battlefield. Yet again, this chapter lastly concludes by summarizing the questions and points made to guide further research on the area.

Literature Review

As a general point, drones are multi-purpose, multi-mission, unaffected by fatigue or any other, in that matter, limiting factors. There uses have been felt since the mid to 20th century. However, their use has proliferated significantly since the year 2001. While they provide a lot of benefits and possess a lot of capabilities, they also can be overused and mismanaged. This protection layer has the possibility of manifesting itself in selecting to utilize an unmanned aerial vehicle as the risk to a pilot is eliminated. As stated in the present literature, the simple truth of decreasing the risk to a person’s life may not be worth the liberties taken by the United States when utilizing the drones to focus on a suspect. Yet again, there is a lot of support for the use of drones in dangerous and austere settings where targets are more difficult to locate.

***For the drone or against the drone***

 The application of armed unmanned aerial vehicles utilization is what really seems to facilitate the distaste for UAVs. The focused killings are even known as assassinations or extrajudicial. United Nations’ Philip Alston (date) questioned the use of unmanned aerial vehicles strikes and challenged the United States’ drone program legality after a scenario where 23 civilians were killed by an accidental attack. Medea Benjamin and Andrew Exum (date) go as far as insinuating that the Unmanned aerial vehicle are immoral, and raise concerns on the nature of the drones. However, this language does not compare to the strength of manned fixed-wing aircraft which are utilized in dropping 2, 3, or even 4 times the size of the precision guided AGM-114 Hellfire missiles utilized by the Reaper and the Predator. Further facilitating this is the focusing of suspected terrorists not within the customary battlefield in sovereign nations, for instance Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. The government of the United States however maintains that they are only used in a case where they are endorsed by the host government. A central theme of the concern against the unmanned aerial vehicles is revealed by the leap of Rand Paul (date) to assert the proliferation of the unmanned aerial vehicle use will not be aware of any boundaries and hence target the citizens of Americans on the soil of the US. The concern for the majority is that the unmanned aerial vehicles, as a result of their simplicity to use, are frequently used abroad hence resulting into too many civilian casualties. Essentially, the argument is that too many innocent lives have been claimed by the unmanned aerial vehicles as a result of the frequent use, which in a battle of insurgents, facilitates more toward insurgency. The number of UAVs strikes increase when there is an increase in the number of insurgents.

 Arguing that unmanned aerial vehicles are a less than honorable manner to conduct wars or questioning their morality is an intriguing position. The catalyst that results in many uncommitted to join an insurgency is collateral damage. In the development of a counterinsurgency strategy, any weapon system misused will result in debilitating impacts. Whether or not there is honorability in the utilization of the weapon system, is a claim not taken by the majority? Other people protest against the collateral damage and wars that are caused by unmanned aerial vehicles.

 To further complicate the utilization of drones, some people have come up with an argument that the decreased risk to the people has altered the calculus in making a decision of when to strike a target. This implies that just because some of the nations can be targeted does not imply that the act has been justified. Other opponents also argue about the legalities of focusing targets outside the battlefield.

***Technological advancements***

 Unmanned aerial vehicles provide a strategy to surgically get into a sovereign nation and initiate attacks on Al Qaeda looking for refuge, without sending in an armed ground force, a far more overt use of military force. As the arguments rise against the use of unmanned aerial vehicles citing the impacts in AUMF expansion, that is Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), it is crucial to reflect that that the advancements in technology have secured the position of the United States as a global superpower. Even though the majority have not had the ability of projecting their degree of their impacts, unmanned aerial vehicles have been a big part of aftermath plans for centuries.

 These kinds of advancements in technology in military vehicles and weapons systems can be seen throughout history. It is worth noting that the incorrect use of these unmanned aerial vehicles can potentially result in a liability. As the US continues to grow its military vehicles and weapons systems to fight an increasingly complicated enemy to conduct war with conventional forces, unconventional methods ought to be leveraged for the security of victory. Therefore, unmanned aerial vehicles, if utilized correctly, have the capacity of providing this capability.



***Drone policies and War-Like Acts***

 The current literature has strong claims that the existing drone policy, or lack thereof, may not continue on its present course. A change in policy must take place to both guide the aftermath focus, (target), to the next focus, (target) with no end in sight, and every of them with a diminishing return.

 Arguments have been presented exploring the causal relationship of conducting war-like attacks, or even going to war, just because the unmanned aerial vehicles make it simple. Unmanned aerial vehicles are a progression, naturally, of the military and the latter’s guiding policies should be able to provide the required constraints of its implementation. For while the existing successes of the unmanned aerial vehicles on the battle field in gaining victory over an enemy and degrade g their freedom of movement is on high regards, they have also been subjected to criticism as a result of their collateral damage. Much more evidence is required to fully comprehend the correlation between the utilization of the unmanned aerial vehicles and its application on insurgency; both on the ability for an insurgency to recruit and on degrading the network of an insurgent.

**Theoretical framework**

 The theoretical framework in this thesis draws its basis on the “Just War Theory”. This theory gives an analysis of how battles are made legitimate and the kinds of arguments that are utilized in justifying the utilization of lethal force. This theory, that is the Just War Theory, is not a theory that is attached to a few or one theorist. It is however a theoretical patchwork and has encountered evolution during the course of history.

 The legitimizing of battles has been on debate ever since the customary Greeks Aristotle and Plato philosophized about principles that guide the use of force. . Some period later, Thomas Aquinas came up with guidelines for what would comprise rightful intentions and purposes for the use of force Hugo Grotius (date) , the founder of International Law, wrote in his book, *On the law of war and peace*, (De Jure Belli ac), what rules and norms serve as guidelines on warfare and that non-combatants and civilians should be offered protection from assaults. The objectives for military utilization have altered during the course of history and are now lots of times under justification through the “humanitarian interventions” label.

 The principles and objectives that decide under which circumstances it is legally acceptable to utilize armed force and by which manner are known as *jus in Bello* and *jus ad bellum.* “Right to wage war”, is the meaning of Jus ad bellum and stipulates that the aggressor should have the proper and right cause and intention. A military intervention should have the ability of restoring order and peace in the universal system; it can’t be motivated by vengeance. The decision to go to a battle must draw its basis on a legitimate authority, either by a sovereign state or by the Security Council. There should also be a reasonable possibility of succeeding with the battle and before that, all likely peaceful options, such as embargos and diplomacy must be exhausted prior to the use of international violence. Yet again, the necessity for humanity and military necessity are guiding principles in the laws of battles is not included in this thesis.

***Research Design: Case Study***

 The use of unmanned aerial vehicles in targeting Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen is the specific case study which provides context to this argument. This case is a representative of its own set of complexities and issues that highlight technology’s reliance to prosecute targets as a result of the simplicity with which these drones provide. A sovereign nation not within the customary battlefield of Afghanistan and Iraq, Yemen was selected as a result of its unique features-it has been host to the targeting of an American citizen as well as the target of numerous drone strikes. These two features make it an appropriate case study. . A lot of opponents to the utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles reference instances of extrajudicial killings and that unmanned aerial vehicles make it simple to kill American targets. It is therefore here, where the unmanned aerial vehicles began receiving much of their notoriety.

