SophiaPretty

(5)

$14/per page/Negotiable

About SophiaPretty

Levels Tought:
Elementary,Middle School,High School,College,University,PHD

Expertise:
Accounting,Algebra See all
Accounting,Algebra,Applied Sciences,Architecture and Design,Art & Design,Biology,Business & Finance,Calculus,Chemistry,Communications,Computer Science,Economics,Engineering,English,Environmental science,Essay writing Hide all
Teaching Since: Jul 2017
Last Sign in: 304 Weeks Ago, 6 Days Ago
Questions Answered: 15833
Tutorials Posted: 15827

Education

  • MBA,PHD, Juris Doctor
    Strayer,Devery,Harvard University
    Mar-1995 - Mar-2002

Experience

  • Manager Planning
    WalMart
    Mar-2001 - Feb-2009

Category > Business & Finance Posted 05 Sep 2017 My Price 4.00

Billie has a car for sale,

Billie has a car for sale, of quality θ ∈ [0, 1]. Louis can make an offer p ∈ [0, 1] but only

Billie knows the quality of the car. The distribution of θ is uniform, and this is common

knowledge. The value of the car to Billie is θ, while the value of the car to Louis is 1.5θ

(thus for any θ, there is the possibility of efficient trade). Show that Louis offering p = 0

and Billie accepting any p ≥ θ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. What does this imply about

efficient trade?

Answers

(5)
Status NEW Posted 05 Sep 2017 05:09 AM My Price 4.00

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