Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey ,
505 U.S.833 (1992) 20 (CITATIONS OMITTED)
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution
protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of liberty is still
questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other
cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe.
At issue in these cases are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended
in 1988 and 1989. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to
the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours
before the abortion is performed.
...Another provision of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking
an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion.
The Act exempts compliance with these three requirements in the event of a "medical emergency,"
which is defined in § 3203 of the Act. ...
Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners, who are five abortion clinics and one
physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services, brought
this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Each provision was challenged as unconstitutional on
its face....
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has
three parts. First is recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability
and to obtain it. Without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State's interests are not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman's
life or health. And third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.
Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." The controlling word in the cases before us is
"liberty." ...
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in
interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree; yet neither does it
permit us to shrink from the duties of our office....
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about
the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some
of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot
control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.
The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such
a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances
in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest. ...
The sum of the precedent enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings un-weakened in any way
affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to
act in society, and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal
autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments at odds
with other precedent for the analysis of personal liberty; and no changes of fact have rendered viability
more or less appropriate as the point at which the balance of interests tips....
From what we have said so far it follows that it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some
freedom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The woman's liberty is not so unlimited,
however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later
point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman
to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted....
We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy.
We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line other than viability which is more workable. To be
sure, as we have said, there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of viability,
but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits given that the medical community and all those who
must apply its discoveries will continue to explore the matter. The viability line also has, as a practical
matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act
before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child.
The woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v.
Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.
On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the protection of potential life. The Roe
Court recognized the State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life." The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the woman's interest, was the difficult
question faced in Roe. We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court
when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when
it is subject to certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming as it does
after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are satisfied that the immediate question is not the
soundness of Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its
holding. And we have concluded that the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed. ...
Roe established a trimester framework to govern abortion regulations. Under this elaborate but rigid
construct, almost no regulation at all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy; regulations
designed to protect the woman's health, but not to further the State's interest in potential life, are
permitted during the second trimester; and during the third trimester, when the fetus is viable,
prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health of the mother is not at stake. Most of our cases
since Roe have involved the application of rules derived from the trimester framework....
We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.
Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the consequences for the fetus do not
necessarily interfere with the right recognized in Roe, although those measures have been found to be
inconsistent with the rigid trimester framework announced in that case. A logical reading of the central
holding in Roe itself, and a necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and the interest of the
State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid
prohibition on all pre-viability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life. The trimester framework
suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's
interest; and in practice it undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.. ..
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not
all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means
of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty....
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which,
while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends....
Some guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than
create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure
designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not
constitute an undue burden.
Even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable. That is to be expected
in the application of any legal standard which must accommodate life's complexity. We do not expect it
to be otherwise with respect to the undue burden standard. We give this summary:
(a) To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the same time accommodating the
State's profound interest in potential life, we will employ the undue burden analysis as explained in this
opinion. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
(b) We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State's profound interest in
potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an
undue burden on the right.
(c) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a
woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.
(d) Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central holding of Roe v. Wade, and
we reaffirm that holding. Regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.
We also reaffirm Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
These principles control our assessment of the Pennsylvania statute, and we now turn to the issue of the
validity of its challenged provisions. ...
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future
generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution's written
terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility
not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We
invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the promise
of liberty....
It is so ordered.

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• 1506096035-Harris Planned Parenthood.docx