 In pursuit of the people held responsible for the attacks against the US in the year 2001, AUMF was provided by congress in the next days. Within this auspices, the president has the privilege to “utilize all the appropriate and necessary force”, against any person giving the function in the safe haven, acts, or any extent of support to al-Qaeda. With no limitations to distance and time, the US seeks justice for the people who take part in the US attack. From the year 2001 till now, when I am writing this paper, Yemen was targeted with approximately 104 airstrikes. Two distinct arguments have been inspired by these attacks as a result of targeting an American citizen. The first issue involves targeting an American citizen in a sovereign state with which the United States is not at war and not engaged as in a traditional battlefield. - . While I do not get into the details of targeting an American in this thesis, it would be negligent not to address its essence as it relates to the utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles. The second issue involves whether the targeted individual’s constitutional rights were violated by the use of drones.

***Evolution of drone technology***

Controversy side, unmanned aerial vehicles have altered the battlefield landscape. The long period of unmanned aerial vehicles taking part in surveillance operations prevents the complication of the former state-of-the-art aircraft for instance the U-2. An attack mode coupled with this capability makes the unmanned aerial vehicles an all-in-one aircraft that is prepared for any situation that comes on its way. These advancements in technology are very common to the military of the United States.

 As a matter of fact, the military of the United States is always searching for innovative strategies to provide security to its global dominance. As “consumer unmanned aerial vehicles” continue evolving, they are molding in accordance to our requirements. Just like smart phones, the unmanned aerial systems are becoming faster, lighter, foldable and also compact as well. As the advancements are occurring at a very fast pace, citizens have gladly welcomed the drone technology to do recordings of their adventures. Application of unmanned aerial vehicles as well as the other drones will diversify with the capability of doing more.



 To begin with, drone technology is morphing into refined and exotic functions and shapes. On viewing the majority of the consumer unmanned aerial vehicles, one will ordinarily think that got to be quad copters. There more flexible and safe design makes one think in this manner. Large technological firms such as Intel have a preference for staying in the zones that are safe, radical alterations in the design implies that either lots of investments or lots of risks. This is the exact reason for the domination of the quad copters in the drone market.

 Thanks to their innovative mindset, other startups have the will of going beyond that and Parrot unmanned aerial vehicles are a good instance. This Parrot is a winged unmanned aerial vehicle with just one propeller on its back in order to rocket it forward. This therefore makes it speedier, coming next after Teal. As unmanned aerial vehicles are morphing, they are getting new label and becoming more exotic. Unmanned Aerial Rescue Vehicle, that is ARV, is essentially unmanned helicopters that have adequate power to lift the weight of a human being in rescue missions.

 Unmanned aerial vehicles are yet again getting more intelligent. It is not everything that is remote controlled. However, I am filled with amazement when I realize that has achieved an accomplishment of well-furnished Al software that makes it possible for them to take part in feats such as auto-piloting and self-balancing. They can use a camera to track the moving targets accurately, while at the same period of time avoiding collisions. Even more amazing, you can throw an unmanned aerial vehicle in the air and program it to record everything from above and it does exactly this.

 It therefore makes sense why the unmanned aerial vehicles have a more appropriate and efficient anti-collision and tracking logics has been in the creation for quite a long period of time. The air is free with a few obstacles and their AI can make smarter decisions using limited chip (brain) powers and sensors. On the other hand, however, roads are quite tricky as they are populated with people and other animals, whose risky performance cannot be understood by AIs.

 The current unmanned aerial vehicles may be equipped with state-of-the-art observation weapons and devices. For instance, the larger MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-IB Predator, both consist of highly accurate weapons, communications equipment and number of sensors on their own. Whereas the vision of LTC Madden was to give reconnaissance support to the observation (RAH-66) and primary attack (AH-64), the current unmanned aerial vehicles are long endurance, medium-altitude, multi-mission remote piloted aircraft. While every of them is singly uniquely qualified to take part in irregular warfare operations while supporting Combatant Commander Goals, the Predator is “primarily sophisticated as an “intelligence collection asset” and while the Reaper is “primarily sophisticated for “dynamic execution targets”. Every of these unmanned aerial vehicles can operate the AGM -114 Hellfire II missile. Yet again, GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions and GBU-12 can be delivered by the Reaper.

***Requirement for Multi-Mission Aircraft***

 The vision of LTC Madden on unmanned aerial vehicles offering support to “aviation strike force” resulted into a series of guidelines in documents and journals such as the 1997 Annual Report on the Army after Next Project, the 1997 National Defense Panel Report, the Army Vision 2010 and also the Joint Vision 2010. All together, these guiding documents request for a, “long-range precision capability… that are equipped to take part in full spectrum operations… while decreasing our logistics footprint sharply. As these were the guiding objectives and principles for the pursuit of LTC Madden in incorporating the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the fold of attack aviation, these similar needs can also be considered and said for the present unmanned aerial vehicles.

 As it is claimed, the principal reason for the interest in unmanned aerial vehicles was the need to decrease the risk to the population of people in combat. Yet again, not all the unmanned aerial vehicles are suited for taking part in targets with attack munitions in combat. Other times, the target may be a damaged nuclear power facility that radiates dangerous wildfire or nuclear energy that sweeps across the forest floor. In the year 2001, after the tsunami that had been induced by an earthquake, destroyed the Fukushima power facility, reconnaissance support, surveillance and real-time intelligence was provided by RQ-4 Global Hawk. Global Hawk’s mission is to “present a wide spectrum of reconnaissance support, surveillance and real-time intelligence collection capability to offer support to joint combatant forces in global and universal wartime, contingency and peacetime operations. Broad is an understatement with weekly, daily and annual; or rather every day; endurance of altitudes that are high and equipped with capabilities of powerful collections, weather has a low possibility of impacting its mission. With not many factors affecting its mission capabilities, this unmanned aerial vehicle is an invaluable asset to all kinds of missions all over the universe.

***Support to Ground Forces***

 It has been argued that lacking a person in the aircraft is a shortcoming of unmanned aerial vehicle as a result of not having situational awareness. However, contrasting with this, some have also argued that these unmanned aerial vehicles have provided force-multiplying situational awareness, albeit incomplete. With the ability of providing real-time full motion video on regions around goals, special operations are able to use the unmanned aerial vehicles to take part in missions with fewer commandos on the ground. Unmanned aerial vehicles replaced the valuable soldiers who conducted security operation in missions, when the latter, that is the valuable soldiers, could still be conducting a kill mission or simultaneous capture on yet another target.

 Other than having an impact on the manner with which the US forces conduct their operations, adversaries are now capable of altering their tactic also. Before, the unmanned aerial vehicles were a terrifying presence that angered and unnerved guards. The severe hazards faced by adversaries by being aware that they could be taken out by an unmanned aerial vehicle anytime, without even being aware, was a causal of intense pressure, and they therefore had to alter their methods consequently. It had an impact on the population they travelled in and also the places where they slept. The fact that the unmanned aerial vehicles, (drone) technology enables the commandos of America to take part in decentralized operations in deconstructing networks of their enemies simultaneously, and forces the foes fighters out of their individual terrain comfort, implies that the unmanned aerial vehicles are having an effect- and possibly intended effect from a superior military that is technologically advanced.

