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MCS,PHD
Argosy University/ Phoniex University/
Nov-2005 - Oct-2011
Professor
Phoniex University
Oct-2001 - Nov-2016
Tess and Meg are the only two bidders in an auction for a van Gogh painting. Each can be one of two types with equal probability: a low-value consumer with valuation $1 million or a high-value consumer with valuation $2 million. Each knows her own type but only knows the probabilities of the other’s type. a. Suppose they compete in a sealed-bid, secondprice auction. What are the equilibrium bidding strategies? Compute the seller’s expected revenue. b. Repeat part a supposing there are three identical bidders. What if there are N bidders? c. Explain how your answer from parts a and b can be used to compute the seller’s expected revenue from a first-price, sealed-bid auction.
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