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| Teaching Since: | Apr 2017 |
| Last Sign in: | 327 Weeks Ago, 4 Days Ago |
| Questions Answered: | 12843 |
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MBA, Ph.D in Management
Harvard university
Feb-1997 - Aug-2003
Professor
Strayer University
Jan-2007 - Present
1.   Suppose a gym faces inverse demand p(qi) = a−bqi from each of N identical customers, and costs represented by C(Q) = cQ. Without competition, this would imply that , and.
The is one contract the gym offers.
1.There is another contract available, though, where the client agrees to give the gym a sum of money, F, out of which the gym would then pay clients f dollars for each workout. What does this second option look like? (That is, what are the optimal F and f?)
2.   How does the optimal two-part tariff change when $t per-unit tax is introduced? (Assume that inverse demand is p(q) = a−bq, and costs are represented by C(q) = cq.)
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