**Analysis**

 The United States government has been tagging its focus on pursuing its foes at all cost. While the government singularly stages its focus on influencing just one outcome, the unexpected and unintended consequences become much more complicated to contend with in comparison to the original challenge. If the United States continues to myopically give address to single issues, in this scenario, utilizing the unmanned aerial vehicles in targeting Al Qaeda who seek refuge in sovereign nations, soon, secondary issues host on the periphery will come into focus. With this scenario, it seems to manifest its individual self into a disdainful position of drones. It is as if the unmanned aerial vehicles are attacking targets and arming themselves, without following any instruction from the human population. As the US stages its focus on gaining victory over those hosting al-Qaeda in any costs, it must be concise, clear and precise of the consequences while assigning culpability carefully. Nevertheless, unmanned aerial vehicles are having a severe effect on the manner with which wars and battles have been conducted over the past ten years.

 There is need to create a policy over the utilization of the unmanned aerial vehicles, but does not offer support to the illusion that the use of these unmanned aerial vehicles is immoral. The conundrum is this idea is that the unmanned aerial vehicles are utilized to eliminate terrorists in austere and remote environments, or in a seeking where the foe is seeking hostage in a sovereign country such as Pakistan and Yemen. Drone strikes, just like any other use of force, can possibly lead to the killing of innocent ordinary people, and have even done so previously. Hence, unmanned aerial vehicles make persons to take up arms that may have otherwise not joined the fight. In theory, these advanced recruits would rank lower in the hierarchy. Unmanned aerial vehicles are gaining lots of success killing adversaries that low-degree operatives are on the list to be targeted for instance where the senior leadership is already murdered. In importance, unmanned aerial drones have the likelihood to maintain keeping back adversaries at the lowest degree, preventing an influential and strong hierarchy from rising.

Military usage of drones has so many advantages that it can bring to the plate. I am however careful not to acknowledge too many advantages of drones. There are four claims that drones can be effective. The first one is the preciseness of locating and killing terrorists with minimal civilian causalities. Because of the low cost of drones and low causality it makes it a better choice. It is argued that drone strikes are not only effective but morally required, because it produces the least civilian deaths.

The second advantage of the use of drone is the successful vanquish of high value targets. The third reason is that drones put pressure on terrorist’s organizations that it deteriorates their organizational capacity and its ability to strike. Once the head of organization is taken out chaos will occur. The fourth and most important reason that drone usage is effective is the cost effectiveness. The cost of deploying ground troops in the area of choice rather than sending a drone is far less.

However, as al-Qaeda refine and deploy their utilization of roadside bombs, otherwise known as improvised explosive devices, claiming lots of lives, both innocent bystanders and intended targets, taking to the air drones decreases the risk to the pilot and the utilization of the ground forces in achieving the same objectives. Service members face a lot of risk when they get onto a vehicle to travel to the location of a target. Improvised explosive devices litter the road networks in Pakistan and Afghanistan hence creating danger to the path of the objective, for Pakistani and coalition forces, rather than the objective itself. While the functions of the unmanned aerial vehicles within the aviation arsenal predate the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq, these battles accelerated their utilization certainly. Their increased utilization possibly grew out of the necessity to look for other viable options to target the al-Qaeda searching for refuge in severe and austere surroundings, but also as a manner of decreasing the population of service members on the roads. Accelerated utilization only starts to define the exponential dependence on drones. Without doubt, drones occupy a significant in the manner with which the US prosecutes its targets.

 Chapter Three

 Droning in Africa

Introduction

In March, the year 2012, al-Qaeda overthrew the Northern Mali government forces and took control of a section of the nation. The al-Qaeda terrorists decided to take advantage of the disorganization caused by a military coup d’état against the government and took control of the northern part of Mali. Due to this, the United States decided on how to give support to the African military forces to win against the al-Qaeda, while not committing fully to the forces on the ground which was from a previously overtaxed military force. Drones provided the capability to attack the terrorist operatives and not causing ground forces of large scale value. This was because, however, as assert by Conway Waddington and David Sanger, is not to cause an overuse of UAVs due to tactical convenience.

As the military from United States continues to fight against the al-Qaeda, North Africa will be increasingly of importance for the national security of America, and it will also test the tactical and strategic effect of the aerial vehicles that were unmanned.

This chapter explores whether places like North Africa in respect to ground forces can use drones. Since drones make the work of fighting against terrorist operatives easy, drones therefore may enable leaders take an option of trying them. From experiences, it shows that the usage of unmanned aerial cars in regions, for instance the northern part of Africa will grow due to the growing interest in their usage, but according to evidences, armed UAVs are not likely to take the place of ground forces. This is because, according to the evidences, ground forces are better placed for strategic reasons but drones give tactical advantages. So as to set this chapter, next is a short outline about “the interesting North Africa” and AFRICOM’s explanation.

***Interest in North Africa***

A year after the military coup d’état which took over the government of Mali, together with the siege of the northern part of the country by the terrorists, France started acquiring power and gained interest on that part. Realizing the “direct security threat”, the government of France sent grass root forces during the early days of January, the year 2013, to fight against the terrorists in the northern region. United States got its interest from the concern that the al-Qaeda together with its members will “carry out training, expand recruitment and advance transnational terrorist plots” in their captured region of the northern part of Mali. This made the United States to offer to extend its aid to attack through intelligence, through the use of unmanned aerial cars together with logistical aid. Using drones gives the United States a chance to give support to a ground war in fighting against the al-Qaeda military group without putting the lives of her troop at risk in the ground-only if its target is of high value.

When discussing on the knowledge ability of the use of drones by the United States in countries like North Africa, questions that need to be answered are which authority does the government of the United States use against terrorists in other countries outside their traditional battlefield, and what are the interests of the national security of America? The first question’s is so obvious, and is linked to the AUMF.As discussed in chapter one, the AUMF takes control and allows the United States to follow and prosecute anyone responsible for the nine out of eleven attacks. Drones take a major role according to how the United States prosecutes terrorism. In one of Barrack Obama’s speeches, he says that “drones are part and parcel of our overall authority when it comes to battling al-Qaeda.’’ This shows that the unmanned ways have greatly altered the way the United States attacks her targets.

In the other question, an argument from James Jay Carafona (date), in the *Washington Times,* among many others, that a benefit for intervening at North Africa is to benefit from their petroleum by securing the oil mining. However, the argument is not necessarily the reason behind the involvement of the United States to aid Africa. In accordance to the USEIA (United States Energy Information Administration), not less than 65%of the country’s imports of oil are from five different nations, of which none of the five nations is in Africa. However, this does not show that the US careless about the production of petroleum in the continent of Africa. In fact, in the year 2005, one of the projects of the United States was to import 25% of the country’s oil import from the African continent by the year 2015.

Unluckily, when they were putting this in writing, statistics showed that United States seemed to have been really dependent on the petroleum products from the Middle East, OPEC (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries). This therefore shows that the interest of North Africa by the national security was mainly to fight against the terrorists. In addition, President Barrack Obama said, “and we will use all elements of our national power to defeat al-Qaeda and to defend America, our allies and all who seek a better future”. This might be easily taken to be a tribute to the massive number of prosecutes done by drones in a show of national strength. On the contrary, without being ambiguous, President Barrack Obama makes a declaration on the real reason for being involved in the African continent, the reason being to fight against terrorism.

