Memo2.final.v2.docx Can someone provide edits on my academic essay? It's in a memo format.

Memorandum

To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

From: Garrett Berntsen                                                                       Date: January 1, 1943

Subject: Assessment of Operation TORCH

1.       The mission of Operation TORCH, as defined by General Eisenhower was “to occupy French Morocco and Algeria with a view of the earliest possible subsequent occupation of Tunisia.”[i]The invasion force consisted of three distinct command-and-control elements, the western, center, and eastern task forces. Our troops completed the first half of this mission as planned; however, several factors contributed to an inability to rapidly strike the successive target, Tunisia.

2.       The operational plan was followed and executed well overall, considering the troops’ minimal training in amphibious operations, the inexperience of our forces, and the coalition’s newly integrated command-and-control structure. However, the operation failed to rapidly occupy Tunisia because of;overly optimistic assumptions about French support for the invasion; the decision to land the first task force in the Atlantic, rather than closer to the subsequenttarget of Tunisia; and logistical unpreparedness for the lack of infrastructure in North Africa.

Uncertain Loyalty: The Vichy French

3.       The largest unanswered strategic question before the execution of TORCH was the degree of Vichy support of Allied forces. This support was also thrown into doubt by the involvement of the British. Vichy hostilitytowards the British had markedly increased followingtheir attack of the French navy at Mers-el-Kebir, intervention in French controlled Syria and Madagascar, andmassacreof French civilians in a Renault plant outside of Pairs by the Royal Air Force.

4.       Numerous attempts were made to ensure Vichy support prior to the invasion, including a secret parley between Major General Clark and General Henri Giraud. However, upon landing our forces “discovered that the actual state of French sentiment in North Africa did not even remotely agree with some of our prior calculations.”[ii] This error came from a miscalculation of the strength of loyalty to Marshal Petain and our belief that Giraud controlled the French forces.

5.       In reality French forces in North Africa were loyal toFrançois Darlan, who had arrived in Algiers a day before TORCH by chance. Darlan was a powerful Vichy leader who held ministerial positions and answered only to Petain. Ultimately, the Vichy joined the coalition after a bloody resistance and because of negotiations directly with Darlan. These political complexities gave our commanders on the ground pause, as they believed it imprudent to advance before securing their rear through negotiating with the French. Yet, theseFrench leadership complications remain. Two weeks ago Darlan was assassinated and Giraud took his place.

Reducing Risk but Risking Time: The Atlantic Approach

6.       General Eisenhower’s initial plan for the invasionincluded only amphibious attacks east of Gibraltar, at Oran, Algiers, and Philippeville. These assaults would have faced the calmer waters of the Mediterranean and brought Allied troops a thousand miles closer to Tunisia. Yet, this plan was deemed too risky for several reasons: 1) The Spanish may have allowed German troops to move through Spain to Gibraltar in order to close the 8-mile wide straits and cut Allied supply lines; 2) German U-boats patrolled the Mediterranean extensively, and the numerous troop carriers would prove a large target for their torpedoes; 3) Axis bombers could more easily contest Allied landings along the Algerian coast. Considering the intelligence available and the risky nature of such a large amphibious assault, these factors were sufficient reason to choose the safer landing location.

7.       However, the reduced short-term risk brought an increased long-term risk that the Germans would reinforce Tunisia. The additional thousand miles of poorly maintained infrastructure between Casablanca and Tunisia slowed the force from their second goal, and the Germans seized this opportunity by quickly moving Luftwaffe elements into Tunis. By the end of November the Germans had transported a German Panzer Division and two Italian Infantry Divisions into Tunis, along with two hundred tanks, one hundred artillery pieces, one hundred aircraft,and the requisite supplies to support them.

8.       The composition of the task forces also limited the chance of quickly taking Tunisia. The center and eastern task forces were composed primarily of light infantry, with most of the Allied armor in the western task force. This required time and logistical effort to mass armored units against German defenses in Tunisia. Allied air and naval forces also missed opportunities to harass German forces being transported to Tunisia because they underestimated the speed with which the Germans would begin reinforcing their position.

Ramifications and lessons of Operation TORCH

9.       The execution of a cross-ocean, near-simultaneous three-pronged amphibious landing by a novice force without a major calamity was a success of military planning and leadership. By keeping the first task force in the Atlantic, the Allies guaranteed supply lines across the Atlantic to North Africa, and ensured a lodgement on the continent. They also guaranteed fierce fighting from reinforced German troops, and between the end of TORCH in mid-November and today, this fighting has resulted in over 20,000 casualties.

10.    As we look ahead to future operations, it is important that we plan forthe uncertain nature of political power dynamics in occupied lands, and that we assume logistical challenges will limit our troops’ ability to move rapidly across large and poorly reconnoitered expanses. We shouldalso understand that any delay in our maneuvers will likely lead to a rapid reinforcement by the capable and organized Axis forces. With Axis air power, armor, and mechanized infantry now in place in North Africa, we will soon have an answer to the most pressing question; how our soldiers fair against the enemy in all out combat.

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