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Elementary,Middle School,High School,College,University,PHD
| Teaching Since: | Jul 2017 |
| Last Sign in: | 304 Weeks Ago, 6 Days Ago |
| Questions Answered: | 15833 |
| Tutorials Posted: | 15827 |
MBA,PHD, Juris Doctor
Strayer,Devery,Harvard University
Mar-1995 - Mar-2002
Manager Planning
WalMart
Mar-2001 - Feb-2009
Billie has a car for sale, of quality θ ∈ [0, 1]. Louis can make an offer p ∈ [0, 1] but only
Billie knows the quality of the car. The distribution of θ is uniform, and this is common
knowledge. The value of the car to Billie is θ, while the value of the car to Louis is 1.5θ
(thus for any θ, there is the possibility of efficient trade). Show that Louis offering p = 0
and Billie accepting any p ≥ θ is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. What does this imply about
efficient trade?
Hel-----------lo -----------Sir-----------/Ma-----------dam----------- T-----------han-----------k Y-----------ou -----------for----------- us-----------ing----------- ou-----------r w-----------ebs-----------ite----------- an-----------d a-----------cqu-----------isi-----------tio-----------n o-----------f m-----------y p-----------ost-----------ed -----------sol-----------uti-----------on.----------- Pl-----------eas-----------e p-----------ing----------- me----------- on----------- ch-----------at -----------I a-----------m o-----------nli-----------ne -----------or -----------inb-----------ox -----------me -----------a m-----------ess-----------age----------- I -----------wil-----------l