*AFRICOM’s Inception*

In order to indicate the essence Africa has to the United States, a different command from the combat was made to find out the ways of strengthening the relationship between the countries of the African Continent and the United States. It was until the year 2007 when the African continent was accommodated in the (EUCOM), the United States European Command. It showed that EUCOM had the capability to cover the fifty-one nations in Europe, the countries in Africa and as section of Asia. The United States formed a separate Command of Africa(AFRICOM), after being given the intensity of the dilemma of the security in Africa, in the year 2008 to “build the defense capabilities” in Africa.

As stated by Andrew Feickert (date), Africa is essentially due to its part in the GWOT, Global War on Terrorism. In fact, the earlier Commanding General, before the formation of AFRICOM, stated, “We don’t pay enough attention to Africa, but I think we’re going to have to in the 21st century”. This is different in the present. With the latest combatant command made to entirely deal with Africa, many initiatives and trainings are done in the countries of Africa with the aid that best makes representations of their needs.

Currently, there are 15 exercises, 11 programs and 2 operations that AFRICOM is doing with the African nations that they have partnered with in Africa. For instance, Flintlock, a counterterrorism exercise, makes people learn minor unit tactics in the Maghreb and Sahel regions, while in the other hand Africa Endeavour focus on control and giving command for a higher level of military officials. These trainings focus on strengthening the militaries’ capabilities. Although UAV training forms part of some of the training exercises used, this kind of exercise is not focused on. The major focus of these training initiatives is to train the ally nation or the partner country with a trial of getting to the root causes of the many troubles in continent. This can only be achieved through forces found on the ground level.

This chapter, chapter two, is discussed in four major sections. The 1st part shows discusses an argument of the discourse about the United States’ function and on the usage of drones in the Northern part of Africa. The second part shows a study looking on the bigger issues of using drones to achieve objectives of national policy. This section summarizes with evidence aiding the usage of drones in regions of ground forces for specific missions, but which does not take the place of human beings. The third part gives an analyzed empirical evidence and literature on the probability of using unmanned aerial vehicles in North Africa. Lastly, this chapter summarizes with comments on analyzed questions and literature based on evidences which will be used as guide during further research.

**Literature Review**

The question tends to acquire a; lot of attention when deciding the certain use of unmanned aerial vehicles in parts of Africa, when the idea to dispatch UAVs to regions like Africa become less thought provoking. Drones, as an arm of counterterrorism provide advantages to fight against terrorism. Although it is a weapon to train traditional forces in decision making and military tactics, it does not have substitute for human beings on ground forces. While the United State tries to fight against the al-Qaeda, drones give them the ability to aid a prudent campaign to counter terrorism from a distance. The distance invites criticism on the usage of drones; this is because its usage is easy, although this distance precipitates convenience.

***Interest in Africa***

So as to study the function and the utilization of the drones in North Africa, it is essential to have an understanding as to why the United States has got interest in what seems to be geographically distant regions. This is because terrorist operatives are allowed to grow in regions which have no laws, no government; especially in Africa. These regions are known as the Sahel and Maghreb regions, and also known as the Horn of Africa. Gardines and Carafano (date) gave reasons why all the focus ought to be on the African continent. They asserted that if no more, the ‘United States is facing increasing international pressure to play a more prominent role in the universe’s most troubled continent’.

 Feickert (date)vgives an argument stating that the United States’ aim about “the potential for Africa to become a breeding ground for terrorists’ is the major cause for the increased attention on Africa. As the Pentagon plans for a longtime terror war, the military officials in the central command realized that they cannot risk losing sight of the African continent especially as al-Qaeda and its partners lose their hideout in Afghanistan and are trying to seek refuge I regions like the African continent. Truly, Africa is a perfect hideout for terrorist activity and is also continuously fighting against civil strife. Gardines and Carafone (date) gave reasons for being attracted to Africa is from “weak civil societies and poor law enforcement and judicial system”, this makes it easier for the easy for the funny groups to gain refuge.

Since Africa is a hideout to terrorists and where their groups have gained more freedom more, due the Northern part of Africa has largely gained the attention over a previous few years. As the coalition forces and the United States get rid of training camps. As coalition forces and the United States get rid of the camps used for training in Afghanistan, Feicker (date) explains that Al-Qaeda has greatly multiplied its training camps and its recruiting camps in Nigeria, Horn of Africa in Kenya and other African countries. African continent has most of it uninhabited and the regions that are inhabited are full of vulnerable persons from which to get recruits from.

Gardines and Carafano (date) state, “It is no coincidence that Osama Bin Laden found safe haven in Sudan in the 1990s. “To purse those who are responsible for conducting the attacks and those who are planning to conduct the attacks, against the allies of the United States and the United States itself, the continent of Africa still remains as a priority for the military of the United States.

The question that now arises, with most giving an agreement on the idea to become more engaged in the African continent, is how. Gardines and Carafano gave an argument for a focused presence in the continent of Africa through closely working together with the countries in Africa to more prudently mitigate the opportunities to security problems with ground forces. As “counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism campaigns” are factors that are necessary and debatably of major importance, in fighting against terrorism in Africa, these being just temporary solutions to these very tough problems that the continent face-corrupt and less strong governments. Truly, the lack of lawful nature of Africa is not only restricted to terrorist activity, but also to other ways of dangerous behavior altogether. African countries are homes, also to other forms of non-legal activity, for instance the non-legal hunting for elephants for ivory tusks. Drones gives a tactical advantage as a tool for war, to fight in war, but looks like it can fall short of affecting the government that are corrupt.

***Support from a distance***

During the mid of the twentieth Century, the government of France established a variety of formal defense and military co-operation accords with the Francophone states in Africa. The France government wanted to give protection to its citizens living overseas as well as trying to ensure that “strategic resources” are protected, explained by Gregory as “oil and uranium, and a ready market for French goods, French cultures, and French ideas.” Giving protection to its citizens and moreover led to agreements of military with almost twenty-four nations as a step to “constitute a permanent intervention,” as explained by Robin Luckham. Due to these reasons, the government of France will have to check besides the tactical capabilities by the drones and put most of their effort on intervening the usage of training functions and the usage of ground forces during combat.

The technology of using drones is a step towards giving support to partner countries in fighting against terrorist activities and not causing ground forces. Others, for instance, Gardiner and Carafano, explain that there are many different reasons that the United States ought not to cause ground forces in the continent Africa. As there is a need to fight al-Qaeda and its partner terrorists, dispatching ground forces in North Africa could create more misunderstandings among the indigenous people, which would be unpopular. Due to these, giving ISR and giving logistical aid to the forces of Africa, together with the French found in Mali, through the use of drones which are how to fight against terrorism without having to dispatch large-scale number of ground forces in a similar way as the civil strife in countries like Afghanistan and in Iraq.

Moreover, as discussed by Singer (date), the idea of relying on drones to acquire strategic objectives, might be accompanied with more costs than if a much more decisive force, that is, ground forces, were to be used initially. This means that ground forces may have the ability to acquire their military goals in a shorter while compared to through the use of a series of drones to strike. In addition, the too much reliance on the tactical roles played by UAVs because these UAVs are easier to use, may come dangerously close to knowing the strategy. The essential point is that the UAVs in Africa, at first sight, is a cheaper alternative to the use of ground forces, although when there is a call for strategic objectives for a different element of the national power of America, the United States ought to be ready to cause the required military support level according to the interest of long-term stability.

Despite all that, training will not go for long. According to Stephen Metz, “solving root causes is certainly easier with insurgent leaders and cadre out of the way.” To get this, the United States has given instances of trusting the responsibility of leaning to drone strikes. For certainty, between 1992 and 2008, the United States involved in not less than 32 interventions that were armed in Africa.

