(402 dustin) How foreign should be reshape to todays warfare and world issues  

 

the question is in reference of the statement bellow

This issue is a perfect example of the flawed nature of the multilateral way of conducting and managing foreign affairs.  While much of the current international system that was established after World War II sounded good in theory, in practice it is a deeply problematic way of solving international crises that depends on the more powerful nation-states to cooperate with the various intergovernmental organizations and each other.

In answering why nation-states are often not held accountable for trans-border aggression, one can look at other issues of international security, which are related to a certain degree.  Today, we see a lot about the possibility of "killer robots" being a future component of warfare.  First off, as a former uniformed member of the U.S. Armed Forces and someone who follows and studies military affairs past, present, and future, much of what you always see in many publications about the "future of warfare" is nothing more than a lot of hype about an experimental technology, weapon prototype, or some other concept that a defense contractor is pushing so that it can get more funding from legislators.  At least half of the so-called weapons of the future will never be fielded for one reason or another, and those that do sometimes are not the "silver bullets" that were promised.  Nevertheless, the issue of autonomous systems are what many in the intergovernmental communities are wanting to bring to the forefront. (Marchant, etc.)  

This issue has a precedent; the effort in the 1950's to bring nuclear weapons and technology under international control. (www.eisenhower.archives.gov)  Even though Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech was widely lauded, it was doomed to be a footnote to his time in office.  The reasoning is the same for why it will be next to impossible to regulate any advances in military robotics and why it is difficult in its own right to collectively punish states in failing, whether by accident or by design, to prevent trans-border attacks; individual states have to cooperate with each other and through the international system to issue such punishments.  For them to do this, they have to believe it is in their own national interests to do so.