Jones v. National American University

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Kathy Jones had been an employee at National American University (NAU) since 1998, when she was hired as a part-time corporate liaison at the university’s Rapid City, South Dakota, campus. Later that year, Jones became a fulltime admissions representative. In 2004, the director of admissions position at the Rapid City campus became available. Jones, then age 56, applied for the position. NAU formed a four-person committee to make the hiring decision. Individuals who had recently been denied a position as vice president of admissions for the university’s online program were notified of the opening.

After receiving initial applications, the applicant pool was narrowed to six of the prior vice-president candidates and Jones. After phone interviews, the pool was narrowed to two of the former applicants and Jones. Each candidate attended an in-person interview. The position was offered to both of the prior vice-president candidates, both of whom rejected it. Jones was never offered the position, but was asked to serve as interim director until a candidate could be found. As part of her interim director duties, Jones helped to interview candidates for admissions positions. Following the interview of a 50-year old candidate, one of the members of the hiring committee said, “I’m not sure we want a grandpa working with our high school students.” Jones never reported this comment. The open directorial position was eventually offered to a 34-year old candidate for an admissions representative position. Jones resigned and filed discrimination charges with the EEOC.

After trial, the jury found that NAU had discriminated against Jones and that its conduct had been willful. The district court denied NAU’s motion for judgment as matter of law and its motion for a new trial. Judgment was entered for $35,130 in damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. NAU appealed.

Judge Murphy

NAU does not contest that Jones satisfied her burden of presenting a prima facie claim of age discrimination. Instead the university asserts that after it rebutted Jones’ prima facie case by providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to promote—specifically Jones’ lack of management experience—she failed to establish that NAU’s proffered reason was pretext.

An employee can prove that her employer’s articulated justification for an adverse employment action is pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Pretext may be shown with evidence that “the employer’s reason for the [adverse employment decision] has changed substantially over time.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, we conclude that she presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that NAU’s proffered reason for the failure to promote was a pretext for age discrimination. Jones presented evidence that between the time of its EEOC charge response and the trial, NAU shifted its reasons for failure to promote her to the director position. NAU’s response to the EEOC charge provided that throughout her employment, “Ms. Jones struggled with her performance. She consistently received moderate to low scores on her semiannual reviews. . . . She has consistently mediocre performance.” By contrast, at trial NAU asserted that its primary reason for not promoting Jones was her lack of managerial and marketing experience. The university did not present evidence at trial that Jones was deficient in her performance.

Jones also presented evidence to dispute each of NAU’s proffered reasons for their failure to promote her to the director position. She established that she was the only candidate considered who had the three years recruiting experience listed as required in one job posting, and preferred in the other. She also presented evidence that Beck lacked the extensive management experience that the hiring committee asserted had been their primary qualification. She presented evidence that she had received consistently positive reviews and performance awards, and that she had a good relationship with her colleagues. Finally, Jones testified about the two age-related comments made by Buckles: (1) that he wasn’t sure he wanted a “grandpa” working with the college kids, and (2) that Beck was a better long-term choice for the director position while Jones would have been the better short-term choice.

Given the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, Jones presented sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to determine that NAU’s proffered reasons for the failure to promote were pretext for intentional age discrimination.

NAU alternatively argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under what it terms “the honest belief doctrine.” See Scroggins v. Univ. of Minn., 221 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir.2000); McNary v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 535 F.3d 765, 769-70 (8th Cir.2008). Relying on Scroggins and McNary, NAU asserts that “what ultimately matters is whether NAU’s hiring committee established its honest belief in the nondiscriminatory facts that led to its decision.” NAU’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In both Scroggins and McNary, the employer prevailed in a discrimination claim because the employee plaintiff failed to present any evidence to contradict the employer’s asserted reason for the adverse employment decision. Thus, the employee failed to present evidence showing that the employer’s proffered reason was mere pretext for discrimination. See Scroggins, 221 F.3d at 1045 (concluding that the employee had presented “no evidence suggesting anything other than the [employer’s] honest belief”); McNary, 535 F.3d at 770 (same). By contrast, Jones has presented evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that NAU’s alleged “honest belief” was pretext. The district court properly denied judgment as a matter of law to the university

CRITICAL THINKING ABOUT THE LAW

So much about legal reasoning depends on taking a close look at analogies. No set of facts is ever exactly like another. When citing precedents, however, each party hopes that the facts in certain cases are similar enough in significant ways to cause the courts to select their cited cases as the more relevant ones in each case

The questions here focus on the quality of the precedent cited by the defendant in Case 22-3.

1. What about and led to their being cited as authority by the defendant?

Clue: Who won in and and why?

2. What caused Judge Murphy to reject the analogy of and as binding in Case 22-3?

Clue: Check her discussion of and to find how she distinguished and from the case.