***Golden Hammer***

The military training of the west go far but when it reaches the time to deal with the shortcomings to the terrorists in the near future. As terrorism is unveiled, the United States and its allies show interests and act swiftly to prevent any attack from the terrorist groups. Due to “large-scale use of U.S combat forces in Africa is not desirable and the surrounding is not conducive to large scale schemes of forces”, yet it is important for the UAVs to pursue terrorist.

Therefore, a question of coming up with something due to the capability of doing it as in contrary of doing a necessary thing. Conway Waddington gave an argument that the use of the tactical advantages given make it easy to aim at individuals with minor damage. He seems to use the argument of UAVs a step ahead through putting blame on the continual use of the drones. This argument is important in showing that the “technological promises of drones and precision strike…encouraged the implementation of tactics.” This reason, however, is the reason why there may be a continual use of drones in pursuing the terrorist group, the al-Qaeda.

As Waddington argues, drone strikes give “political-risk-mitigating properties, “which is likely to be an illusion of the electorate to be credited with a prudent pursuit of terrorism while escaping a commitment of dispatching ground forces.

Waddington refers Maslow’s “Golden Hammer,” this means that when it is the only tool, it is depended on to solve all the needs you want. This is similar to Leon Panetta’s argument, among others, that UAVs seem to be an effective tool against terrorist affected regions, politically and geographically or even environments that are unsuitable for ground forces. Therefore, scholars and professionals asserts for a closely regulated usage of drones during war. Environments like Sahel desert, together with zero damage, can been conducive for the use of drones. This technique had the ability to achieve its objectives as it was removing the risk of the forces of America on the ground by the use of unmanned system from the firmament.



Unmanned Aerial Vehicles enabled the state of the art surveillance tool, present a convenient method of engaging aims. The use of UAVs is not only for counterterrorism operations but also for a progression and natural use in the other regions of the world. Anyway, drones carry the act of art of equipment of surveillance. A well known drone of the Air Force of the United States, known as the MQ-1B Predator, has the ability to detect the heat produced by a foot of a human being from ten thousand feet.

In a recent initiative to multiply ISR roles on North Korea, and in Chinese ships in East and South China Seas, Japan made an agreement to be the host of the Air Force of the United States’ premier ISR UAV package platform, the RQ-4 Global Hawk. However, this might be achieved with a price. While the package importance certainly provides decision makers together with more accurate and timely results, the step will likely be a nuisance to the Chinese. However, Secretary Kerry said that the partnership together with Japan, “this bilateral alliance remains a vital element of our respective national security strategies”. Checking the risks, being provocative to China is measurable to the unprecedented cover of North Korea, for the Chinese seas and for the United States, and also for the Japanese, thus strengthening the relationship it has with Japan.

Making the bond strong with an ally helps to preserve her national security, which is not something new to the United States, and it is accompanied with many positive benefits. About Africa, making a team from African and French forces in not combat, aiding functions that prevent the United States from being pulled into a grass root war as it is ensured that tactical advantage obtained from the use of drones is made available to the allied forces.

This argument of having to rely on UAVs to help in solving long-term strategic objectives is not a strong argument on instances, but being used as a tactical tool for war still remains relevant. According to the former Assistant Secretary of the United States, Johnnie Carson, when there was a discussion on what military plan was to be included, “ensuring that he proposed military action is adequately linked to a sufficiently detailed political strategy and end-state for military operations”. While his comments are more specific to the Northern part of Mali, it gives support to the idea of choosing a tactic that gives support to the end-state compared to the succumbing to “Golden Hammer” by Marlow. What can be extracted from the present literature is that, as drones have got their place in giving providence to a technical advantage to the United States; supplements for training those traditional militaries of Africa, are not there, to solve the root cause as to why terrorist groups are seeking their safe havens in the Horn of Africa, Maghreb and in Sahel. On the contrary, the United States ought to employ all the elements of its national power appropriately including UAVs and ground forces.

In order to get to the main cause of the problem, the United States, together with her allies ought to ensure they are not fully putting their focus on the terrorists that already exist, but to also put their focus on the reasons behind the terrorist rich environment, therefore being the reason as not to rely on depending on drones alone in order to acquire stability in the continent of Africa.

Putting focus on the services offered by the military, enforcement of the law and the judicial systems, and making sure that political systems are paramount in making address on the security concerns in the Continent of Africa and also ensuring that these political systems are democratic. A prudent campaign to counter the insurgency in Africa could lead to a reduction in criminal activity. In order to ensure that the stability of the environment is enough to withstand upcoming threats, a more similar approach is needed. To get these aimed at effects need a more aimed at approach by the United States.

**Research Design: Case study**

Several instances exist of making use of drones to target terrorists in North Africa. This shows the usefulness of making a balance on the reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles, giving training exercises to the partner nations in Africa on tactics to counter terrorism, and using combat ground forces. The reason why the preceding examples were chosen to make an examination on the bigger picture is that it seemed to increase the usage of UAVs in regions like North Africa. Doing this, the case study is not in contrary with the military action of the combat in Libya and in Somalia, as well as support of Mali by the United States, with the arguments that were presented in the current literature.

The United States’ support on Malian and French forces, which greatly consisted of the use of UAV ISR coverage, shows the urge and wants to counter the al-Qaeda and also reducing the risk of America ground forces. In the contrary, the missions in Somali and in Libya in October, the year 2013 show that the United States is truly committed to use combat ground forces whether the conditions are suitable or not for a drone strike or even whether the target value is large enough to bear the risk caused to ground forces.

***UAVs, Not Ground Forces***

In the month of March, the year 2012, just preceding the military coup d’état, AQIM took over the control of the Northern part of the nation of Mali. This made France to dispatch forces to help the government of Mali to counter AQIM and to get back the control of the Northern region of the nation. While Japan and the European Union made pledges to give foreign aid in form of hundreds of millions of dollars, the United States was making them ready to offer both military and monetary assistance.



As French forces formed partners with the forces of Mali to acquire back the Northern Mali that had been taken by AQIM, Jeff Gilmour’s (date) asserts, “the crucial issue is likely to be ensuring that the African forces which take over from departing French troops are properly trained”. This means that, after the French troop has pushed away the AQIM, they will return home, therefore it will of importance for the forces of Africa to keep AQIM out of Mali. This shows the importance of training the army of Mali and of other African nations on how to counter terrorist groups.

The war in Mali, when the ground forces of the American combat were not deployed, was being given support by the United States using the UAVs serving ISR roles. The ISR ability of the drones made not less than 60 attacks versus the enemy forces in the initial few months of doing its aiding role. UAVs give an extent of separation that is between being actively involved in a combat function, in which losing human life is an outcome that is expected and also giving support to the combat operations without putting a human life at risk.

Since the United States relies on UAVs, she is providing more support, through drones than with the use of manned aircrafts, to the French. Although nearly 12 countries have more than 70 manned aircrafts, the United States relies more on unmanned systems. This can also support Gardiner’s and Crafano’s assertion that the United States ought to look to give support to the conflicts in Africa, that is after knowing what is missing out that is from the aid of the other partner nations.

*Ground Forces, Not Armed Forces*

In the early days of October 2013, with the continent in an already coverage of drones, the United States carried out two dissimilar operations with the use of combat forces. The usage of ground forces, and the following withdrawal show that while UAVs provide ISR abilities, they are not substitute however, to ground forces. This is essential because the usage of force was not lifted in order to overcome adversaries in the area, but this operation was stopped due to the damage that was likely to be high. This therefore shows that drones are not being relied upon for operations that are better fit for the troops that are on the ground, but are seen as a way of decreasing the risks that are to ground forces.

*Proliferation of Drone Technology*

The idea of developing unmanned systems has led to the growth of leaps and bounds over the as dozen years-most, of penchant and development for drone use originates from the United States. Since even before World War II, the United States was already using the UAVs, which they also referred to them as remotely piloted cars. When the civil strife in Afghanistan and in Iraq did not create any demand for the usage of drones, it unarguably increased its application and its use. Besides the United States, China is also pushing to surpass it in terms of the quantities of aircrafts produced. The dominance of the industry by the United States, has led to the change in how drones are look at and made them look formidable, and seemingly a weapon used in war, which is unchallenged, just as the words of MackySall, “we need training, we need material, we need intelligence”, when he was making a speech on the state of security of the continent of Africa as a whole.

**Analysis**

The evidence shows that UAVs are indeed the ideal weapon for war in regions such as Africa. The longtime of mission of these drones make them become the ideal candidates to give ISR aid to ground forces when training or engaging with an enemy when the environment at that place is right. Deploying the ground forces all around the globe of the Earth to chase the al-Qaeda together with its operatives is not likely to be a decision that will be popular with the public of America, nor is it going to be likely a sustainable course of action to be taken for the military.

As Goure says that the effects of new technology, they, “give decisive if not necessarily strategic advantage to the party employing them”. It seems that drones are not only shaping United States’ strategic objectives, but it is also shaping up in Africa at this time. The many instances of drone strikes are in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia and also the use of UAV technology to curb terrorist operatives.

In a stable world, the way to curb terrorism is through training the indigenous population, and by enforcing the law. However, this is not how it does work. Regions like North Africa, where they lack the ability to prevent terrorist operatives, demand more attention of the United States. To prevent terrorism in Africa and in the United States, a combination of combat forces, use of drones, and the use of ground forces are used to undermine the efforts by the terrorists and it also appears to be that these factors also are shaping the strategic objectives in the Northern part of Africa.

Chapter Four

 May the Force be Applied Approxriately.

Introduction

 Unmanned aerial vehicles have contributed significantly in guarding ground forces and moreover defending the United States from her enemies through their ISR and strike capabilities. They are being used efficiently and effectively to ensure the force through the drones is consistent with United States’ strategic goal.

 Consequently, there is criticism on the use of drones in one type of mission and not any other type. This is relevant because drones are no exception when it comes to “air power” and they are a principal strategy during wartime for United States. However, will the usage of drones help in tackling insurgency and terrorism? Furthermore, are drones suitable for COIN or CT missions? This article seeks to explore if drones can be ideal weapons of war if this is true; drones can be used in both COIN and CT operations.

 The Department of Defense (DoD) defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and its root causes." Insurgency as defined by Ricardo (date) is “a popular movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion." While the (DoD) defines counterterrorism (CT) as “actions taken direct against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environment inhospitable to terrorist networks." Furthermore, David Kilcullen defines terrorism as “politically motivated violence against non-combatants with the intention to coerce through fear."

 The aim of this chapter is to determine when drones can efficiently support both CT and COIN operations. For drones to be more effective in their use the type of operation should be clearly defined. This is significant because the way the foe is being described will affect the pursue strategy by United States via instruments of national power.

**Literature Review**

 Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are significant terms which determine how an enemy will be prosecuted by the United States. The aspect of how the enemy is to be prosecuted brings in the use of drones. David Kilcullen who is an expert in counterinsurgency argues that “global jihad” and the war in Afghanistan should be tackled with counterinsurgency methods and therefore has become critical of drone usage. Others like Michael Boyle state that al-Qaeda is not a global insurgency but rather "a highly dangerous and resilient terrorist organization that has not articulated a vision of political life” This type of argument is significant in determining the type of mission for drone support.

 Rendering al-Qaeda as a terrorism organization intuitively implies a counterterrorism approach, yet a body of professionals like David Kilcullen (date) suggest otherwise.

 The Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual expanded their definition in that "today’s operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency one which seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide. “This definition upholds Ricardo’s description of a more global insurgency as a threat not contain in a single state; he takes globalization one step further and posits another adaptation of insurgency “resistance insurgency”. “Resistance insurgency” is in causing massive chaos and undermining the government rather than take political control. In other terms deciding between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is dependent on the use of force and level of support of host government.

 Kilcullen (date) on the other hand argues that because insurgents use terrorism as a persuasive tactic does not imply they are terrorist who need a counterterrorism approach. Briefly describing the principles governing COIN and CT will ensure a clear insight on when to use drones against enemies.

***Basic principles of counterinsurgency***

 Experts and theorists on counterinsurgency believe that fundamental to COIN practice is pacification, “winning hearts and minds”. Steps taken for a fruitful COIN place emphasis on the local population rather than the insurgent. However, each step aims at weakening the insurgency and strengthening the government. Kalev Sepp (date) states that the focus should be on the people and their support and beliefs of their government. This suggests that abuse of human rights is considered an act of counterinsurgency. To achieve insurgency, the basic premise is to have a valid negotiation between the insurgency and the government. On the other hand, resistance insurgency as described by Kilcullen emphasizes on undermining the existing government with no intention of ruling it.

***Basic principles of counter terrorism***

 In counterterrorism, the emphasis is not on the ability of nation to win over its people or govern or rather placating their hearts and minds. According to (DoD) of Joint Publication the military strategy on counterterrorism is to deny any resources, defeat terrorism and establish conditions against terrorism attacks. The main aim of these efforts is to act against terror networks themselves, (John, 2005). As Boyles (date) states in his definition of counterterrorism methods, the focus is one the one employing the terrorism. These methods include; capturing and murdering the senior of the terrorism organization, destroying resources and camps, eliminating safe havens, disrupting their recruitment programs.

***Conflating CT and COIN***

 Similarity between CT and COIN is in the Irregular *warfare*, while the fundamental differences come in the force applied. In counterinsurgency, the force applied seems to be accurate, calculated and more lawful while considering the second and third offer; whereas in counterterrorism the force is applied with no prejudice and may happen quickly. If both CT and COIN are used together the effect generated by one my negate the other.

 Boyles came up with four primary concerns; the first is “popular backlash” occurs when CT is perceived as a violent use of force, and the violence involved in COIN should be distinctly choreographed to avoid invasion of the populations' private security. Second, “counter mobilization” this comes in due to expansion CT’s operation target list given the ease in target pursue leading to “mission creep” into COIN operations causing instability due to the indiscriminating target practices. Third, "legitimacy gap" is created when CT operations are carried out in a country because it implies the host government cannot unilaterally counter the threat .Fourth "leverage" is lost when it is clearly obvious that the host government cannot afford to lose the fight, the insurgency and the host government can exploit the lost leverage by dragging out the war.

 In tackling counterinsurgency one must know what to do and it is also important to know what not to. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have different meanings for what the military is to achieve and how to achieve. Contradiction of the central government by disregarding its role when using drones becomes culpable to excessive force trying to achieve either one.

***Drone use in CT and COIN***

Due to increased discrimination in time manner drones may be ideal for counterinsurgency according to Kenneth Anderson (date). He further states there is no need in rushed decisions on the use of force because ground force is not imminent danger. The more time for loiter time of drones coupled with their ISR collection capabilities is facilitates gaining a target’s fidelity to make decisions on the following move.

 Moreover, Anderson focuses on the question whether drone strikes make it harder for ground forces trying to carry out a heart- and –minds campaign to win over local population. Drone strikes causes too many civilian casualties, consequently increasing recruitment for an insurgency. Generally, there seems to be lack of concrete evidence behind the relationship between drone strikes and joining insurgency.

 However, there are many tests on what drives someone to join a fight. In accordance to Pakistan, Byman down plays the casual relationship and the question on the biasness of the polls conducted, (Jeff, 2002). On a greater scale “many members of the global jihad are related by birth or marriage…sons of jihadists often follow their fathers and widows often avenge their husbands by becoming suicide bombers”

 Audrey Kurth (date) argues that the real issue is that the United States is losing the war of perception a key section in any counterterrorism attack. Whether drones are resulting in many adversaries than they are eliminating seems to remain inconclusive. Even though the evidence in establishing a clear relationship between drone strikes and any recruitment for insurgency, Anderson takes on the allegation comparing collateral damage in military operations. He states than in any way force is used then collateral damage is unavoidable. Conversely, in case the situation does not allow use of force then civilian death by drones is excessive.



 Using counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the right format should drive how the use of force is applied. This allows proper use of drones and in case anything goes wrong it emphasizes on goals of the mission rather than inanimate objects.

**Research Design: Case Study**

 This case study shall examine mainly the use of drones, and more precisely armed drones. The objective of this case study is to determine whether drones are more advantageous to counterinsurgency or counterterrorism missions. The evidence suggests there are advantages to both, but also consequences if not used appropriately. The use of force to conduct a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency is a central component is at stake. Pakistan gives an example of where counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations being conducted concurrently. Yemen provides an example of armed unmanned aerial vehicles upholding counterterrorism missions with no significant number of American ground forces and Afghanistan underscores the lawful use of force as it greatly pertains to a counter insurgency mission.

***Unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistan***

In Pakistan, armed drones are used to pursue an enemy looking for refugee there. The targets in Pakistan are mainly are generally in Pakistan’s North and South Waziristan provinces being controlled by Taliban groups. The Taliban either through tacit endorsement or approval of the government of Pakistan created a “state –within –a – state” in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). These are habitats to some of the most lethal groups in the area. Moreover, this sanctuary is said to be habitat to al-Qaeda planning attacks against the United States, (Tom, 2012). Despite the number of airstrikes is not divided to determine which strikes are more choreographed and deliberate and which are signature strikes. The more the level of target fidelity seems to take on the characters of what a counterinsurgency strike would be like. While signature strike appears to be counterterrorism in nature by striking to a combat force where there is no time for sorting individuals.

***Drone use in Yemen***

In Yemen from 2002 until September 2014, 103 airstrikes were carried out resulting in death of 498 al-Qaeda and 105 civilians. The strike produced greater than three times the number of civilians by comparison; nearly five and a half percent of the total number of casualties were civilians in Pakistan, about eighteen percent in Yemen.

In spite the criticism President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi received because of the great collateral damage from airstrikes he was still a strong United States partner in 2013. He is fighting al-Qaeda as they are aggressively trying to take over some parts of Yemen from which to plot attacks against the United States. This prompted Hadi to partner with the United States to uphold drone strikes and agree to support in form of weapons, ammunition, logistics, and intelligence to enhance the Yemen military. Yemen government is seeking counter radicalization programs for reintegration of the government’s adversaries.

***Drones in Afghanistan***

A clearly fair counterinsurgency operation against the Taliban the use of force is greatly scrutinized. After massive loss of civilian life from manned aircraft, a distinct message was required to assure the Afghanistan government and the people that the use of force would be applied more equally. Thus, United States troops were required to weigh the use of force to guard the troops while ensuring safety of the population.

Truly through correct use of drones in Afghanistan is a way to reduce civilian casualties under a counterinsurgency model sort by military commanders. The primary objective of drones in Afghanistan seems to be for intelligence collection, with striking capabilities and collateral benefit. General Mueller stated the objective of drones in the counterinsurgency strategy is not about finding insurgents, but when they do get them, strike capabilities are leveraged.

***Mixed messaging***

The operation in Pakistan seems to be unclear. The government has allowed the usage of drone strikes in some circumstances, but lashed publicly against them in other settings. As it is stated in chapter one former President Zardari had a careless attitude towards the number of civilian casualties caused by targeting al-Qaeda saying “Kill the seniors. Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me.” As extreme as it may seem maybe Zardari’s approach is kind of reflective to the counterterrorism view in that once the use of force was discovered to be the proper response to combat militant extremists in the FATA, collateral damage was an unavoidable outcome. Zardari attempts to bring back credibility in his nation’s capability to tackle the threat akin to the principles of counterinsurgency.

***On the use of force***

In what seems to be in retaliation for the lethal attack on the international airport in Karachi in June 2014. Pakistan sort the United States for help and granted, “express approval” for drone strike on those responsible for the attacking. These kind of approval shows when there is a clear gain to attacking an adversary in a scenario such as FATA, where drones are very efficient, even from a nation that has been very critical to drone use, (Marcus, 2005). In case drones violate the sovereignty of the state, thus undermining the work of the central government, the result of the strike is immaterial.

Counterterrorism mission with armed drones such as in Pakistan could bring about a backlash among locals making it hard to counter an insurgency. On the other hand, not leveraging the strike capabilities of drones in a counter terrorism operation, due to unavailability of target fidelity, could delay successful counterterrorist missions further by not striking the foe when feasible. In both cases the emphasis should be on the use of force should be applied to achieve the operation.

**Analysis**

 Correctly categorizing an enemy is a paramount in discovering how to defeat the foe. An insurgent force using terrorism techniques or a terrorist group inciting insurgency. The use of force is used in different ways. An airstrike from a drone or a manned vehicle is still an airstrike. A target is pointed out, a missile is launched and thereafter an explosion on the ground.

Furthermore, the amount of fidelity on the intended target must be of paramount concern to a COIN strike to not further the chasm between the central government and insurgent force. In Afghanistan, General Chrystal curtailed the use of force, distinctly airpower to decrease civilian casualties, thus guarding the population from collateral damage.

Many indiscriminate targeting practices, such as “signature strikes” can cause lack of stability by targeting groups of people behaviorally or characteristically putting out a threat with no exact knowledge of who they are. Such missions endanger the goals of a more “choreographed” use of force in COIN, but they do have their place in CT. Moreover, the United States is involved in providing material support to Yemen security forces.

The Pakistan approach appears to be a favor a more counterterrorist approach whereby views of the stability of the Pakistan nation is subordinate to the primary objective of targeting adversary. Without United States ground forces in Pakistan the number of airstrikes suggest these strikes are used as abusive operations solely to attrite the enemy; something COIN professionals have warned against when carrying airpower in COIN missions. In places where ground forces are present, drones not only carry out strike missions, but also uphold defenses or force guarding missions. The lack of support of United States ground force in Pakistan to guard, further supports a more CT role for drones in Pakistan. The raid on Osama Bin Laden’s homestead suggests CT takes a greater role in the technique against enemies located in Pakistan.

In spite of the acknowledgement for drone strikes and hosting airbases, from where drone launching takes place, makes claims that their use is counterproductive and an affront to the sovereignty of Pakistan, thereby forming a “legitimacy gap” However, Pakistan likely chooses this approach because they are faced with their own difficulty of “struggling to deal with its stubborn militancy problem” Pakistan government is sensitive to public opinion on drone strikes as they allow operations to strengthen the central government’s legitimacy but also fight their foes within the state. A counterinsurgency operation is likely more suitable for Pakistan to carry out within their country.

The United States CT based operation appears to not mutually support Pakistan carrying out its own COIN operation. Luckily, there could be mutual benefits like when a drone strikes it only takes down insurgents or terrorists that pose a threat to Pakistan without causing collateral damage, (Marcus, 2005). In case the use of force is chosen to stop an insurgent, collateral damage is regarded as an unfortunate consequence.

Drones seem to be able to tackle COIN operations through the persistent ISR package. A great level of fidelity can be achieved to ensure it is the correct target and in case force is decided to be used, they can choose a moment to strike when there is zero risk of collateral damage. Moreover, drones take out the requirement for ground forces, which may be another contributing aspect to the lack of stability on the ground (Marcus, 2005). As evidence suggests, the use of airpower in counterinsurgency, like Afghanistan, may be used in measuring amounts and only after options are deemed fit.

Drones also seem to have their positions in CT operations, because they are a dependable offensive measure against a terrorist network. In various places such as North Waziristan, Pakistan, drones have been capable of accessing inhospitable environments to target adversaries seeking refuge. Same as in Yemen they have been integral parts in fighting AQAP without placing ground forces in harm’s way. As a tool in CT operations, the evidence suggests that drones have been fruitful in detaching adversaries from the battlefield.

The difference between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy appears to be the crux issue in determining whether and what amount of force is to be used. Nonetheless, drones seem relevant in being able to uphold either counterinsurgent or counterterrorism missions. To ensure the consistent usage of force with the principles of its operation, the identification of the mission is first. According to the evidence presented in this chapter, leveraging the importance of drones should be clearly measured with how the use of force is to be applied to ensure the goals of the overall technique are what lead the use of drones.

Conclusion

After spending thirteen years in Afghanistan and almost half of that in Iraq simultaneously, the United States nation and military heads alike understandably sort to leverage the good sections of both COIN and CT- to ensure stability of the host nation’s government to avoid insurgency further, while dealing with swift defeat to the foes of the United States. However, getting used to one strategy (COIN) to achieve the objectives of the other (CT) is unclear and inefficient. Due to lack of clarity this has resulted in misplacement of blame in case things go wrong. Alleging that drones are counterproductive suggests that there is clear, or at least a common objective one can achieve. Drones have several importance well outside their usage as armed tools, such as their capability to collect intelligence. Saying drones cause many civilian casualties overlooks how the usage of force is to be applied.

Due to lack of a conclusive study with evidence detracts from an explanatory answer on the casual relationship of drone strikes leading in more people involving in insurgency or terrorist groups. More research would improve the fidelity on the relationship between the two.

During stressful experiences leaders seek for the best options to uphold their decisions that achieve their desired objectives. Unmanned aerial vehicles not only allow kinetic strike options, but also improve target knowledge. At times the decision is made from the best of the terrible alternatives present, but they are options nevertheless. In case things go wrong, culpability may rest with unclear application of the use of force and not involving on an inanimate object.

Chapter 5

Summary and conclusion

 Airpower has been utilized for a long period of time as an implementation of coercion to get a foe to alter its behavior, with different extents of success. As I write this thesis, the US I utilizing its individual airpower, amongst various other national elements power, to confront the group of Islamic State of Syria and Iraq in northern Syria. Drone strikes have partly successes in the reinforcement of Kurds, but airpower only is not staged to be the “decisive element” in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Yet again, drone strikes have made it possible for ground forces to have the initiative, and “buoyed the fighters’ spirits” on the ground while giving the enemy other setbacks.

 However, drones alone, from unmanned or manned aircraft, are possibly not going to gain the long-term strategy. Ground forces will have to take part in this larger plan. Ground forces have occupied terrain for centuries. Despite the gravitation to advancements in technologies, in Max Boot’s words, “in the reinforcement of regime alteration, there isn’t any replacement for a rifleman on a street corner.” For their section, unmanned aerial vehicles give tactical benefits and provide motivation to ground forces. However, decisive victory will result from more sweeping alteration in the political ground that has been reinforced by ground forces that provide security for the terrain. Airpower, in the form of drones’ strikes, is appropriate at focusing on individuals, but is not capable of eradicating complete terrorist’s organizations.

 For all the advantage of unmanned aerial vehicles, the evidence gives a suggestion that they will not have the ability of achieving similar objectives like ground forces. In the scenario of the support of the United States in Mali, unarmed aerial vehicles were giving support to a larger ground campaign that was led by Malian and French forces. The variance in these two scenarios challenges the claim that unmanned aerial vehicles make it simple to go to battle, (Michael, 2013). In the instance of ISIS, that is Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, there are armed strikes from fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles. Airpower was used to forward regaining the Kurdish ground forces initiative by the suppression of ISIS. Yet again, in the case of Mali, unarmed aerial vehicles were utilized to offer support to ground battle. Unmanned aerial vehicles were not directly engaged in armed, but rather provided intelligence collection support for the ground forces. This is a critical element to decide on as it highlight drones as a manner of supporting a larger ground conflict without exposing the United States to the dangers of battles.

 In conclusion, coming up with the strategies of the conflict will be significant in deciding how the utilization of force is implemented from unmanned aerial vehicles. This is critical as a result of a significant rise in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Unmanned aerial vehicles are appropriate CT weapons as they can go after the foes of the US in very difficult regions to reach, while dodging boots from the ground. Unmanned aerial vehicles also offer support to COIN missions via their capability of providing uninterrupted and persistent coverage of a target over a long-time period for intelligence collection purposes, where the surrounding is appropriate, for a kinetic strike.

 The simplicity with the engagement of other targets is hence the motivation behind the necessity of a transparent policy on the utilization of UAVs. Drones need a transparent policy to sophisticate and design its role and to prevent the US from getting into the conflicts as it is quite simple, (Wilson, 2005). Absent precise information on the causal relationship of unmanned aerial vehicle strikes and raising the hierarchy of foe fighters, is an ideal scenario of dealing with the arguments on the degree of collateral damage, while making sure the US’ security is preserved.

 It is with no doubt that this thesis has some of its shortcomings. There is therefore room for aftermath research to refine these conclusions. First and foremost, other assertions developed in this thesis are based on the population of civilian casualties resulting from the strikes and the drone’s strikes. This may be complicated as the information itself may contain inconsistencies in the definition of a civilian. The miscount of civilian casualties may alter the analysis behind the utilization of force in some of the missions. Yet again, a question to ask is, what options are there to go after the foes of the US in complicated regions?

 As a progression, naturally that is, of a technologically superior military, drones have proved to be dependable and reliable intelligence collection platform with a strike capability. However, they cannot substitute ground forces, and also need an unambiguous and clear mission to guide the utilization of force by the drones.

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